JOSEPH M. HOOD, Senior District Judge.
This action is before the Court on Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment [Record No. 65]. Plaintiff has filed a Response [Record No. 70], and Defendants have made a Reply in further support of their Motion [Record No. 73]. The Court has also had the benefit of Plaintiff's Surreply [Record No. 76]. This motion is now ripe for decision and, for the reasons stated below, will be granted in part and denied in part.
Plaintiff's amended complaint avers a number of claims against Defendants Jessamine County Fiscal Court, Jessamine County Judge-Executive William Neal Cassity, and Jessamine County Detention Center, in their official capacities, and Jailer Cecil Ray Moss, Deputy Jailer Tami Jean Teaven, Lt. James David Crowe, and Cpt. James Lynn Watts, in both their individual and official capacities. Plaintiff avers that Defendants "were deliberately indifferent to her serious medical needs, resulting in her being forced to endure labor unassisted by any medical personnel, and to give birth to her daughter in the... holdover cell" at the Jessamine County Detention Center ("JCDC") in violation of her Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment. Plaintiff also avers Defendants' failures with respect to hiring, training, supervising, and disciplining JCDC employees led to this deprivation of Plaintiff's constitutional rights. Finally, she avers that Defendants were negligent and intentionally inflicted emotional distress upon her in violation of Kentucky common law. She bases her claims upon the facts set forth below.
Plaintiff was booked into the JCDC on August 25, 2006 at 10:46 p.m. At booking, Plaintiff told Teaven that she was nine months pregnant. Shortly after booking, Plaintiff told Teaven that she was suffering sharp back pains, that she was experiencing vaginal discharge, that the mucous plug had discharged from her cervix, and that she felt the urge to have a bowel movement but was unable to do so. Teaven gave Plaintiff an aspirin substitute at 3:01 AM after Plaintiff again complained to Teaven of cramping and feeling the urge to have a bowel movement although she
Thirty minutes later Plaintiff told Teaven that her water had broken, but Teaven did not call for help. Rather, Teaven told Plaintiff to put her wet pants back on and stop urinating on herself. About forty-five minutes to an hour later, Plaintiff told Teaven that she could feel her baby crowning, but Teaven did nothing in response. Plaintiff informed Teaven that she could not meet with pre-trial services because she felt her "child was coming." Jail officials finally notified EMS at 6:50 A.M. once Teaven became convinced that Plaintiff's amniotic sac had ruptured. Plaintiff blacked out at some point, only to come to with EMS assisting her in delivering her baby.
On the night in question, Jailer Moss was not present at the JCDC, nor is there evidence that anyone was relaying the events at bar to him over the course of the hours that Webb labored. Of those remaining defendants present at the jail, Crowe knew that Webb was pregnant and had a view of the cells that Webb occupied that night from his post. Crowe heard a commotion from where Webb was housed and received Teaven's reports from Teaven. At some point, Crowe approached the door of Webb's cell, which he never entered, and told her to put her clothes back on and to "stop lying ... and stop acting like a child." Watts knew that Plaintiff was pregnant and was aware to some extent of the complaints that prompted Teaven to transfer Webb from one cell to another as she labored, but he heard only reports from Crowe and Teaven. Ultimately, it was Watts who relayed the message from Teaven to another guard that EMS was needed once Teaven decided to make that request.
At the end of it all, Plaintiff delivered a healthy baby and suffered no physical injuries during the delivery, but she was, however, embarrassed and humiliated by the experience.
The standard for summary judgment mirrors the standard for directed verdict. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 251, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). A grant of summary judgment is proper "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c).
The moving party bears the initial burden to show the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). This burden is met simply by showing the court that there is an absence of evidence on a material fact on which the nonmoving party has the ultimate burden of proof at trial. Id. at 325, 106 S.Ct. 2548. The burden then shifts to the nonmoving party to "come forward with some probative evidence to support its claim." Lansing Dairy, Inc. v. Espy, 39 F.3d 1339, 1347 (6th Cir.1994). A material fact is one that may affect the outcome of the issue at trial, as determined by substantive law. A genuine dispute exists on a material fact, and thus summary judgment is improper, if the evidence shows "that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505; Summers v. Leis, 368 F.3d 881, 885 (6th Cir.2004).
Defendants ask this Court to evaluate whether they are entitled to qualified immunity with respect to Plaintiff's § 1983 claims against them in their individual capacity because "government officials performing discretionary functions, generally are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known." Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982). Once Defendants assert that they are due qualified immunity, "the burden of proof [shifts] to the plaintiff to show that the defendant is not entitled to qualified immunity."
