Tracey N. Wise, Bankruptcy Judge.
May an attorney limit the scope of their bankruptcy services to a prepetition analysis of a debtor's bankruptcy options and filing the debtor's skeletal chapter 7 petition? In short, if done properly, yes.
Much has been written about attorneys' attempts to "unbundle" services and "bifurcate" their fee arrangements in chapter 7 proceedings. By these efforts, counsel seek to avoid the result occasioned by Lamie v. United States Trustee, 540 U.S. 526, 124 S.Ct. 1023, 157 L.Ed.2d 1024 (2004), Rittenhouse v. Eisen, 404 F.3d 395 (6th Cir.), cert. denied 546 U.S. 872, 126 S.Ct. 378,
In this case, the Court sought information from J. Christian A. Dennery, Esq. and Dennery, PLLC (collectively, the "Attorneys"), sua sponte, upon the Court's review of the Attorneys' "Disclosure of Compensation of Attorney for Debtors" [ECF No. 19 (the "Fee Statement")]. The Fee Statement discloses that the Attorneys received $300 from chapter 7 Debtor Chanda S. Carr prepetition and were to be paid $1,185 post-petition. After the Court determined that Debtor did not schedule any debt owed to the Attorneys, the Court reviewed other chapter 7 cases involving the Attorneys and discerned that they had filed many cases with similar fee disclosures. As a result, although the Court had no concerns about the quality of the Attorneys' representation of chapter 7 debtors, the Court entered a series of orders [ECF Nos. 28, 37, 42] which, inter alia, (i) required the Attorneys to file their written engagement agreement and other documents relating to their representation of Debtor, (ii) required the Office of the United States Trustee ("UST") to respond to the Attorneys' filings, (iii) set a hearing to discuss the Attorneys' fee practices, and (iv) authorized the filing of post-hearing memoranda. The matter is now ripe for review and decision.
From the Attorneys' submissions
If a chapter 7 case is deemed appropriate, the Attorneys present the debtor with two payment options for retaining the Attorneys via a written disclosure [e.g., ECF No. 35 at 2-3 (the "Disclosure")] that the Attorneys and the debtor review together. First, the Attorneys advise that they can provide services to the debtor for a flat fee paid prepetition (typically $800) plus the chapter 7 filing fee ($335) for a total prepetition payment of $1,135. Alternatively, if the debtor cannot afford this option, the Attorneys offer an arrangement in which the Attorneys accept payment prepetition and post-petition pursuant to separate contracts (the "Dual Contract Option"). The Attorneys report that most of their clients choose the second option.
[Id. at 2 (emphasis in original).] The Disclosure also states that the Attorneys are willing to provide post-petition services to the debtor, subject to the post-petition execution of a second agreement:
[Id.]
The Disclosure advises that, if the debtor selects the Dual Contract Option, the debtor must pay the Attorneys $98.75 per month for 12 months for the "post-filing routine services" (including the filing fee), which totals $1,185. It explains the consequences of the overall arrangement with respect to the dischargeability of the legal fees:
[Id. at 3 (emphasis in original).] The Disclosure sets forth the proposed payment schedule and states: "
If a debtor chooses the Dual Contract Option, the Attorneys present the first engagement agreement to them for execution [e.g., ECF No. 35 at 4-7 (the "First Contract")]. That four-page document expressly identifies the prepetition services to be provided:
[Id. at 4.] The First Contract explicitly discloses the "excluded services" that the Attorneys will not provide thereunder. It also states that "the representation created by this agreement shall naturally terminate immediately after the filing of the skeletal petition." [Id.]
The First Contract also discloses the post-petition work the Attorneys are willing to perform if the debtor opts to engage them post-petition. The First Contract advises that the debtor should engage an attorney post-petition even if they do not retain the Attorneys. It also summarizes the terms under which the Attorneys would agree to provide that post-petition work and states that the debt created by a post-petition agreement would not be dischargeable. The Attorneys discuss each term of the First Contract with the debtor in person, answer any questions, have the debtor initial each paragraph thereof as it is discussed, and have the debtor sign the document at its end.
