KAREN WELLS ROBY, Magistrate Judge.
The claimant, Antonio Porrazzo ("Porrazzo"), seeks judicial review pursuant to Title 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), of the final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security denying his claim for Disability Insurance Benefits ("DIB") and Supplemental Security Income ("SSI"), under Title II of the Social Security Act, Title 42 U.S.C. § 1382(c).
The matter was referred to the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge pursuant to Title 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Local Rule 19.02E(b), for the submission of Proposed Findings and Recommendations.
Porrazzo is a thirty-five-year-old, 165 pound, 5' 6" tall male.
On August 23, 2011, Porrazzo filed for a period of disability and DIB under Title II, and protectively filed for SSI under Title XVI of the Social Security Act.
He alleges that he became disabled on November 07, 2008, due to severe low back pain with permanent nerve damage affecting his testicles and the right side of his body.
Porrazzo filed a written request for a hearing on December 29, 2011.
In his decision, the ALJ analyzed Porrazzo's claims pursuant to the five-step
The ALJ further found that Porrazzo has a degenerative disc disease of the lumbar spine. The ALJ noted that Porrazzo has a medically determinable mental impairment of substance abuse in remission and mood disorder, which does not, individually or in a combination, rise to the level of severe.
The ALJ held that Porrazzo does not have an impairment or combination of impairments that meet or medically equal the severity of one of the listed impairments in 20 C.F.R. Part 400, Subpart P, Appendix 1.
The ALJ further found that Porrazzo is unable to perform any past relevant work as a car lot porter, hardware sales person, amusement park manager and inventory control person.
On August 15, 2013, Porrazzo requested review of the hearing decision.
The Commissioner contends that the ALJ (1) properly found that Porrazzo did not meet or equal the listing 1.04 impairment; (2) substantial evidence supports the ALJ's credibility finding and residual functional capacity findings; and (3) the Appeals Council properly considered the new evidence plaintiff submitted after the ALJ's decision.
On appeal, Porrazzo challenges:
To receive disability benefits, a SSI or DIB claimant must be "disabled" as defined by the Social Security Act. See 42 U.S.C. § 423(a)(1)(D), 42 U.S.C. § 1382(a). An individual is "disabled" if he is unable "to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months . . ." 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A); Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 140 (1987); Anthony v. Sullivan, 954 F.2d 289, 292 (5th Cir. 1992). A physical or mental impairment is "an impairment that results from anatomical, physiological, or psychological abnormalities which are demonstrable by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques." 42 U.S.C. § (d)(3); Dellolio v. Heckler, 705 F.2d 123, 125 (5th Cir. 1983).
The Social Security Regulations delineate a five-step process for determining whether a claimant is disabled within the meaning of the Act. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520. At the first step, the ALJ considers whether the claimant is presently employed or "engaged in substantial gainful activity." 20 C.F.R. 404.1520(b). If he or she is, then the claimant is found not disabled, and the evaluation process is over; if he or she is not, then the ALJ must then determine whether the claimant has a severe impairment or combination of impairments which "significantly limits . . . physical or mental ability to do basic work activities." See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(c).
In the third step, the ALJ determines whether severe impairment(s) matches or is equal to any of the impairments listed in the regulations. 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. P, app. 1. If it does, then the impairment is presumed to be severe enough to preclude any gainful activity and is acknowledged by the Commissioner as conclusively disabling. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(d). However, if the impairment does not qualify under the listings, the evaluation proceeds to the fourth and fifth steps.
At the fourth step, the ALJ reviews the claimant's "residual functional capacity" ("RFC") and the physical and mental demands of his past work. RFC is a measure of what an individual can do despite the limitations imposed by his impairments. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a); 20 C.F.R. § 416.945(a). If the claimant can perform his past work, he is not disabled and the evaluation ends. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(e).
The claimant bears the burden of proof on the first four steps. Anderson v. Sullivan, 887 F.2d 630, 632-33 (5th Cir. 1989). However, if the claimant shows that his impairment is so severe that he is unable to engage in his past relevant work, then the burden of proof shifts to the Commissioner for the fifth step. At the fifth step, an application for disability benefits cannot be denied unless the Commissioner establishes that the claimant — in light of his age, education, job experience and functional capacity to work — is capable of performing other work and that such work exists in the national economy. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(f).
The role of this Court on judicial review under Title 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) is limited to determining whether (1) the final decision is supported by substantial evidence, and (2) whether the Commissioner used the proper legal standards to evaluate the evidence. See Brown v. Apfel, 192 F.3d 492, 496 (5th Cir. 1999). The Court may not re-weigh the evidence, try issues de novo or substitute its judgment for that of the Secretary. Allen v. Schweiker, 642 F.2d 799, 800 (5th Cir. 1981). If supported by substantial evidence, the Secretary's findings are conclusive and must be affirmed. Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389 (1971). See also Wilkinson v. Schweiker, 640 F.2d 743, 744 (5th Cir. 1981) (citations omitted).
"Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept to support a conclusion. It is more than a mere scintilla and less than a preponderance." See Ripley v. Chater, 67 F.3d 552, 555 (5th Cir. 1995). Substantial evidence must do more than create a suspicion of the existence of the fact to be established. A finding of no "substantial evidence" will only be found where there is a "conspicuous absence of credible choices" or "no contrary medical evidence." Payne v. Weinberger, 480 F.2d 1006, 1007 (5th Cir. 1973); Hemphill v. Weinberger, 483 F.2d 1137, 1138 (5th Cir. 1973).
A single piece of evidence will not satisfy the substantiality test if the ALJ ignores, or fails to resolve, a conflict created by countervailing evidence. Evidence is not substantial if it is overwhelmed by other evidence, particularly that offered by treating physicians. Kent v. Schweiker, 710 F.2d 110, 114 (3d Cir. 1983).
Finally, the Court "weigh[s] four elements of proof when determining whether there is substantial evidence of disability: (1) objective medical facts: (2) diagnosis and opinions of treating and examining physicians; (3) the claimant's subjective evidence of pain and disability; and (4) [his] age, education, and work history." Hendricks v. Apfel, No. 99-1212, 2000 WL 174884, *3 (E.D. La. Feb. 14, 2000)(citing Martiniez v. Chater, 64 F.3d 172, 174 (5th Cir. 1995)).
Porrazzo contends that the ALJ's conclusion that he did not meet the listing level impairment of the musculoskeletal is not based upon substantial evidence. Porrazzo contends that his medical records show evidence of nerve root compression in September 2008. He asserts that the ALJ erred when he concluded that Porrazzo's post-surgery EMG was normal. Porrazzo further contends that the evidence from the record satisfies all requirements of the Listing 1.04A and that substantial evidence does not support the ALJ's contrary finding.
The Commissioner in contrast contends that the ALJ's decision that Porrazzo does not meet the listing level impairment is based upon substantial evidence. The Commissioner contends that the post-surgical diagnostic tests revealed normal lower extremity sensory, non-severe bulges on the right. The Commissioner contends that an old radicular injury does not meet the listing level impairment.
The Code of Federal Regulations defines Listing Level 1.04 as:
20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. P, app. 1
The ALJ noted that the medical sources Porrazzo sought treatment from diagnosed him with degenerative disc disease of the lumbar spine but that medical evidence did not support his allegations of physical limitations more restrictive than those listed in the residual functional capacity.
The ALJ further noted that Dr. Mandich, the consultative examiner, stated that Porrazzo ambulated without difficulty and was able to get in-and-out of a chair and on-and-off an exam table without difficulty.
The record shows that the ALJ properly considered the medical evidence in the record. The record shows that Dr. Mandich conducted a physical examination of Porrazzo.
While the straight leg raising test performed by Dr. Mandich is reportedly negative, on October 6, 2011, the same test performed by Dr. Miranne during Porrazzo's visit on August 6, 2010, almost a year earlier, was positive on the left which is consistent with the decrease in reflexes on the left side. It appears that Porrazzo's back condition had some improvement ten months later.
Thereafter, on July 2, 2012, Porrazzo returned to Dr. Lundgren.
On July 23, 2010, an MRI was done and showed that there were no definite signs for recurrent disc herniation at the L3-4 level.
Further, both MRIs indicate that the right S1 nerve root was also seen on examination and remained unchanged but is more likely to be secondary to a venous congestion along the nerve root and not a sign of arachnoiditis.
It is the
A party's failure to file written objections to the Proposed Findings, Conclusions, and Recommendation in a Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation
First, the claimant must not be presently working at any substantial gainful activity. Id. Second, the claimant must have an impairment or combination of impairments that are severe. Id. An impairment or combination of impairments is "severe" if it "significantly limits [a claimant's] physical or mental ability to do basic work activities." Id. (citing Crowley, 197 F.3d 194, 197-98). Third, the claimant's impairment must meet or equal an impairment listed in the appendix to the regulations. Id. Fourth, the impairment must prevent the claimant from returning to his past relevant work. Fifth, the impairment must prevent the claimant from doing any relevant work that exists in the national economy, considering the claimant's residual functional capacity, age, education, and past work experience. Id.; see also Villa v. Sullivan, 895 F.2d 1019, 1022 (5th Cir. 1990).