NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

OPINION

COMBS, Judge.

Randall Creek, pro se, appeals from an order of the Warren Circuit Court denying a motion to vacate his criminal convictions filed pursuant to RCr1 11.42. Creek contends that his attorney failed to provide him with effective assistance at trial. Having considered the record, the parties' briefs, and the applicable case law, we affirm the order of the Warren Circuit Court.

On the morning of October 5, 2008, Creek shot Debbie Rediess to death as she stood at her front door. He then aimed the gun at Gregory Wilson and ordered him to re-enter Rediess's home. Creek left the scene, fled the state, and was later apprehended in Iowa.

On November 19, 2008, Creek was indicted for murder, tampering with physical evidence, and first-degree wanton endangerment. Following his indictment, Creek was represented by Attorney Sam Lowe. Creek entered a plea of not guilty.

A jury trial was conducted between August 3 and August 13, 2010. In support of Creek's defense of involuntary intoxication, the expert testimony of Rodney Richmond, a pharmacist, was presented. Although he could not comment on Creek's state of mind at the time of the shooting, Richmond testified generally about the possible side effects of the medications that Creek had ingested before he shot and killed Rediess. Several other witnesses testified in support of Creek's intoxication defense, noting that his behavior leading up to and including the shooting was completely out of character. Creek testified in his own defense.

Following the presentation of evidence and a period of deliberation, the jury found Creek guilty of murder and first-degree wanton endangerment. The jury recommended that he be sentenced to life in prison for murder and five-years' imprisonment on the wanton endangerment conviction. The trial court's judgment and a sentence consistent with the jury's recommendation were entered on August 24, 2010.

In November 2011, the Supreme Court of Kentucky rejected Creek's direct appeal. Creek v. Commonwealth, 2010-SC-000575 (Rendered, November 23, 2011). The Court concluded that the trial court had not erred in denying an instruction on involuntary intoxication because Creek had failed to present evidence to support any doubt that he knew what he was doing when he shot and killed Rediess.

On October 4, 2012, Creek launched a collateral attack against the judgment of conviction. Pro se, he filed a timely motion for post-conviction relief on the basis of ineffective assistance of counsel. In support of his motion, Creek alleged that his trial counsel had been deficient for several reasons, including his failure to call an expert to testify regarding a defense of extreme emotional disturbance. He also alleged that counsel had failed to examine witnesses adequately and that he neglected to call others who might have been helpful. Creek requested that an evidentiary hearing be conducted to resolve his claims and that he be appointed counsel to assist him.

In an order entered on October 23, 2012, the trial court granted Creek's motion for appointment of counsel. However, following a review of Creek's case, the Department of Public Advocacy filed a motion with the circuit court to withdraw as Creek's counsel. In the motion, counsel indicated that the post-conviction proceeding was not one "that a reasonable person with adequate means would be willing to bring at his own expense."2 On the basis of this assessment, the circuit court granted counsel's motion to withdraw and set the matter for an evidentiary hearing.

Creek's trial counsel, Attorney Lowe, testified at the evidentiary hearing conducted on February 26, 2015. Lowe indicated that he recommended to Creek that they present evidence to show that Creek was laboring under an extreme emotional disturbance at the time of the killing. Lowe indicated that Creek was evaluated by Dr. Eric Drogin and it appeared that there was a basis for the defense. Lowe testified that Creek rejected this strategy, however, and that he was adamant that Lowe pursue the defense of involuntary intoxication. Lowe testified that the presentation of testimony regarding extreme emotional disturbance would have been inconsistent with and would have undermined the defense of involuntary intoxication. Additionally, Lowe explained that Creek had confessed to Dr. Drogin that he had not felt impaired when he shot and killed Rediess. Lowe believed that if Drogin were called to testify, this disclosure would present an enormous risk to Creek's intoxication defense. Additionally, Lowe testified that the witness list was discussed with Creek before trial and that Creek raised no objection.