After the parties execute the First Contract, the Attorneys will prepare, finalize and file the Skeletal Chapter 7 Case, the credit counseling certificate, and an application to pay the filing fee in installments. However, the Attorneys advised at the hearing (and the record in this case confirms) that, while the First Contract states that the Attorneys will file a "statement of attorney compensation" with the petition, this is not the Attorneys' typical practice. Rather, they usually wait to file their Fee Statement until they determine whether they are retained post-petition. This alleviates the need to file an initial Fee Statement with the petition (reporting the prepetition fee paid only) and an amended Fee Statement, as Rule 2016(b) requires, if the debtor retains the Attorneys for post-petition services.
If the debtor elects to retain the Attorneys' services post-petition (which, the Attorneys report, almost always occurs), the Attorneys and the debtor have a post-petition meeting. In other words, and importantly, the debtor will not sign a prepetition contract and a post-petition contract on the same date. At the post-petition meeting, the Attorneys and the debtor review the next contract, titled a "Statement of Work and Promissory Note" [e.g., ECF No. 35 at 8-11 (the "Second Contract")]. As with the First Contract, the Attorneys have the debtor initial all paragraphs and sign the Second Contract at its end.
The Second Contract delineates the "routine" post-petition chapter 7 work the Attorneys agree to perform:
[Id. at 8.] The Second Contract specifically excludes certain "non-routine" services
The Second Contract provides that the debtor agrees to make equal payments to the Attorneys over 12 months at the rate of $98.75 per month (which includes interest on the financed portion of the legal fee at the rate of 7.55% per annum). The Attorneys also obtain the debtor's permission to run a credit check, given that the Attorneys are agreeing to finance the legal fees over time.
The Second Contract states that the Attorneys will advance the money to pay the debtor's chapter 7 filing fee but that the debtor is ultimately responsible for the filing fee and the costs related to their case. The Second Contract provides for the application of a debtor's payments to the Attorneys as follows:
[Id. at 9.] It advises that the Attorneys will collect post-petition payments from the debtor's bank account. The Attorneys confirmed at the hearing that they do not accept credit card payments from debtors or enter into factoring agreements (i.e., sell or assign the debtor's post-petition debt to a third party in exchange for a discounted lump-sum payment).
Because the Attorneys are accepting a prolonged payment plan, and because (in the Attorneys' experience) Dual Contract Option cases typically require more effort than up-front-flat-fee chapter 7 cases, the total legal fee charged to the debtor for a Dual Contract Option case exceeds that of an up-front-flat-fee case by $350.
The Attorneys' interactions with Debtor were consistent with their standard chapter 7 practices outlined above. On June 13, 2019, Debtor had a lengthy initial meeting with the Attorneys to discuss filing for bankruptcy relief. The Attorneys used the Disclosure to lay out Debtor's options for chapter 7 representation. The Attorneys provided a hard copy of the Disclosure to Debtor and had Debtor sign it. Debtor also initialed and signed the a First Contract with the Attorneys for services in accordance with the Dual Contract Option.
On July 25, 2019, at her second meeting with the Attorneys, Debtor initialed and signed a Second Contract and thereby retained the Attorneys to provide post-petition services in her case. On August 14, 2019, the Attorneys filed Debtor's required schedules and other documents, including the Fee Statement. As noted above, the Court's review of the Fee Statement started the chain of events that led to this opinion.
While the Court's investigation regarding the Attorneys' fee practices proceeded, Debtor's chapter 7 case continued to move forward. On October 10, 2019, the Attorneys filed a certificate confirming that Debtor completed a financial management course. On November 5, a creditor filed a reaffirmation agreement with Debtor, which indicates that the Attorneys represented Debtor during the negotiation of that agreement. And, on December 20, Debtor received a chapter 7 discharge.
The Court has jurisdiction herein and venue is proper. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1334(b), 1408, 1409. The review of the Attorneys' fee arrangement with a chapter 7 debtor is a core proceeding regarding which the Court may enter final orders. 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(A).
