MOORE, JUDGE.
The Brush Mountain Farms Home Owners Association, Inc. ("the HOA"), moved the Bell Circuit Court to hold appellee, Brush Mountain Farms Property Owners Association, Inc. ("the POA") in contempt of court. The Bell Circuit Court entered an order overruling its motion. The HOA then moved for the circuit court to make additional findings of fact in support of the aforementioned order. The circuit court denied the HOA's latter motion. The sole issue on appeal is whether the circuit court erred when it refused to make the findings of fact requested by the HOA. Finding no error, we affirm.
The factual and procedural history of this case and the arguments presented by the parties to this appeal are largely detailed over the course of three circuit court orders and four motions of record, beginning with an unappealed order that the circuit court entered on February 24, 2011. It provides in relevant part:
On March 22, 2012, Diversified and HOA moved the circuit court to hold POA in contempt of the February 24, 2011 order. In relevant part, their joint motion stated:
In his affidavit, which is referenced by and attached to this motion, Carroll avers that he was the HOA's designee pursuant to paragraph 8 of the circuit court's February 24, 2011 order and that the POA's designee, Jesse Burchett, had essentially excluded him from participating in the process of nominating and electing new association officers.
In response to the HOA's motion for contempt, the POA acknowledged that the circuit court's February 24, 2011 order had directed the POA and HOA to respectively designate two individuals to contact all association members and arrange for the nomination and election of new association officers. Furthermore, the POA acknowledged that its designee, Jesse Burchett, had arranged for the nomination and election of new association officers without the assistance of the HOA's designee, Alex Carroll. However, the POA asserted that the HOA's failure to participate in the process was not the result of the POA's willful noncompliance with the circuit court's order, but rather Alex Carroll's refusal to cooperate. To this effect, the POA's response stated:
On April 23, 2012, the circuit court conducted a hearing with regard to the HOA's motion for contempt, and the HOA emphasized that the basis of its motion was its assertion that the POA, through Burchett, had excluded Carroll from the nomination and election process. After considering the HOA's argument and the POA's response to it, the parties submitted this matter for a ruling based upon the HOA's motion, the POA's response, and the accompanying exhibits. The circuit court then resolved this matter through a May 3, 2012 order. Its order states:
Thereafter, HOA moved the circuit court pursuant to Kentucky Rule(s) of Civil Procedure (CR) 59.05 to alter, amend, or vacate its May 3, 2012 order. In relevant part, its motion stated:
In response, POA contended that it was unnecessary for the circuit court to make the additional findings of fact called for in HOA's motion. POA argued that the only issue raised in the HOA's and Diversified's prior March 22, 2012 contempt motion was whether Alex Carroll's failure to participate in the election and nomination process provided grounds for holding the POA in contempt. The POA argued the record contained substantial evidence supporting that, in spite of Carroll's failure to participate, the POA had not willfully disobeyed the circuit court's order because it had attempted to include Carroll in the process, Carroll had received notice of it, but Carroll had refused to participate. Furthermore, the POA argued that it would be improper for the circuit court to consider whether the bylaws had been followed in the nomination and election process—inasmuch as the HOA was asserting it as a ground for either holding the POA in contempt or setting aside the election that had taken place—because the HOA had never raised it as a basis for holding POA in contempt in its March 22, 2012 motion or prior to the circuit court's May 3, 2012 order.
On August 8, 2012, the circuit court overruled the HOA's motion, and HOA filed this appeal.
On appeal, the HOA does not argue that any of the circuit court's orders in this matter are either unsupported by substantial evidence of record or manifestly against the weight of the evidence. Instead, the HOA's sole argument is that the circuit court abused its discretion because it failed to make findings of fact in its May 3, 2012 order denying the HOA's motion for contempt. In its brief, the HOA argues that such findings of facts should have detailed "how the property owners had substantially complied with the February 24, 2011 Order or which facts the trial court considered in reaching its judgment." The HOA argues that those findings should have addressed the following points: 1) why a contempt sanction against the POA was not warranted for the POA's failure to include Carroll in the nomination and election process; and 2) whether the bylaws had been followed during the nomination and election process. The HOA further argues that findings regarding the latter point would, in turn, require additional findings with respect to the identities of the eligible voters, who was present at the meeting, where the meeting was held, when the meeting was held, and who voted in the meeting or otherwise.
The POA, on the other hand, argues that the circuit court had no obligation to make any such findings. In support, the POA turns to the language of CR 52.01, which makes no reference to any requirement that a circuit court make findings of fact in response to a contempt motion. The POA argues that even if findings of fact would have been appropriate, the only ground for contempt that HOA had submitted to the circuit court was the POA's failure to include Carroll in the nomination and election process. The circuit court was therefore justified in making no findings relating to any other issue. Furthermore, the POA argues that a finding of fact is unnecessary where the record otherwise clearly demonstrates the basis of the circuit court's judgment. The POA argues that no findings were warranted because the record clearly demonstrates why the circuit court rejected the HOA's motion for contempt.
