CHARLES R. SIMPSON, III, Senior District Judge.
This case is before the Court on Defendant Jarrow Formulas, Inc.'s Motion for Leave to Take a Two-Hour Rule 30(b)(6) Deposition of Plaintiff and to Compel Production of an Unredacted Email Between Plaintiff and Its Vendor. DNs 276, 279.
At the outset of discovery in this case, Jarrow Formulas served a number of requests for admission (RFA). DN 276-3. Two were targeted at determining the specific processes Caudill had used in producing its broccoli seed product:
DN 276-3 at 5-6. Caudill responded to each that "Plaintiff is without sufficient knowledge to admit or deny this allegation and therefore, at this time, must deny it." Ibid.
The Court subsequently ordered the parties to supplement discovery responses. DN 166. Caudill supplemented some of its responses, but did not supplement RFAs 21 or 23. Jarrow moved to compel those responses. DN 192. The Court granted the motion, specifically ordering Caudill to file supplemental responses to RFAs 21 and 23. DN 253 at 13. Caudill then filed supplemental responses, stating:
DN 276-7 at 11-12.
Jarrow then moved for sanctions based on Caudill's failure to comply with the Court's order to supplement their discovery responses. DN 259. The Court, noting that Caudill "had enough time" to verify its denials, found that Caudill had failed to fully comply with the magistrate judge's order. DN 271 at 14. The Court then ordered that the RFAs would be deemed unequivocally denied unless Caudill unequivocally admitted them. Id. at 14-15. Caudill made no supplementation, so the Court deems RFAs 21 and 23 unequivocally denied. Afterward, Caudill produced the documents it had requested from one of its vendors, NATECO2. DN 278-1 (sealed). The document details the specific temperature and pressures used to treat broccoli seed at NATECO2's laboratory in Germany. One page of the document contains a redaction undertaken by Caudill unilaterally.
Jarrow's motion contains two interrelated requests. First, Jarrow moves for leave to depose Caudill regarding its processes, the NATECO2 document, and the now-denied RFAs 21 and 23. Second, Jarrow moves to compel the production of an unredacted email from NATECO2 to Caudill.
In determining whether a deposition should be permitted after the close of discovery, the Court applies the standard for amending a scheduling order found in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16(b)(4). That rule provides that the "schedule may be modified only for good cause." F. R. CIV. P. 16(b)(4). The primary measure of Rule 16's "good cause" standard is the moving party's diligence in attempting to meet the scheduling order's requirements, though courts may also consider prejudice to the nonmoving party. Inge v. Rock Fin. Corp., 281 F.3d 613, 625 (6th Cir. 2002).
The production of new information after a deposition has concluded usually provides sufficient justification for amending the scheduling order and permitting additional depositions. Babcock Power, Inc. v. Kapsalis, 3:13-CV-717-CRS, 2015 WL 9257759, at *4 (W.D. Ky. Dec. 17, 2015) (good cause for subsequent deposition when documents later produced were unavailable at the time of the first deposition). See also G & E Real Estate, Inc. v. Avison Young-Washington, D.C., LLC, 323 F.R.D. 67, 71 (D.D.C. 2017) ("Given the indisputable fact that additional relevant materials have been produced by Plaintiff after the close of the discovery period, the Court finds good cause for reopening discovery in this case."); In re Rail Freight Fuel Surcharge Litigation, 281 F.R.D. 12, 14-15 (D.D.C. 2011) (good cause for additional deposition when documents produced on last day of discovery after first deposition had already occurred). Subsequent depositions are generally limited in scope to topics not covered in the first deposition or to the topics or documents which necessitated the second deposition. See e.g. Babcock Power, 2015 WL 9257759, at *4 ("Plaintiffs are warned that they are not to cover topics already covered at the [first] deposition"); In re Rail Freight Fuel, 281 F.R.D. at 15 (limiting scope to the disclosed notes and surrounding context).
The parties undertake lengthy arguments as they try to blame each other for the current predicament. For example, a primary dispute seems to be whether Caudill undertook the "reasonable inquiry" mandated by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 36(a)(4) before asserting a lack of knowledge or information as a reason for failing to admit or deny RFAs 21 and 23.
The purpose of requests for admission is to avoid the time, trouble, and expense associated with proving uncontested issues at trial. Jarrow has repeatedly attempted to get an unequivocal admission or denial out of Caudill on this specific issue, which Caudill has refused to give. Afterward, at the close of the extended discovery period permitted by Court order, Caudill produced a document which directly relates to Caudill's responses to RFAs 21 and 23.
On balance, the Court believes that Jarrow has been diligent in attempting to meet the scheduling order's requirements and that Caudill would not be prejudiced by permitting an additional Rule 30(b)(6) deposition of Caudill. Therefore, the Court will grant the motion for leave to conduct a deposition of Caudill. This deposition will be limited in scope to discussing the content of RFAs 21 and 23, including Caudill's specific processes undertaken through its vendors. The subjects listed in Jarrow's Notice of Deposition are adequately narrow. See DN 276-5 at 8-9.
Caudill produced an email from its vendor NATECO2 with a redacted block of text. DN 278-1 at 6. In response to Jarrow's motion to compel, Caudill asserts that "[t]he single redacted element that Jarrow complains of in its Motion for Leave relates to ongoing and future product development by Caudill, beyond the scope of anything contemplated in the subject Requests for Admission." DN 282 at 5-6. These issues have arisen before and been promptly resolved by the magistrate. See Caudill Seed and Warehouse Co., Inc. v. Jarrow Formulas, Inc., No. 3:13-CV-82-CRS, 2017 WL 4799815, at *7 (W.D. Ky. Oct. 24, 2017) (DN 253). Therefore, the Court will order Caudill to produce an unredacted version of the email to the magistrate for review and appropriate order in accordance with this Court's previous referral order. DN 157.
For the reasons set forth above, and the Court being otherwise sufficiently advised, the Court: