JOHNSON, Chief Justice.
Following a bench trial, defendant, Ashaki Kelly, was convicted of molestation of a juvenile and sentenced to fifteen years at hard labor, without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence. We granted defendant's writ application to determine whether the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to support his conviction, and whether the court of appeal erroneously vacated defendant's sentence as illegally lenient on errors patent review. For the following reasons, we affirm that portion of the court of appeal's ruling which upheld defendant's conviction. However, we find the court of appeal failed to conduct a proper errors patent review and erred in vacating defendant's sentence.
On March 14, 2013, defendant was charged by a Calcasieu Parish grand jury by bill of indictment with three counts of aggravated rape of D.V., date of birth May 29, 2000, a juvenile under the age of thirteen, in violation of La. R.S. 14:42, and two counts of oral sexual battery of A.V., in violation of La. R.S. 14:43.3. D.V. and A.V. are sisters who were living with their mother and defendant, the mother's fiancé.
At trial, the state presented testimony from the investigating detective, videos of interviews of D.V. and A.V. conducted by the Children's Advocacy Center ("CAC"), testimony from the minors' mother and aunt, and testimony from both D.V. and A.V. The defense presented testimony from a registered nurse with the Sexual Assault Nurse Examiner ("SANE") program at Lake Charles Memorial Hospital, who conducted the physical examinations of A.V. and D.V.
Defendant was acquitted of all charges pertaining to A.V. Regarding D.V., the district court found defendant not guilty of two counts of aggravated rape and guilty of the lesser included offense of molestation of a juvenile with regard to the third aggravated rape count. At a sentencing hearing on October 2, 2013, the court sentenced defendant to fifteen years at hard labor, without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence, pursuant to La. R.S. 14:81.2(B)(2) relative to molestation of a victim between the ages of thirteen and
Defendant appealed his conviction and the court of appeal affirmed, finding a sufficient basis in the record to support the conviction. However, on errors patent review, the court found defendant's sentence to be illegally lenient. State v. Kelly, 14-522 (La.App. 3 Cir. 12/10/14), 153 So.3d 1257. The court noted where, as in this case, the victim is under thirteen, the mandatory sentence set forth by the legislature in La. R.S. 14:81.2(D)(1) for molestation of a juvenile is twenty-five years to ninety-nine years. Thus, the court of appeal vacated defendant's sentence and remanded the case to the trial court for resentencing pursuant to La. R.S. 14:81.2(D)(1). Id. at 1272. Judge Amy dissented in part, finding the alleged sentencing error identified by the majority was not discoverable in a proper errors patent review. Id. at 1273.
Defendant filed a writ application in this court arguing there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction, and the court of appeal erred in finding his sentence illegally lenient during its errors patent review. We granted defendant's writ application. State v. Kelly, 15-0484 (La. 2/19/16), 186 So.3d 1177.
In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction, this court has recognized that an appellate court in Louisiana is controlled by the standard enunciated by the United States Supreme Court in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560, rehearing denied, 444 U.S. 890, 100 S.Ct. 195, 62 L.Ed.2d 126 (1979). State v. Tate, 01-1658 (La. 5/20/03), 851 So.2d 921, 928. Under this standard, an appellate court "must determine that the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution, was sufficient to convince a rational trier of fact that all of the elements of the crime had been proved beyond a reasonable doubt." Tate, 851 So.2d at 928. In applying this standard, a reviewing court is not permitted to second guess the rational credibility determinations of the fact finder at trial, nor is a reviewing court required to consider the rationality of the thought processes employed by a particular fact finder in reaching a verdict. State v. Marshall, 04-3139 (La. 11/29/06), 943 So.2d 362, 367. It is not the function of an appellate court to assess credibility or reweigh the evidence. State v. Stowe, 635 So.2d 168, 171 (La.1994).
The crime of molestation of a juvenile is defined in La. R.S. 14:81.2(A)(1):
The testimony at trial sufficiently established that the incident occurred while D.V.'s mother was at work and D.V. was under defendant's supervision and control. D.V. testified at trial that defendant, who was engaged to D.V.'s mother and living in the same house, touched her "behind" with "his front stuff." This testimony was similar to what D.V. told the SANE nurse. During that examination, D.V. stated that defendant "tried to put his private stuff in my booty." However, these accounts conflicted with D.V.'s videotaped interview at the CAC, during which D.V. claimed that defendant anally and vaginally raped her. In its ruling, the district court first noted that it believed if D.V. had been raped there would have been some physical signs of penetration when she was examined by the SANE nurse two days after the reported incident. The court further questioned the language D.V. used during her recorded interview. It found that phrases such as "his private part" and "his wrong spot" were not phrases children normally used, which led the court to believe someone had spoken to D.V. before the interview. The district court concluded that due to D.V.'s inconsistent accounts in her CAC interview and trial testimony, and the lack of corroborating physical evidence from the SANE examination, there was insufficient evidence to convict defendant of aggravated rape. However, the court found D.V. did not completely fabricate the allegations. The court noted D.V. reported an incident to her mother two days before the SANE examination, as verified by D.V.'s mother. The court found the evidence established beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant molested D.V. on November 24, 2012.
