NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
OPINION
MOORE, Judge.
Joe Ray Turner appeals the Allen Circuit Court's order denying his motion for reconsideration of the court's order denying his successive CR1 60.02 motion. After a review of the record, we affirm because Turner's victim impact evidence claim lacks merit and his remaining claims either were, or could have been, raised in prior proceedings.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
According to the circuit court's order denying Turner's most recent CR 60.02 motion, Turner "is currently serving a 99[-]year sentence for the murder of his father, Bill Turner, and has previously filed multiple appeals challenging his conviction." We cite this particular court order in regard to its discussion of Turner's conviction, sentence, and the procedural history of the case because the written record before us does not include the court's original judgment or the procedural history of the case. Rather, the written record before us begins with Turner's recent CR 60.02 motion, which is the subject of this appeal.
In that motion, Turner alleged that the Commonwealth failed to inform the victims of their right to file victim impact statements for the trial court's consideration. He also alleged that: There was insufficient evidence to support his conviction; the victim's dying declaration was inadmissible; Juror Henry Weaver, who was the uncle of a city police officer, should have been stricken for cause during voir dire; some jurors engaged in misconduct regarding Turner's guilt, based upon a conversation allegedly overheard by Turner's family member; he received the ineffective assistance of counsel; his trial counsel had a conflict of interest because counsel was also appointed to represent Kathy Scruggs, despite Turner's allegation that someone in Scruggs's "circle" was the actual murderer of Bill Turner; and the "wanton murder instruction" given at trial was in error.
The circuit court denied Turner's CR 60.02 motion, finding that his victim impact statements claim lacked merit and that his remaining claims had been raised and addressed in prior proceedings. Turner moved for reconsideration of the court's order, and the court denied the motion.
Turner now appeals, contending that: (a) the circuit court erred in denying his CR 60.02 motion concerning the victim impact statements claim; and (b) the circuit court erred in dismissing the following issues as barred by procedural default: (1) there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction; (2) the victim's dying declaration could have been effectively challenged if trial counsel had investigated information concerning it; (3) Juror Henry Weaver should have been stricken for cause during voir dire because he was the uncle of a city police officer involved in the investigation; (4) jurors engaged in misconduct when they were overheard by Turner's brother during a trial recess discussing their belief regarding Turner's guilt; (5) he received the ineffective assistance of trial counsel because counsel was inexperienced; (6) his trial counsel had a conflict of interest which prejudiced Turner because counsel also represented Kathy Scruggs; and (7) the jury instruction on wanton murder was improper because it was not supported by the evidence.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
On appeal, we review the denial of a CR 60.02 motion for an abuse of discretion. See White v. Commonwealth, 32 S.W.3d 83, 86 (Ky. App. 2000). "Civil Rule 60.02 is not intended merely as an additional opportunity to relitigate the same issues which could reasonably have been presented by direct appeal or RCr2 11.42 proceedings." McQueen v. Commonwealth, 948 S.W.2d 415, 416 (Ky. 1997) (internal quotation marks omitted). Civil Rule 60.02 "is not a separate avenue of appeal to be pursued in addition to other remedies, but is available only to raise issues which cannot be raised in other proceedings." Id.
III. ANALYSIS
As an initial matter, we note that Turner's present CR 60.02 motion is a successive motion, as implied by the circuit court in its order denying the motion, in which the court referred to the motion as a "renewed motion for relief from judgment pursuant to [CR] 60.02(f)." However, Civil Rule 60.02 does not provide for successive post-conviction motions. See Gross v. Commonwealth, 648 S.W.2d 853, 856 (Ky. 1983). Regardless, the circuit court properly denied the motion for the reasons that follow.
A. VICTIM IMPACT EVIDENCE CLAIM
Turner first contends that the circuit court erred in denying his CR 60.02 motion concerning his victim impact statements claim because the prosecutor failed to inform the victims of their rights to file victim impact statements. Kentucky Revised Statute (KRS) 421.520 concerns victim impact statements as follows:
(1) The attorney for the Commonwealth shall notify the victim that, upon conviction of the defendant, the victim has the right to submit a written victim impact statement to the probation officer responsible for preparing the presentence investigation report for inclusion in the report or to the court should such a report be waived by the defendant.
(2) The impact statement may contain, but need not be limited to, a description of the nature and extent of any physical, psychological or financial harm suffered by the victim, the victim's need for restitution and whether the victim has applied for or received compensation for financial loss, and the victim's recommendation for an appropriate sentence.
