JANE TRICHE MILAZZO, District Judge.
Before the Court is Defendant's Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction (R. Doc. 5). For the following reasons, this Motion is GRANTED, and this case is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE IN PART and REMANDED IN PART.
Plaintiff, Gail Butler, alleges that on January 20, 2013, she was injured when the streetcar in which she was riding was involved in a collision with a United States Postal Service (USPS) vehicle. On October 28, 2013, Plaintiff filed an administrative claim with the USPS. Then, on January 16, 2014, Plaintiff brought a state court suit against the driver of the USPS vehicle, Calvin Robiskie; the owner of the streetcar, Regional Transit Authority; its operator, Veolia Transportation Services, Inc.; and the streetcar driver, Stacy Gould. The United States, on behalf of Robiskie, removed the suit to this Court, certifying that Robiskie was acting within the course and scope of his employment at the time of the accident and substituting the United States as the proper party defendant. The United States now moves to have this case dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, alleging that Plaintiff failed to exhaust her administrative remedies before filing suit.
A Rule 12(b)(1) motion challenges the subject matter jurisdiction of a federal district court. "A case is properly dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction when the court lacks the statutory or constitutional power to adjudicate the case."
The United States of America is a sovereign that is immune from suit except in the manner and degree sovereign immunity is waived.
In this case, Plaintiff did not wait until either a final disposition of her claim through the USPS administrative process or the passage of six months from the time she filed her claim with the USPS. It is undisputed that when Plaintiff filed suit in state court against the driver of the USPS truck, her administrative claim had not yet been adjudicated and less than three months had elapsed. "Exhaustion of administrative remedies is a jurisdictional prerequisite to suit under the FTCA, and absent compliance with the statute's requirement the district court is without jurisdiction."
In her opposition, Plaintiff argues that she intentionally did not sue the United States when she brought suit in state court to avoid dismissal on these grounds. She did, however, sue Robiskie, the driver of the USPS truck. The FTCA expressly states that:
"Thus, any person who believes he has been injured by a government employee acting within the scope of his official duties effectively will be in litigation with the United States once the Attorney General's certification of the employee's scope of employment issues."
Plaintiff likewise asserts that she was forced to prematurely file suit in state court in order to interrupt prescription pursuant to Louisiana Civil Code article 3492 and that this situation creates a "serious quandary between state and federal law."
Accordingly, Plaintiff would have had six months after the final denial of her claim by the USPS in which to file suit against the United States (as the proper party defendant for the driver of the USPS truck).
For these reasons, this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiff's claim against the United States, as proper party defendant for Robiskie, and this claim must be dismissed. The dismissal leaves this Court with, according to Plaintiff's petition, a state law tort suit by a Louisiana resident against another Louisiana resident and two political subdivisions of the City of New Orleans. Plaintiff has given this Court no basis on which to assert either diversity or federal question jurisdiction over these remaining claims. Accordingly, this Court holds that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the remainder of this case, and it must be remanded back to state court.
For the foregoing reasons, this Motion is GRANTED. Plaintiff's claim against the United States is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE, and the case is REMANDED.