ORDER

DANIEL E. KNOWLES, III, Magistrate Judge.

Before the Court is the Motion for Magistrate Judge Knowles Be Recused [sic] [Doc. #108] filed by pro se plaintiff Anderson Wallace, Jr. This is the second motion to recuse. Wallace alleges that this Court has a personal bias against him and is acting in collusion with counsel for defendant. He maintains that the Court has denied his motion for appointment of counsel and has violated his rights to due process and equal protection under the laws.

Wallace's conclusory allegations are no more than that, conclusory allegations. He provides no evidence of bias on the part of the Court apart from the fact that the Court has denied many of his earlier-filed motions. Wallace is simply unhappy with the outcome of his earlier motions, and unhappiness is not grounds for recusal. This Court has followed the law as cited in its earlier orders. That Wallace is unhappy with the state of the law is not a reason for the Court to recuse itself. See, e.g, Poole v. United States, No. 3:06 CR 722, 2009 WL 2392927, *4 (N.D. Ohio Jul 31, 2009) ("Defendant's unhappiness with this Court's ruling cannot form the basis for a recusal."); Bethel v. Town of Loxley, Civ. A. No. 06-0573, 2006 WL 3361402, *2 (S.D. Ala. Nov. 20, 2006) ("Mere adverse rulings do not constitute the sort of pervasive bias that necessitates recusal. Careful review of plaintiffs' Motion reveals that they seek recusal merely because they are unhappy with the October 27 Order. Such a showing falls well short of the necessary threshold for recusal or disqualification of Magistrate Judge Milling.") (citations omitted). Wallace simply seeks to judge shop, unhappy with this Court's earlier orders. That is not permitted. Accordingly,

IT IS ORDERED that the Motion for Magistrate Judge Knowles Be Recused [sic] [Doc. #108] is DENIED.