After review, we note the district court made clear in its ruling that it carefully considered the inconsistencies in D.V.'s statements when reaching its verdict. Despite the contradictions, the court was convinced that D.V. was molested on one occasion based on her timely report of the incident, corroborated by her mother's testimony. The district court was in the best position to evaluate the victim's credibility and we find no reason to disturb this finding. The evidence described above suffices, when viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution under the standard of Jackson v. Virginia, to support the conviction. For these reasons, we find no merit in this assignment of error and thus affirm defendant's conviction.
The statutory sentence range for molestation of a juvenile is dependent on the age of the victim. La. R.S. 14:81.2(B)(2) provides:
La. R.S. 14:81.2(D)(1) provides:
Louisiana courts have long screened appeals for patent error. See, e.g., State v. Behan, 20 La. Ann. 389 (1868). Currently, in accordance with La. C.Cr.P. art. 920, all appeals are routinely reviewed for errors patent on the face of the record. See, e.g., State v. Shaw, 12-686 (La.App. 5 Cir. 1/16/13), 108 So.3d 1189, 1197; State v. Celestine, 11-1403 (La.App. 3 Cir. 5/30/12), 91 So.3d 573, 575; State v. Bourda, 10-1553 (La.App. 3 Cir. 6/8/11), 70 So.3d 82, 83. La.C.Cr. P. art. 920 provides: "The following matters and no others shall be considered on appeal: (1) An error designated in the assignment of errors; and (2)
We must determine whether the court of appeal went beyond the permissible scope of review under Article 920(2) to find defendant's sentence illegally lenient.
Because this was a bench trial, there is no verdict form and no separate judgment appears in the record. Over approximately ten pages of the trial record, the district court explained its verdict in open court. In concluding the evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of molestation of a juvenile, the court stated:
At a post-trial status conference on June 12, 2013, during which the court discussed a pending presentence investigation and possible habitual offender bill with the state and defense counsel, the court noted that, without a habitual offender adjudication, defendant was subject to a sentence between twenty-five and ninety-nine years. Later in the hearing, defense counsel stated, "I think the correct statement of law is that the sentence on the molestation with the victim under 13 is at least 25, but not more than 99." At the end of the hearing the court stated:
During a hearing on defendant's motion for new trial on October 13, 2013, defense counsel argued the district court may have "misapprehended the nature of the verdict that was returned" due to court's apparent surprise to learn afterwards it was constrained to a minimum sentence of twenty-five years. The court rejected the argument for purposes of entitlement to a new trial, but appeared to agree it was unaware of the sentencing range:
Neither the state nor defendant objected to the sentence. Two days later, the district court confirmed in open court during a sex offender registry hearing that it sentenced defendant in accordance with La. R.S. 14:81.2(B)(2), and also signed defendant's "notification to sex offender" form, which included a notation that he had been convicted under La. R.S. 14:81.2(B)(2).
In finding a sentencing error, the majority of the court of appeal did not explicitly state where within the pleadings and proceedings it discovered the error patent. The court simply stated the victim's age could be determined based on a mere inspection of the pleadings and proceedings without inspection of the evidence pursuant to La.C.Cr. P. art. 920(2). The court of appeal essentially concluded because the indictment alleged D.V. to be under the age of thirteen, the district court was obligated to make such a finding relative to its verdict and sentence. The court of appeal stated: "The responsive verdict of molestation of a juvenile to the crime of aggravated rape of a child under thirteen requires the trial court to sentence Defendant to molestation of a juvenile under thirteen." Kelly, 153 So.3d at 1271. Without further analysis, the court of appeal stated the victim was under the age of thirteen, and thus found the sentence imposed illegal because it was not in accordance with the mandatory minimum set forth by the legislature.
The state argues the court of appeal could readily determine from an examination of the bill of indictment containing D.V.'s age and the decision reached by the district court finding the defendant guilty of the molestation of D.V., that the defendant's sentence was illegally lenient. We disagree. After review, we conclude the sentence imposed in this case, even if illegally lenient, does not constitute error discoverable from an inspection of the pleadings and proceedings under the jurisprudential construction of La.C.Cr. P. art. 920(2). The victim's age stated in the indictment is simply an allegation made by the state. It cannot be equated to a definitive finding by the district court relative to defendant's guilt. Additionally, as the
Referencing the transcript from the motion for new trial and sentencing hearing, the state also alleges the district court was obviously aware of the correct sentencing range, but because of the court's uneasiness about this case, it created a way to avoid imposing the twenty-five year minimum sentence. Nevertheless, we cannot consider the thought process of the district court in rendering the sentence. As Judge Amy correctly noted in dissent, "the alleged error ... is [only] discoverable after an inquiry into the transcript, the evidence, and the trial court's evaluation of the facts developed. Such an inquiry ... is beyond the type of review anticipated by Article 920(2)." Kelly, 153 So.3d at 1273. In State v. Wrestle, Inc., 360 So.2d 831, 837 (La.1978), rev'd in part on other grounds, Burch v. State of Louisiana, 441 U.S. 130, 99 S.Ct. 1623, 60 L.Ed.2d 96 (1979), this court explained that "our jurisprudence does not permit inspection of the trial transcript to ascertain such error, but only of the pleadings and proceedings alone considered part of the record for purposes of patent-error appellate review in general, the indictment or information, the minutes, and the verdict and sentence." (Internal citations omitted).
