STUMBO, Judge.
Rancie Hannah appeals from a judgment and decree of dissolution of marriage. He claims that the trial court erred in making Angela Hannah the primary custodian of the parties' minor children, that the trial court erred in the distribution of the marital estate, that the trial court erred in the award of child support, that the trial court erred in the award of maintenance, that the trial court erred in the allocation of a marital bank account, and that the trial court erred in requiring Mr. Hannah to be responsible for the debt on two credit cards. We find that the trial court erred in some respects in its judgment; therefore, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings.
The parties were married on September 28, 1991, and separated on or about April 27, 2009. At the time of the filing of the petition for dissolution of marriage, the parties were both 33 years old. There were four children born of the marriage, but only two were still minors at the time of the dissolution. Mr. Hannah was employed as a doctor and Ms. Hannah was a homemaker.
A final hearing was held in this case on January 30 and 31, 2012. A number of issues had been resolved prior to the hearing. Ultimately, the trial court awarded the parties joint custody of the minor children, with Ms. Hannah being named the primary residential parent. Mr. Hannah received timesharing according to the Greenup Circuit Guidelines, but was also given one additional weekend per month. The court also ordered Mr. Hannah to pay $4,192 per month in child support and $4,000 per month in maintenance for a period of five years. In addition, the court ordered that the marital residence be sold, with Mr. Hannah continuing to pay the mortgage, taxes, and insurance. Ms. Hannah and the children were allowed to remain in the home until it was sold. The court awarded Ms. Hannah $26,900 as her marital interest in Mr. Hannah's medical practice. The court also ordered Mr. Hannah to pay off the debts on two credit cards. Finally, the trial court found that at the time of separation, Mr. Hannah had around $39,000 in a bank account that only he had access to. The court awarded Ms. Hannah $19,834.70 as her marital interest in the account. This appeal followed.
Mr. Hannah's first argument on appeal is that the trial court abused its discretion in making Ms. Hannah the primary residential parent of the minor children. Mr. Hannah argues the court should have awarded the parties equal timesharing.
Miller v. Harris, 320 S.W.3d 138, 141 (Ky. App. 2010).
The factors the trial court considers when awarding custody can be found in KRS 403.270(2). KRS 403.270(2) states:
In the case at hand, Mr. Hannah does not argue the court erred in awarding joint custody. His claim is that he and Ms. Hannah should have been given equal parenting time. We find no error.
For our purposes, only KRS 403.270(2)(a) through (d) applies. There was no evidence presented at the hearing that relates to the other factors. As to 403.270(2)(a), the trial court found that Ms. Hannah wanted primary custody with Mr. Hannah receiving the timesharing allowed by the Greenup Circuit Guidelines, and Mr. Hannah wanted equal parenting time. As to 403.270(2)(b), the court found that the children liked having Ms. Hannah as the primary residential parent and Mr. Hannah having visitation.
Mr. Hannah's next argument on appeal is that the trial court erred in the distribution of the marital estate. Mr. Hannah claims that when the marital residence is sold, it will most likely be sold at a loss. The evidence presented established that as of July of 2010, the parties owned two parcels of land that made up the marital residence: the actual marital home and a smaller parcel used as rental property. The combined appraisal value of the two parcels was $326,000 and as of July, 2010, the combined mortgage of the properties was $366,495. This means that the property was about $40,000 underwater. Mr. Hannah argues that the court erred in awarding Ms. Hannah half the value of his medical practice, but not also making her share the burden of any debt that may be realized once the marital residence is sold.
KRS 403.190(1) states that the trial court will divide the marital property in "just proportions", which does not mean equally. Stipp v. St. Charles, 291 S.W.3d 720, 726 (Ky. App. 2009). The division of marital assets is within the broad discretion of the trial court. Id. We agree in part with Mr. Hannah on this issue. The trial court did not err in awarding Ms. Hannah half of the value of Mr. Hannah's practice. The trial court used the calculations presented by Mr. Hannah's expert and Mr. Hannah does not find fault with the trial court's decision as to that division. Where he does find fault, however, is that the trial court did not state what was to be done with any debt that may come from the selling of the marital residence. He assumes that he will be required to pay off any remaining debt on the residence; however, there is no guarantee the mortgage will still be underwater when the property is sold. Any anticipated debt is too speculative at this point. We are not reversing the award of $26,900 to Ms. Hannah as her marital interest in Mr. Hannah's practice, but the trial court will have to revisit the issue of any remaining mortgage debt at the time the residence is sold.
