NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

OPINION

NICKELL, Judge.

Mark Bratcher, pro se, appeals from the Morgan Circuit Court's dismissal of a petition for declaration of rights challenging two prisoner disciplinary actions and adjustment proceedings at Eastern Kentucky Correctional Complex (EKCC). Upon review of the record, the briefs and the law, we affirm.

Bratcher is a prisoner housed at EKCC. In his role as a teacher's aide, he was assigned a state computer.

After being written up for suspicion of improper use of a computer on April 4, 2013, an investigation revealed Bratcher had used the state computer to type unauthorized personal correspondence, religious work(s) and other items. When questioned, he admitted creating several documents for personal use, but claimed he had used his own paper, undertook the projects for the benefit of others, and was unaware he was prohibited from using the state computer in this manner. Bratcher was dismissed as a teacher's aide, and, at the conclusion of the investigation, was charged with possessing or promoting dangerous contraband.

While the first write-up was pending, a second write-up was issued on April 5, 2013, resulting from a probe that began on April 2, 2013, when Father Todd Boyce, EKCC Chaplain, became aware of a letter from Southeast Christian Church in Louisville, Kentucky, addressed to "Rev. Jim Estes, Chaplain," offering to provide requested books, journals and curriculum for use at EKCC. Rev. Estes volunteers at EKCC, but had made no such request and had not asked that such a request be made on his behalf.

By letter bearing his signature and dated March 8, 2013, Bratcher contacted Kyle Idleman, an author and teaching pastor at Southeast Christian Church, stating:

Based on Bratcher's own words—indicating he was circumventing EKCC rules to gain materials for himself and other inmates—and Bratcher's subsequent admission he wrote and sent the letter, Bratcher was charged with using mail to obtain money, goods, and services by fraud. Bratcher maintained he sent the letter only to procure materials for classes that were already underway.

On April 5, 2013, Bratcher was banned from all volunteer-led Chapel services, although he was still permitted to attend services led by EKCC staff and other inmates. According to the memo from Father Boyce to Bratcher announcing the ban, the step was "necessitated by [Bratcher's] demonstrated pattern of behavior in Volunteer-led Chapel services at EKCC and [his] demonstrated pattern of behavior toward/with Chapel Volunteers at EKCC, LSCC, and KSR."1

Following a prison disciplinary hearing on the first write-up on April 9, 2013, a hearing officer found Bratcher guilty of an amended charge of obtaining money, goods, privileges or services with false pretenses, based on his use of a "state computer for illegal services for your personal use." Bratcher was given 45 days in disciplinary segregation, suspended for 120 days. The reason given for the penalty was "[t]o control inmate actions and behavior and enforce institutional rules."

Bratcher appealed to the warden,2 Gary Beckstrom, claiming the adjustment officer had violated his due process rights by finding him guilty of an offense unsupported by the proof. He argued the only charge supported by the evidence was "improper or unauthorized use of or possession of state equipment or materials." He denied attempting to obtain or obtaining money, goods, privileges or services under false pretenses, and argued the disciplinary report failed to specify what he had illegally obtained as required by CPP3 15.6, page 4, § (C)(1)(a).

The second write-up was heard on April 11, 2013, with Bratcher being found guilty of writing the letter to the church requesting items for himself and other inmates—ostensibly at the behest of Rev. Estes. As a result, Bratcher was assigned to disciplinary segregation for sixty days, suspended for 180 days. Again, the stated reason for the penalty was "[t]o control inmate actions and behavior and enforce institutional rules." Bratcher appealed claiming due process violations during the investigation and the adjustment hearing. His main allegation was double jeopardy because the single letter to the church figured prominently in both write-ups.

Bratcher petitioned the Morgan Circuit Court for a declaration of rights challenging both prison disciplinary proceedings and arguing violations of due process, CPP 23.1, the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA).4 Appellees— Commissioner LaDonna Thompson, Warden Beckstrom, Adjustment Officer Daphne Bentley and Chaplain Boyce—moved to dismiss the petition; that motion was granted without explanation. Bratcher now appeals to this Court.

ANALYSIS

For both write-ups and subsequent findings of guilt, Bratcher was assigned to disciplinary segregation. To prevail on a due process claim regarding administrative segregation, Bratcher had to prove his punishment was an "atypical and significant hardship on [him] in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life." Marksberry v. Chandler, 126 S.W.3d 747, 750-51 (Ky. App. 2004). There being no proof disciplinary segregation is "atypical" or "significant," we affirm dismissal of the petition.

