NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

OPINION

THOMPSON, Judge.

Donna Marie Blake appeals from the judgments convicting her after the denial of her motion to suppress.

Blake was indicted for two counts of trafficking in a controlled substance in the first degree, a class D felony, and being a persistent felony offender in the second-degree (PFO-2) in case number 2014-CR-00025. She was also indicted for trafficking in a controlled substance and PFO-2 in case number 2014-CR-00026. Blake moved to suppress all of the evidence against her on the grounds that the traffic stop and subsequent consensual search of her vehicle were unlawful. Detective Wade Shoemaker and Sergeant James Jenkins testified at the suppression hearing.

Det. Shoemaker was employed with the Kentucky State Police's drug task force when he conducted a drug investigation in Muhlenburg County of a suspected dealer selling drugs out of his home. In the course of this investigation, he suspected that an individual who parked a red Hyundai in front of that residence was actually the source of narcotics a confidential informant purchased from the suspected dealer inside the home.

The confidential informant made two controlled buys from the suspected dealer at the same residence. During the first controlled buy, on January 22, 2014, Det. Shoemaker watched the confidential informant enter the residence of the suspected dealer and later saw a red Hyundai driven by a white female pull up to the residence and park in front. He then saw the suspected dealer walk out of the residence and stand beside the vehicle for a few minutes and then walk back inside.

Det. Shoemaker relayed the license plate of the Hyundai to dispatch and learned that it was registered to Blake. He knew Blake was rumored to be involved in drug trafficking and he suspected she was the supplier of the drugs.

The confidential informant returned with two tablets of Dilaudid. He told Det. Shoemaker he purchased the tablets from the suspected dealer.

During the second controlled buy, on January 28, 2014, after the confidential informant entered the residence, once again a red Hyundai pulled up in front and parked. The suspected drug dealer approached the car, stood beside the vehicle and then returned to the house. From Det. Shoemaker's vantage, he could not see the license plate of the vehicle or the driver, but suspected it was the same vehicle and driver as before. After his confidential informant texted Det. Shoemaker that he was leaving the residence, Det. Shoemaker called Sgt. Jenkins of the Central City police department, told him that he was conducting a narcotics investigation and believed the driver of the Hyundai was selling drugs. Det. Shoemaker requested that Sgt. Jenkins make a traffic stop.

Det. Shoemaker testified he wanted Sgt. Jenkins to develop his own probable cause for stopping the vehicle because he did not want to expose his confidential informant and was not sure if the driver was the supplier. At the time he requested that Sgt. Jenkins stop the vehicle, Det. Shoemaker did not know whether his confidential informant had purchased narcotics on that occasion.

Sgt. Jenkins testified he was familiar with Blake as being rumored to be involved in trafficking narcotics and, in response to the call, he began following a red Hyundai which matched the description and license plate Det. Shoemaker supplied. At 5:15 p.m., he noticed the vehicle's rear license plate was not illuminated and at 5:16 p.m., he stopped the vehicle for this violation.

When Sgt. Jenkins approached the vehicle he recognized the driver as Blake. Sgt. Jenkins testified the only reason he stopped Blake was because her plate was not illuminated. It was dusk, there was some light, but it was dark enough for him to see her plate was not illuminated. There were no weather conditions that he recalled which would impair visibility and most other vehicles had their lights on.

Sgt. Jenkins told Blake he stopped her because her plate was not illuminated. He asked for permission to search her vehicle and she immediately consented. He found methamphetamine in the glove box, $10,200.50 cash in her purse and decided to arrest her. Det. Shoemaker joined him at the scene and identified a portion of the money as that used by his confidential informant.

Ultimately, the trial court found there was no probable cause for the traffic stop under Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) 186.170(1) and KRS 189.030(1). Blake was not required to illuminate her license plate until thirty minutes after sunset, Blake was stopped at 5:16 p.m. and sunset occurred at 5:08 p.m.

However, the trial court found the stop was still lawful based on the transfer of reasonable suspicion between officers, explaining Det. Shoemaker's reasonable suspicion that Blake was involved in criminal activity was sufficient for Sgt. Jenkins to stop Blake's vehicle. The trial court stated a warrantless investigatory traffic stop was justified because the facts and totality of circumstances surrounding it indicated the existence of a reasonable and articulable suspicion that Blake was engaged in an unlawful activity.

