VICTORY, J.

This writ application involves the admissibility of a video deposition taken to perpetuate testimony where the deposition was halted due to the deponent's failing health and fatigue, and the deponent died before his deposition could be continued and before he could be cross-examined by opposing counsel. After reviewing the record and the applicable law, we find that while most of the video deposition is inadmissible, parts of the deposition are admissible under an exception to the hearsay rule. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the district court in part and affirm in part.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

In March 2007, Joseph C. Trascher (Mr. Trascher) filed a petition in the district court seeking an ex parte order to perpetuate his testimony, alleging that he had been diagnosed with asbestosis in August 2006, and that it was unlikely that he would survive more than another six months.1 Mr. Trascher also alleged he sustained occupational exposures to asbestos while working as a tack welder at the Avondale Shipyard from 1960 to 1964, and at the Equitable Shipyard from 1965-1974. He requested service on these parties and a number of other parties he identified as expected defendants in his anticipated suit for damages.2 The district court granted the ex parte order and the videotaped perpetuation deposition was scheduled for April 3, 2007, at Mr. Trascher's home.

The deposition began at 2:20 on April 3, 2007, and most of the potential defendants were present through counsel. Mr. Trascher testified about the effects of the failing state of his health and the circumstances of his exposure to asbestos at Avondale. After 15 minutes of direct examination by his attorney, Mr. Trascher indicated he was too fatigued to continue and the deposition was recessed, followed by a discussion by counsel:

The deposition was never completed as Mr. Trascher died eight days later, on April 11, 2007.

Plaintiffs3 filed suit against numerous defendants in August 2007, asserting survival and wrongful death claims arising out of Mr. Trascher's illness and death allegedly caused by his work place exposure to asbestos. Avondale4 was a named defendant as Mr. Trascher's employer at one of the five work sites where Mr. Trascher was exposed. In May 2011, plaintiffs moved for summary judgment against Avondale and its insurer, relying in part on Mr. Trascher's video deposition testimony. Avondale opposed the motion, and moved to strike the deposition from consideration in connection with the summary judgment motion, and for an in limine order precluding its admission into evidence against them for any purpose, including trial, on the grounds that the deposition was incomplete and that no defendant had been afforded the opportunity to cross-examine Mr. Trascher. All the motions were heard together. The motion for summary judgment was denied. The motion to strike the deposition was also denied, with the trial court further ruling that "I'm going to allow the deposition to be read at trial." The court's questions to counsel reflect that it based its decision to admit the deposition on its apparent understanding that Mr. Trascher was not the only one who was going to be able to testify as to the facts Mr. Trascher alleged in his deposition. The Fourth Circuit declined to exercise its supervisory jurisdiction on the showing made. Trascher v. Territo, 11-0891 (La.App. 4 Cir. 8/25/11), ___ So.3d ___. We granted Avondale's writ application to determine the admissibility of the video deposition at trial. Trascher v. Territo, 11-2093 (La.12/16/11), 76 So.3d 1187.

DISCUSSION

A ruling on the admissibility of evidence is a question of law and is not subject to the manifest error standard of review. Frank L. Maraist, Louisiana Civil Law Treatise: Evidence and Proof, Vol. 19, § 2.10, p. 36. A party may not complain on appeal about an evidentiary ruling in the trial court unless the trial judge was given the opportunity to avoid the perceived error, and the ruling "affected" a "substantial right" of the party. Id. (Citing La. C.E. art. 103(A)(1)).

Defendants argue that the substantial right that was affected by this evidentiary ruling is their right to cross-examine the witness. While a defendant's right to confront his accusers in a criminal case is guaranteed by the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution, "the importance of cross-examination cannot be minimized" in civil cases. Garza v. Delta Tau Delta Fraternity Nat., 05-1508 (La.7/10/06), 948 So.2d 84, 90, and n. 12. Where opposing party never has the opportunity to cross examine the deponent, troubling ramifications are presented because this violates a party's fundamental right to cross-examine witnesses against him. Indeed, one of the basic reasons for excluding hearsay testimony, is that "there is no opportunity for cross-examination." Id. at 90 (citing Donnelly v. U.S., 228 U.S. 243, 273, 33 S.Ct. 449, 459, 57 L.Ed. 820 (1913)).