Even if findings of fact were warranted in an order either granting or denying contempt sanctions, there are situations where findings of fact are not mandated. This case presents two of those situations, both of which are touched upon in the POA's arguments in support of the circuit court's judgment.
First, it is unnecessary for the circuit court to make findings of fact regarding legal issues or arguments raised for the first time in a CR 59.05 motion if those issues and arguments could have been raised prior to the entry of judgment. Hopkins v. Ratliff, 957 S.W.2d 300, 301 (Ky. App. 1997). There is no argument within the HOA's original contempt motion regarding whether the bylaws had been followed during the nomination and election process, or with respect to the following: the identity of the eligible voters, who was present at the meeting, where the meeting was held, when the meeting was held, or who voted in the meeting or otherwise. Instead, the HOA's requests for these findings appeared exclusively in its CR 59.05 motion. The HOA certainly could have raised such arguments in its original motion for contempt. Having failed to specifically do so, the HOA failed to preserve any issue or opportunity for additional fact-finding regarding these issues.
Second, "[i]n cases where the record is so clear that the court does not need the aid of findings it may waive such a defect on the ground that the error is not substantial in the particular case." Clark Mechanical Contractors, Inc. v. KST Equipment Co., 514 S.W.2d 680, 682 (Ky. 1974); see also Perry v. McLemore, 414 S.W.2d 141, 142 (Ky. 1967).
Here, the only issue that the HOA properly raised in this matter was whether the POA was in contempt of the circuit court's February 24, 2011 order for failing to include Carroll in the nomination and election process. No court order or party to this matter has specified the nature of the contempt at issue herein, but the relief HOA requested in its motion was coercive (i.e., "for the newly elected members [to] be discharged and the parties be ordered to abide by the court's order"). Therefore, we assume that HOA sought to have POA found in civil contempt. See, e.g., Commonwealth, Cabinet for Health and Family Services v. Ivy, 353 S.W.3d 324, 332 (Ky. 2011) ("Since this proceeding was meant to coerce Ivy's compliance with her child-support obligation and not to punish her, it was civil in nature.").
Id.
It is undisputed that the POA violated the circuit court's February 24, 2011 order when it nominated and elected the new Association officers. The POA's only argument in response, despite phrasing it as one of "substantial compliance," was that it was either unable to comply with the court's order or justified in not complying with it because the HOA's delegate, Alex Carroll, refused to cooperate. The evidence on either side of this issue consisted only of a few e-mails, documents and affidavits. In support, the POA offered evidence showing that it had made sustained efforts to include Carroll in the process; that its inability to elect new Association officials had caused many if not all of the problems recited in the circuit court's February 24, 2011 order to persist; and, that the POA had waited for almost a year before unilaterally initiating the nomination and election process. Consequently, the only questions that remained for the circuit court to adjudicate were: 1) Was the evidence presented by POA sufficient to dissolve the presumption of contempt and demonstrate that POA made reasonable efforts to comply with the circuit court's order? And, if so, 2) Did HOA carry its burden to persuade the circuit court, based upon the totality of the evidence, that POA should nevertheless be held in contempt?
When interpreting a judgment, "effect must be given to that which is unavoidably and necessarily implied in a judgment, as well as that which is expressed in the most appropriate language." Furlow v. Sturgeon, 436 S.W.2d 485, 486 (Ky. 1969) (citation omitted). The circuit court's denial of HOA's contempt motion unavoidably and necessarily implied that the circuit court found the evidence produced by POA sufficient to dissolve any presumption of contempt and that HOA's evidence had failed to persuade it to find POA in contempt. Stated differently, the record in this matter is clear and "this court finds no great necessity for findings of fact since there is not presented such a difficulty or inconvenience as would prevent the court from waiving the requirement." Clark Mechanical, 514 S.W.2d at 682 (internal citation omitted).
Having concluded that the circuit court was not obligated to conduct any additional fact-finding in relation to HOA's motion for contempt, we end our analysis. HOA has put forth no other arguments for our review. We therefore affirm.
ALL CONCUR.
Here, HOA's contempt motion only gave the circuit court one specific ground for holding POA in contempt (i.e., the matter of Carroll's exclusion). HOA's motion did not fairly apprise the trial judge or opposing counsel that its position also encompassed any other issues. Therefore, the circuit court was not required to make findings of fact or rule upon any other issues. Accordingly, the circuit court committed no error or abuse when it made no findings of fact regarding any additional matters.
