THOMAS B. RUSSELL, District Judge.
This matter comes before the Court on Defendant Hartford Life & Accident Insurance Company's ("Hartford") Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings. (Docket No 37.) Plaintiff Richard E. Davis has responded, (Docket No. 56), and Defendant has replied, (Docket No. 58). Fully briefed, this matter is ripe for adjudication. For the reasons enumerated below, the Court will
This dispute arises from Defendant Hartford's denial of Plaintiff Richard E. Davis's disability benefits claim. (Docket Nos. 1 at 2; 27 at 1.) According to Davis, he stopped working in 2011 and "has remained continuously disabled and unable to function on a full time basis in any gainful employment." (Docket No. 1 at 2.) Hartford provided Davis with short term disability benefits from October 2011 through April 2012 and long term disability benefits from April 2012 to April 2014. (Docket Nos. 1 at 2; 5 at 2-3.) Following these two time periods, Hartford terminated Davis's disability benefits. (Docket No. 27 at 1.)
Davis vehemently disagrees with Hartford's decision to terminate his benefits. Davis contends that he is unable "to engage in full-time gainful employment." (Docket No. 1 at 2.) Davis states that his treating physician has diagnosed him with "multiple myeloma without remission . . . [and] chronic pain syndrome secondary to multiple compression fractures." Id. at 2-3. Davis alleges that according to his treating oncologist, "he is limited to sitting no more than [one] hour per day, standing or walking no more than [one] hour per day, with work activity limited to [one] hour per day." Id. at 3. Davis further states that his physician limited him to "lifting up to [ten] pounds infrequently." Id. Ultimately, Davis notes that his treating physician concluded he "is not capable of functioning in a sedentary work capacity." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Davis argues that he has and continues to satisfy the requirements of Hartford's long term disability insurance policy and, therefore, he is entitled to continue to receive monthly benefits. Id.
Following Hartford's termination of his benefits, Davis filed this action and asserted claims for Breach of Contract (denial of benefits), Breach of Fiduciary Duty, and Disgorgement. (Docket No. 1 at 5-7.) Davis has brought a claim for Breach of Contract pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B), seeking to "obtain past benefits, to receive reinstatement for payment of future benefits, and to obtain declaratory relief." Id. at 5-6. However, only Davis's claims for Breach of Fiduciary Duty and Disgorgement, through which he seeks equitable relief, are at issue at this time. (Docket No. 37 at 1.) In his Complaint, Davis alleges that Hartford breached its fiduciary duty to him and "all other participants" by
(Docket No. 1 at 6.) As a result of these allegations, Davis is seeking equitable relief pursuant to 29 U.S.C. §1132(a)(3), "including enjoining Hartford's claims practices that violate the terms of the plan and ERISA, redressing such violations, and/or enforcing provisions of the plan and ERISA." Id. Davis has also brought a claim for disgorgement pursuant to 29 § U.S.C. 1132(a)(1)(B), (a)(3). Under this claim, Davis contends that "[a]s a result of its delayed payment of his monthly benefits[,] . . . Hartford has accumulated earnings on the plan benefits otherwise payable to [him] [and therefore those] accumulated earnings are rightfully" his property. Id. at 6-7.
The Court will address Davis's claims for breach of fiduciary duty and disgorgement below.
Under the Rule 12(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, "a party may move for judgment on the pleadings." Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c). A court is to apply the same standard to a motion for judgment on pleadings that it applies to a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Warrior Sports, Inc. v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 623 F.3d 281, 284 (6th Cir. 2010) (citing EEOC v. J.H. Routh Packing Co., 246 F.3d 850, 851 (6th Cir. 2001)). "For purposes of a motion for judgment on the pleadings, all well-pleaded material allegations of the pleadings of the opposing party must be taken as true, and the motion may be granted only if the moving party is nevertheless clearly entitled to judgment." JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. v. Winget, 510 F.3d 577, 581 (6th Cir. 2007) (quoting Southern Ohio Bank v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 479 F.2d 478, 480 (6th Cir. 1973)). The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals has stated that a Rule 12(c) motion for judgment on the pleadings, "is granted when no material issue of fact exists and the party making the motion is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Id. (quoting Paskvan v. City of Cleveland Civil Serv. Comm'n, 946 F.2d 1233, 1235 (6th Cir. 1991)).
This dispute involves the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 ("ERISA"). See 29 U.S.C. § 1001 et seq. "ERISA protects employee pensions and other benefits by providing insurance, . . . specifying certain plan characteristics in detail, . . . and by setting forth certain general fiduciary duties applicable to the management of both pension and nonpension benefit plans." Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489, 496 (1996).
Here, Defendant Hartford argues that Davis's claims for breach of fiduciary duty and disgorgement fail as a matter of law because the relief that Davis is seeking under 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B) will make him whole "in the form of an award of benefits, attorney's fees, costs and pre-judgment interest." (Docket No. 37 at 1.) Consequently, according to Hartford, Davis's claims for breach of fiduciary duty and disgorgement "provide an impermissible duplicative recovery, contrary to clear Supreme Court and Sixth Circuit precedent." Id. (quoting Rochow v. Life Ins. Co. of N. Am., 780 F.3d 364, 371 (6th Cir. 2015)). In response, Davis contends that his claims for breach of fiduciary duty and disgorgement are permitted and meet the pleading standard under ERISA. (Docket No. 56 at 6-13.)
This Court has previously addressed the interplay between 29 U.S.C § 1132(a)(1)(B) and § 1132(a)(3) in its opinion in Hackney v. Lincoln Nat. Life Ins. Co., No. 3:11-CV-00268-TBR, 2014 WL 3940123, at *3-4 (W.D. Ky. Aug. 12, 2014). As this Court explained:
Hackney, 2014 WL 3940123, at *3-4. This Court's analysis in Hackney makes clear that if Davis's claim for breach of contract under § 1132(a)(1)(B) provides adequate relief for his alleged injury, his claims for equitable relief under §1132(a)(3) are not viable.
This Court finds that Davis's alleged injury can indeed be fully remedied by his claim for breach of contract under § 1132(a)(1)(B). Though Davis makes numerous allegations as part of his breach of fiduciary duty claim that Hartford's claims process is systematically flawed, "ultimately, the only injury [he] purports to have suffered is loss of benefits—an injury § 1132(a)(1)(B) is designed to address."
As Davis's claim for breach of contract under § 1132(a)(1)(B) provides adequate relief for his only alleged injury, Hartford's denial of his disability benefits, his claims for breach of fiduciary duty and disgorgement must fail as a matter of law.
For the aforementioned reasons, Defendant's Motion for Partial Judgment on the Pleadings is