DAVID J. HALE, District Judge.
This matter is before the Court upon a motion to dismiss this action for failure to meet the notice-pleading standard of Fed. R. Civ. P. 8 and for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction (Docket No. 23). Fully briefed, this matter is ripe for review. For the following reasons, the Court will grant the instant motion.
Pro se Plaintiff Vivian Janet Bowman filed the instant employment-discrimination action against Defendants David Fiorini and Kristen Cunningham, the assistant principal and office manager at East Oldham Middle School, respectively, where Plaintiff was briefly employed as a substitute teacher.
Plaintiff begins the complaint (DN 1) as follows:
Plaintiff first makes specific allegations regarding the day of April 24, 2019. She alleges that Defendant Cunningham treated her rudely on that day when she would not help Plaintiff find the lesson plans she needed as the substitute teacher. Plaintiff then states that, at the end of that day, Defendant Fiorini asked her to come to the office with him and replaced her "with this large size woman who has looks of masculine woman which is completely the opposite of my small feminine look." She states that Defendant Fiorini then told her she was not going to be "allowed to substitute teach again in that school" because she does not follow lesson plans or "have classroom management." She then alleges that Defendant Fiorini "falsely blames me that a boy student got his head hit by a ball or he hit his own head on the gym floor during PE class on February 14, 2019. . . . Hateful liar Defendant Fiorini knows the truth yet he wants to place his hateful prejudice, discrimination against me. . . ." She further states that the "United States Federal Court needs to know the ludicrous, immoral, leading to pervert language, liar words spoken by Defendant [] Fiorini — this Defendant [] Fiorini was becoming a pedophile there in his office." Plaintiff next alleges she then ran out the door because she was "afraid of a more serious attack" and that Defendant Cunningham told her to "get back in Mr. Fiorini's office" and "other nonsense words to show that she and [] Defendant Fiorini work together to show hate, age discrimination towards me. I only say to her `yes madam' as I run out that door." In another section of the complaint, Plaintiff states that on one occasion Defendant Fiorini "sneaked into my classroom . . . I saw him squatting very low at BOY students desk! . . . there is no telling what he was doing in such low inappropriate places with boy students."
Plaintiff concludes her complaint as follows:
In the section of the Court-supplied complaint form which instructs Plaintiff to state briefly and precisely what damages or other relief the plaintiff asks the court to order, she writes, "Defendants are guilty of doing a hate crime against me" (DN 1-1).
The Court recognizes that pro se pleadings are to be held to a less stringent standard than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972). The duty to be less stringent with pro se complaints, however, "does not require [the Court] to conjure up unpled allegations," McDonald v. Hall, 610 F.2d 16, 19 (1st Cir. 1979) (citation omitted), and the Court is not required to create a claim for a pro se plaintiff. Clark v. Nat'l Travelers Life Ins. Co., 518 F.2d 1167, 1169 (6th Cir. 1975). To command otherwise would require the "courts to explore exhaustively all potential claims of a pro se plaintiff, [and] would also transform the district court from its legitimate advisory role to the improper role of an advocate seeking out the strongest arguments and most successful strategies for a party." Beaudett v. City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1278 (4th Cir. 1985).
Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires that a complaint contain:
Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007)). "A pleading that offers `labels and conclusions' or `a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.' Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders `naked assertion[s]' devoid of `further factual enhancement.'" Id. (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 557). Conclusory allegations or bare legal conclusions will not suffice as factual allegations. Followell v. Mills, 317 F. App'x 501, 505 (6th Cir. 2009) ("Conclusory allegations or legal conclusions masquerading as factual allegations will not suffice."); Gregory v. Shelby Cty., Tenn., 220 F.3d 433, 446 (6th Cir. 2000) ("[W]e need not accept as true legal conclusions or unwarranted factual inferences.").
Upon the Court's review of the complaint, the Court finds that it does not state coherent allegations to establish the Court's jurisdiction, to show that Plaintiff is entitled to relief, or to state any claim for the relief sought. The pleadings, therefore, fail to meet the basic pleading standard required by Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2).
Furthermore, "a district court may, at any time, sua sponte dismiss a complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure when the allegations of a complaint are totally implausible, attenuated, unsubstantial, frivolous, devoid of merit, or no longer open to discussion." Apple v. Glenn, 183 F.3d 477, 479 (6th Cir. 1999). A complaint is "frivolous" if it lacks an arguable basis in law or fact. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). A claim lacks an arguable basis in fact if it is "`premised on clearly baseless factual allegations that describe fantastic or delusional scenarios, rising to the level of the irrational or the wholly incredible.'" Selvy v. Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev., 371 F.Supp.2d 905, 908 (E.D. Mich. May 31, 2005) (quoting Tenn. ex rel. David Francis Fair v. Comm'r, No. 3:04-cv-494, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26677 (E.D. Tenn. Nov. 4, 2004)). Even liberally construing the pro se complaint, which the Court must do, the Court concludes that the allegations meet this standard.
Thus,
The Court will enter a separate Order dismissing this action for the reasons stated herein.