Plaintiffs claim the deposition is admissible as a deposition taken to perpetuate testimony. Articles 1429-1432 of the Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure govern the requirements for the taking of a deposition to perpetuate testimony. Article 1429 contains the requirements of the petition for the perpetuation of testimony.5 Notice must be given to all expected adverse parties, and if timely notice cannot be given, the court "shall appoint ... an attorney who shall represent them, and, in case they are not otherwise represented, shall cross examine the deponent." La. C.C.P. art. 1430. An ex parte order granting the perpetuation of testimony may be issued under the following circumstances:

La. C.C.P. art. 1430.1. The deposition to perpetuate testimony "may be used in any action involving the same subject matter subsequently brought in any court of this state, in accordance with the provisions of Article 1450." La. C.C.P. art. 1432.6

La. C.C.P. art. 1450 provides in pertinent part:

The thrust of La. C.C.P. art. 1450, particularly Paragraph A, seems to be that the party against whom a deposition is sought to be used must have been afforded a meaningful opportunity to cross-examine the deponent. La. C.C.P. art. 1450 states that the admissibility of any deposition, including a deposition offered because the witness is unavailable, is dependent on whether the deposition would be admissible under the Code of Evidence as if the witness were present and testifying at trial. La. C.C.P. art. 1450(A). Clearly, if a witness provides testimony at trial but the opposing party never is given the opportunity to cross-examine him, there would be grounds to strike the testimony given. Further, the reference in La. C.C.P. art. 1450(C) to La. C.E. art. 804, which provides the very limited circumstances in which hearsay evidence is admissible at trial when the declarant is unavailable as a witness, is a recognition by the Legislature that the admissibility of a deposition where the deponent is unavailable could conflict with the hearsay rule, and particularly the limited exceptions provided by La. C.E. art. 804. As explained herein, one of the reasons hearsay is excluded is because the credibility of the statement cannot be tested by cross-examination. Further, the necessity of an opportunity for cross-examination is evident from the notice provisions of La. C.C.P. art. 1430, which provide that if a party cannot be given timely notice of a deposition to perpetuate testimony, the court must appoint an attorney to represent that party who "shall cross examine the deponent." Thus, for this deposition to be admissible under La. C.C.P. art. 1450, the opposing party would have to have been given the opportunity to cross-examine the witness.7 Because defendants did not have this opportunity, the testimony is inadmissible as a deposition under La. C.C.P. art. 1450.

Thus, as out of court statements, the admissibility of his statements are governed by the hearsay rule. Hearsay is "a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the present trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted." La. C.E. art. 801 C. Hearsay is inadmissible "except as otherwise provided by this Code or other legislation." La. C.E. art. 802. Hearsay is excluded because the value of the statement rests on the credibility of the out-of-court asserter who is not subject to cross-examination and other safeguards of reliability. State v. Brown, 562 So.2d 868, 877 (La. 1990); State v. Martin, 458 So.2d 454 (La.1984). However, when an extrajudicial declaration or statement is offered for a purpose other than to establish the truth of the assertion, its evidentiary value is not dependent upon the credibility of the out-of-court asserter and the declaration or statement falls outside the scope of the hearsay exclusionary rule. Id.

Plaintiffs claim that the deposition is admissible under three hearsay exceptions. Two are found in La. C.E. art. 804, which governs the admissibility of hearsay statements where the declarant is "unavailable," which obviously includes the situation where the declarant is dead at the time of trial. La. C.E. art. 804(A)(4). The other is found in La. C.E. art. 803, which governs the admissibility of hearsay statements regardless of the availability of the declarant.

First, plaintiffs claim that the deposition testimony is admissible under La. C.E. art. 804(B)(2) as a "statement under belief of impending death," which is "[a] statement made by a declarant while believing that his death was imminent, concerning the cause or circumstances of what he believed to be his impending death." This "dying declaration" exception was adopted from the common law, which developed the exception based upon a reasoning that "a person would not be likely to lie as he or she prepared to meet the Maker." Maraist, supra, § 10.9, p. 254. This applicability of this exception is determined not by the substance of the statement, but by the circumstances under which the statement was made. It is the declarant's subjective belief in the imminence of his death that provides the independent indicia of reliability that warrants the admission of the statement. However, "[a]lthough a declarant is seriously ill for a time prior to her eventual death, not all communications made while ill or depressed are admissible under the dying declaration exception." Garza, supra at 94. To fall under this exception, "fear or even belief that illness will end in death will not avail of itself to make a dying declaration" and "there must be `a settled hopeless expectation' that death is near at hand, and what is said must have been spoken in the hush of its impending presence." Id. at 94-95 (citing Shepard v. U.S., 290 U.S. 96, 99-100, 54 S.Ct. 22, 23-24, 78 L.Ed. 196 (1933)). We have held that spontaneity is important in a dying declaration exception and that the use of the words "impending" and "imminent" in La. C.E. art. 804(B)(2) "require that a mortal wound or injury be inflicted at the time of the statement." Garza, supra at 96, 98. In this case, a scheduled deposition taken because the deponent was not expected to live more than six months does not qualify under the dying declaration exception. Mr. Trascher did not believe his death was "imminent" as that term is contemplated in the dying declaration exception and thus the circumstances under which the statements were made lack the indicia of reliability that would warrant its admissibility. Further, all in attendance, apparently including Mr. Trascher, believed the deposition would be continued at some time in the future.