Mr. Hannah also claims on appeal that the trial court erred in the award of child support. We agree and find that reversal is necessary. In this case, the adjusted parental gross income exceeded the child support guideline table. When that happens, KRS 403.212(5) applies and the trial court sets child support using its discretion. "As are most other aspects of domestic relations law, the establishment, modification, and enforcement of child support are prescribed in their general contours by statute and are largely left, within the statutory parameters, to the sound discretion of the trial court. This discretion is far from unlimited." Van Meter v. Smith, 14 S.W.3d 569, 572 (Ky. App. 2000)(citations omitted).
Here, the trial court awarded $4,192 per month in child support. The trial court did not make any findings supporting that figure. The court only attached a child support calculation worksheet which set forth that amount. We believe that the case of Downing v. Downing, 45 S.W.3d 449 (Ky. App. 2001), is directly on point. In that case, the adjusted parental gross income exceeded the uppermost level of the child support guideline table. A previous panel of this Court stated:
Id. at 454 (citations and footnotes omitted).
In Downing, the Domestic Relations Commissioner and trial court projected what the child support guidelines table would indicate would be a reasonable amount of child support for parents whose income exceeded the uppermost levels. It then used this mathematical extrapolation to set a child support amount. The previous panel of this Court stated:
Id. at 455-456. The Court rejected the method of awarding child support based on a mathematical calculation without supporting said amount by making specific findings as to how that amount will meet the reasonable needs of the children. In the case sub judice, the trial court used a mathematical calculation to award child support, but made no findings to support its determination. We therefore reverse and remand on this issue.
Next, Mr. Hannah argues that the trial court erred in the award of maintenance. Specifically, Mr. Hannah claims that the trial court did not make specific findings regarding the award of maintenance and that the court did not take into account that Ms. Hannah is employable. He also takes issue with the court awarding maintenance for a period of five years. We find no error.
KRS 403.200 states:
The trial court must find that the spouse seeking maintenance meets the factors listed in both KRS 403.200(1) and (2). As to KRS 403.200(1), the trial court found that Ms. Hannah would not be awarded enough financial resources to support herself and was not currently employed outside the home, nor employed during the pendency of the action. Further, the court found that Ms. Hannah was a homemaker during the marriage with only a high school education and less than one year of college credit. As to KRS 403.200(2), the court found that Ms. Hannah would not be awarded enough financial resources as a result of the division of the marital estate to support herself, that Ms. Hannah is a candidate for additional education and training to enhance her employment
As to the duration of the maintenance, Mr. Hannah argues that five years is too long. Ms. Hannah claimed she needed five years to complete nursing school, but Mr. Hannah argues she should have begun her education at the time of separation. Had she done so, she would have already had three years of education. Mr. Hannah requests a shorter duration in maintenance.
The award of maintenance is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Brosnan v. Brosnan, 359 S.W.3d 480, 485 (Ky. App. 2012). The trial court's findings stated that it considered all the required factors in awarding Ms. Hannah maintenance. It further stated that she was a good candidate for further education in order to become employable in the nursing field. As for awarding Ms. Hannah maintenance for five years, Ms. Hannah was specifically asked during the final hearing why she did not begin school earlier. Her response was that she was unable to afford it and that was one reason she was seeking maintenance. This is a reasonable answer and justifies the five year duration for maintenance. There was no abuse of discretion.
Mr. Hannah also argues on appeal that the trial court erred in the allocation of a bank account. At the time of separation, the bank account contained $39,669.34. Mr. Hannah claims it was an account used to pay the parties' tax obligations, that the money in the account was not wasted, and that it was an abuse of discretion to award Ms. Hannah half the amount at time of separation instead of half the amount at the time of divorce. We find no error.
As with all issues pertaining to the division of marital property, we review looking for an abuse of discretion. This was clearly a marital asset. Only Mr. Hannah had access to this account during the marriage and the money in the account was from Mr. Hannah's income. Mr. Hannah testified that after he moved out of the marital home, he used the account as his primary checking account. He used the funds for his own living expenses. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding Ms. Hannah half the funds in the account at the time of separation.
Mr. Hannah's final argument on appeal is that the trial court erred in requiring Mr. Hannah to pay off two credit card debts. Mr. Hannah was required to pay off a J.C. Penny credit card with a balance of $900 and a Sears Card with a balance of $2,700.
Neidlinger v. Neidlinger, 52 S.W.3d 513, 523 (Ky. 2001)(citations omitted). Here, Ms. Hannah testified that the balance on the J.C. Penny card was due to her buying bedroom furniture for the children. She also testified that the balance on the Sears card was primarily for medical expenses, medical expenses that Mr. Hannah had been ordered to pay by a previous order of the trial court. These debts were marital debts. The trial court specifically took into consideration the income disparity between the parties when assigning the debts solely to Mr. Hannah. This was not an abuse of discretion.
Based on the foregoing, we reverse in part, affirm in part, and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
ALL CONCUR.