CHARLES R. SIMPSON, III, Senior District Judge.
This matter is in front of the Court on Defendant Chris Woosley's motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. This Court ruled on a similar motion another defendant in this matter filed on July 1, 2015. ECF No. 30. In ruling on that motion, this Court said:
Nov. 23, 2015 Mem. Op. and Order 2, ECF No. 41.
The allegations in the complaint against Woosley nearly mirror those that the Court dismissed for failure to state a claim against Defendant Clanton. Instead of moving to amend the complaint to cure its deficiencies, Plaintiff's counsel provided additional factual allegations in motion practice. For the reasons stated below, the Court will grant Woosley's motion to dismiss.
Plaintiff D.H., a minor proceeding through Richard Harris, alleged over one hundred and fifty causes of action in this case against nine defendants. Plaintiff originally filed this action in Meade County Circuit Court, and Defendants properly removed to this Court. The complaint asserted federal claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1983 and the First and Fourteenth Amendments, and related state claims of wrongful imprisonment, assault, battery, negligent hiring, training, and supervision, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. This Court has already dismissed the majority of these claims. See Mem. Op. and Order November 23, 2015, ECF No. 41; Order July 27, 2015, ECF No. 36.
This Court has issued multiple opinions in the life of this case. At this stage of litigation, it is unnecessary to rehash the factual narrative already set to paper. See July 27, 2015 Mem. Op., ECF No. 35. Plaintiff's remaining claims against Defendant Chris Woosley in his individual capacity are for wrongful imprisonment, assault, battery, and violation of Plaintiff's Fourteenth Amendment rights.
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure "apply to a civil action after it is removed from a state court." Fed. R. Civ. P. 81(c)(1).
When evaluating a motion to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), the Court must determine whether the complaint alleges "sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal quotations and citations omitted). A claim is plausible if "the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Id. (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007)). Although the complaint need not contain "detailed factual allegations," "a plaintiff's obligation to provide the grounds of his entitlement to relief requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (internal quotation marks and alteration omitted). The complaint must "give the defendant fair notice of what the. . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests." Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 127 (2007) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).
The Court does not consider facts or additional documents included in a response to a motion to dismiss that are not alleged in the pleadings. See Weiner v. Klais and Co., Inc., 108 F.3d 86, 88 (6th Cir. 1997). "Matters outside of the pleadings are not to be considered by a court in ruling on a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss." Id. at 88-89 (citing Hammond v. Baldwin, 866 F.2d 172, 175 (6th Cir. 1989)). The Court only considers the allegations in the four corners of Plaintiff's complaint and does not consider the factual matter Plaintiff now asserts in her response to Woosley's motion to dismiss.
Woosley moves this Court to dismiss Plaintiff's claims against him in his personal capacity. The following is the full extent of allegations against Woosley in Plaintiff's complaint:
Pl.'s Compl. ¶¶ 30; 34-37, ECF No. 1-3.
Similar to Plaintiff's allegations against Defendant Clanton, Plaintiff's allegations here may generously be described as mere labels and conclusions without sufficient factual support. Plaintiff does not address the elements of her alleged causes of action and gives insufficient factual matter to "give the defendant fair notice of what the. . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests." Erickson, 551 U.S. at 127 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). While this Court does not require Plaintiff to plead detailed factual allegations, Plaintiff must plead enough factual matter for the Court to determine whether the complaint states "a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (internal quotations and citations omitted). Plaintiff has not met this minimal pleading standard.
Instead of correcting these pleading deficiencies, Plaintiff's counsel now resorts to provoking Defendant Woosley that he "should be well aware of the allegations contained in the Complaint unless he is involved in so many sexual assaults of minor children that he has difficulty recalling which sexual assault of a minor female this Complaint addresses." Resp. 4, ECF No. 48. This is unnecessary and ignores Plaintiff's burden in federal court to plead in the complaint "factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556) (emphasis added).
Plaintiff has not pleaded sufficient facts to state a claim for relief against Defendant Chris Woosley in his individual capacity for wrongful imprisonment, assault, battery, and violation of Plaintiff's Fourteenth Amendment rights. The Court will dismiss these claims against Defendant Woosley without prejudice.
Accordingly, and the Court being sufficiently advised,