NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

OPINION

TAYLOR, JUDGE.

Ben Richards, Jr., appeals an Opinion and Order entered by the Jefferson Circuit Court on April 24, 2014, denying his motion pursuant to Kentucky Rules of Criminal Procedure (RCr) 11.42, wherein he claimed ineffective assistance of trial counsel. After careful review of the record and the applicable law, we affirm.

Relevant Facts

On August 23, 2010, Richards was indicted in Jefferson County for rape in the first degree, sodomy in the first degree, sexual abuse in the first degree and for being a persistent felony offender in the first degree, arising from sexual contact with a child victim under 12 between 2008 and 2009.

Just prior to trial, on August 24, 2011, Richards entered a plea in Jefferson Circuit Court to charges of sodomy in the first degree and sexual abuse in the first degree pursuant to North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 91 S.Ct. 160, 27 L. Ed. 2d 162 (1970). The plea included a twenty-year prison sentence and registration as a sex offender. In exchange, the charges of rape in the first degree and being a persistent felony offender in the first degree against Richards were dismissed. During Richards' guilty plea, Richards' attorney stated that the plea in this case was a part of a larger plea agreement with the Commonwealth. Under that agreement, Richards also entered a plea to charges against the same victim in Bullitt County of sexual abuse in the first degree and unlawful transaction with a minor in the second degree. In exchange, the Commonwealth dismissed charges against Richards for being a persistent felony offender in the first degree against the same victim in Bullitt County as in the present case, and two counts of sexual abuse in the first degree and one count of being a persistent felony offender in the first degree against a second victim in Bullitt County under a separate indictment. Judgment on the plea was entered August 25, 2011.

On August 30, 2011, Richards filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea, wherein he raised various claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. After counsel withdrew his representation, the trial court appointed a public defender for Richards. On December 16, 2011, the Jefferson Circuit Court conducted a hearing on Richards' motion to withdraw his guilty plea, which included a review of his previous counsel's representation in negotiating the plea. The court ultimately denied the motion and Richards was sentenced to twenty-years' imprisonment on the charge of sodomy in the first degree and five-years' imprisonment for sexual abuse in the first degree, to run concurrently for a total of twenty years, by judgment entered February 24, 2012.

In March of 2012, Richards filed a pro se motion pursuant to RCr 11.42, in which he claimed that his plea was not entered knowingly and voluntarily. He also moved to terminate his appointed counsel. On August 1, 2013, post-conviction counsel from the Department of Public Advocacy filed a supplement to Richards' original RCr 11.42 motion, which alleged that Richards' trial counsel was deficient for his failure to interview witnesses. On September 13, 2013, Richards filed an additional supplement to his RCr 11.42 motion. The Jefferson Circuit Court denied Richards' motion by Opinion and Order entered April 24, 2014. This appeal follows.

Analysis

As a preliminary matter, Richards raises several arguments on appeal which are not appropriate for our review. Richards claims that his counsel ignored exculpatory evidence in the form of two letters from a child victim. This argument was not raised in Richards' original RCr 11.42 motion (or its two supplements), and so we decline to address it on its merits.1 Bowling v. Com., 80 S.W.3d 405, 419 (Ky. 2002) (a specific claim of ineffective assistance of counsel which was not raised in the original RCr 11.42 motion will not be considered on appeal).

Richards also raises two additional arguments which could only be raised on direct appeal. First, Richards argues that portions of recorded conversations in which he made inculpatory statements regarding Richards giving marijuana to a child victim should have been excluded by the trial judge. Richards separately argues that the trial court erred when it failed to exclude certain conduct or acts by him from the record pursuant to Kentucky Rules of Evidence 404(b). This case does not involve a situation in which the appellant's trial counsel failed to raise these arguments; the record reveals that appellant's trial counsel did make these arguments, and that the trial judge overruled them. RCr 11.42 "provides a vehicle to attack an erroneous judgment for reasons which are not accessible by direct appeal." Gross v. Com., 648 S.W.2d 853, 856 (Ky. 1983). Richards waived his right to appeal unconditionally when he entered his Alford plea, and he is precluded from raising these evidentiary issues now.

Richards also raises at least two additional arguments for the first time in his reply brief.2 These arguments include that: 1) his trial counsel was ineffective because he failed to request Richards' plea be set aside in order to establish proper venue; and 2) Richards' counsel was ineffective for failing to try the Bullitt County case before his case in Jefferson County. Our Court will not entertain arguments on appeal set out for the first time in a reply brief. Caldwell v. Chauvin, 464 S.W.3d 139, 145 n.9 (Ky. 2015).

Based on our examination of Richards' meandering arguments as set out in his brief, we believe three arguments remain to be addressed on his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel: 1) his Alford plea was not knowing and voluntary; 2) his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate evidence that he was imprisoned during the timeframes alleged in one of his indictments; and 3) his counsel should have interviewed additional alibi witnesses.

In Strickland v. Washington, the United States Supreme Court promulgated a two-part test to determine ineffective assistance of counsel claims. Strickland, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984). A petitioner is entitled to relief for ineffective assistance of counsel if, at trial, counsel provided representation that "fell below an objective standard of reasonableness," and "there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different." Id. at 669, 694. To be granted relief under RCr 11.42, a movant must overcome the presumption that counsel's representation was effective. Parrish v. Com., 272 S.W.3d 161 (Ky. 2008). Furthermore, "[e]ven though claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are subject to de novo review, a reviewing court should defer to the determination of facts made by the trial judge." Logan v. Com., 446 S.W.3d 655, 658-59 (Ky. App. 2014) (citation omitted).

The trial court patiently endured numerous filings by Richards, pro se, or via his "hybrid" filings, through appointed counsel. The court conducted an extensive hearing on Richards' original motion to withdraw his plea and carefully considered a multitude of filings in support of the RCr 11.42 motion. The trial court, in its detailed opinion and order entered April 24, 2014, did a thorough analysis of the facts and law applicable to the remaining issues before this Court.

As concerns the voluntariness of his plea, Richards received a detailed, satisfactory colloquy, as required by Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969). The Kentucky Supreme Court has held that "a voluntary, intelligent plea of guilty . . . preclude[s] a post-judgment challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence." Taylor v. Com., 724 S.W.2d 223 (Ky. App. 1986).

Upon review of the record, we note Richards acknowledged that he believed the Commonwealth could prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt, and that no one threatened or coerced him to plead guilty. Based on the charges set out in the indictment, Richards faced a maximum sentence of life in prison if convicted. Moreover, Richards' many pro se filings in this case demonstrate coherency and an understanding of the legal process and the seriousness of the charges against him. The record clearly supports the circuit court's finding that Richards entered his plea voluntarily and intelligently, and we see no reason to disturb that finding.

As concerns Richards' remaining claims, we again defer to the trial court's well-written opinion and order entered April 24, 2014, which addresses these issues in detail, for which we adopt and incorporate herein by reference. We would also add that Richards' claim that counsel failed to interview numerous alibi witnesses fails on its face, as none of the witnesses are identified, or their testimony detailed in Richards' brief nor was this error preserved below. Simply put, Richards has failed to establish how this would have affected the outcome of the case had it gone to trial.

Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, the Opinion and Order of the Jefferson Circuit Court denying RCr 11.42 relief is affirmed.

ALL CONCUR.