NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

OPINION

LAMBERT, Judge.

Joseph C. Bowden appeals, pro se, the Fayette Circuit Court's denial of his motion for relief made pursuant to Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure (CR) 60.02. He argues that he was entitled to CR 60.02 relief because his criminal sentence was not allowable by law. For the reasons stated herein, we affirm.

The facts of this case are not in issue. In 2002, Bowden was convicted of kidnapping, first-degree sexual abuse, and resisting arrest. He was also found to be a persistent felony offender (PFO) in the second degree. As a result of his PFO status, Bowden's ten-year sentence for kidnapping was enhanced to thirty years, and his five-year sentence for sexual abuse was enhanced to ten years. Both sentences were ordered to run consecutively for a total of forty-years' imprisonment. The Supreme Court of Kentucky affirmed Bowden's conviction and sentence on direct appeal. Bowden v. Commonwealth, 2002-SC-00378, 2003 WL 22415617 (Ky. App. 2006). Thereafter, Bowden filed a motion to vacate his sentence pursuant to Kentucky Rules of Criminal Procedure (RCr) 11.42. The motion was denied by the trial court and on appeal, we affirmed the trial court's decision. Bowden v. Commonwealth, 2005-CA-2424, 2006 WL 2919153 (Ky. App. 2006).

In October 2014, Bowden moved the trial court to amend or modify his sentence pursuant to RCr 10.26 and CR 60.02(f). In his motion, Bowden alleged that he is serving an illegal sentence due to the trial court improperly using his PFO status to enhance the penalty on both of his charges. The trial court denied Bowden's motion for relief, concluding that Bowden's motion failed because it was not filed within a "reasonable time" as required by the statute, and because Bowden could have raised the claim in one of his earlier appeals. The court further found that Bowden's claim failed on the merits. This appeal followed.

"Civil Rule 60.02 is not intended merely as an additional opportunity to relitigate the same issues which could reasonably have been presented by direct appeal or RCr 11.42 proceedings." McQueen v. Commonwealth, 948 S.W.2d 415, 416 (Ky. 1997) (internal quotation marks omitted). CR 60.02 "is not a separate avenue of appeal to be pursued in addition to other remedies, but is available only to raise issues which cannot be raised in other proceedings." Id. "The [CR 60.02] movant must demonstrate why he is entitled to this special, extraordinary relief. Before the movant is entitled to an evidentiary hearing, he must affirmatively allege facts which, if true, justify vacating the judgment and further allege special circumstances that justify CR 60.02 relief." Gross v. Commonwealth, 648 S.W.2d 853, 856 (Ky. 1983). Additionally, claims brought under CR 60.02(a), (b), or (c) must be brought within one year after the judgment is entered, and claims brought under the remaining sections of CR 60.02 must be brought within a "reasonable time." See CR 60.02.

The standard of review concerning a trial court's denial of a CR 60.02 motion is whether or not the trial court abused its discretion, and we will not disturb the exercise of that discretion on appeal absent abuse. Richardson v. Brunner, 327 S.W.2d 572, 574 (Ky. 1959). The test for abuse of discretion is whether the trial judge's decision was arbitrary, unreasonable, unfair, or unsupported by sound legal principles." Johnson v. Commonwealth, 184 S.W.3d 544, 551 (Ky. 2005), citing Commonwealth v. English, 993 S.W.2d 941, 945 (Ky. 1999).

We first note that the trial court found, and the Commonwealth now claims, that Bowden is barred from raising this issue on a CR 60.02 motion or in the present appeal because he did not raise it in a `reasonable time' or on direct appeal. However, we have long recognized that a court may address defects in jurisdiction at any time.1 Skiles v. Commonwealth, 757 S.W.2d 212, 215 (Ky. App. 1988). Sentencing is jurisdictional, and should be reviewed by this Court where issues of statutory or constitutional violations are claimed. Wellman v. Commonwealth, 694 S.W.2d 696, 698 (Ky. 1985). Additionally, our Supreme Court has recognized that "the imposition of an unauthorized sentence is an error correctable by appeal, by writ, or by motion pursuant to RCr 11.42 or CR 60.02." Myers v. Commonwealth, 42 S.W.3d 594, 596 (Ky. 2001), (overruled on other grounds by McClanahan v. Commonwealth, 308 S.W.3d 694 (Ky. 2010)). Accordingly, we will consider Bowden's allegation of sentencing error.

During the penalty phase, the jury found that Bowden was a persistent felony offender in the second degree. The PFO enhancement was applied to both the kidnapping and the first-degree sexual abuse charges. Bowden insists that the sentence imposed amounts to "double enhancement" and runs afoul of Kentucky case law and Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) 532.080. We disagree.

KRS 532.080 states in pertinent part:

Our Supreme Court has explained that "[C]onviction as a [PFO] is not a charge of an independent offense but rather a particular criminal status[ ] that enhances the punishment for a crime committed by a defendant who qualifies as a PFO." Commonwealth v. Derringer, 386 S.W.3d 123, 126 (Ky. 2012). Once the status of PFO has been established, the defendant can receive enhanced punishment on each and every subsequent felony. Kroth v. Commonwealth, 737 S.W.2d 469 (Ky. 1987) (no reversible error in permitting the sentence under both counts 1 and 2 of the indictment to be enhanced by the persistent felony charge).

Bowden argues that his sentence was erroneously enhanced twice. However, double enhancement occurs when a single prior felony charge is used twice—once to create an offense and again to prosecute the defendant as a persistent felony offender and enhance the sentence on the same charge. See Dale v. Commonwealth, 715 S.W.2d 227 (Ky. 1986). Here, Bowden's single prior felony conviction was used at trial to establish his status as a persistent felony offender. It was not used to create either the charged offense of kidnapping, or to create the charged offense of sexual abuse. Therefore, the prior felony conviction was used one time in relation to each charge. Bowden's PFO status merely had the effect of increasing the possible range of sentencing on both underlying charges. The trial court correctly applied Bowden's status to both underlying offenses and sentenced him in accordance with KRS 532.080.

Finding no error, the judgment of the Fayette Circuit court is affirmed.

ALL CONCUR.