SUSIE MORGAN, District Judge.
Before the Court is a motion for summary judgment
This civil rights lawsuit arises out of Carter's allegations of cruel and unusual punishment while he was incarcerated at the B.B. "Sixty" Rayburn Correctional Center Rayburn Correctional Center ("Rayburn") in Angie, Louisiana.
Carter's incarceration at Rayburn began on April 11, 2011. Due to his conduct during previous periods of incarceration, Carter was placed in "Extended Lockdown Level 1" ("Level 1") as soon as he arrived Rayburn. Pursuant to Rayburn policy, Carter's Level 1 status required him to be handcuffed and shackled any time he was allowed out of his cell,
In his complaint, Carter claims the Rayburn policy curtailed his ability to exercise while incarcerated and thus constituted an "unjustified form of punishment" which violated his Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment.
Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Carter sought the following relief from the Defendants, in both their individual and official capacities, as a result of their alleged Eighth Amendment violations: (1) a declaration that his Eighth Amendment rights have been violated; (2) a preliminary and permanent injunction against Defendants, directing them to "refrain and be enjoined from depriving plaintiff the opportunities to participate in regular out-of-cell exercise . . . without restraints"; (3) an order directing the Rayburn Level 1 exercise policy be "ceased and declared unlawful in application"; (4) compensatory damages from Defendants in the amount of $200 a day; (5) punitive damages from Defendants in the amount of $30,000; (6) an award of costs in Carter's favor; and (7) equitable relief. Carter separately filed a motion for preliminary injunction.
On January 3, 2012, Magistrate Judge Knowles denied Carter's request for preliminary injunctive relief.
On September 28, 2012, Carter informed the Court that he is no longer incarcerated at Rayburn.
On June 11, 2013, at a status conference, the Court granted Defendants' motion insofar as it seeks dismissal of Carter's claim for permanent injunctive relief.
Carter's complaint sets forth allegations against the Defendants in both their individual capacities and official capacities. A state employee acting in his or her official capacity is not a "person" subject to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989). It is settled law that the Eleventh Amendment bars recovery of money and damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 from state employees in their official capacity. Oliver v. Scott, 276 F.3d 736, 742 (5th Cir. 2001). Accordingly, to the extent Carter seeks monetary damages against the Defendants in their official capacities, the Eleventh Amendment bars those claims against Defendants.
At this stage in the proceedings, Carter's remaining claims are for compensatory and punitive damages, costs, and other just and equitable relief against the Defendants in their individual capacities.
Summary judgment is appropriate only "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." FED. R. CIV. P. 56; see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986).
Ordinarily, if the dispositive issue is one on which the moving party will bear the burden of proof at trial, the moving party "must come forward with evidence which would `entitle it to a directed verdict if the evidence went uncontroverted at trial.'"
If, however, the party moving for summary judgment asserts a defense of absolute or qualified immunity "in good faith," as Defendants have done in this case, the burden shifts to the non-moving party to rebut that defense. Disraeli v. Rotunda, 489 F.3d 628, 631 (5th Cir. 2007) (citing Beck v. Tex. State Bd. of Dental Exam'rs, 204 F.3d 629, 633-34 (5th Cir. 2000)); Gates v. Tex. Dept. of Protective and Regulatory Servs., 537 F.3d 404, 419 (5th Cir. 2008) ("In the summary judgment context, a government official need only plead qualified immunity, which then shifts the burden to the plaintiff.") (citation omitted). In this situation, the party moving for summary judgment on an immunity defense "can support its motion by relying on the pleadings alone," id., and the non-moving party bears the burden of setting forth, by competent evidence, a genuine issue for trial. See Beard v. Banks, 548 U.S. 521, 529 (2006). While a party asserting a qualified immunity defense can support a motion for summary judgment by relying on the pleadings alone, the non-moving party cannot rely solely on the pleadings; instead, he is required (as is the moving party in the typical summary judgment motion) to "set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Id. In The non-moving party may rebut the qualified immunity defense "by establishing that the official's allegedly wrongful conduct violated clearly established law and that genuine issues of material fact exist regarding the reasonableness of the official's conduct." Gates, 537 F.3d at 419. Where, as here, a plaintiff's complaint is verified, the contents of that complaint may be considered competent summary judgment evidence, so long as those contents otherwise comply with Rule 56. See King v. Dogan, 31 F.3d 344, 346 (5th Cir. 1994).