There are two sentencing provisions applicable to the crime of molestation of a juvenile, depending on the age of the victim: La. R.S. 14:81.2(B)(2) and La. R.S. 14:81.2(D)(1). The sentence imposed by the district court is stated under La. R.S. 14:81.2(B)(2). Thus, the sentence imposed is a correct sentence in response to a guilty verdict for molestation of a juvenile.
The state also suggests the court of appeal's decision was correct because La. C.Cr.P. art. 882 permits an appellate court to correct an illegal sentence at any time.
Although Williams represented a clear departure by this court from the prohibition against an appellate court taking steps to correct an illegally lenient sentence where there is no state objection to the sentence, the court of appeal's review of that issue is limited to review under Article 920(2) — errors patent review. See State v. Campbell, 03-3035 (La.7/6/04), 877 So.2d 112, 116. In this case, as discussed above, the appellate court could only conclude the sentence was illegally lenient by going beyond what is statutorily allowed in an errors patent review. See State v. Parker, 03-2736 (La. 2/20/04), 868 So.2d 23 (wherein this court reinstated the defendant's sentence after it was vacated by the court of appeal, finding State v. Williams did not sanction the sua sponte correction made by the court of appeal on defendant's appeal of his conviction and sentence where the court of appeal relied on information beyond the scope of the record for purposes of errors patent review.) While a sentence which does not conform to the minimum terms set forth in a statute may normally be "discoverable by a mere inspection of the pleadings and proceedings
Because we find the court of appeal erred in vacating defendant's sentence, the district court's sentence must be reinstated. However, we note an error requiring amendment. As stated above, the district court specifically sentenced defendant under the provisions of La. R.S. 14:81.2(B)(2). The sentence imposed by the trial court provides that it be served without benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence, but La. R.S. 14:81.2(B)(2) contains no such provision. Thus, that condition of the district court's sentence must be stricken to comport with the provisions of the sentencing statute.
For the above reasons, we affirm the ruling of the court of appeal finding the evidence sufficient to support defendant's conviction. However, we find the court of appeal exceeded the statutorily imposed scope of errors patent review in finding defendant's sentence to be illegally lenient. Thus, the ruling of the court of appeal vacating defendant's sentence is reversed. We remand this matter to the district court to reinstate defendant's sentence, as amended, to remove the provision that it be served without benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence. On remand, the district court is ordered to correct the minutes and commitment and to transmit the corrected commitment to the Department of Corrections.
GUIDRY, Justice, concurs in part, dissents in part, and assigns reasons.
CRICHTON, Justice, additionally concurs and assigns reasons.
GUIDRY, J., concurs in part, dissents in part, and assigns reasons.
While I concur in the finding that the evidence was sufficient to support the conviction of molestation of a juvenile, I dissent from the majority's holding that the court of appeal erred in exceeding its authority under an errors patent review and vacating the defendant's sentence as illegally lenient. In my view, because this was a bench trial in which the judge issued his verdict in a lengthy explanation on the record, the court of appeal properly found the victim's age at the time of the offense could be determined by a mere inspection of the pleadings and proceedings without resort to inspection of the evidence pursuant to La.Code Crim. Proc. art. 920(2).
Although the majority voices concern about inviting appellate courts to review for errors patent the reasons given by a trial judge in issuing its judgment, I disagree that such is the case in this criminal matter. The majority dismisses any discussion of what a verdict or a judgment might consist of in a bench trial to be reviewable for errors patent. As the majority notes, the scope of review under La.Code Crim. Proc. art. 920(2), includes the verdict and the judgment. Slip op., p. 6 (quoting State v. Oliveaux, 312 So.2d 337, 339 (La.1975)). Because this was a bench trial, the trial judge's verdict was given on the record in open court.
Accordingly, in lieu of a jury's verdict being issued in a verdict form, the trial
CRICHTON, J., additionally concurs and assigns reasons.
I agree in all respects with the holding of this case, but write separately to note that the liberty interest at stake necessitates a strict application of criminal law, and this strict application mandates the majority's outcome.
For reasons known only to that office, the district attorney: (1) failed to contemporaneously object at time of sentencing; (2) failed to file a written motion for reconsideration pursuant to La.C.Cr.P. 881.1(A); and (3) failed to appeal or seek review of the sentence pursuant to La.C.Cr.P. art. 881.2.
The failure of the State to lodge an objection at the trial court level or seek review at the intermediate appellate level renders the district attorney's position untenable. As such, it must be rejected. The rule of law and the integrity of the administration of justice deserve no less.