Attorney fees owed under prepetition agreements are not excepted from a debtor's chapter 7 discharge pursuant to § 523. Rittenhouse v. Eisen, 404 F.3d 395, 396 (6th Cir. 2005). In Rittenhouse, the Sixth Circuit held that this conclusion follows inescapably from the Code's text, and stated that it isn't a court's role to alter legislative policies:
Id. at 397 (quoting Bethea v. Robert J. Adams & Assocs., 352 F.3d 1125, 1128 (7th Cir. 2003)). The Sixth Circuit released its opinion in Rittenhouse not long after the Supreme Court held that a chapter 7 debtor's counsel cannot be paid from estate property absent authorization under § 330(a)(1) and any prepetition attorney's fee due is dischargeable. Lamie v. United States Tr., 540 U.S. 526, 537, 124 S.Ct. 1023, 157 L.Ed.2d 1024 (2004). As a result, an attorney that takes a post-petition action to collect on unpaid prepetition fees as a personal liability of the debtor violates either the automatic stay in § 362(a) or the discharge injunction in § 524. In re Gourlay, 483 B.R. 496, 500 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2012), aff'd 496 B.R. 857 (E.D. Mich. 2013).
The Code requires a debtor's attorney (including counsel representing chapter 7 debtors) to disclose compensation "paid or agreed to be paid . . . for services rendered or to be rendered in contemplation of or in connection with" a bankruptcy case. 11 U.S.C. § 329(a); Henderson v. Kisseberth (In re Kisseberth), 273 F.3d 714, 720 (6th Cir. 2001) ("An attorney in a bankruptcy case has an affirmative duty to disclose fully and completely all fee arrangements and payments."). This disclosure statement typically must be filed within 14 days of the order for relief. FED. R. BANKR. P. 2016(b).
The bankruptcy court, in turn, has an independent duty to examine the fees for reasonableness under § 329(b). See, e.g., In re Ortiz, 496 B.R. 144, 148 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2013) ("The Court has an `independent duty to review any fee application, even in the absence of an objection from an interested party.'" (citation omitted)); Burd v. Walters (In re Walters), 868 F.2d 665, 668 (4th Cir. 1989) ("any payment made to an attorney for representing a debtor in connection with a bankruptcy proceeding is reviewable by the bankruptcy court [under § 329] notwithstanding the source of payment."). In In re Netoche Brigham Fair, Case No. 15-33400-SGJ-13, 2016 WL 3027264, 2016 Bankr. LEXIS 2043 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. May 18, 2016), the court reasoned:
Id. at *13, 2016 Bankr. LEXIS 2043, 2016 WL 3027264, at *48-49 (footnotes omitted)). The Sixth Circuit has explained that "bankruptcy courts have broad and inherent authority to deny any and all compensation where an attorney fails to satisfy the requirements of the Code and Rules." Kisseberth at 721 (citation omitted).
There is no express guidance from the Sixth Circuit (or from courts in this District) on dual contracts for the representation of debtors in chapter 7 cases. Absent such authority, as a matter of first impression in the District, this opinion assesses whether the Attorneys' compensation arrangement with Debtor is permissible.
A debtor's attorney is considered a "debt relief agency" under the Code. 11 U.S.C. § 101(12A); see also Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz v. United States, 559 U.S. 229, 235-36, 130 S.Ct. 1324, 176 L.Ed.2d 79 (2010). Section 528(a) therefore required the Attorneys to satisfy certain obligations:
11 U.S.C. § 528(a).
There is no dispute that the Attorneys and Debtor executed the First Contract at their initial meeting, before the Attorneys filed Debtor's petition. It "clearly and conspicuously" outlined the services that the Attorneys would perform, the fees charged for those services, and the payment terms. Debtor received a fully-executed copy of the First Contract and a copy of the Disclosure that further detailed the Dual Contract Option. There also is no dispute that, at a subsequent, post-petition meeting, Debtor and the Attorneys executed the Second Contract that also "clearly and conspicuously" outlined the post-petition services that the Attorneys would perform, the fees charged for those services, and the payment terms. Debtor also received a fully-executed copy of the Second Contract. The Court concludes that the Attorneys complied with their obligations under § 528(a).
