JANE TRICHE MILAZZO, District Judge.
This maritime action arises from the discovery of a barge (the "CAPTAIN FRANKS") buried beneath the bed of the Mississippi River adjacent to a tract of riparian property (the "Batture Property"). Plaintiff Port of South of Louisiana (the "Port")—the owner of the Batture Property—encountered the sunken CAPTAIN FRANKS while constructing a finger pier.
This matter was tried before the undersigned without a jury. Having considered the evidence admitted at trial and the arguments of counsel, the Court announces its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52. To the extent a finding of fact constitutes a conclusion of law, the Court adopts it as such. To the extent a conclusion of law constitutes a finding of fact, the Court adopts it as such.
The dispositive issue in this case is whether TP Barge owned, controlled, or caused the CAPTAIN FRANKS to sink. Before making findings specific to this issue, the Court provides a brief overview of the relevant background facts.
1. On April 17, 1985, Reserve Barge, Inc. ("Reserve Barge") sold to Cargo Transfer, Inc. ("Cargo Transfer") the Batture Property, certain movable property, and several leases. One of the movable items is described as follows in the sale documents under the subheading "
2. Augustine signed the sale documents as president of Cargo Transfer.
3. On May 11, 1988, Cargo Transfer sold to TP Barge the Batture property and the same movable property that Cargo Transfer previously purchased from Reserve Barge.
4. Augustine is the vice-president, treasurer, and director of TP Barge; William Dupree ("Dupree") is the secretary. Dupree signed the sale documents on behalf of TP Barge as vice-president.
5. On May 12, 1989, TP Barge sold the Batture Property to Tri-Parish Industries, Inc. ("TP Industries"). The sale did not include any movable property.
6. Augustine signed the sale documents on behalf of TP Industries as president.
7. On April 9, 2009, the Port expropriated the Batture Property from TP Industries for the purpose of expanding a docking facility along the Mississippi River.
8. Continental began driving test pilings in August 2010. Work was halted shortly thereafter when Continental encountered three large underwater obstructions. Continental contracted with Inland Salvage ("Inland") to raise and remove the obstructions.
9. One of the obstructions—buried approximately twelve feet below the riverbed—was a barge bearing the nameplate CAPTAIN FRANKS. The CAPTAIN FRANKS measured approximately 120 ft. × 40 ft. × 7 ft. and contained three spudwells (but no spuds). There were no marks or any other indication of ownership on the CAPTAIN FRANKS.
10. Inland scrapped the CAPTAIN FRANKS within one week of removal. Neither the Port nor TP Barge inspected the CAPTAIN FRANKS after it was removed.
11. The Port does not know when the CAPTAIN FRANKS sank, how the CAPTAIN FRANKS sank, or who owned the CAPTAIN FRANKS when it sunk.
12. TP Barge did not purchase the CAPTAIN FRANKS.
13. TP Barge purchased three 40-foot long, 17-inch square spuds associated with the CAPTAIN FRANKS. The evidence adduced at trial provides ample support for this finding.
14. Cargo Transfer did not purchase the CAPTAIN FRANKS from Reserve Barge. Thus, TP Barge could not have purchased the CAPTAIN FRANKS from Cargo Transfer.
15. TP Barge did not control the CAPTAIN FRANKS, cause it to sink, and was not otherwise aware that it sunk.
The Court has subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1333, which confers on the federal district courts original jurisdiction over maritime claims. Venue is proper, because a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claims occurred in the Eastern District of Louisiana. See 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(2).
1. Negligence is an actionable wrong under the general maritime law. Withhart v. Otto Candies, LLC, 431 F.3d 840, 842 (5th Cir. 2005). In order to prevail, the plaintiff must demonstrate that: (1) the defendant owed a duty; (2) the defendant breached that duty; (3) the plaintiff sustained damages; and (4) the defendant's wrongful conduct caused his damages. In re Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., LLC, 624 F.3d 201, 211 (5th Cir. 2010).
2. The threshold inquiry in any negligence analysis is whether a duty is owed vel non. See In re Signal Int'l, LLC, 579 F.3d 478, 491 (5th Cir. 2009). Determination of a tortfeasor's duty is a question of law. Canal Barge Co. v. Torco Oil Co., 220 F.3d 370, 376 (5th Cir. 2000).
3. A maritime tortfeasor's standard of care is derived from positive law, custom, and the general principles of tort law. See S.C. Loveland, Inc. v. E. W. Towing, Inc., 608 F.2d 160, 165 (5th Cir. 1979); 1 Thomas J. Schoenbaum, Admiralty and Maritime Law § 5-2 (5th ed. 2013). The Port urges this Court to look to 33 U.S.C § 409 (the "Wreck Act") in determining the existence and scope of TP Barge's duty. Although the Wreck Act is a criminal statute, it also establishes a standard of care applicable in ordinary maritime negligence actions. See Nunley v. M/V Dauntless Colocotronis, 727 F.2d 455, 462 (5th Cir. 1984) (en banc); Inland Tugs Co. v. Ohio River Co., 709 F.2d 1065, 1068 n.1 (6th Cir. 1983); Chute v. United States, 610 F.2d 7, 10 (1st Cir. 1979).
4. "When the doctrine of negligence per se applies, the general standard of care of a reasonable man is replaced by a specific rule of conduct established in a statute or regulation." Dougherty v. Santa Fe Marine, Inc., 698 F.2d 232, 234 (5th Cir. 1983). The Wreck Act requires the "owner, lessee, or operator" of a sunken vessel that obstructs navigation to immediately (1) mark the wreck, and (2) commence removal. See 33 U.S.C. § 409.
5. TP Barge did not own, lease, or operate the CAPTAIN FRANKS. Therefore, the statutory duties imposed by the Wreck Act do not apply.
6. Having concluded the doctrine of negligence per se is inapplicable and finding custom equally inapplicable, the remaining question is whether a duty may be imposed from the general principles of tort law. See Loveland, 608 F.2d at 165. Under those principles, "[d]uty . . . is measured by the scope of the risk that negligent conduct foreseeably entails." Consol. Aluminum Corp. v. C.F. Bean Corp., 833 F.2d 65, 67 (5th Cir. 1987) (alteration in original). Given that TP Barge did not own, control, or cause the CAPTAIN FRANKS to sink—nor was TP Barge even aware that the CAPTAIN FRANKS had sunk—there is simply no basis under the law for imposing a duty.
7. TP Barge owed no duty to the Port. Accordingly, the Port's negligence claim fails, as does its veil-piercing claim against Augustine. See Port of S. La. v. Tri-Parish Indus., Inc., 2013 WL 2394859, at *3 (E.D. La. May 28, 2013) ("A veil-piercing claim is ancillary—it is not actionable unless a corporate defendant is cast in judgment.")
The Port's failure to prove that TP Barge owed a duty sinks its general maritime negligence claim. Accordingly, all remaining claims are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. Judgment will be entered in favor of Defendants.