In the case at bar, Plaintiff claims that the individual defendants violated the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment when they delayed seeking medical care for her while she was in labor.
As an initial matter, it is well established that simply being pregnant—without more—does not constitute a serious medical condition. See Patterson v. Carroll Cnty. Detention Ctr., No. 05-101-DLB, 2006 WL 3780552, at *3 n. 5, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 92507, at *13 n. 5 (E.D.Ky. Dec. 20, 2006). As with any human condition, however, developments that "require immediate attention" can arise. Id. (quoting Smith v. Franklin Cnty., 227 F.Supp.2d 667, 677 n. 10 (E.D.Ky.2002)); see also Coleman v. Rahija, 1996 WL 939219, at *6, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21702, at *17-18 ("[P]regnancy is not a serious medical need alone but ... certain circumstances may exist in any particular case which would provide the basis for determining that a woman's pregnancy was a serious medical need.").
It comes as no surprise, then, that neither party disputes that an inmate in labor has a serious medical need. See [Record No. 70, p. 6] (citing multiple depositions) ("It has been admitted that an inmate being in labor would constitute a serious medical need."); [Record No. 73, p. 4] (Defendants' Response admitting Plaintiff suffered from a plainly obvious medical condition for which she received timely medical attention). The Court agrees. Simply stated, labor, whether premature as in Patterson or at term as in this case, is the type of development in a normal human condition which requires immediate attention under contemporary standards of decency. Cf. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102, 97 S.Ct. 285, 50 L.Ed.2d 251 (1976) ("[W]e have held repugnant to the Eighth Amendment punishments which are incompatible with `the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.'"). Attended births are the generally accepted norm in the United States, and "[h]aving medical assistance immediately preceding and during a birth is, in today's society, taken for granted."
Defendants argue, however, that Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate with "verifying medical evidence" that she was in labor at any time prior to when her amniotic sac ruptured, i.e., her water "broke," and that, thus, she was not actually experiencing an "objectively, `sufficiently serious'" medical need which triggered an obligation on their part to obtain medical care prior to the time that EMS assistance was sought. Defendants' argument is flawed for the "`verifying medical evidence' requirement is relevant to those claims involving minor maladies or non-obvious complaints of a serious need for medical care." Blackmore v. Kalamazoo County, 390 F.3d 890, 898 (6th Cir.2004). It "does not apply to medical care claims where facts show an obvious need for medical care that laymen would readily discern as requiring prompt medical attention by competent health care providers." Id.
Perhaps anticipating the weakness in their argument, Defendants urge this Court to conclude that a layperson would
Rather than looking for a bright line in the course of labor, Courts consider the amount of time left before a pregnant inmate reaches the full term of her pregnancy, the symptoms of labor that she has exhibited, any previous or potential complications with respect to the inmate's pregnancy, and—ultimately—the reaction of jail officials.
Patterson, who was only four to five months pregnant, had experienced no complications in her pregnancy prior to exhibiting cramping that would have led anyone to take "more robust action" until something other than cramping occurred. Id. The case before this Court is easily distinguishable from that in Patterson. Patterson, unlike Plaintiff, was only in her second trimester and had complained of no "pregnancy-related medical problems" other than cramping for the five-and-a-half weeks she spent in the jail before her water broke. Patterson, No. 05-101-DLB, 2006 WL 3780552, at *1, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 92057, at *1-2. Thus, the comparison of Patterson with Plaintiff, who was nearing or at full term for her pregnancy and exhibiting significant signs of labor when she was booked at the facility where she would give birth less than twelve hours later, provides little useful guidance to this Court.
On the facts before it, the Court concludes that a reasonable jury could conclude that Webb had a "serious medical need" during the overnight hours in which she, at the end of her pregnancy term, experienced readily recognizable symptoms of labor. While the fact that Plaintiff was nine months pregnant alone would not show that a serious medical condition existed, it should have put anyone, including jail officials, on notice that labor and delivery would happen soon. Webb's advanced stage of pregnancy must then be considered together with the fact that, in the hours immediately after her booking, she
On the facts before this Court, Plaintiff could clearly show that it would be obvious to a layperson that she was in labor on the night in question and was, thus, experiencing a serious medical condition. She can, thus, meet the objective burden necessary to show deliberate indifference rising to a violation of the Eighth Amendment.