After considering the evidence, the trial court denied Creek's motion. The court found that Lowe's decision not to call Dr. Drogin fell squarely within the purview of trial strategy and that it was ultimately dictated by Creek himself. The trial court concluded further that counsel's examination of witnesses "was guided by the desire to avoid minimizing the serious nature of the offense and the risk of inviting a harsher sentence from the jury" and that there was no evidence to support Creek's claim that trial counsel failed to call any other necessary witnesses. The trial court observed as follows:

The trial court denied Creek's motion for relief in an order entered on May 6, 2015. Creek was permitted to proceed on appeal in forma pauperis, and counsel was appointed to represent him on appeal.

On August 25, 2015, the Department of Public Advocacy filed a motion with this court to withdraw as Creek's counsel. In the motion, counsel indicated again that the post-conviction proceeding was not one "that a reasonable person with adequate means would be willing to bring at his own expense." By order entered on September 23, 2015, this Court granted counsel's motion to withdraw and ordered that Creek's brief, tendered pro se, be filed of record.

On appeal, Creek contends that the circuit court erred by denying his motion for post-conviction relief. The Commonwealth disagrees and argues that trial counsel's decision not to present the testimony of Dr. Drogin was reasonable trial strategy. The Commonwealth contends that the remaining arguments presented in Creek's brief were not first addressed to the trial court and are not now reviewable on appeal.

In Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984), the United States Supreme Court set forth a two-pronged analysis to be used in determining whether the performance of a convicted defendant's trial counsel was so deficient as to merit relief from that conviction. See also Gall v. Commonwealth, 702 S.W.2d 37 (Ky. 1985); Sanborn v. Commonwealth, 975 S.W.2d 905 (Ky. 1998); Haight v. Commonwealth, 41 S.W.3d 436 (Ky. 2001). First, the defendant must show that counsel's performance was deficient. Id. The movant must show that his counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. He bears the burden of proof and must overcome a strong presumption that counsel's performance was adequate. Jordan v. Commonwealth, 445 S.W.2d 878 (Ky. 1969); McKinney v. Commonwealth, 445 S.W.2d 874 (Ky. 1969).

Second, the defendant must show that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. Strickland, supra. In order to show prejudice, the defendant must show there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is one sufficient to undermine the confidence in the outcome of the trial. Id.; see also Bowling v. Commonwealth, 80 S.W.3d 405, 412 (Ky. 2002). If an evidentiary hearing is conducted, the reviewing court must determine whether the trial court erred by concluding that the movant received adequate assistance. Ivey v. Commonwealth, 655 S.W.2d 506 (Ky.App. 1983). We must defer to the determinations of fact and witness credibility made by the trial court. McQueen v. Commonwealth, 721 S.W.2d 694 (Ky. 1986).

We believe that the trial court did not err by concluding that the performance of Creek's trial counsel was adequate. The court was persuaded by Attorney Lowe's testimony that Creek rejected his recommendation to pursue the defense of extreme emotional disturbance and by Lowe's statement that he did not believe that both defenses could be presented in light of Creek's disclosures to Dr. Drogin. The court rejected Creek's testimony outright. The course chosen by Lowe (as dictated by Creek) had a reasonable basis and was designed to serve his client's best interests. Counsel's informed defense strategy is not subject to second-guessing by the court. McQeen, supra. His performance was not deficient.

The record confirms that Lowe's examination of the witnesses at trial was also reasonably calculated to promote Creek's best interest, and the trial court did not err by concluding that Lowe provided effective assistance in this respect. Furthermore, the decision whether to call a particular witness is a tactical decision entirely within the discretion of counsel. See Foley v. Commonwealth, 17 S.W.3d 878, 885 (Ky. 2000). Finally, if a potential trial witness is not called to testify at a post-conviction hearing, the defendant should provide sufficient explanation for the witness's absence and "demonstrate, with some precision, the content of the testimony [he or she] would have given at trial." United States ex rel. Cross v. DeRobertis, 811 F.2d 1008, 1014-15 (7th Cir.1987). Creek failed to show what the testimony of the uncalled witnesses would have been — or how it could have been — helpful to the defense. Consequently, he did not show that counsel's performance was deficient. Accordingly, the circuit court properly denied Creek's motion for relief.

Having concluded that Creek failed to establish the first prong of the Strickland test, we need not address the second. See Commonwealth v. Searight, 423 S.W.3d 226 (Ky. 2014).

We affirm the order of the Warren Circuit Court.

ALL CONCUR.