MARTIN L.C. FELDMAN, District Judge.
Before the Court are three motions: (1) the defendants' motion to dismiss; (2) the plaintiffs' motion for class certification; and (3) the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment. For the reasons that follow, the defendants' motion to dismiss is DENIED and the plaintiffs' motions for class certification and summary judgment are continued, to be reset because of inadequate briefing.
This putative class action lawsuit follows this Court's March 29, 2012 ruling in Doe v. Jindal, 851 F.Supp.2d 995 (E.D.La. 2012), in which the Court declared that Louisiana's sex offender registry law, which mandates sex offender registration by individuals convicted of violating the State's Crime Against Nature by Solicitation statute, but not those convicted for the identical sexual conduct under the Prostitution statute, deprived individuals of Equal Protection of the laws; the nine plaintiffs in Doe I have since been relieved by the State of their sex offender registration obligations. In this new lawsuit, the plaintiffs and proposed class members now challenge the requirement that, notwithstanding
The facts underlying the Equal Protection challenge advanced in Doe I are more completely set forth in that opinion. 851 F.Supp.2d 995 (E.D.La.2012).
In response to the Court's Judgment, some six weeks later, the Louisiana legislature enacted into law on May 31, 2012 Act 402 of the 2012 Legislative Session.
La.R.S. 15:541(F)(4) (2012) (as amended by Act 402). Accordingly, under Act 402, a person convicted of Crime Against Nature by Solicitation may petition a state court for an order removing him or her from the state registry and relieving that person from any registration obligations. This remedy is not self-executing; rather, it requires the registrant to file papers in a local court and to prove entitlement to relief, and for the court to grant relief.
Less than one month after Act 402 became law, four plaintiffs,
In the factual allegations framing the plaintiffs' § 1983 Equal Protection claim, plaintiffs trace the legislative history of the Crime Against Nature by Solicitation statute and accompanying penalties and registration requirement, as well as this Court's Order and Reasons and Judgment in Doe I. Plaintiffs also summarize the sex offender registration requirements that continue to be imposed upon them as a result of their Crime Against Nature by Solicitation convictions.
The defendants now seek dismissal of the plaintiffs' lawsuit, invoking the doctrine of sovereign immunity; arguing that the plaintiffs have failed to adequately allege standing; and, in the alternative, contending that the plaintiffs fail to state a claim for relief because they have not pleaded a violation of the Constitution. The plaintiffs, on the other hand, now request that this Court certify a class of persons consisting of:
The plaintiffs also seek summary judgment in their favor. The only issues that have been adequately briefed to the Court deal with the motion to dismiss.
Motions filed under Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allow a party to challenge the Court's subject matter jurisdiction. Fed. R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1). The defendants, sued in their official capacities, challenge this Court's subject matter jurisdiction over them, invoking the doctrine of sovereign immunity. The burden of proof for a Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss is on the party asserting jurisdiction. Ramming v. United States, 281 F.3d 158, 161 (5th Cir.2001). The Court may find a plausible set of facts to support subject matter jurisdiction by considering any of the following: "(1) the complaint alone; (2) the complaint supplemented by undisputed facts evidenced in the record; or (3) the complaint supplemented by undisputed facts plus the court's resolution of disputed facts." Barrera-Montenegro v. United States, 74 F.3d 657, 659 (5th Cir.1996).
The defendants also seek dismissal for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6). The standard of review applicable to motions to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1) is similar to that applicable to motions to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6). See Williams v. Wynne, 533 F.3d 360, 364-65 n. 2 (5th Cir.2008) (observing that the Rule 12(b)(1) and Rule 12(b)(6) standards are similar, but noting that applying the Rule 12(b)(1) standard permits the Court to consider a broader range of materials in resolving the motion).
Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allows a party to move for dismissal of a complaint for failure
"`To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Gonzalez v. Kay, 577 F.3d 600, 603 (5th Cir.2009)(quoting Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949 (2009))(internal quotation marks omitted). "Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level, on the assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact)." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) (quotation marks, citations, and footnote omitted). "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949 ("The plausibility standard is not akin to a `probability requirement,' but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully."). This is a "context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense." Id. "Where a complaint pleads facts that are merely consistent with a defendant's liability, it stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of entitlement to relief." Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557, 127 S.Ct. 1955) (internal quotations omitted). "[A] plaintiff's obligation to provide the `grounds' of his `entitle[ment] to relief'", thus, "requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955 (citation omitted).