The Court next considers whether Plaintiff's claims can survive summary judgment by evaluating the subjective portion of the deliberate indifference test. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834, 114 S.Ct. 1970. The subjective portion of the deliberate indifference test inquires into the culpability of a particular defendant, i.e., a defendants' state of mind. Id. at 842, 114 S.Ct. 1970. While Plaintiff need not show "evidence of conscious intent to inflict pain," she "must demonstrate deliberateness tantamount to punish." Horn ex rel. Parks v. Madison County Fiscal Ct., 22 F.3d 653, 660 (6th Cir.1994) (citations omitted). Thus, Plaintiff must "show that the official being sued subjectively perceived facts from which to infer substantial risk to the prisoner, that he did in fact draw that inference, and that he then disregarded that risk." Comstock v. McCrary, 273 F.3d 693, 703 (6th Cir.2001) (citing Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837, 114 S.Ct. 1970). Circumstantial
As an initial matter, the Court finds that a reasonable jury could conclude that Teaven perceived facts necessary to draw an inference that a serious medical condition existed and then disregarded that condition. It is undisputed that Teaven knew Plaintiff was nine months pregnant, and that Plaintiff informed Teaven of or that Teaven was witness to the multiple signs and symptoms of labor that Webb was experiencing on multiple occasions in the hours leading to the delivery of her child at the jail.
Three times Webb told Teaven that her amniotic sac had ruptured before Teaven finally called for help. Teaven even witnessed and made light of Webb's wet clothes, apparently soaked by Webb's amniotic fluid, telling Webb to stop urinating on herself. Teaven does not dispute this account except to say that she thought Plaintiff's complaints were "not real bad." Teaven Deposition, p. 16, line 8. Taking this evidence in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, the nonmoving party, for purposes of this motion Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986), this Court is persuaded that (1) a reasonable jury could find that Teaven perceived facts, first-hand, from which to infer that Plaintiff was in labor, (2) that the circumstantial evidence showed a risk so obvious such that Teaven drew the inference that Plaintiff was in labor, and (3) that Teaven disregarded that risk. See Comstock v. McCrary, 273 F.3d 693, 703 (6th Cir.2001) (citation omitted). Summary judgment is, thus, precluded on the basis of qualified immunity for Teaven so long as the violated right "was `clearly established' at the time of the defendant's alleged misconduct." Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 232, 129 S.Ct. 808, 172 L.Ed.2d 565 (2009). Teaven has not suggested that the right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment by virtue of deliberate indifference to a serious medical need of an inmate was not "clearly established" nor could she in light of long-established case law. See Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104-105, 97 S.Ct. 285; Patterson, 2006 WL 3780552, at *3 n. 5, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 92507, at *13 n. 5. Accordingly, Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment as to Plaintiff's claim of deliberate indifference to Plaintiff's serious medical needs against Teaven in her individual capacity shall be denied.
By contrast, neither Crowe, Watts, nor Moss were as involved with Webb on the night that her child was born. Crowe knew that Webb was pregnant and had a view of the cells that Webb occupied that night from his post. Crowe heard a commotion from where Webb was housed and received Teaven's reports of what was going on—although what Teaven told Crowe is not part of the record before the Court. Webb has testified that in the sole interaction she had with Crowe, he told her through the door of her cell—a room that he never entered—to put her clothes back on and to "stop lying . . . and stop acting like a child," but the Court cannot say with any certainty that he was aware that her amniotic sac had ruptured because the Court does not know what he was told by his colleagues.
In other words, there is no evidence of record which suggests that these Defendants had sufficiently specific knowledge of the outward signs of labor exhibited by Plaintiff in the course of the night. Crowe and Watts could do no more than perceive that an objectively serious risk could become present since Plaintiff was close to the end of her term of pregnancy, but that is not enough. Moss knew nothing because he was not there and there is no evidence that any of these events were communicated to him on the night in question. As a result, this Court will grant Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment as to Plaintiff's claim of deliberate indifference to serious medical needs against Crowe, Watts, and Moss in their individual capacities, as Crowe, Watts, and Moss are entitled to qualified immunity with respect to this claim.
Plaintiff has also averred a cause of action against Defendants, in both their individual and official capacities, for violating her constitutional right of protection from cruel and unusual punishment by being "deliberately indifferent in hiring, training, supervising and disciplining employees, creating widespread practices and customs that gave rise to the violations of Plaintiff's rights outlined therein." [Record No. 45]. Again, Defendants, in their individual capacity, have made a motion for summary judgment based on qualified immunity. Thus, as previously stated, the Court must consider "whether the facts that a plaintiff has . . . shown . . . make out a violation of a constitutional right" and "whether the right at issue was `clearly established' at the time of the defendant's alleged misconduct" to determine whether Defendants may assert qualified immunity as to these claims. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 232, 129 S.Ct. 808, 172 L.Ed.2d 565 (2009).