Blake entered conditional pleas of guilty, reserving her right to appeal the denial of her motion to suppress. In both cases, Blake was sentenced to five years on the trafficking counts, enhanced to seven years for being a PFO-2, with the sentences to be served concurrently.

Blake argues Sgt. Jenkins had no probable cause or reasonable suspicion to stop her because he testified the only reason he stopped her was for a suspected traffic violation. Therefore, he did not rely on the statements and information supplied by Det. Shoemaker in making the stop, but instead acted based on his independent but incorrect belief that a traffic violation had occurred. Alternatively, Blake argues that if reasonable suspicion could transfer from one officer to another, it could not transfer here because Det. Shoemaker did not have reasonable suspicion Blake was involved in criminal activity.

We review the decisions made on suppression motions pursuant to Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 116 S.Ct. 1657, 134 L.Ed.2d 911 (1996), reviewing findings of historical fact for clear error and determinations of reasonable suspicion and probable cause de novo, making sure to give "due weight to inferences drawn from those facts by resident judges and local law enforcement officers." Bauder v. Commonwealth, 299 S.W.3d 588, 591 (Ky. 2009) (quoting Ornelas, 517 U.S. at 699).

Commonwealth v. Morgan, 248 S.W.3d 538, 540 (Ky. 2008) (internal citations and footnote omitted). If an illegal stop or detention takes place, it "taints" any subsequent consent, thus making the evidence seized pursuant to such consent inadmissible. Henson v. Commonwealth, 245 S.W.3d 745, 751 (Ky. 2008).

It is well established that a traffic violation justifies a police officer stopping a motor vehicle. Garcia v. Commonwealth, 185 S.W.3d 658, 662 (Ky.App. 2006). However, where the plain language of a statute demonstrates that the observed conduct does not constitute a violation of its provision, it cannot justify a stop. Id. at 664-65. Therefore, suppression of a subsequent consensual search is appropriate. Id. at 665.

Sgt. Jenkins testified he only stopped Blake based on her committing a traffic violation by driving without her license plate being illuminated after sunset. We agree with the trial court that based upon when Blake was stopped, she had not violated the license plate illumination statute and thus, there was no basis for a traffic stop. In Baker v. Commonwealth, 475 S.W.3d 633, 634-35 (Ky.App. 2015), we stated the officer must highlight his reasonable suspicion of the violation of the law required to initiate the stop. Because this stop for failure to illuminate license plate was not authorized by law, we must reverse.

We disagree with the trial court that Sgt. Jenkins was justified in stopping Blake based upon reasonable suspicion that Blake was involved in criminal activity. While we agree that reasonable suspicion can be transferred between officers in appropriate circumstances, see e.g. Tucker v. Commonwealth, 199 S.W.3d 754 (Ky.App. 2006), we disagree that it can justify Sgt. Jenkins's stop where Sgt. Jenkins specifically testified that although he was told that Det. Shoemaker suspected Blake was involved with narcotics, he did not stop Blake for that reason. Because Sgt. Jenkins did not rely on Det. Shoemaker's information in determining to stop Blake, Det. Shoemaker's suspicions are irrelevant to our analysis. See Poe v. Commonwealth, 169 S.W.3d 54, 59 n. 2 (Ky.App. 2005) (where an officer testified that he stopped a driver because he thought the driver might be lost, his observation and testimony that the driver was not wearing his seatbelt could not provide an independent ground to support the stop where the officer admitted he did not stop the driver for this reason). Therefore, because Sgt. Jenkins's justification for the stop was entirely dependent upon whether Blake committed a traffic violation and no traffic violation took place, the evidence seized after Blake consented to a search following an improper stop must be suppressed.

Accordingly, we reverse the judgments convicting Blake and remand because her motion to suppress should have been granted. It appears that without the suppressed evidence there was no basis for her convictions.

STUMBO, JUDGE, CONCURS.

J. LAMBERT, JUDGE, DISSENTS.