In deciding a motion to dismiss, the Court may consider documents that are essentially "part of the pleadings" — that is, any documents attached to or incorporated in the plaintiffs' complaint that are central to the plaintiff's claim for relief. Causey v. Sewell Cadillac-Chevrolet, Inc., 394 F.3d 285, 288 (5th Cir.2004) (citing Collins v. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter, 224 F.3d 496, 498-99 (5th Cir.2000)). Also, the Court is permitted to consider matters of public record and other matters subject to judicial notice without converting a motion to dismiss into one for summary judgment. See United States ex rel. Willard v. Humana Health Plan of Texas Inc., 336 F.3d 375, 379 (5th Cir.2003).
The defendants contend that sovereign immunity bars the plaintiffs' claims;
"Sovereign immunity is the privilege of the sovereign not to be sued without its consent." Virginia Office for Protection and Advocacy v. Stewart, ___ U.S. ___, 131 S.Ct. 1632, 1637, 179 L.Ed.2d 675 (2011)(holding that Ex parte Young exception to sovereign immunity permitted suit by independent state agency dedicated to advocacy for persons with disabilities against certain state officials sued in their official capacities, alleging violations of federal law by refusing agency access to records to which it was entitled under federal enabling statutes). The Eleventh Amendment bars suits by private citizens against a state in federal court. K.P. v. LeBlanc, 627 F.3d 115, 124 (5th Cir.2010)(citing Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 700, 98 S.Ct. 2565, 57 L.Ed.2d 522 (1978)). This immunity protects state actors in their official capacities. Id. There is, of course, "an important limit" on the sovereign immunity doctrine: the iconic Ex parte Young exception "rests on the premise ... that when a federal court commands a state official to do nothing more than refrain from violating federal law, he is not the State for sovereign-immunity purposes." Stewart, 131 S.Ct. at 1638; K.P., 627 F.3d at 124 (Ex parte Young "is based on the legal fiction that a sovereign state cannot act unconstitutionally[; t]hus, where a state actor enforces an unconstitutional law, he is stripped of his official clothing and becomes a private person subject to suit."); see also Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 n. 10, 109 S.Ct. 2304, 105 L.Ed.2d 45 (1989)(noting "[o]f course a state official in his or her official capacity, when sued for injunctive relief, would be a person under § 1983 because `official-capacity actions for prospective relief are not treated as actions against the State'").
Of course, as this Court previously noted, the Ex parte Young exception applies when the plaintiff demonstrates that the state officer has "some connection" with the enforcement of the disputed act. See Doe v. Jindal, No. 11-388, 2011 WL 3925042, at *5 (E.D.La. Sept. 7, 2011)(citing K.P., 627 F.3d at 124 (citing Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. at 160, 28 S.Ct. 441, and noting that the purpose of the connection requirement is to prevent litigants from misusing the exception)). The Fifth Circuit U.S. Court of Appeals instructs:
Id. (quoting Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. at 157, 28 S.Ct. 441). But the defendants do not suggest that they lack the requisite connection with the enforcement of the continued registration requirement necessary to establish the applicability of the Ex parte Young exception to their sovereign
"[I]n determining whether the doctrine of Ex parte Young avoids an Eleventh Amendment bar to suit, a court need only conduct a `straightforward inquiry into whether [the] complaint alleges an ongoing violation of federal law and seeks relief properly characterized as prospective.'" Stewart, 131 S.Ct. at 1639 (quoting Verizon Md. Inc. v. Public Serv. Comm'n of Md., 535 U.S. 635, 645, 122 S.Ct. 1753, 152 L.Ed.2d 871 (2002)). The plaintiffs' lawsuit satisfies this inquiry: they allege an ongoing violation of federal law pursuant to § 1983 (by alleging that the defendants continue to fail to remedy the Equal Protection violation conduct focused in Doe I). They do also seek relief that is indeed prospective in nature: declaratory relief that their continued subjection to sex offender registration and notification requirements violates the Equal Protection clause; that they be removed from the registry; and that the records documenting that they are sex offenders be expunged.