With all summary judgment motions, whether or not they involve the invocation of an immunity defense and regardless of which party bears the burden of proof, the Court is required to draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party when resolving disputed issues of fact. Beard, 548 U.S. at 529. That said, in a qualified immunity case, when resolving "disputed matters of professional judgment," as the Court is often asked to do in such cases, the Court's "inferences must accord deference to the views of prison authorities." Id. Assuming there are no genuine factual disputes, "[u]nless a prisoner can point to sufficient evidence regarding such issues of judgment to allow him to prevail on the merits, he cannot prevail at the summary judgment stage." Id.
It is well-settled that "the treatment a prisoner receives in prison and the conditions under which he is confined are subject to scrutiny under the Eighth Amendment." Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 31 (1993). The Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution, incorporated against the states via the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, protects persons from cruel and unusual punishment. State of Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459, 463 (1947). Carter claims the Rayburn policy of requiring Level 1 prisoners to remain handcuffed and shackled while on the exercise yard is cruel and unusual punishment and thus a violation of his Eighth Amendment rights.
"In its prohibition of `cruel and unusual punishments,' the Eighth Amendment places restraints on prison officials, who may not, for example, use excessive physical force against prisoners." Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832-33 (1994) (citations omitted). "The [Eighth] Amendment also imposes duties on these officials, who must provide humane conditions of confinement; prison officials must ensure that inmates receive adequate food, clothing, shelter, and medical care, and must take reasonable measures to guarantee the safety of the inmates." Id. (quotation marks and citations omitted). That said, the "Constitution does not mandate prisons with comfortable surroundings or commodious conditions." Talib v. Gilley, 138 F.3d 211, 215 (5th Cir. 1998).
The Supreme Court has established a two-part test to determine whether a prisoner has established a constitutional violation relating to the conditions of his confinement. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834. In Hernandez v. Velasquez, 522 F.3d 556 (5th Cir. 2008), a case involving a prisoner's claim that lack of exercise opportunities rose to the level of an Eighth Amendment violation, the Fifth Circuit set forth this two step test as follows:
Id. at 560-61; see also Haralson v. Campuzano, 356 F. App'x 692, 696 (5th Cir. 2009) ("To succeed on [a] conditions-of-confinement claim, [a prisoner] must show that (1) his confinement, objectively speaking, resulted in a deprivation that was sufficiently serious; and (2) that prison officials acted with deliberate indifference.")(citing Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834).
Before turning to the specific details of Carter's allegations, the Court notes that cases involving prisoners' complaints about the lack of ability to exercise while incarcerated are not uncommon, and thus a fairly well-developed body of case law exists regarding a prisoner's right and ability to exercise under the Eighth Amendment. The Supreme Court has identified exercise as a "identifiable human need" for which the Eighth Amendment provides protection. Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 304-05 (1991). Among other things, deprivation of exercise may constitute an unconstitutional impairment of a prisoner's health, actionable under the Eighth Amendment, and the Fifth Circuit has noted on a number of occasions that the absence of exercise opportunities may constitute a constitutional violation. See, e.g., Green v. Ferrell, 801 F.2d 765, 771-72 (5th Cir. 1986); Ruiz v. Estelle, 679 F.2d 1115, 1152 (5th Cir. 1982), modified on other grounds, 688 F.2d 266 (5th Cir. 1982); Maze v. Hargett, 200 F.3d 814, at *3 (5th Cir. 1999) (unpublished); Hewitt v. Henderson, 271 F. App'x 426, 428 (5th Cir. 2008) (unpublished); Hernandez, 522 F.3d at 560-61; Haralson, 356 F. App'x at 696-97. The right to exercise is not absolute, however, and deprivation of exercise is not a per se constitutional violation. Hernandez, 522 F.3d at 560 n. 5 (internal citations omitted).