With respect to her argument that her constitutional rights were violated by the jail's hiring practices, Plaintiff's claim is woefully lacking in form or substance. At best, the Court understands her argument to be that Jailer Moss hired Teaven without confirming that she was, in fact, a certified nursing assistant ("CNA") as claimed on her resume. [See Record No. 70, p. 25] (the only place where the word "hire" appears in Plaintiff's Response or Sur-reply). To succeed on a claim of negligent hiring, Plaintiff would need to show that something in Teaven's record made it plainly obvious that hiring her in such a fashion would lead to the deprivation of Plaintiff's constitutional right. Bd. of
Webb has not articulated, let alone demonstrated with evidence of record, anything about Teaven's application or history which would have made make it plainly obvious to Moss that a constitutional violation would result if Teaven became an employee of the jail. It is not enough for Webb to argue that Moss failed to confirm Teaven's work history and training reported on her application, because she has not articulated and, thus, cannot demonstrate how failure to do so would show that Moss should have know that hiring Teaven would create a serious risk to others and then consciously ignored that risk. Her claim fails.
With respect to Webb's failure to train claim, the Sixth Circuit requires Plaintiff to "point to a specific action of each individual supervisor to defeat a qualified immunity claim." Phillips v. Roane Cnty., 534 F.3d 531, 543-44 (6th Cir.2008). Plaintiff has failed to do so. In the absence of a specific action that the Court might evaluate (or even an account of who was supervising who on the night in question), there can be no genuine issue of material fact. Rather, there is a failure of evidence with respect to Plaintiff's claims against Defendants, in their individual capacity, for failing to train employees.
Neither can Plaintiff demonstrate that any of the defendants violated her constitutional right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment through their deliberate indifference with respect to supervision of jail employees. Since § 1983 liability does not arise from the failure to control employees,
Shehee v. Luttrell, 199 F.3d 295, 300 (6th Cir.1999) (quoting Hays v. Jefferson Cnty., 668 F.2d 869, 874 (6th Cir.1982)).
Plaintiff argues that Jailer Moss encouraged the conduct at bar and, thus, impliedly authorized, approved, or knowingly acquiesced in the conduct of Teaven, Watts, and Crowe when he authorized Teaven, because she was a CNA, to decide when to call for emergency medical assistance for an inmate. This was, she claims, in direct contradiction of state statute and the JCDC policy and procedures manual and somehow injured her. The Court is not immediately persuaded that this authorization was in violation of the JCDC policy and procedures manual, which provided that an "officer confronted with a medical emergency will . . . call the Facility Physician, Physician Assistant, or 911 in accordance with the medical emergency plan, and relay the emergency information." [Record No. 70-35.] According to the Medical Emergency Care Plan, officers were to "[t]elephone the Emergency Transport Unit if needed, and/or the Facility Physician or Physician Assistant," among other things. Id. Further, even though Moss has admitted that a CNA would not be able to make a diagnosis of illness or medical condition in an inmate as would a physician, Webb still has not articulated how the decision to assign that evaluative task to a CNA generally or Teaven, specifically, led to the harm she allegedly experienced upon a theory of failure to supervise. Her claim fails on this ground, as well.
Finally, Plaintiff cannot demonstrate that any defendant violated her
Since Webb has failed to identify a wrong of constitutional proportions with respect to hiring, training, supervision, or discipline, Crowe, Watts, Teaven, and Moss enjoy qualified immunity, and the Court shall grant Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment as to Plaintiff's cause of action against Defendants, in their individual capacities for all remaining allegations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, except as set forth above, and Plaintiff's claim against them shall be dismissed.
Next, the Court understands Plaintiff's cause of action against Defendants in their official capacities as claims against the office they represent, namely the JCDC, which is, in turn, for all purposes the Jessamine County Fiscal Court. See Will v. Mich. Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 70-71, 109 S.Ct. 2304, 105 L.Ed.2d 45 (1989) ("[A] suit against a state official in his or her official capacity is not a suit against the official but rather is a suit against the office."). The Court, therefore, must determine "(1) whether plaintiff's harm was caused by a constitutional violation, and (2) if so, whether the [municipality] is responsible for that violation." Collins v. City of Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 120, 112 S.Ct. 1061, 117 L.Ed.2d 261 (1992).