The Code prohibits a "debt relief agency" from advising a debtor to "to incur more debt in contemplation of such person filing a case under this title or to pay an attorney or bankruptcy petition preparer a fee or charge for services performed as part of preparing for or representing a debtor in a case under this title." 11 U.S.C. § 526(a)(4). "[T]he statute contains two distinct prohibitions—one about
With respect to the first prohibition, the Attorneys did not improperly advise Debtor to incur debt in contemplation of bankruptcy. See generally Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, P.A. v. U.S., 559 U.S. 229, 130 S.Ct. 1324, 176 L.Ed.2d 79 (2010) (concluding that a debt relief agency violates the first prohibition if it advises a debtor to incur debt for an invalid purpose designed to manipulate the bankruptcy process). As to the second prohibition, the Eleventh Circuit explained that it "is aimed at one specific kind of misconduct— in essence, a bankruptcy lawyer saying to his client, `You should take on additional debt to pay me!'" Cadwell, 886 F.3d at 1159. As a result, "an attorney violates Section 526(a)(4) if he instructs a client to pay his bankruptcy-related legal fees using a credit card." Id. at 1155. This prohibition does not prevent a debtor from paying their counsel's legal fees directly over time. Here, the Attorneys required Debtor to pay for services under the Second Contract monthly via bank account automatic withdrawals. Accordingly, the Dual Contract Option does not raise concerns under § 526(a)(4).
In addition, the Attorneys do not enter into agreements whereby they sell client accounts receivable; thus, the Court needs not address the propriety of factoring attorneys' fees in this case.
Rule 1006, which implements 28 U.S.C. § 1930, requires bankruptcy filing fee installments to be paid within 120 days after a debtor files a bankruptcy petition. The Rule specifically prohibits a debtor's attorney from receiving any fee payments before the filing fee is fully paid:
FED. R. BANKR. P. 1006(b)(3).
The Second Contract provides that Debtor's monthly payments first will be applied to the amounts owed on her filing fee and then to the interest and principal due under the Second Contract. Debtor's full filing fee was paid by September 22, 2019. The Attorneys confirmed at the hearing that they did not apply payments received from Debtor towards the legal fees owed for post-petition services until after the full amount of Debtor's filing fee was paid. This arrangement complies with Rule 1006(b)(3).
The Attorneys received $300 from Debtor prepetition. In exchange for that payment, they performed specific prepetition legal services under the First Contract. The parties' fee-for-services contractual relationship ended, by its terms, after the Attorneys provided those services. Debtor owed the Attorneys no additional money in exchange for contracted-for services on the petition date. Therefore, Dennery, PLLC properly was not listed as a creditor on Debtor's bankruptcy schedules because Debtor did not owe a debt to the Attorneys as of the petition date, and they had no claim against Debtor. Thus, the issue in Rittenhouse—that a pre-petition agreement to pay attorney fees does not fall within an exception to a chapter 7 discharge under § 523—is not an issue in this case.
On August 14, 2019, the Attorneys filed the Fee Statement required by Rule 2016(b) and § 329(a). The Disclosure accurately stated that Debtor paid the Attorneys $300 prepetition and that Debtor promised to pay them $1,185 post-petition (which includes the $335 filing fee). The UST does not contend that the compensation charged to Debtor for the Attorneys' services is unreasonable.
First, UST correctly notes that attorneys appearing in bankruptcy cases before this Court may not withdraw from representing a debtor absent the Court's approval. Joint Ky. Civ. Prac. R. 83.6 (made applicable by KYEB LR 1001-3). In this case, while the First Contract states that it will terminate upon the completion of the services the Attorneys agreed to provide thereunder, they did not move to withdraw from representing Debtor after they filed the Skeletal Chapter 7 Case. Because Debtor retained the Attorneys again post-petition and they did not attempt to withdraw from this case (with or without the Court's approval) before the Second Contract's execution, the Attorneys did not violate the local rule. The Court leaves for another day the issues that may be raised in other cases upon the post-petition filing of a Motion to Withdraw.
Next, Trustee Baker commented on the Attorneys' fee practices at the hearing and filed a post-hearing brief summarizing his concerns with those practices. [ECF No. 50.] Trustee challenges the structure of the
Trustee notes that the Attorneys met with Debtor prepetition for a significant period (what Debtor described as several hours at her § 341 meeting), far longer than their second, post-petition meeting. He contends that a bankruptcy practitioner must conduct a meaningful initial client interview to understand a potential debtor's options, to provide appropriate advice, and to prepare even a Skeletal Chapter 7 Case and a list of known creditors. His brief effectively assumes that the Attorneys satisfied this obligation to Debtor but argues that they shifted the cost burden for some portion of that initial meeting so that it became a post-petition obligation for Debtor. As a result, Trustee Baker concludes that the Attorneys' payment arrangement with Debtor is flawed.
