JOHNSON, Justice.
We granted this writ application involving Louisiana's motion picture investor tax credit to address the correct interpretation of La. R.S. 47:6007, specifically as amended by Act 456, Section 3(C) of the 2007 Regular Session of the Louisiana Legislature ("Act 456"). The issue raised is whether Section 3(C) of Act 456 provides a time limitation for expenditures which would qualify for tax credits such that no tax credits can be earned on expenditures incurred after January 1, 2010.
For the reasons that follow, we reverse the decision of the court of appeal, and hold that Section 3(C) of Act 456 provides that no tax credits may be earned on expenditures incurred after January 1, 2010.
The State of Louisiana provides for certain motion picture investor tax credits, including tax credits for "State-certified infrastructure projects," set forth in La. R.S. 47:6007. Seeking to take advantage of these tax credits, Red Stick Studio Developments, L.L.C. ("Red
The Louisiana motion picture investor tax credit program is administered by the Office of Entertainment Industry Development ("OEID"),
At the time Red Stick filed its application with the State, La. R.S. 47:6007 generally provided for a tax credit of twenty-five percent of the base investment, and allowed an additional fifteen percent tax credit until January 1, 2008. Thus, the available tax credits totaled forty percent. However, during the 2007 Regular Session, while Red Stick's application was pending, the Louisiana Legislature enacted Act 456, which amended La. R.S. 47:6007 to impose certain limits on these tax credits. Act 456 included a "grandfather clause" relative to applications filed
Red Stick's application proceeded through the State's review and approval process, and Red Stick and the State negotiated terms and conditions relative to the proposed project. On August 27, 2007, the State issued an Initial Certification Letter to Red Stick for its proposed project. However, this letter also included paragraph (ii), containing the following language: "[S]ince this application was filed on or before August 1, 2007, the applicant shall have until January 1, 2010 to earn tax credits on this project." Red Stick disagreed with the language in paragraph (ii), contending the State had confused "earning the credits" with "qualifying to earn the credits," contrary to the language of Section 3(C).
Red Stick filed a Petition for Writ of Mandamus on November 13, 2008, asking the court to direct the State to remove the requirements contained in paragraph (ii) of the Initial Certification Letter and either not replace them or replace them with language taken directly from Section 3(C). Red Stick amended its petition for Mandamus, seeking a declaratory judgment that Section 3(C) does not provide a time limitation for expenditures which would qualify for tax credits and that tax credits may be earned on expenditures beyond January 1, 2010. Red Stick took the position that as long as it received the Initial Certification Letter, and made the minimum spend (i.e., twenty percent or $10 million) within twenty-four months of January 1, 2008 (i.e., January 1, 2010), it is entitled to forty percent tax credits on all expenditures until the project is completed. The State asserted that Red Stick is only entitled to forty percent tax credit on expenditures made by January 1, 2010, and entitled to no tax credits after that date.
On December 3, 2008, the parties entered into a stipulation pursuant to which the State provided Red Stick with a new Initial Certification Letter, subsequently issued on January 14, 2009, and replaced paragraph (ii) of the original letter with language citing Section 3(C) of Act 456. The parties further agreed that if a final judgment in the pending action declares, or if a future statutory amendment or enactment by the legislature provides, that Section 3(C) of Act 456 does not provide a time limitation for expenditures which would qualify for tax credits, and that tax credits may be earned on expenditures beyond January 1, 2010, then Red Stick shall be entitled to earn tax credits on this project for expenditures during a period of the lesser of sixty months from the date of final judgment or effective date of legislation, or seventy-eight months from the
Red Stick's declaratory judgment action came to trial on March 10, 11, 12, 13 and 16, 2009. The parties presented extensive evidence relative to Red Stick's application process and the legislative history of Act 456, including testimony of various legislators and other witnesses regarding their understanding of Section 3(C) and legislative intent. Following trial, the trial court ruled in favor of Red Stick, finding the statute was clear and unambiguous and that Red Stick qualified for the tax credits when it received its pre-certification letter and made the minimum spend. The trial court held that Red Stick had from that point until it finishes the project to claim the forty percent tax credit. The stipulation between the parties was also made part of the judgment. Because it found the statute to be clear and unambiguous, the trial court stated it was not required to look to legislative intent. However, the court went on to note that even if it were to look at legislative intent, it was embodied in the testimony of Taylor Townsend, Chairman of the House and Ways Committee who authored Act 456 and supported Red Stick's position.