However, "a local government cannot be sued under § 1983 for an injury inflicted solely by its employees or agents." Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978); Leary v. Daeschner, 349 F.3d 888, 903 (6th Cir.2003)(citing Taylor v. Mich. Dep't of Corr., 69 F.3d 76, 81 (6th Cir.1995)) ("[section] 1983 liability cannot be premised on a theory of respondeat superior."). It is only when the "execution of a government's policy or custom, whether made by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official policy, inflicts the injury that the government as an entity is responsible under § 1983." Id. In order to show a policy or custom, Plaintiff "must (1) identify the municipal policy or custom, (2) connect the policy to the municipality, and (3) show that [her] particular injury was incurred due to the execution of that policy." Alkire v. Irving, 330 F.3d 802, 815 (6th Cir.2003) (numbers in original) (citation omitted). Further, "a plaintiff may be able to prove the existence of a widespread practice that, although not authorized by written law or express municipal policy, is `so permanent and well settled as to constitute a custom or usage' with the force of law." City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 127, 108 S.Ct. 915, 99 L.Ed.2d 107 (1988) (quoting Adickes v. S.H. Kress
Here, Plaintiff's claim against the Jessamine County Fiscal Court and the individual defendants in their official capacities must fail as she has not identified a policy or custom—whether with respect to the provision of care or with respect to hiring, training, supervision, or discipline of JCDC employees—which inflicted her injury and which would make these defendants responsible under § 1983. Webb has not shown that there exists any written law or express municipal policy of the Jessamine County Fiscal Court or the existence of a widespread practice at the JCDC that ultimately caused her injury and which could subject the county to liability.
Plaintiff has drawn the Court's attention to the JCDC policy and procedure manual which sets forth the medical emergency plan for the JCDC, but she fails to articulate how that policy and procedure manual caused her harm. Rather, it strikes the Court that she believes that it was a failure to adhere to that plan which caused her the injury of which she complains. Plaintiff has also argued that Jailer Moss's practice of allowing an officer who is a CNA to decide when to call for additional medical help could qualify as a widespread custom at the JCDC. However, even if this Court accepted that such a practice was a custom for the purposes of this analysis, Webb has not demonstrated how that policy caused her injury because it does not—on its face—direct the conclusion that employees should delay seeking aid for inmates laboring in the jail.
Plaintiff has not demonstrated with evidence any actions on the part of JCDC staff which reveal "deeply embedded traditional ways of carrying out state policy [reflecting] a course of action deliberately chosen from among various alternatives" which can be said to be attributable to the Jessamine County Fiscal Court. Cash v. Hamilton Cnty. Dep't of Adult Probation, 388 F.3d 539, 543 (6th Cir.2004) (quoting Doe v. Claiborne Cnty., 103 F.3d 495, 507-08 (6th Cir.1996)). Rather, the evidence shows, at best, a single set of decisions made and actions taken by an individual or individuals who were jail employees on the night in question, and "[n]o evidence indicates that this was anything more than a onetime isolated event for which the county is not responsible." Fox v. Van Oosterum, 176 F.3d 342, 348 (6th Cir.1999) (citing Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690-91, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978)); see also [Record No. 70, pp. 17-20, pp. 21-25].
Without a municipal policy or custom directing the actions of those employees, Jessamine County Fiscal Court cannot be held liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. On the facts before this Court, no reasonable jury could find that Plaintiff has shown a policy or custom of the Jessamine County Fiscal Court caused her Eighth Amendment rights to be violated and this Court shall grant Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment as to Plaintiff's claims against the Jessamine County Fiscal Court, the JCDC, and the individual defendants in their official capacities. See Cash, 388 F.3d at 543 (quoting Claiborne Cnty., 103 F.3d at 508); see also Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986).
Under Kentucky law, "[b]ecause [Jessamine County] is a political subdivision
Additionally, the absolute immunity from suit afforded to the county, as a political subdivision of the state, also extends to county officials sued in their representative or official capacities when the state is the real party against whom relief is sought. Yanero v. Davis, 65 S.W.3d 510, 518 (Ky.2001). Here, because Plaintiff's claims against the Jessamine County Fiscal Court and the individual defendants in their official capacities allege wrongful operation of the jail, they are claims against the Defendant Jessamine County Fiscal Court and any immunity belonging to the county will also be enjoyed by the individual defendants in their official capacity.