Trustee Baker compares the amount of work done prepetition (based on the time the Attorneys spent with Debtor) with the amount of work Mr. Baker expects was necessary in this case post-petition. He then assumes that an arrangement to make greater total payments post-petition must be compensating the Attorneys for more extensive prepetition work. The record does not support this assumption.
Under the Second Contract, the Attorneys agreed to have a post-petition meeting with Debtor; to review Debtor's documents and any additional information provided; to prepare and file any documents or other materials required to satisfy Debtor's obligations under the Code that correlate with filing the petition, including the preparation and filing of Debtor's Schedules; to provide necessary information to the UST and to Trustee Baker on Debtor's behalf; to pay the $335 filing fee; to prepare Debtor for, travel to, and attend the § 341 meeting of creditors; and to perform several other tasks. In exchange, the Attorneys agreed to accept $800 as a fee for these post-petition services (plus $335 for advancing the filing fee).
Trustee Baker assumes, in effect, that the Attorneys must charge Debtor a comparable hourly rate for prepetition and post-petition work. This is incorrect. The Attorneys essentially agreed to perform prepetition services for one flat rate and post-petition services for a second flat rate. No party has argued that either flat rate was unreasonable.
Moreover, Trustee Baker does not estimate or provide evidence of the amount of time the Attorneys expended to perform either the pre- or post-petition work. To the extent any evidence in the record bears on this issue, the Second Contract states that the Attorneys bill $200/hour for attorney time and $85/hour for paralegal time. It does not appear unreasonable to the Court that the amount of time the Attorneys may need to devote to post-petition services for Debtor under the Second Contract easily could meet or exceed four hours of attorney time (let alone any time spent by a paraprofessional to assist with document preparation or perform other appropriate tasks). As no party challenges the reasonableness of the post-petition fee, there is no basis to find that the Attorneys will not have to perform sufficient legal work to earn their post-petition fee, or that they are being paid post-petition for prepetition work.
Finally, the Court takes issue with one aspect of the Attorneys' performance of their disclosure requirements under the Code and the Rules. The Fee Statement
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky, by Local Rule 83.3, has determined that the Kentucky Supreme Court Rules govern attorneys practicing before courts in this District. The Kentucky Rules of Professional Conduct provide: "A lawyer may limit the scope of the representation if the limitation is reasonable under the circumstances and the client gives informed consent." Ky. S.C.R. 3.130(1.2). "Reasonable" in this context "denotes the conduct of a reasonably prudent and competent lawyer." Ky. S.C.R. 3.130(1.0(h)). "`Informed consent' denotes the agreement by a person to a proposed course of conduct after the lawyer has communicated adequate information and explanation about the material risks of and reasonably available alternatives to the proposed course of conduct." Ky. S.C.R. 3.130(1.0(e)). The Kentucky Supreme Court has held that "limited-representation agreements . . . are permissible so long as they are reasonable under the circumstances and otherwise comport with our rules of practice and procedure[.]" Persels & Assocs., LLC v. Capital One Bank, 481 S.W.3d 501, 504 (Ky. 2016). No party in this proceeding, including UST, argues that the Attorneys improperly limited the scope of representation of Debtor under Kentucky's Rules of Professional Conduct in the manner effected through the Dual Contract Option.
The first requirement under Kentucky Supreme Court Rule 3.130(1.2) is that the limitation on the scope of the Attorneys' representation had to be reasonable. Debtor approached the Attorneys for bankruptcy representation. At their lengthy initial meeting, based on information that Debtor provided, the Attorneys concluded that it would be appropriate for her to file a chapter 7 case. The Attorneys told Debtor about the two alternatives they offered for chapter 7 representation and explained each one. Debtor chose the Dual Contract Option. Offering the First Contract was a reasonable action that afforded Debtor access to bankruptcy and the benefit of the automatic stay. The Attorneys explained that additional post-petition work was required in her bankruptcy case, and that she should retain counsel to assist with that post-petition work. The Attorneys discussed that they could perform that post-petition work for Debtor under a second fee agreement. A short time thereafter, Debtor had another meeting with the Attorneys, retained them under the Second Contract to perform post-petition services, and agreed to pay the post-petition fees pursuant to a specific monthly payment plan. On these facts, the Court concludes that it was reasonable for the Attorneys to limit the scope of the initial representation to Debtor as effected through the Dual Contract Option.
