NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

OPINION

CLAYTON, Judge.

Amos Stiltner, pro se, appeals from the June 22, 2011 order of the Franklin Circuit Court, which denied his petition for writ of mandamus and motion for default judgment. He also appeals the July 8, 2011 order of the trial court that denied his Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure (CR) 59.05 motion to reconsider and his CR 52.01, CR 52.02, and CR 52.04 motion for findings of facts and conclusions of law. After careful consideration, we affirm.

Stiltner is a prisoner currently incarcerated at the Eastern Kentucky Correctional Complex where he is serving a fifty-year prison sentence based on a felony conviction from Montgomery County. In the record, he never identifies the basis for his felony conviction. On November 22, 2010, Stiltner had a parole hearing and was denied parole. He received a letter from the Parole Board on December 10, 2010, that notified him of the denial. The denial of probation was based on the seriousness of Stiltner's crimes and his previous felony convictions.

Thereafter, Stiltner filed a petition labeled as a "writ of mandamus" in Franklin Circuit Court. In it, he asked the trial court to grant him parole because the minimum term of his sentence had been served and he had complied with all sentencing requirements. Or, in the alternative, Stiltner requested that he be granted a hearing before the trial court in order to be given an opportunity to appeal statutory and constitutional issues concerning the probation and parole statutes. Stiltner claimed in the petition that he was entitled to parole as a matter of right under the former "Indeterminate Sentence Act."1 Interestingly, the jurisdictional statement of the petition does not refer to Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) 439.250 — 439.560, which address probation and parole, but rather implicates KRS Chapter 418, the declaratory judgment act. Moreover, the petition does not allege any incidents of noncompliance with the probation and parole statutes.

Additionally, regarding the petition, the Parole Board was not named as a respondent nor was Commissioner LaDonna Thompson served properly under CR 4.01 or 4.04(2). Ultimately, on June 29, 2011, Commissioner Thompson filed a "notice of appearance and waiver of service of summons." In fact, Stiltner filed a motion for default judgment, which was denied by the June 22, 2011 order. In the order denying the petition for the writ of mandamus and the motion for a default judgment, the trial court observes that Stiltner's contentions rest upon an improper assertion that he is entitled to parole as a matter of right.

Next, Stiltner filed a motion for reconsideration of the order, which was dismissed on July 8, 2011. In the denial of the motion for reconsideration, the trial court states that Stiltner inaccurately suggests that the Parole Board's denial of his probation was capricious, arbitrary, an abuse of discretion, and not in compliance with the statutes. Citing Belcher v. Kentucky Parole Bd., 917 S.W.2d 584, 587 (Ky. App. 1996), the trial court notes that Kentucky law has not elevated parole to a liberty interest for which inmates have a legitimate claim of entitlement. Stiltner now appeals the trial court's orders denying his petition for a writ of mandamus, default judgment, and subsequent motion for reconsideration.

Stiltner maintains that the trial court abused its discretion when it dismissed his complaint, sua sponte. Apparently, he is referring to the petition for writ of mandamus in which he asks that the trial court mandate that the Parole Board grant him parole. He then goes on to state that because of his pro se status, the original complaint may not have been appropriately filed but it does allege four major points that the trial court should have addressed. They are: that the trial court was presented with arguments that parole statutes must have fixed standards that require parole to be granted, that the parole statutes are unconstitutional because of the lack of definite standards, that the parole statutes must be given without any mandatory service requirement and, lastly, that the parole statutes cannot be delegated by the legislative branch to the courts with discretionary power. In response, the Commissioner notes that a sua sponte dismissal is allowable when the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, permissible since Stiltner was not unduly prejudiced and, lastly, that the relief sought by Stiltner is not available.

First, we address Stiltner's claim that the trial court abused its discretion when it denied his complaint sua sponte. In doing so, he bases his claim on the holding in Gall v. Scroggy, 725 S.W.2d 867 (Ky. App. 1987). His reliance, however, is misplaced because trial courts have the inherent power to dismiss cases for which the trial court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. Storer Communications of Jefferson County, Inc. v. Oldham County Bd. of Educ., 850 S.W.2d 340, 342 (Ky. App. 1993). Further, judicial review of Parole Board decisions is limited under KRS 439.330(3). Therein it states that "[t]he orders of the board shall not be reviewable except as to compliance with the terms of KRS 439.250 to 439.560." Stiltner has not alleged a lack of compliance by the Parole Board in its decision regarding his parole.

Regardless of Stiltner's arguments, the issue here is the scope and authority of the Parole Board in rendering a decision to deny parole to a prison inmate. It is long-established in this Commonwealth that parole is not a right, but a privilege and "a matter of grace or gift to persons deemed eligible." Stewart v. Commonwealth, 153 S.W.3d 789, 793 (Ky. 2005) (citing Lynch v. Wingo, 425 S.W.2d 573 (Ky. 1968)). Besides that, in the parole review process, it has been determined that when parole is denied, the prisoner must have the opportunity to be heard and be advised in general terms of the reasons for the Board's decision. Belcher, 917 S.W.2d 584. The judicial standard of review of decisions of the Parole Board is limited to an examination of compliance with the terms of KRS 439.250 to 439.560. Stewart at 791. In the case at hand, Stiltner was advised of the reasons for the decision of the Board and had the opportunity to be heard. Thus, his due process rights have been satisfied.

Finally, even though Stiltner labels his petition a writ of mandamus, it is actually a petition for declaratory or habeas relief. Stiltner identifies KRS Chapter 418 (the Declaratory Judgment Act) and KRS 419 (Habeas Corpus) in the petition. Further, in the petition, he asks for release from prison based on the Indeterminate Sentence Act, which has been repealed. Under the current state of the law, however, the trial court does not have the authority to grant habeas relief. Moreover, under the Declaratory Judgment Act, there must be an actual controversy (KRS 418.040). This relief is also unavailable since parole is discretionary, not mandatory, under the current probation and parole statutes.

The judgment of the Franklin Circuit Court is affirmed.

ALL CONCUR.