The defendants next urge this Court to resolve another threshold issue: the Court must be satisfied that each of the three plaintiffs have standing to challenge the continued registration requirement imposed on individuals convicted of violating Louisiana's Crime Against Nature by Solicitation statute. Like they did in Doe I, the defendants vigorously attack the plaintiffs' standing.
Article III of the Constitution commands that a litigant must have standing to invoke the power of a federal court. See Nat'l Fed'n of the Blind of Texas, Inc. v. Abbott, 647 F.3d 202, 208 (5th Cir.2011). The doctrine of standing requires that the Court satisfy itself that "the plaintiff has `alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy' as to warrant his invocation of federal-court jurisdiction." See Summers v. Earth Island Institute, 555 U.S. 488, 493, 129 S.Ct. 1142, 173 L.Ed.2d 1 (2009); see also Doe v. Beaumont Indep. Sch. Dist., 240 F.3d 462, 466
To establish standing, the plaintiffs must demonstrate the "irreducible constitutional minimum of standing", which is informed by three elements: (1) that they each personally suffered some actual or threatened "injury in fact" (2) that is "fairly traceable" to the challenged action of the defendants; (3) that likely "would be redressed" by a favorable decision in Court. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992).
There is no dispute,
Second, the plaintiffs must establish that their injuries are fairly traceable, or caused by, the defendants' actions. As this Court previously observed, and the defendants did not dispute, there seems little doubt that the defendants are responsible for administering and enforcing the sex registry law. This places the defendants among those who contribute to the plaintiffs' claimed harm. Because the defendants have the authority to enforce the registry law, they have significantly contributed to the plaintiffs' claim of harm and, thus, the plaintiffs' injuries are traceable to the defendants' conduct.
Third, and finally, the Court considers redressability. "[A] plaintiff satisfies the redressability requirement when he shows that a favorable decision will relieve a discrete injury to himself. He need not show that a favorable decision will relieve his every injury." Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 243 n. 15, 102 S.Ct. 1673, 72 L.Ed.2d 33 (1982). Here, the sued officials or their successors have duties related to the enforcement of the registry law and — if the Court were to rule in the plaintiffs' favor — the plaintiffs would be relieved of their obligation to register as sex offenders. Therefore, an outcome in plaintiffs' favor would redress the plaintiffs' present and future injuries.
Because the plaintiffs have standing, the Court turns to the defendants' challenge to the technical sufficiency of the plaintiffs' civil rights claim.
These parties are by now be familiar with the applicable substantive legal and constitutional requirements, as this Court has spoken to them in Doe I emphatically. See Doe v. Jindal, 851 F.Supp.2d 995 (E.D.La.2012).
In considering now whether these plaintiffs' allegations themselves are at this stage sufficient to withstand the defendants' Rule 12(b)(6) challenge, the Court reiterates the applicable legal principles.
Section 1983 imposes civil liability on:
42 U.S.C. § 1983. To allege a § 1983 violation, a plaintiff must state a violation of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States and state that the
Here, the plaintiffs allege that they are being denied Equal Protection under the Fourteenth Amendment because they continue to be subject to sex offender registration pursuant to La.R.S. § 15:542(A)(1)(a). The plaintiffs claim that they are each registered or registrable solely because they were convicted of La. R.S. § 14:89(A)(2) (prior to August 15, 2010) or La.R.S. § 14:89.2 (after August 15, 2010) — Louisiana's Crimes Against Nature by Solicitation statute. In the first generation of this case, this Court determined that because Louisiana's Prostitution statute and Crime Against Nature by Solicitation statute punish identical conduct, requiring one group of offenders to register as sex offenders, but not the other, violates the Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee of Equal Protection under the laws. Doe v. Jindal, 851 F.Supp.2d 995 (E.D.La.2012). Plaintiffs here complain that, notwithstanding Act 402 or this Court's declaratory judgment — that the application of the Registry Law to those convicted of Crime Against Nature by Solicitation... and their inclusion on the State Sex Offender & Child Predator Registry pursuant to La.R.S. § 15:542, deprives them of Equal Protection of the laws in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution — they continue to be subject to the sex offender registration requirement, in violation of their right to Equal Protection, given that identically situated individuals convicted of solicitation of Prostitution are not required to register.
