ELIZABETH W. MAGNER, Bankruptcy Judge.
On September 23, 2015, Debtor, Ann Ruth Baehr ("Baehr"), filed a Motion to Avoid Lien and Cancel Inscription pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 522(f).
On March 27, 2012, NENH filed suit on a promissory note and for recognition of a second mortgage on commercial property owned by Baehr and her former spouse. Recognition of the mortgage became moot as a superior mortgage holder had the property seized and sold on January 9, 2013. As a result of the sale, NENH's mortgage was cancelled.
On May 8, 2013, NENH obtained a personal judgment against Baehr in the principal amount of $144,171.57. The judgment was properly recorded in the records of Jefferson Parish.
On January 22, 2014, Baehr purchased a home for a sales price of $795,000.00. NENH subordinated its judgment in favor of First NBC Bank, the entity financing the purchase of the property.
On February 27, 2015, Baehr filed a petition for relief under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code.
11 U.S.C. § 522(f)(1)(A) provides in pertinent part:
11 U.S.C. § 522(f)(2)(A) sets forth an arithmetic test to determine whether a lien impairs an exemption, providing:
In In re Brantz, 106 B.R. 62, 68 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. Oct. 2, 1989), the Court set forth the following formula:
Baehr's property is worth $680,000.00.
NENH argues that its judicial lien cannot be avoided according to the Supreme Court's decision in Farrey v. Sanderfoot, 500 U.S. 291, 111 S.Ct. 1825, 114 L.Ed.2d 337 (1991). In Farrey, the parties were married and jointly owned their home. As part of a Consent Judgment, Sanderfoot was granted full ownership of the property and Farrey was granted an equalizing payment secured by a lien on the home. Rather than execute a security agreement on the home, the parties simply recorded the Consent Judgment. As a result, the Consent Judgment created a judicial lien over the home to secure the equalizing payment.
Sanderfoot filed for bankruptcy relief and sought to avoid Farrey's lien. When the amounts due under the first mortgage and homestead exemption were combined, there was no equity in the property to secure the equalizing payment granted by the Consent Judgment. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court refused to avoid the lien. The Court reasoned that because the Consent Judgment was the very act that transferred the property interest, avoiding the lien securing the cost of acquisition would be unfair.
Several courts have narrowly interpreted Farrey, limiting it to its facts. See In re Pacheco, 342 B.R. 352, 356 (Bankr. D. N.M. May 23, 2006) (limiting Farrey to a situation where a lien is created in connection with, or as a direct result of the debtor's acquisition of property. The fixing of the lien was the direct result of the divorce decree which created both the lien and the debtor's property interest); In re Perez, 391 B.R. 190, 192 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. June 5, 2008) (noting that Sanderfoot took the property and the lien together, as if he had purchased an already encumbered estate from a third party); In re Anderson, 496 B.R. 812, 817 (Bankr. E.D. La. July 26, 2013) (declined to follow reasoning in Farrey outside the context of a divorce proceeding).
This Court holds that the distinguishing feature that materially affects application of Farrey to this case is the consensual or non-consensual nature of the lien in question. The Supreme Court's reluctance to avoid the lien in Farrey can be explained because the created lien was consensual. As in the Dewsnup v Timm, 502 U.S. 410, 112 S.Ct. 773, 116 L.Ed.2d 903 (1992), and the Bank of America, N.A. v. Caulkett, ___ U.S. ___, 135 S.Ct. 1995, 192 L.Ed.2d 52 (2015) cases, the Supreme Court has refused to strip consensual liens in Chapter 7 proceedings even when there is no equity in the property to secure their repayment.
The judgment in this case is not consensual. It was an unsecured lien prior to the acquisition of debtor's home and an unsecured lien today. Even as of the purchase date, the home's fair market value less the outstanding first mortgage and homestead exemption left little, if any, equity for NENH's benefit. Assuming for the sake of argument that NENH had even a dollar of equity when the home was purchased, costs of sale or foreclosure would have eliminated even this razor thin possibility of value for its lien. In reality, NENH's position would only improve if debtor substantially paid down her mortgage or the property appreciated in value. Neither has happened. NENH's agreement to subordinate its lien in favor of First NBC Bank had as its motive a hope that the home might one day serve as security for its debt. It cannot be said that NENH's position was adversely affected by its actions.
Having found that the prior recording of a judgment against Baehr and her subsequent acquisition of property does not render 11 U.S.C. § 522(f)(1)(A) inapplicable, Baehr's Motion to Avoid Lien and Cancel Inscription
A separate Order will be rendered in accord with these Reasons for Decision.
For this and the reasons set forth in these Reasons, the Court respectively disagrees with the above holdings.