Additionally, inmates do not enjoy the same rights as those who are not incarcerated; they enjoy only minimal due process rights. Smith v. O'Dea, 939 S.W.2d 353, 357 (Ky. App. 1997). In a prison disciplinary hearing, due process is provided when a prisoner receives three things: advance written notice of the charges; an opportunity to call witnesses and present a defense; and, a written statement by the factfinder detailing the evidence relied upon and the basis of the result. Superintendent, Mass. Correctional Institution, Walpole v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 454, 105 S.Ct. 2768, 2773, 86 L.Ed.2d 356 (1985) (summarizing Wolff v. McConnell, 418 U.S. 539, 563-67, 94 S.Ct. 2963, 2978-80 (1974)). Bratcher received all three—advance written notice before each hearing; the opportunity to call witnesses, but he chose to call no one at either hearing; and, written explanations of the hearing officer's findings of fact and conclusions for both cases. There being "some evidence" supporting the hearing officer's results, we discern no denial of due process. Bratcher admitted using a state computer and printer for personal correspondence; and, he admitted secretly writing an unauthorized letter and mailing it to Southeast Christian Church requesting "curriculum, books and journals" which amounted to obtaining money, goods, privileges or services under false pretenses. This constituted "a modicum of evidence" to support the findings. See Webb v. Sharp, 223 S.W.3d 113, 118 (Ky. 2007).

The Double Jeopardy Clause does not apply to prison disciplinary proceedings, and specifically, does not prohibit successive prison disciplinary proceedings. Meeks v. McBride, 81 F.3d 717, 722 (7th Cir. 1996). To further repel Bratcher's argument, Appellees argue the two charges were different—the first being based on Bratcher's unauthorized use of a state computer for personal correspondence, and the second being based on the letter Bratcher admitted sending to Southeast Christian Church requesting materials at no cost or at a reduced cost. Thus, we reject the double jeopardy claim.

Bratcher also argued the charges were retaliatory. To prevail, he must show three things, the most basic of which is that he was engaged in constitutionally protected conduct. Thomas v. Eby, 481 F.3d 434, 440 (6th Cir. 2007) (citing Thaddeus-X v. Blatter, 175 F.3d 378, 394 (6th Cir.1999)). Because Bratcher was not engaged in constitutionally protected conduct he cannot prevail. While he has a right to practice his religion, he does not have a right to use state equipment for personal projects such as writing letters and composing religious tracts (something he referenced in his letter to Southeast Christian Church). To protect organizations from attempted fraud, prison officials have determined all requests for religious materials to be used in the prison are to be initiated by the EKCC Chaplain as specified in CPP 23.1. Bratcher's conduct violated this rule and he has shown no authority allowing him to flaunt legitimate prison rules and regulations. When "the discipline which the prisoner claims to have been retaliatory was in fact imposed for an actual violation of prisoner rules or regulations, then the prisoner's claim that the discipline was retaliatory in nature must fail." Henderson v. Baird, 29 F.3d 464, 469 (8th Cir. 1994) (quoting Goff v. Burton, 7 F.3d 734, 738 (8th Cir. 1993)).

Any claim under the RFRA is dismissed because this uniquely federal Act does not apply to states and their subdivisions. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 117 S.Ct. 2157 (1997). Similarly, Bratcher's claims under RLUIPA are also doomed to fail because the burdens imposed were the least restrictive means and furthered a compelling governmental interest. Bratcher violated prison rules by using a prison-assigned state computer to create wholly personal documents—a privilege afforded him solely due to his position as a teacher's aide. Additionally, via the letter he sent to Southeast Christian Church, he fraudulently conveyed the idea he was acting on behalf of EKCC or its Chaplain. Bratcher was not prohibited from creating personal documents or contacting churches; his actions became an issue due solely to the way in which he accomplished these things.

Bratcher alleges anointing with oil, laying on of hands in administering prayers, posture of prayers, raising hands in prayer, and spontaneity during worship is impermissibly restricted. We disagree. Bratcher seems to forget he is imprisoned for intentional murder. Bratcher v. Commonwealth, 406 S.W.3d 865 (Ky. App. 2012); Bratcher v. Commonwealth, 151 S.W.3d 332 (Ky. 2004). In a prison setting, freedom must be curtailed to maintain order, security and discipline. We defer to prison and jail administrators to adopt regulations and procedures to allow calm and tranquility to permeate an otherwise volatile setting. Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 722-23, 125 S.Ct. 2113, 2123, 161 L. Ed. 2d 1020 (2005). Additionally, we reject Bratcher's claim that CPP 23.1 was violated because he has failed to establish he exhausted administrative remedies as required by KRS5 454.415.

Finally, we reject Bratcher's claim for monetary damages. Damages are unavailable to Kentucky inmates in civil actions absent a prior showing of physical injury. KRS 454.405(5). Similarly, an award of damages under the PLRA6 or RLUIPA is also dependent upon a prior showing of physical injury. Cardinal v. Metrish, 564 F.3d 794, 801 (6th Cir. 2009). There being no allegation or proof of physical injury, no basis exists for an award of damages.

Based on the foregoing, we affirm dismissal of the petition for declaration of rights.

ALL CONCUR.