PER CURIAM.
This disciplinary matter arises from formal charges filed by the Office of Disciplinary Counsel ("ODC") against respondent, Walter Brent Pearson, an attorney licensed to practice law in Louisiana.
At all times relevant to this proceeding, respondent was a partner in the Alexandria law firm of Crowell and Owens (hereinafter referred to as "the firm") and was solely responsible for handling the firm's financial matters. The firm managed its payroll expenses by transferring funds to WB Management, Inc. ("WB"), a company the firm established at respondent's suggestion and specifically for this purpose. Eventually, the firm's accountants learned that respondent had caused excess funds from the firm to be distributed to the WB account, which funds he then converted to his own use. In January 2010, the firm discovered some eighteen unauthorized withdrawals from WB totaling $133,489.75, all payable directly to respondent or to persons or companies affiliated with or controlled by respondent.
Respondent acknowledged that he misappropriated the funds and resigned from the firm in February 2010. However, prior to his departure, he distributed $29,000 of the firm's funds to himself without the knowledge, consent, or permission of the other partners.
Both respondent and the firm reported his conversion of funds to the ODC. In September 2010, the ODC filed formal charges against respondent, alleging that his conduct as set forth above violated the following provisions of the Rules of Professional Conduct: Rules 8.4(a) (violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct), 8.4(b) (commission of a criminal act that reflects adversely on the lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness,
Respondent answered the formal charges and admitted that he made unauthorized withdrawals from WB, which he indicated was wholly owned by William B. Owens (another partner in the firm) and himself. He also indicated that he had reimbursed some of the funds and was in the process of re-paying the full amount of unauthorized withdrawals.
This matter proceeded to a formal hearing on the merits, conducted by the hearing committee in May 2011. The ODC introduced documentary evidence at the hearing and called two witnesses to testify before the committee. Respondent also introduced documentary evidence and called several witnesses, including character witnesses, to testify before the committee. Finally, respondent testified on his own behalf and on cross-examination by the ODC.
After considering the testimony and evidence presented at the hearing, the hearing committee made factual findings, including the following:
Based on these facts, the committee determined the ODC met its burden of proving that respondent violated Rule 8.4 with respect to all of the alleged misconduct except the improper credit card use. Although the committee determined that the baseline sanction for respondent's misconduct is disbarment, it noted the record contains substantial evidence in mitigation. The mitigating factors include the fact that respondent self-reported his conduct to the ODC and the fact that he has had a highly successful practice and is regarded as a valuable member of the community. Additionally, the committee "deems it important that no client funds or property were implicated in the conversion, that the public was not at risk due to [respondent's] behavior, that no restitution is owed, that all financial disputes between [respondent] and his former law partners have been confidentially compromised, and all litigation dismissed with prejudice."
Although the committee acknowledged that conversion of funds is a serious infraction, under the circumstances, it recommended respondent be suspended from the practice of law for three years.
Both respondent and the ODC objected to the hearing committee's report and recommendation.
After review, the disciplinary board adopted the hearing committee's factual findings, except the finding regarding respondent's use of the firm's credit card. The board also adopted the committee's legal conclusions regarding respondent's conversion of the firm's funds but rejected the committee's conclusion that respondent did not engage in misconduct with respect to the firm's credit card. Specifically, the board determined that respondent used the firm's credit card for unauthorized personal expenses and improperly allocated many of those expenses to the firm as business related. Respondent made unilateral decisions about which of his personal expenses would be allocated to him and which would be allocated to the firm as "compensatory." In the board's view, the issue is not whether respondent was entitled to use the firm's credit card for strictly personal expenses or whether he was
The board determined that respondent knowingly violated duties owed to the legal system and the legal profession. While there was no risk of harm to any client or the public, respondent's misconduct caused actual harm to his law partners. After considering the ABA's Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions, the board determined that the baseline sanction is disbarment.
In aggravation, the board found the following factors: a dishonest or selfish motive, a pattern of misconduct, multiple offenses, and substantial experience in the practice of law (admitted 1985). The board found the following mitigating factors are present: absence of a prior disciplinary record, full and free disclosure to the disciplinary board and a cooperative attitude toward the proceedings, character or reputation, and remorse.
After further considering this court's prior jurisprudence addressing similar misconduct, the board determined that the mitigating factors present are insufficient to warrant a downward deviation from the baseline sanction. Therefore, the board recommended that respondent be disbarred.
Respondent filed an objection to the disciplinary board's recommendation. Accordingly, the case was docketed for oral argument pursuant to Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 11(G)(1)(b).
Bar disciplinary matters fall within the original jurisdiction of this court. La. Const. art. V, § 5(B). Consequently, we act as triers of fact and conduct an independent review of the record to determine whether the alleged misconduct has been proven by clear and convincing evidence. In re: Banks, 09-1212 (La.10/2/09), 18 So.3d 57. While we are not bound in any way by the findings and recommendations of the hearing committee and disciplinary board, we have held the manifest error standard is applicable to the committee's factual findings. See In re: Caulfield, 96-1401 (La.11/25/96), 683 So.2d 714; In re: Pardue, 93-2865 (La.3/11/94), 633 So.2d 150.
The record of this matter supports the hearing committee's factual findings as modified by the disciplinary board. Essentially, respondent admitted that over a two-year period, he intentionally converted more than $133,000 in funds belonging to his law firm in order to pay expenses relating to his personal business venture. He also took unauthorized distributions from the firm and used the firm's credit card for personal expenses, which he then allocated to the firm without the knowledge or consent of the other partners. Based on these facts, respondent has violated the Rules of Professional Conduct as charged.
Having found evidence of professional misconduct, we now turn to a determination of the appropriate sanction for respondent's actions. In determining a sanction, we are mindful that disciplinary proceedings are designed to maintain high standards of conduct, protect the public, preserve the integrity of the profession,
Respondent intentionally violated duties owed to the legal profession. His misconduct caused actual harm to the firm and its partners. The baseline sanction for this type of misconduct is disbarment. The record supports the aggravating and mitigating factors found by the board.
Considering the record before us, we reject any suggestion by respondent that his intentional misconduct warrants a sanction less than disbarment. In prior cases, we have disbarred lawyers who intentionally converted funds belonging to their law firms. See In re: Sharp, 09-0207 (La.6/26/09), 16 So.3d 343, and In re: Bernstein, 07-1049 (La.10/16/07), 966 So.2d 537. Notably, the monetary sums at issue in Sharp and Bernstein were considerably smaller than in the instant matter. Furthermore, the significant mitigating factors present in In re: Kelly, 98-0368 (La.6/5/98), 713 So.2d 458, which prompted us to impose a three-year suspension upon a lawyer who converted law firm funds to his own use, are not seen in this case, most notably the clinical depression from which Mr. Kelly suffered at the time of the misconduct. Here, respondent suffers from no mental impairment and there was no finding of such by either the hearing committee or the disciplinary board. When considered against the backdrop of the proven misconduct, the weight of the mitigating circumstances in this case is simply insufficient to warrant a downward deviation from the baseline sanction.
Accordingly, we will accept the disciplinary board's recommendation and disbar respondent.
Upon review of the findings and recommendations of the hearing committee and disciplinary board, and considering the record, briefs, and oral argument, it is ordered that Walter Brent Pearson, Louisiana Bar Roll number 17088, be and he hereby is disbarred. His name shall be stricken from the roll of attorneys, and his license to practice law in the State of Louisiana shall be revoked. All costs and expenses in the matter are assessed against respondent in accordance with Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 10.1, with legal interest to commence thirty days from the date of finality of this court's judgment until paid.