The State appealed the trial court's ruling regarding the interpretation of Section 3(C) and also challenged the trial court's ruling allowing legislators and non-legislators to give testimony regarding their interpretation of the statute and legislative intent. The court of appeal affirmed the trial court, finding that Section 3(C) of Act 456 is clear and unambiguous, and its application does not lead to absurd consequences.
In a footnote, the court of appeal stated that if it were to look past the language of Act 456 and consider other evidence of record in search of the intent of the Legislature, its conclusion would remain the same, i.e., that the Legislature passed Act 456 with no deadline for incurring expenditures for "grandfathered projects." Noting the full record made by the trial court, the court of appeal found the Legislature intended to establish a minimum expenditure of $10 million or twenty percent of the total base investment to be expended within the twenty-four month time period before a project is able to earn any tax credits. Moreover, the court of appeal found no error in the trial court's decision to allow numerous witnesses, including legislators, to testify concerning their interpretation of Section 3(C), citing La. R.S. 24:177.
The State of Louisiana
Tax credits for motion picture investors in Louisiana were first provided for in 1992 with the enactment of La. R.S. 47:6007.
In 2005, the legislature enacted Act 456 of 2005, substantially amending La. R.S. 47:6007. Act 456 of 2005 authorized for the first time income tax credits for "State-certified infrastructure projects." The State's objective was to encourage development of a Louisiana film, video, television and digital production and post-production infrastructure with state-of-the-art facilities. La. R.S. 47:6007(A)(2)(c)(2005). Relative to tax credits for infrastructure projects, Act 456 of 2005 provided that if the total base investment was greater than $300,000, each investor was allowed a tax credit of twenty-five percent of the base investment, and further allowed an additional fifteen percent tax credit until January 1, 2008. Thus, the available tax credits totaled forty percent.
During the 2007 Regular Session, the Legislature again amended La. R.S. 47:6007 by Act 456. Act 456 provided for infrastructure tax credits through January 1, 2009, but imposed limits on those tax credits for applications filed after August 1, 2007. Act 456 limited infrastructure credits primarily by increasing and imposing a deadline on the minimum spend necessary to obtain credits, imposing a six-month deadline to begin construction, and imposing a $25 million per project cap on the tax credits. Of significance to the Red Stick infrastructure project is the grandfather clause set forth in Section 3(C) of Act 456, which addressed applications filed on or before August 1, 2007. (See supra, p. 3).
The issue before us is the correct interpretation of Section 3(C). Because this matter involves the interpretation of a statute, it is a question of law, and is thus reviewed by this Court under a de novo standard of review. Thibodeaux v. Donnell, 2008-2436, p. 3 (La.5/5/09), 9 So.3d 120, 122. After our review, we "render judgment on the record, without deference to the legal conclusions of the tribunals below. This court is the ultimate arbiter of the meaning of the laws of this state." Holly & Smith Architects, Inc. v. St. Helena Congregate Facility, Inc., 2006-0582, p. 9 (La.11/29/06), 943 So.2d 1037, 1045.
As this Court explained in M.J. Farms, Ltd. v. Exxon Mobil Corp.:
2007-2371, p. 13 (La.7/1/08), 998 So.2d 16, 27 (internal citations omitted). With these principles in mind, we examine the language of Section 3(C).
As previously stated, Section 3(C) of Act 456 provides:
The State argues Section 3(C) is susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation, and therefore is not clear and unambiguous. The State argues the use of the past tense in "qualify for tax credits earned on expenditures" clearly suggests that credits must be actually earned. The words do not say qualify for credits which "will be earned" or "to be earned." Thus, the statute can be interpreted to mean an application does not qualify for tax credits until expenditures are made, and there is a twenty-four month window for making such expenditures. Moreover, the State argues that "qualify" means to be entitled to a particular benefit or privilege by fulfilling a necessary condition. Therefore, an applicant has twenty-four months within which to qualify for the forty percent tax credits earned on expenditures, and the necessary condition which must be fulfilled is the expenditure of monies. Further, the clear wording of the statute suggests the minimum spend is simply a condition for earning tax credits in the year in which expenditures are made.