The second requirement under Kentucky Supreme Court Rule 3.130(1.2) is that, to limit the scope of their services to those set forth in the First Contract, the Attorneys must have obtained Debtor's informed consent in writing. As detailed above, the Attorneys provided a comprehensive written explanation of the Dual Contract Option to Debtor via the Disclosure. They walked through the Disclosure's
The Attorneys' arrangement with Debtor also satisfies other applicable ethics rules. As explained above, the Attorneys took appropriate steps to gather information from Debtor to assess her needs and provide competent representation, which ultimately led to Debtor obtaining a chapter 7 discharge. Ky. S.C.R. 3.130(1.1). No party argues that the agreed-upon arrangement for services resulted in the Attorneys failing to act on Debtor's behalf with reasonable diligence and promptness. Ky. S.C.R. 3.130(1.3). The Attorneys entered into agreements for reasonable fees with Debtor as required. Ky. S.C.R. 3.130(1.5). Those written contracts and the Disclosures allowed Debtor to make informed decisions regarding her representation in the bankruptcy case. Ky. S.C.R. 3.130(1.4(b)).
The Court is aware of authority stating that certain conduct in a bankruptcy proceeding is so fundamental to the representation of a debtor that a reasonable lawyer cannot limit the scope of representation to avoid providing those services. See, e.g., In re Ortiz, supra, 496 B.R. at 149-50 (interpreting New York ethics rules and citing multiple cases for the proposition that counsel's attendance at the § 341 meeting is a "`fundamental and core obligation' of any attorney representing a debtor."). While other courts may reach decisions on how attorneys may limit the scope of their representation of clients based on ethical rules applicable in those cases, the Court finds that the Attorneys' actions and the Dual Contract Option in this case comply with Kentucky's ethical requirements.
In sum, based on the record, the Court finds no ethical problem with or resulting from the agreed-upon fee structure for the Attorneys' representation of Debtor.
It appears to the Court that the Attorneys made great efforts to propose separate fee arrangements that comport with case law in which other attorneys have successfully formulated such arrangements. For example, in In re Slabbinck, 482 B.R. 576 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2012), the bankruptcy court approved a fee arrangement in which counsel provided legal services to chapter 7 debtors using separate prepetition and post-petition agreements. Upon review of pertinent Michigan ethical rules and related authority, the court held that the arrangement was not improper and that the attorney could be compensated for post-petition chapter 7 services under a post-petition agreement.
Similarly, in In re Hazlett, No. 16-30360, 2019 WL 1567751 (Bankr. D. Utah Apr. 10, 2019), a law firm provided chapter 7 services to a debtor whereby the attorney received no prepetition fee and agreed to accept $2,400 post-petition in ten monthly installments. The debtor and the firm executed both a prepetition and a post-petition
Finally, a bankruptcy court accepted an arrangement involving prepetition and post-petition contracts in Walton v. Clark & Washington, P.C., 469 B.R. 383 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2012), stating that "there is nothing inherently wrong with a lawyer giving terms to clients for the payment of legal services." Id. at 386. The prepetition contract presented to the debtor (under which the law firm would prepare and file the chapter 7 petition) detailed the law firm's two-contract system and the client's post-petition options (proceed pro se, retain the law firm, or retain a different attorney or firm). The debtor then would have a two-week period in which to decide which option to pursue, during which time the firm would continue to serve as the debtor's counsel—and the firm would remain in place until the court approved its withdrawal.
Here, the Attorneys assiduously followed the best practices drawn from these cases. They made full disclosures to Debtor so that Debtor could make an informed decision. Their efforts, reasonable fee arrangement, and willingness to provide access to the courts in this manner allowed Debtor to retain and pay for legal counsel and receive a chapter 7 discharge.
Not all multiple fee arrangements will pass muster. Different circumstances involving different debtors may require different processes or even render an arrangement like the one discussed herein an improper practice. But in this instance, the Attorneys proceeded reasonably and after having obtained Debtor's informed consent in writing. They accepted reasonable fees for prepetition work under their prepetition contract and agreed to a reasonable payment arrangement for their fees for post-petition work under their post-petition contract.
As a result, it is ORDERED that the Court will take no action under § 329(b) to disrupt the fee arrangements in this case.
It is further ORDERED that the Attorneys are instructed to provide greater clarity about multiple contract fee arrangements in their Rule 2016(b) disclosures in future cases.