(3) The victim impact statement shall be considered by the court prior to any decision on the sentencing or release, including shock probation, of the defendant.
Thus, Turner alleges that his conviction should be set aside because the Commonwealth failed to inform the victims of their rights to file victim impact statements.
However, KRS 421.540 provides: "The failure to provide a right, notice or privilege to a victim or witness under KRS 421.510 to 421.550 or 15.245 shall not be grounds for the defendant to seek to have the conviction or sentence set aside." Therefore, the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in holding that pursuant to KRS 421.540, Turner was not entitled to have his conviction or sentence set aside due to the Commonwealth's failure to inform the victims of their right to file victim impact statements. Consequently, this claim lacks merit.
B. REMAINING CLAIMS
Turner's remaining claims, which he asserted in the circuit court, are as follows: (1) there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction; (2) the victim's dying declaration could have been effectively challenged if trial counsel had investigated information concerning it; (3) Juror Henry Weaver should have been stricken for cause during voir dire because he was the uncle of a city police officer involved in the investigation; (4) jurors engaged in misconduct when they were overheard by Turner's brother during a trial recess discussing their belief regarding Turner's guilt; (5) he received the ineffective assistance of trial counsel because counsel was inexperienced; (6) his trial counsel had a conflict of interest which prejudiced Turner because counsel also represented Kathy Scruggs; and (7) the jury instruction on wanton murder was improper because it was not supported by the evidence.
The circuit court held that all of Turner's remaining claims were previously raised and addressed on direct appeal, in his initial RCr 11.42 motion, or in his "numerous post-conviction motions and appeals since the defendant's May 22, 1998 conviction." As we previously mentioned, the written record before us contains nothing prior to Turner's most recent CR 60.02 motion.
[I]t is an appellant's responsibility to ensure that the record contains all of the materials necessary for an appellate court to rule upon all the issues raised. And we are required to assume that any portion of the record not supplied to us supports the decision of the trial court.
Clark v. Commonwealth, 223 S.W.3d 90, 102 (Ky. 2007) (internal footnotes omitted). Therefore, because the record before us does not contain Turner's direct appeal, his initial RCr 11.42 motion, or his numerous post-conviction motions and appeals, we must assume that those portions of the record support the circuit court's decision that Turner's remaining claims in this case were raised and addressed in those prior proceedings. Furthermore, in his opening appellate brief, Turner acknowledges that the circuit court's finding was correct when he states that he "does not deny that he has tried to litigate the issues raised in his current CR 60.02(f) motion, other than the victim impact evidence issue, in prior court proceedings."
We note that in Gross, the Kentucky Supreme Court held:
The structure provided in Kentucky for attacking the final judgment of a trial court in a criminal case is not haphazard and overlapping, but is organized and complete. That structure is set out in the rules related to direct appeals, in RCr 11.42, and thereafter in CR 60.02. CR 60.02 is . . . for relief that is not available by direct appeal and not available under RCr 11.42. The movant must demonstrate why he is entitled to this special, extraordinary relief. Before the movant is entitled to an evidentiary hearing, he must affirmatively allege facts which, if true, justify vacating the judgment and further allege special circumstances that justify CR 60.02 relief.
Through our own research, we have found numerous actions filed by Turner in which he challenges the judgment against him. Consequently, we deem the present appeal as fitting the symptoms of the ills that Gross was intended to cure. We note that as far back as 2008, our Court stated the following regarding Turner's various actions challenging his conviction and sentence:
The Commonwealth has charged that Turner is engaging in groundless litigation and calls upon this Court to admonish him. Although pro se litigants are not held to the same procedural standards as litigants represented by counsel, "a court does not look with favor upon litigation unprofitable to the suitors and wasteful of the court's time."
Turner v. Commonwealth, No. 2004-CA-000261-MR, 2004 WL 2563668, *1, *3 (Ky. App. Nov. 12, 2004) (unpublished) (quoting Citizens Tel. Co. v. Anderson, 269 S.W.2d 283, 284 (Ky. 1954)) (footnote omitted). Therefore, because the "remaining claims" that Turner asserted in the CR 60.02 motion at issue in this appeal were previously raised and addressed, they are not properly before us in this CR 60.02 proceeding, and we will not consider them.
Accordingly, the order of the Allen Circuit Court is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