Red Stick argues the words of Act 456 are clear and unambiguous. Red Stick asserts the State's interpretation leads to absurd consequences because under that interpretation grandfathered projects would be treated worse under Act 456 than they would have been treated under Act 456 of 2005, where projects would have been entitled to at least twenty-five percent credits. Further, had the legislature intended to require that the entirety of the total base investment be made prior to the expiration of the twenty-four month period, there was no reason to require infrastructure projects spend at least twenty percent or $10 million dollars on the unique to film infrastructure elements.
Red Stick argues that "application" as used in Section 3(C) clearly means the filing submitted to obtain certification. Red Stick points to other usage of the word "qualify" in the statute which suggests that "qualify" means "submit an accepted application." In the context of Act 456, the only reasonable conclusion is that the deadline set forth in the first sentence of Section 3(C) is a deadline for applications
Without much analysis or explanation, the lower courts both concluded that Act 456 is clear and unambiguous, and supports Red Stick's position. However, in light of the language used in Section 3(C), and considering the parties' arguments relative to its meaning, we find the words "to qualify for" to be ambiguous. Looking strictly at the language of Section 3(C), we find both of the interpretations provided by the parties to be plausible. Thus, to correctly interpret Section 3(C) of Act 456, we must examine the legislative intent behind the statute.
We first address the State's argument that the appellate court erred in allowing the testimony of legislators and other witnesses concerning their interpretations of Section 3(C) to be admitted at trial. While the lower courts did not rely on this testimony to reach their decisions, we review this matter de novo, and have the benefit of the full record made below, including evidence of legislative history and the testimony of numerous witnesses, including legislators, relative to their understanding of Section 3(C). We do not find the testimony of the legislators or the other witnesses to be inadmissible per se in this case. Some of this testimony is relevant to understand the history of Act 456. Nevertheless, we decline to consider the opinions of the legislators or other witnesses as to the meaning of the statute or the legislature's intent in passing Section 3(C) of Act 456. How Red Stick, State employees, or even an individual legislator interpreted Section 3(C) is irrelevant. The only relevant issue is the intent of the entire legislature in enacting Act 456.
This Court has recognized "that the post-enactment statements of legislators on legislative intent have generally been excluded as having `limited value to an understanding of the clear meaning and legal effect of a statute.'" East Baton Rouge Parish School Board v. Foster, 2002-2799, p. 22 (La.6/6/03), 851 So.2d 985, 999 (internal citations omitted). Further, "the understanding of one member, or even a few members, of the legislature is not determinative of legislative intent." Id. This same viewpoint is generally applied in state and federal courts nationwide. See Norman J. Singer & J.D. Shambie Singer, Sutherland Statutes and Statutory Construction, § 48.16 (7th ed.2010); P. Raymond Lamonica & Jerry G. Jones, 20 Louisiana Civil Law Treatise: Statutory Construction, § 7.11(2010 ed.). Keeping these guidelines in mind, we look to the contemporaneous legislative history, made part of the record below, to determine the Legislature's intent in passing Section 3(C) of Act 456.
Act 456 originated as House Bill 936 ("HB 936"), authored by Representative Taylor Townsend.
Relative to the proposed amendment, Ms. McConnell explained:
In response to questioning about potential exposure to the State, Ms. McConnell testified that if all pending infrastructure projects came to fruition, the exposure to the State fisc would be approximately $1.5 billion. Jerry Luke LeBlanc, Commissioner of Administration, also testified regarding the bill and amendments, explaining that the proposed bill allowed tax credits to be disbursed over several years.
HB 936 moved to the House Appropriations Committee. The transcript of the Committee meeting on June 7, 2007, reflects that Representative Townsend explained HB 936 to the Committee stating:
He proceeded to "walk" the Committee through the bill. The bill contained a grandfather clause set forth in proposed Amendment 3. The proposed amendment provided the following language:
The Committee Chairman, Representative John Alario, asked that the amendment be offered, and Representative Townsend asked Bobby Freeman
He further explained: "And this would allow those large, big projects
Later, relative to Amendment 3, Mr. Townsend stated:
Bill Black, point person in the DOA for HB 936, was also present at the Committee meeting and expressed no disagreement with these statements. He testified relative to the bill, explaining that it gave the State authority to negotiate a multi-year payout of the tax credit.
