REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

ALMA L. CHASEZ, Magistrate Judge.

This matter was referred to the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge to conduct a hearing, including an evidentiary hearing, if necessary, and to submit proposed findings and recommendations for disposition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §636(b)(1)(B) and (C), and as applicable, Rule 8(b) of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States District Courts. Upon review of the entire record, the Court has determined that this matter can be disposed of without an evidentiary hearing. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2). For the following reasons, IT IS RECOMMENDED that the petition for habeas corpus relief be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE as time-barred.

I. Procedural History

Petitioner, Cherie Perez, is a state prisoner incarcerated in the Louisiana Correctional Institute for Women in St. Gabriel, Louisiana. On January 11, 2005, Perez pleaded guilty to one count of armed robbery under Louisiana law and was sentenced to a term of 20 years imprisonment without benefit of parole, with credit for time served, to run concurrently with her other sentence in Terrebonne Parish.1 She did not appeal her conviction.

On or about June 4, 2012, petitioner filed a motion for review of sentence with the state district court.2 The motion was denied on June 11, 2012.3 On July 20, 2012, petitioner filed a notice of intent to apply for supervisory and/or remedial writs of mandamus, prohibition and certiorari. The state district court ordered a return date of September 11, 2012.4 On October 29, 2012, the Louisiana First Circuit Court of Appeal denied her related writ application.5 On April 26, 2013, the Louisiana Supreme Court denied relief.6

On July 25, 2013, petitioner filed the instant federal application seeking habeas corpus relief.7 In her application, petitioner claims that her sentence is illegal, counsel was ineffective and she was denied the opportunity to submit mitigating evidence during sentencing. The State argues that the federal application is untimely.8 For the following reasons, the court agrees and finds the petition to be untimely.

II. Statute of limitations

The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA") generally requires that a petitioner bring his Section 2254 claims within one (1) year of the date on which his underlying criminal judgment becomes "final."9 On that point, the United States Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals has explained:

Butler v. Cain, 533 F.3d 314, 317 (5th Cir.2008).

As noted, on January 11, 2005, petitioner pleaded guilty and was sentenced. Because she did not file a direct appeal within the thirty days allowed by state law, her conviction and sentence became final no later than February 10, 2005.10 Accordingly, the period that she had in which to file her federal application for habeas corpus relief with respect to her state criminal judgment commenced on that date and expired one year later on February 10, 2006, unless that deadline was extended through tolling.

The Court first considers statutory tolling. Regarding the statute of limitations, the AEDPA expressly provides: "The time during which a properly filed application for State post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending shall not be counted toward any period of limitation under this subsection." 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). However, petitioner had no such applications pending before the state courts during the applicable one-year period. Although she did file applications during that period requesting documents, it is clear that applications seeking documents are not considered "application[s] for State post-conviction or other collateral review" for tolling purposes because they are preliminary in nature and do not directly call into question the validity of a petitioner's conviction or sentence. Higginbotham v. Tanner, Civ. Action No. 10-1130, 2011 WL 3268128, at *1 (E.D.La. July 29, 2011); Parker v. Cain, Civ. Action No. 02-0250, 2002 WL 922383, at *2 n.22 (E.D.La. May 1, 2002), certificate of appealability denied, No. 03-30107 (5th Cir. June 23, 2003); Boyd v. Ward, Civ. Action No. 01-493, 2001 WL 533221, at *4 (E.D.La. May 15, 2001), certificate of appealability denied, No. 01-30651 (5th Cir. Aug. 22, 2001). Because those applications did not trigger statutory tolling, and because petitioner had no other state applications pending at any time during the one-year limitations period, she clearly is not entitled to any tolling credit pursuant to § 2244(d)(2).11

The Court must next consider equitable tolling. The United States Supreme Court has expressly held that the AEDPA's statute of limitations is subject to equitable tolling. Holland v. Florida, 130 S.Ct. 2549, 2560 (2010). However, "a petitioner is entitled to equitable tolling only if he shows (1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary circumstance stood in his way and prevented timely filing." Id. at 2562 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Davis v. Johnson, 158 F.3d 806, 811 (5th Cir.1998) (holding that the AEDPA's statute of limitations can be equitably tolled "in rare and exceptional circumstances"). A petitioner bears the burden of proof to establish entitlement to equitable tolling. Alexander v. Cockrell, 294 F.3d 626, 629 (5th Cir.2002). In the instant case, petitioner has brought forth no evidence demonstrating that she is entitled to such tolling, and this Court knows of no reason that would support equitable tolling of the statute of limitations. Accordingly,

RECOMMENDATION

IT IS RECOMMENDED that petitioner's application for federal habeas corpus relief be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE as time-barred.

A party's failure to file written objections to the proposed findings, conclusions, and recommendation in a magistrate judge's report and recommendation within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy shall bar that party, except upon grounds of plain error, from attacking on appeal the unobjected-to proposed factual findings and legal conclusions accepted by the district court, provided that the party has been served with notice that such consequences will result from a failure to object. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Douglass v. United Services Auto. Ass'n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1430 (5th Cir.1996) (en banc).12