NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
OPINION
MAZE, Judge.
Jack Binion appeals from a conditional guilty plea to one count of facilitation of manufacturing methamphetamine. He argues that the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress evidence obtained during a warrantless search of property where he was found. We conclude that the trial court did not err in finding that the officer's initial entry onto the property was reasonable under the "emergency aid" exception to the warrant requirement. Hence, we affirm.
On September 28, 2012, a Carter County grand jury returned an indictment charging Binion and a co-defendant with one count each of manufacturing methamphetamine. Subsequently, Binion filed a motion to suppress evidence obtained during a warrantless entry onto his property and a search of an outbuilding in which he was found. The trial court conducted an evidentiary hearing at which Officer Dick Williams of the Olive Hill Police Department and Trooper John Marcum of the Kentucky State Police testified.
During the early morning hours of July 15, 2012, Officer Williams was on patrol on Chili Street in the City of Olive Hill. Officer Williams testified that he had been approached by a street contact earlier that evening who told him that someone was manufacturing methamphetamine on Chili Street. Trooper Marcum was also in the area, following up on a separate complaint from a person who said that Binion had accosted his girlfriend with a baseball bat and a gun, and that Binion was making methamphetamine at that location.
Shortly after 1:00 a.m., both officers heard a loud noise. Officer Williams described the noise as similar to a shotgun blast or a small explosion. Trooper Marcum thought the sound came from a shotgun or high caliber rifle. Williams testified that he saw a puff of smoke coming from an outbuilding on Binion's property across the street from where both officers were parked.
The officers pulled into the driveway and approached the outbuilding, splitting up as they went. Officer Williams went to the front of the outbuilding, while Trooper Marcum walked past the outbuilding into the yard. Officer Williams stated that, when he was approximately five to seven feet from the outbuilding, he saw a vapor coming from the door and smelled a strong odor consistent with methamphetamine. He also testified that he heard movement inside the building.
Officer Williams called Trooper Marcum over and both approached the door to the outbuilding. Officer Williams indicated that he knocked on and then opened the door, which was not locked. Upon entering, he saw a table and "shake and bake" meth labs on the floor. Binion was in the building, standing with his back to the door and cooking on a hot plate. The co-defendant was also in the building. Trooper Marcum described the fumes within the outbuilding as "strong enough to knock a person down." He added that his eyes and lungs were burning and he had a headache after being in the building for only a few minutes. The officers removed Binion and the co-defendant from the building and placed them under arrest.
After considering the testimony, the trial court concluded that exigent circumstances existed which allowed warrantless entry onto the property and into the outbuilding. The court found that, while both officers were investigating reports involving the manufacture of methamphetamine, their primary purpose for entering the curtilage of the property was to investigate sounds of gunfire or an explosion and to render assistance to anyone who may be injured. Consequently, the trial court denied Binion's motion to suppress the evidence.
Subsequently, Binion entered a conditional plea of guilty to one count of facilitation of manufacturing methamphetamine. He specifically reserved his right to challenge the trial court's ruling on the suppression motion. Pursuant to the Commonwealth's recommendation, the trial court imposed a sentence of five-years' imprisonment. This appeal followed.
Appellate review of a trial court's rulings on a motion to suppress is two-fold. Anderson v. Commonwealth, 352 S.W.3d 577, 583 (Ky. 2011) (citing Commonwealth v. Whitmore, 92 S.W.3d 76 (Ky. 2002), and RCr1 9.78)). First, the factual findings of the trial court are conclusive if supported by substantial evidence. Id. Second, if the findings are supported by substantial evidence, the appellate court conducts a de novo review to determine whether the trial court's ruling is correct as a matter of law. Id. See also Bishop v. Commonwealth, 237 S.W.3d 567, 568-69 (Ky. App. 2007).
"It is a basic principle of Fourth Amendment Law that searches and seizures inside a home without a warrant are presumptively unreasonable." Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 586, 100 S.Ct. 1371, 1380, 63 L. Ed. 2d 639 (1980) (internal quotation omitted). Likewise, the Kentucky Constitution also protects citizens from unreasonable searches and seizures without a warrant. See Hallum v. Commonwealth, 219 S.W.3d 216 (Ky. App. 2007). Generally, a house and its surrounding curtilage are protected by the Fourth Amendment's proscription against warrantless searches and seizures. Dunn v. Commonwealth, 360 S.W.3d 751, 757 (Ky. 2012), citing United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294, 300, 107 S.Ct. 1134, 94 L. Ed. 2d 326 (1987). For purposes of this action, the Commonwealth conceded that the outbuilding was within the protected curtilage of the property and that the officers made a warrantless entry onto the curtilage.
All searches without a valid search warrant are presumed to be unreasonable unless shown to be within one of the exceptions to the rule that a search must rest upon a valid warrant. The burden is on the Commonwealth to show the search comes within an exception. Gallman v. Commonwealth, 578 S.W.2d 47, 48 (Ky. 1979). Among these recognized exceptions is when "the exigencies of the situation make the needs of law enforcement so compelling that the warrantless search is objectively reasonable under the Fourth Amendment." Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 394, 98 S.Ct. 2408, 2414, 57 L. Ed. 2d 290 (1978) (internal quotation omitted). Exigent circumstances justifying a warrantless entry include those which require swift action when officers reasonably believe that a person within is in immediate need of aid. Id. at 392, 98 S. Ct. at 2413. See also Dunn, supra at 757, and Todd v. Commonwealth, 716 S.W.2d 242, 247-48 (Ky. 1986). The police may seize any evidence that is in plain view during the course of their legitimate emergency activities. Mincey, 437 U.S. at 393, 98 S. Ct. at 2413.
Binion argues that the loud noise and puff of smoke were not sufficient to support the officers' conclusions that there may be a person in need of immediate aid within the curtilage. Binion notes that the officers immediately proceeded to the outbuilding without checking to see if anyone was in the residence. He further contends that they had no reason to believe that anyone was in the outbuilding or in need of aid until they entered onto the curtilage of the property. He also notes that both officers were investigating reports of methamphetamine manufacturing, and he suggests that their entry onto the property was primarily motivated by that information rather than any reasonable concern that persons on the property were in need of immediate aid. As a result, Binion argues that the trial court erred in finding that their warrantless entry onto the property was justified by legitimate exigent circumstances.
We disagree. The trial court specifically found the testimony by Officer Williams and Trooper Marcum to be credible, and Binion cannot show that the trial court clearly erred in making that determination. Binion points to Trooper Marcum's inconsistent testimony whether he had discussed the reports of methamphetamine manufacturing with Officer Williams prior to hearing the loud noise. But both officers testified to receiving separate reports of possible methamphetamine manufacturing in the area prior to arriving on Chili Street.
If the entry onto the property was motivated by those reports, then we would agree that the warrantless search was not reasonable. However, the prior complaints merely legitimized the officers' suspicions that the noise heard was gunfire or an explosion. That suspicion was further confirmed by Officer Williams's observation of a puff of smoke coming from the area around the outbuilding. Given those facts and the lateness of the hour, the officers reasonably believed that individuals on the property may be injured, and that swift, immediate action may be necessary to render aid. Therefore, we agree with the trial court that their entry into the yard was objectively reasonable. Since their initial entry onto the property was justified by exigent circumstances, their subsequent observations and any evidence discovered were admissible. Consequently, the trial court did not err by denying Binion's motion to suppress.
Accordingly, the judgment of conviction by the Carter Circuit Court is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