Plaintiff argues, however, that the General Assembly has waived this immunity with respect to the care and keeping of inmates by virtue of KRS § 71.040, which states:
KRS § 71.040. Construing this statute "strictly . . . in favor of the state" absent a clearly expressed intention of the legislature to do otherwise and giving the words "their literal, usual and ordinary meaning" in the absence of any ambiguity, the Court concludes that there has been no waiver of immunity by the legislature by means of KRS § 71.040.
Defendants, in their individual capacities, have also shown that no genuine issue of material fact exists with respect to whether Plaintiff can demonstrate an injury resulting from their negligence. "Negligence, under Kentucky law, requires a showing of duty, breach of duty, and resulting injury."
A genuine issue of material fact exists, however, only to Teaven's actions regarding Plaintiff's negligence claim. Teaven was aware that Webb needed assistance but failed to take action to obtain the care Plaintiff needed. Meanwhile, Plaintiff labored for hours—with all that entails—in a jail cell without assistance. Between the discomfort and the pain from the contractions, the intense pressure that resulted from the baby passing through the labor canal, the bodily fluids that soaked her clothes, and the very intimate act of a baby finally emerging from her body, she claims that she suffered embarrassment and humiliation as she labored and gave birth to her baby, unattended by caregivers and in the face of Teaven's not so tender ministrations, even though fortunately neither Plaintiff nor her child suffered physical harm as a result. The fault, however, is Teaven's if it is anyone's. As explained elsewhere in this Memorandum
That said, Plaintiff has brought forth no evidence to demonstrate that Defendants acted with an "intent to cause Webb emotional distress" as required by Kentucky. See Smith v. Franklin Cnty., 227 F.Supp.2d 667, 683-84 (E.D.Ky.2002) (citing Gross v. Citizens Fid. Bank, 867 S.W.2d 212, 215 (Ky.Ct.App.1993); Rigazio v. Archdiocese of Louisville, 853 S.W.2d 295, 299 (Ky.Ct.App.1993)). While she may be able to demonstrate that Teaven failed to call for aid and that Teaven may have even been somewhat crass in her interactions with Webb while she labored, she has not demonstrated that Teaven or anyone else acted with the necessary intent to cause her emotional distress. Since Plaintiff must "come forward with some probative evidence to support [her] claim" or find herself subject to summary judgment, Lansing Dairy, Inc. v. Espy, 39 F.3d 1339, 1347 (6th Cir.1994), the Court will grant Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment as to Plaintiff's claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress against Defendants in their individual capacities.
For the reasons stated above,
(1) that Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment [Record No. 65] shall be
(2) that Plaintiff's claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the Jessamine County Fiscal Court; the Jessamine County Detention Center; Defendants Cecil Ray Moss, James David Crowe, James Lynn Watts, and Tami Jean Teaven, in their official capacities; and Defendants Cecil Ray Moss, James David Crowe, and James Lynn Watts, in their individual capacities, shall be
(3) that Plaintiff's claim of Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress against all Defendants shall be
(4) that Plaintiff's claim of Negligence against the Jessamine County Fiscal Court; the Jessamine County Detention Center; Defendants Cecil Ray Moss, James David Crowe, James Lynn Watts, and Tami Jean Teaven, in their official capacities; and Defendants Cecil Ray Moss, James David Crowe, and James Lynn Watts, in their individual capacities, shall be
Nonetheless, the Court would be remiss if it did not note that these more recent out-of-hospital births are also largely attended by individuals with training to assist in labor and delivery (making, of course, no assumption about the number of homebirths that were attended by skilled personnel in 1940). For example, of those births at home in 2006, 61% were reported as attended by midwives and 7.6% by physicians. Id. at 4. Only the remaining 36% were attended by "others," some of whom were trained to assist in birth. Id. These "others" included family members, emergency medical technicians, and anyone else would found themselves at the right place at the right time. Id.
All of this is to say that, the notion of "serious medical need" with respect to labor must and has kept up with the times because births attended by trained professionals— whatever the setting—are clearly the norm. Cf. Harmelin v. Mich., 501 U.S. 957, 1014-15, 111 S.Ct. 2680, 115 L.Ed.2d 836 (1991) (quoting Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 369, 109 S.Ct. 2969, 106 L.Ed.2d 306 (1989) and Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 30 S.Ct. 544, 54 L.Ed. 793 (1910)) (observing that the Eighth Amendment has been interpreted "in a flexible and dynamic manner," mindful of the admonition that "time works changes, brings into existence new conditions and purposes. Therefore a principle to be vital must be capable of wider application than the mischief which gave it birth. This is peculiarly true of constitutions.")