HB 936 moved to the House floor, where it passed unanimously. The bill was then referred to the Senate Committee on Revenue and Fiscal Affairs. The transcript of the meeting of that Committee on June 20, 2007, shows that Ms. McConnell and Mr. Black both testified regarding the grandfather clause amendment. The transcript reflects the following colloquy occurred relative to the twenty-four month period (emphasis added):
HB 936 then moved to the Senate floor, where it was amended to add a "minimum spend," which initially provided for a twenty-five percent of the total base investment before any credits could be earned. The Senate also adopted an amendment providing that the twenty-four month period would commence running from the "effectiveness of all rules promulgated," not the date of initial certification. HB 936 passed the Senate as amended.
When HB 936 returned to the House floor, Representative Townsend asked that the Senate amendments be rejected because he "was not sure of the effects" of the amendments, and he wanted to "make the statute as tight as possible." The bill was then sent to a Conference Committee.
The Conference Committee Report was presented to the House and Senate during the final hours of the legislative session. The transcript of the House Floor Proceedings on June 28, 2007, reflects that Representative Townsend presented the Conference Committee Report and stated, in pertinent part:
The only question presented on the House floor was for a clarification that the time period was twenty-four months from January 1, 2008, and that January 1, 2008, was
The Conference Committee Report was presented to the Senate by Senator Adley. The only record of these proceedings simply demonstrates that the Senate unanimously voted to adopt the Conference Committee Report.
Based on the above legislative history, it is clear that the information presented to the Legislature regarding HB 936 provided an understanding that grandfathered projects had to be completed within the twenty-four month period to earn tax credits. While the initial proposed grandfather clause in the House Ways and Means Committee contemplated that pending projects would fall completely under the old (2005) law, the legislative history demonstrates that as the grandfather clause developed, subsequent changes and amendments imposed additional requirements or restrictions on grandfathered projects in order to receive tax credits. Testimony in the House Appropriations Committee on June 7, 2007, explained that grandfathered projects will "have 24 months within which to complete" their projects; and the proposed amendment would allow larger projects "to be completed" within a certain time. In the Senate Committee on Revenue and Fiscal Affairs on June 20, 2007, questions and testimony demonstrate that no one saw a need to extend the twenty-four month period, and the DOA expressed an opinion that most of these projects believed they "could get their spending done" within that deadline. And, when Representative Townsend presented the Conference Committee Report on the House Floor, he stated that the grandfather amendment allowed these projects "to continue to be eligible for the 40 percent credits" for twenty-four months. He did not state that grandfathered projects would continue to be eligible for the forty percent credits for the life of the project.
Red Stick contends that the change of the word "claim" to "qualify for" during the Conference Committee was a substantive change that essentially changed the meaning of the proposed law. Red Stick relies on former Representative Townsend's testimony that he considered this to be a substantive change, supporting Red Stick's position. We find that Red Stick's position is not supported by the record and legislative history. Evidence at trial demonstrates that the Conference Committee's change of the words
We hold that evidence comprising the contemporaneous legislative history of Act 456 supports the State's position. The information and testimony presented to legislators in the House and Senate Committees and on the House and Senate floors unquestionably supports an understanding that the twenty-four month period was a window of time for applicants to complete their projects. Nothing in this legislative history suggests that the legislature intended that grandfathered projects be entitled to earn forty percent tax credits for the life of the projects, with no deadline or time limit for incurring expenditures. Moreover, to allow a forty percent tax credit for the life of these projects would provide them with a greater benefit than was afforded under the 2005 law.
Transcripts of relevant Committee meetings and Floor Proceedings demonstrate that as the grandfather clause developed, it was clearly presented to the Legislature as requiring grandfathered projects to be completed within the twenty-four month period in order to be entitled to tax credits. This allowed grandfathered projects the benefit of receiving the forty-percent tax credits for a longer period of time than was allowed under the 2005 law. Based on the legislative history, and considering the language of the statute, we hold that Section 3(C) of Act 456 means that a grandfathered project, such as the one submitted by Red Stick, is only entitled to forty percent tax credits on expenditures incurred by January 1, 2010.