Plaintiffs next claim that Mr. Trascher's deposition testimony contains certain statements that are admissible as an exception to the hearsay rule under La. C.E. art. 803(3), which provides as follows:

A review of the video shows Mr. Trascher in a hospital type bed, hooked up to oxygen, obviously in very poor health and struggling to breathe. After answering general questions about deposition procedures and stating his name and where he lives, Mr. Trascher is asked the following question: "And today how do you feel?" In response, Mr. Trascher answers:

Plaintiffs claim the above statement is admissible under La. C.E. art. 803(3) and we agree. The testimony fits squarely within that exception as it is a statement of Mr. Trascher's then existing state of mind and physical condition offered to prove his then existing condition. He is clearly in very poor health, having trouble breathing, depressed that he is confined to a hospital bed and upset that he will die without getting the chance to be with his grandchildren as they grow up. This information is highly relevant in a wrongful death and survival action and plaintiffs are entitled to present this facet of their case and are entitled to have the fact finder consider the weight of this evidence. This portion of the video deposition is admissible under La. C.E. art. 803(3).

For the rest of the deposition, Mr. Trascher testifies that he is mad and disappointed at the people who made asbestos, that asbestos caused his disease, and that "they" knew about it all along. He also describes his work at Avondale, his recollections of asbestos in his work environment and his exposure to it, and the lack of safety precautions taken at Avondale relative to asbestos. Plaintiffs plan to introduce this testimony to prove the truth of those matters. These statements fall under no specific exception to the hearsay rule and will only be admissible if they fall under the "residual" hearsay exception of La. C.E. art. 804(B)(6), which provides:

This exception exists to provide a trial court with discretion to admit a statement by an unavailable declarant which is not specifically covered by any other hearsay exception, if the statement was made under sufficient assurances of trustworthiness, the evidence in the statement generally is otherwise unavailable, and the opponent is given a fair opportunity to meet the evidence in the statement. Maraist, supra at § 10.12, p. 257. The Official Comments indicate that this exception is intended to apply only in extraordinary circumstances:

La. C.E. art. 804, Official Comment(C).

In Buckbee v. United Gas Pipe Line Co., 561 So.2d 76, 82 (La.1990), we held that for hearsay to be admissible under La. C.E. art. 804(B)(6), it must "possess circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness and that a necessity exists for its introduction in a particular case." As stated, the testimony in the deposition at issue concerns Mr. Trascher's statements about his employment at Avondale, his employment duties, his exposure to asbestos during his employment, and the lack of safety precautions concerning asbestos. To a limited extent, he also mentions he worked for Boland Shipyard and Equitable Shipyard.

Regarding necessity, plaintiffs claim that this testimony is necessary as they have made a reasonable effort to adduce all other admissible evidence to establish the fact that Mr. Trascher was exposed to asbestos while working at Avondale. Plaintiffs claim they have conducted numerous investigative searches for Avondale coworkers of Mr. Trascher to no avail as such persons are either deceased or their whereabouts are unknown. Assuming there are no other witnesses available to testify as to Mr. Trascher's exposure to asbestos while at Avondale, this testimony still does not meet the second requirement for admissibility under La. C.E. art. 804(B)(6), i.e., trustworthiness.

While the testimony was made under oath, it lacks any other guarantees of trustworthiness sufficient to justify its admission under this hearsay exception. First, there was no opportunity for cross-examination during which the reliability and truthfulness of his statements could have been tested. Second, the testimony concerned events that occurred nearly 50 years ago. Such a substantial lapse of time diminishes the reliability of the testimony because it heightens the probability that memory has become fogged by the passage of time. Indeed, the effects of this lapse of time are apparent from reading parts of the deposition:

The inconsistencies and errors is this testimony convince us that it is not trustworthy given the strict parameters of the residual exception. In addition, "[a]rguably, the residual exception should not be applied to admit hearsay that falls within the general confines of another exception but fails to meet all of the requirements for admissibility under that exception." Maraist, supra at § 10.12, p. 259, n. 4. To use the residual exception in that way would seem to "emasculate the hearsay rule," as cautioned against in the Official Comments. For all of the above reasons, the deposition testimony does not meet the requirements of the residual exception of La. C.E. art. 804(B)(6) and is therefore inadmissible.

