CHARLES R. SIMPSON, III, District Judge.
This matter is before the court for consideration of the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Recommendation (the "report," DN 27) of the United States Magistrate Judge which recommends that we affirm the decision of the Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") denying the plaintiff disability insurance benefits and supplemental security income benefits. The claimant, Cheryl L. Scott Brown ("Brown"), has not objected to the report. The court has considered both the report and the record in the case, and concludes that the report of the magistrate judge should be accepted and adopted, and the decision of the ALJ should be affirmed.
This matter is before the court on remand from the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. The court is thus constrained by the Sixth Circuit's directive "to consider whether the ALJ erred in failing to address the side effects of Brown's medication." ( DN 19, p. 7). This judge had no involvement in the matter prior to this remand.
In his report, the magistrate judge noted that Brown's claim of disabling side effects was recognized by the ALJ but not discussed in any greater detail than his determination that Brown's own statements concerning the extent to which she is affected by her medications were not credible, as the medical record did not support a finding of total disability. Indeed, Brown's claim of totally disabling drowsiness, nausea, and dizziness from her medications was considered by the ALJ in the context of the entire record. He stated as much in the decision: "In making this finding, I have considered all symptoms and the extent to which these symptoms can reasonably be accepted as consistent with the objective medical evidence and other evidence..." (DN 7-2, p. 6). As noted by the magistrate judge, there is a complete absence of evidence in the medical record to substantiate Brown's claim of debilitating side effects from medication. Brown's testimony before the ALJ stands alone in this record. While the ALJ did not elaborate on the conclusion, he clearly reached a conclusion regarding her credibility upon failing to find any support for the seemingly sincere statements offered by Brown. On remand of this issue, Brown offered nothing beyond mere disagreement with the ALJ's credibility determination.
The magistrate judge correctly noted that the regulations recognize that intensity and persistence of a person's symptoms may "suggest a greater severity of impairment than can be shown by objective medical evidence alone." 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(3).
As explained in Walters v. Commissioner of Social Security, 127 F.3d 525, 531-32 (6
The regulations indicate that if disabling severity cannot be shown by objective evidence alone, the Commissioner will also consider other factors, such as daily activities and the type and dosage of medication taken. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.159(c)(3). In so doing, the Commissioner has the power and discretion to weigh all of the evidence and resolve the significant conflicts in the administrative record. See Bradley, 862 F.2d at 1227.
As noted, however, here there is no objective medical evidence at all suggesting a disabling severity of side effects from medications — neither objective tests nor any physician's observations or opinions.
The magistrate judge determined that the ALJ's credibility determination was, in fact, supported by an adequate basis, and that the ALJ did not err. We agree.
For the reasons set forth herein and the court being otherwise sufficiently advised,