As explained above, to succeed on a conditions-of-confinement claim and to overcome a qualified immunity defense, Carter must show (1) that his confinement "resulted in a deprivation that was objectively, sufficiently serious" and (2) "that prison officials acted with deliberate indifference to his health or safety." Hernandez v. Velasquez, 522 F.3d 556, 560 (5th Cir. 2008). The Court will assume Carter has met the "objective prong" and that the Level 1 exercise policy was a sufficiently serious deprivation. As such, the issue in this case turns on the "subjective prong" of the analysis.
"Deliberate indifference is a stringent standard of fault, requiring proof that a municipal actor disregarded a known or obvious consequence of his action." Connick v. Thompson, 131 S.Ct. 1350, 1360 (2011)(internal quotation marks omitted). "A prison official acts with deliberate indifference only if (A) he knows that inmates face a substantial risk of serious bodily harm and (B) he disregards that risk by failing to take reasonable measures to abate it." Id. at 346 (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted). The knowledge requirement is subjective: the official "must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference." Farmer, 511 U.S. at 847. Under Farmer, prison officials cannot be found to have acted with deliberate indifference if: (1) "they were unaware of even an obvious risk to inmate health or safety," (2) "they did not know of the underlying facts indicating a sufficiently substantial danger," (3) "they knew of the underlying facts but believed (albeit unsoundly) that the risk to which the facts gave rise was insubstantial or nonexistent," or "they knew of a substantial risk to inmate health or safety [and] responded reasonably to the danger, even if the harm was not ultimately averted." Id. at 845. [O]nly the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain implicates the Eight Amendment." Id. at 834.
The Court finds that Carter cannot show Defendants were deliberately indifferent to his health or safety under Farmer because there is no indication the complaints from which he suffered posed a substantial risk of serious harm. Carter's verified complaint alleges he suffered from depression, loss of appetite, muscle aches, joint pain, weakness, lightheadedness, nausea, loss of muscle mass, and fatigue. The Fifth Circuit has found substantially similar conditions do not pose a "substantial risk of serious harm." Hernandez, 522 F.3d at 561 (finding the plaintiff's complaints of muscle atrophy, stiffness, loss of range of motion and depression did not pose a "substantial risk of harm" sufficient to constitute an Eighth Amendment violation). Accordingly, Carter has not raised an issue of fact as to whether he suffered a "serious illness or injury" sufficient to constitute an Eighth Amendment violation. Id. (citing Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976)).
Although it is unclear from the pleadings, Carter's pro se complaint could also be read to allege an impairment of health claim based on the treatment he received at Rayburn. Miller v. Carson, 563 F.2d 741, 751 n. 12 (denial of exercise may constitute an "impairment of health" actionable under the Eighth Amendment). To prevail on an impairment of health claim, Carter must show a "serious medical need and the prison officials' deliberate indifference to it." Hernandez, 522 F.3d at 561 (citing Johnson v. Treen, 759 F.2d 1236, 1238 (5th Cir. 1985)). "Unsuccessful medical treatment, acts of negligence, or medical malpractice do not constitute deliberate indifference, nor does a prisoner's disagreement with his medical treatment, absent exceptional circumstances." Gobert v. Caldwell, 463 F.3d 339, 346 (5th Cir. 2006).
Carter has not shown that prison officials failed to reasonably address his medical needs. Carter repeatedly made sick call requests and the Rayburn medical staff prescribed treatments each time he made a formal sick call. Viewing the facts alleged in Carter's verified complaint in the light most favorable to him, Carter cannot Defendants treated him with "wanton disregard" for his medical needs. Id. As such, Carter cannot show "deliberate indifference" on behalf of Defendants and he has failed to raise a genuine issue for trial to defeat Defendants' assertion of qualified immunity. Summary judgment in favor of Defendants is warranted.