CONCLUSION

For a deposition taken to perpetuate testimony to be admissible under La. C.C.P. art. 1450 where the witness is unavailable at trial, the party against whom it is being used or with similar interests to that party must have been given the opportunity to cross-examine the witness. Otherwise, assuming the objectionable testimony is hearsay, it must fall within one of the limited hearsay exceptions. Here, the only portion of the deposition testimony that is admissible is the video portion showing Mr. Trascher being asked and answering the question: "[a]nd today how do you feel?" His answer reflects his then existing mental, emotional, or physical condition and is offered to prove his then existing condition, which is highly relevant in a wrongful death and survival claim. However, the rest of the video deposition is inadmissible hearsay. It fails to meet the "dying declaration" exception as the deposition was not taken when Mr. Trascher believed his death was "imminent," but was instead scheduled because Mr. Trascher's doctor attested that Mr. Trascher may not survive for more than six months. Though Mr. Trascher believed he would soon die of his disease, the statements made in this scheduled deposition lack the spontaneity which provide the independent indicia of reliability required of this exception. Further, the deposition testimony does not fall under the "residual" exception because, although it was taken under oath, the substance of Mr. Trascher's answers show that his memory may have lapsed over the 50 year time span since the events occurred and therefore lack the indicia of trustworthiness required of this exception.

DECREE

For the reasons stated herein, the judgment of the district court is affirmed in part and reversed in part. The only portion of this deposition that will be admissible at trial is the part referred to in this opinion as meeting the requirements of La. C.E. art. 803(3). The case is remanded to the district court for further proceedings.

AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED IN PART; REMANDED.

JOHNSON, Justice, dissents.

KNOLL, Justice, dissents and assigns reasons.

WEIMER, Justice, concurs with reasons.

JOHNSON, J.

I dissent from the majority opinion.

KNOLL, J., dissents.

I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion and would recall the writ as improvidently granted. I do not believe this case, which arises from an interlocutory judgment on a pretrial motion in limine regarding the admissibility of evidence, merits the exercise of this Court's supervisory jurisdiction.

This Court's docket is largely discretionary.1 That discretion must be exercised carefully, with an eye to clarifying uncertain or disputed areas of law and resolving issues with ramifications stretching beyond the present case. As Justice Lemmon cogently noted in his concurrence to Touchard v. Slemco Elec. Foundation, 99-3577 (La.10/17/00), 769 So.2d 1200:

Id. at 1206, n. 1

Given the natural bounds on this Court's time and judicial resources, we should limit our discretionary review to those cases most likely to have a widespread impact on the development of the law of the state of Louisiana. The exercise of discretionary review on a district court's ruling on a motion in limine is a highly inefficient use of our time:

Scott v. Poole's Classic Travels, Inc., 03-2748 (La.5/25/04), 874 So.2d 835, 838 (Knoll, J., dissenting)

Reviewing motions in limine inevitably leads to piecemeal adjudication of a dispute, and it is simply not feasible for this Court to rule on the admissibility of each piece of evidence to be presented at trial, one by one. It is a better and more efficient use of this Court's resources to allow the case to proceed to judgment, after which we can address all of the relator's assignments of error at once. This is especially true for interlocutory rulings on motions in limine, which may be reconsidered by the district court at any time prior to judgment.2

Moreover, I do not find the district court committed clear error in finding plaintiff's deposition excerpts were admissible. The excerpts meet the requirements of La. Code of Civ. Proc. art. 1450, which permits a party to introduce the deposition testimony of an unavailable witness "against any party who was present or represented at the taking of the deposition or who had reasonable notice thereof." Avondale and the other defendants were timely notified of plaintiff's scheduled deposition and were actually represented by counsel at the deposition. Therefore, the express requirements of article 1450 are met.

The majority disagrees, finding an implied requirement of cross-examination within article 1450's penumbras. I do not find this is a proper interpretation of article 1450, but rather changes the law by effectively adding new words to the statute. This simply is not our function.3 This Court should yield to the Legislature to make such a change in the law, where the legislative process would allow careful consideration of all possible circumstances under which such a requirement may be imposed. Moreover, I find the Legislature anticipated extreme extenuating circumstances could exist and, through article 1450(C), expressly granted the trial court discretion to rule on such matters, as the court properly did in this case.