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution commands that no State shall "deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. Const. Amend. XIV, § 1; Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793, 799, 117 S.Ct. 2293, 138 L.Ed.2d 834 (1997) (citations omitted) (holding that New York's prohibition on assisting suicide did not violate Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment). The Constitutional lesson of Equal Protection under law is a common sense one. This is "essentially a direction that all persons similarly situated should be treated alike." City of Cleburne, Texas v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 440, 105 S.Ct. 3249, 87 L.Ed.2d 313 (1985) (citation omitted); John Corp. v. City of Houston, 214 F.3d 573, 577 (5th Cir.2000) (citation omitted)("The Equal Protection Clause protects individuals from governmental action that works to treat similarly situated individuals differently."); Stoneburner v. Secretary of the Army, 152 F.3d 485, 491 (5th Cir.1998) (citation omitted)("The Equal Protection Clause ... essentially directs that all persons similarly situated be treated alike."). However, "if a law neither burdens a fundamental right nor targets a suspect class," the Supreme Court has observed, "the legislative classification [will survive] so long as it bears a rational relation to some legitimate end." Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 631, 116 S.Ct. 1620, 134 L.Ed.2d 855 (1996)(citing Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 319-20, 113 S.Ct. 2637, 125 L.Ed.2d 257 (1993)); City of Cleburne, Texas v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 440, 105 S.Ct. 3249, 87
When conducting the pivotal rational basis review, the U.S. Supreme Court has observed that "we will not overturn such [government action] unless the varying treatment of different groups or persons is so unrelated to the achievement of any combination of legitimate purposes that we can only conclude that the [government's] actions were irrational." Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 84, 120 S.Ct. 631, 145 L.Ed.2d 522 (2000)(citing Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 97, 99 S.Ct. 939, 59 L.Ed.2d 171 (1979)). Where, as here, the challenged classification is presumptively rational, "the individual challenging its constitutionality bears the burden of proving that the `facts on which the classification is apparently based could not reasonably be conceived to be true by the governmental decisionmaker.'" Id. (citing Bradley, 440 U.S. at 111, 99 S.Ct. 939).
To state at this juncture an Equal Protection violation, and thereby satisfy their burden of alleging a Constitutional violation sufficient to warrant § 1983 relief, the plaintiffs must allege that they have been purposefully treated differently from others similarly situated, and that there is no rational basis for the difference in treatment. Stoneburner, 152 F.3d at 490 (citations omitted). The plaintiffs contend that they have stated a violation of the Equal Protection Clause for the same reason that the plaintiffs in Doe I succeeded in their claim: they allege that, because they were convicted of Crime Against Nature by Solicitation before August 15, 2011, even though their conduct also fell within the scope of the statute prohibiting solicitation of Prostitution, they have, without any rational basis, been subjected to mandatory sex offender registration while identically situated individuals convicted under the solicitation provision of the Prostitution statute are not required to register as sex offenders. At this stage of the litigation, the Court must accept the plaintiffs' well-pleaded facts as true and in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs; because the test is simply whether the plaintiffs have stated a claim for relief that has facial plausibility, the Court finds that the plaintiffs' allegations are technically sufficient to withstand dismissal.
The defendants contend that Act 402 substantively changed the law this Court declared unconstitutional in Doe I by providing a remedy in state court to those who prove they are only on the registry for a Crime Against Nature by Solicitation conviction (and, defendants contend, that they prove they did not solicit sex from a minor).
Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED: that the defendants' motion to dismiss is DENIED. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED: that the hearing on the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment and motion for class certification is hereby continued, to be reset.
On February 15, 2011 nine plaintiffs, proceeding pseudonymously, sued the defendants in their official capacities under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to challenge the constitutionality of Louisiana's mandatory inclusion of one particular crime on the State's sex offender registry, the Crime Against Nature by Solicitation statute. This Court determined that there was no rational legislative purpose in requiring registration as a sex offender for persons convicted for violation of Crime Against Nature by Solicitation when conviction under the identical solicitation provision of Louisiana's Prostitution statute commanded no sex offender registration. See Doe I.
It is also noteworthy that, during oral argument, counsel for defendants conceded that the nine plaintiffs in Doe I were provided relief in accordance with this Court's Judgment (including by being removed from the sex offender registry and issued new licenses without the "SEX OFFENDER" designation) through cooperation amongst various defendants in their official capacities; the same defendants named in this lawsuit.
Doe v. Jindal, 851 F.Supp.2d 995, 1008-09 (E.D.La.2012).