As to the claimed right to cross-examine a witness, in an ordinary case, all parties would certainly have the right to question a deponent. However, this case presents extreme extenuating circumstances, outside the control of either party, which unfortunately made this impossible. By the time the deposition was scheduled, the witness's health had already seriously deteriorated. Only minutes into the deposition, he became extremely tired, asked for additional oxygen, and was soon unable to continue. This is not a case where a plaintiff or his attorney acted in bad faith or purposefully conspired to deny the defendant an opportunity to cross-examine. Plaintiff's own attorneys were not even able to complete their direct examination. Although the defense attorneys had no chance to cross-examine plaintiff, they were able to assert objections during the direct examination, thus protecting their rights to some extent. Given the unique circumstances of this case, where a witness is so ill that he cannot reasonably be expected to complete his deposition, it is enough that the adverse parties were actually represented at the deposition and had the opportunity to assert objections. This is all that is required by La.Code of Civ. Proc. art. 1450, and it is not the province of this Court to impose additional requirements beyond those mandated by the express language of the statute.

Defendants also raise a hearsay objection. However, article 1450(C) includes a discretionary exception to the hearsay rule for depositions administered under that article:

I do not find the trial court abused its discretion in finding the proffered deposition excerpts admissible under La.Code of Civ. Proc. art. 1450(C). Indeed, the majority of courts who have addressed this issue have permitted the introduction of deposition testimony without cross-examination where, as here, the deponent passes away before the deposition can be completed.

The leading case of Derewecki v. Pennsylvania Railroad Co., 353 F.2d 436 (3d Cir.1965)4 is closely on point. Plaintiff Joseph Derewecki brought suit against his former employer, the Pennsylvania Railroad Company, claiming that an accident at the railyard caused a serious heart injury. Id. at 438. During plaintiff's deposition, he suffered a heart attack. The deposition was continued and later reconvened, but plaintiff was only able to talk for about fifteen minutes before he suffered another attack. He died later that day. Id. at 439.

Plaintiff's widow moved to introduce the depositions into evidence, as they were the sole evidence regarding the railyard accident. Defendant objected, claiming the depositions "had not been completed and that it did not have the opportunity to exercise its `right' to cross-examine Derewecki." Id. The trial court ruled the deposition admissible, and the jury entered judgment for plaintiff. The court of appeal affirmed, finding the introduction of the deposition testimony did not violate defendant's due process rights given the unusual set of factual circumstances before the court:

Id. at 442.

This rule has been widely adopted by later courts5 and endorsed by leading civil practice treatises.6 By enacting La.Code of Civ. Proc. art. 1450(C), the Louisiana Legislature expressly granted trial courts the discretion to permit introduction of deposition testimony where the circumstances warrant. Given the highly unusual set of facts surrounding this case, I find no abuse of discretion in the trial court's decision.

WEIMER, J., concurs.

I agree for the most part with the reasoning and analysis of the majority opinion, but write separately to express my reservations about language in the opinion that is not central to its holding and may have the effect of eviscerating La. C.E. art. 804(B)(6)'s residual exception. Particularly, I am concerned with the majority's suggestion that "arguably," the residual exception should not be used to admit testimony that falls within another exception, but fails to meet the requirements of that exception. Op. at 367-68, citing 19 MARAIST, LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW TREATISE: EVIDENCE AND PROOF, § 10.12, p. 259 n. 4.

The residual exception "is designed to take care of the rare situation where in a civil case the declarant of a trustworthy out-of-court hearsay statement is unavailable, but the out-of-court statement does not fit neatly within any of the categorical exceptions provided in [La. C.E.] Articles 803 and 804(B)(1) to (5), nor within any hearsay exception otherwise provided by the Legislature." PUGH FORCE, RAULT & TRICHE, HANDBOOK ON LOUISIANA EVIDENCE LAW, p. 707 (2010). In other words, the exception is intended to avert the necessity (and impossibility) of having to pigeonhole every situation into a neat category of exception where the element of trustworthiness that lies at the heart of every hearsay exception is otherwise met. While there is no question but that the Louisiana legislature intended to make the residual exception narrower than its federal counterpart, the majority's suggestion that the exception cannot be applied to a situation that might nominally fall under a recognized exception to the hearsay rule when the requirements of general unavailability and trustworthiness are otherwise met, in my view, unduly subverts and "emasculates" the residual exception.