JAY C. ZAINEY, District Judge.
Before the Court is a
Plaintiff Charles Roberts, Jr. was injured on November 9, 2011, while working on a platform on the Outer Continental Shelf. Roberts was working in the course and scope of his employment as an electrician. (Rec. Doc. 1, Complaint ¶¶ VI & VII). Roberts was climbing onto scaffolding to gain access to adjacent scaffolding in order to perform work on an elevated cable tray. (Id. ¶ VII). Roberts alleges that he grabbed onto a piece of scaffolding pipe to gain leverage but the pipe was not properly secured and as a result he fell to the rig's deck below. (Id.). The platform was under construction and was not yet in production mode. The scaffolding had been erected by defendant Dynamic Industries. Roberts was employed by VersaTech Automation Services, LLC. Defendant Audubon Field Solutions, LLC f/d/b/a Petro Construction Management, LLC was overseeing the platform's construction. Defendant McMoran owned the platform. Roberts contends that McMoRan failed in its duty to properly and safely hire, instruct, supervise, and inspect the work performed by Dynamic. (Complaint ¶ IX).
McMoRan now moves for summary judgment arguing that Dynamic and the other subcontractors on the rig were independent contractors over whom McMoRan retained no operational control. Therefore, according to McMoRan, Roberts cannot prevail on his vicarious liability claims against McMoRan. McMoRan also argues that it committed no independent acts of negligence that would render it directly liable for Roberts' injuries.
A jury trial is scheduled to commence on November 9, 2015.
Summary judgment is appropriate only if "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any," when viewed in the light most favorable to the non-movant, "show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact." TIG Ins. Co. v. Sedgwick James, 276 F.3d 754, 759 (5th Cir. 2002) (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249-50 (1986)). A dispute about a material fact is "genuine" if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Id. (citing Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248). The court must draw all justifiable inferences in favor of the non-moving party. Id. (citing Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255). Once the moving party has initially shown "that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's cause," Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986), the non-movant must come forward with "specific facts" showing a genuine factual issue for trial. Id. (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e); Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio, 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986)). Conclusional allegations and denials, speculation, improbable inferences, unsubstantiated assertions, and legalistic argumentation do not adequately substitute for specific facts showing a genuine issue for trial. Id. (citing SEC v. Recile, 10 F.3d 1093, 1097 (5th Cir. 1993)).
The general rule under Louisiana law is that a business owner is not liable for the negligence of an independent contractor hired by the owner to perform work. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Veninata, 971 So.2d 420, 425 (La. App. 4
At this juncture the precise cause of Roberts' fall is a disputed issue of fact. The Court therefore begins by construing the facts in Roberts' favor, as it must, and assumes that Roberts fell because of a dangerous defect in the scaffolding that Dynamic constructed at McMoRan's order.
Turning now to McMoran's submissions on summary judgment, the Court remains unpersuaded that McMoRan has met its initial burden on summary judgment. The Court is unmoved by anything that McMoRan's 30(b)(6) representative (Kenneth Istre) said in his deposition, at least as to the excerpts that were submitted with the memoranda. (Rec. Docs. 91-3 & 99-3). The remainder of McMoRan's evidence comprises the non-job-specific master agreements that McMoRan had in place with its contractors like Dynamic. These agreements contain language regarding independent contractor status but none of these agreements are specific to the platform where Roberts was injured, and the agreement with Dynamic is dated nearly ten years prior to Roberts' accident. But even more importantly, under Louisiana law, rote language in a contract is insufficient to insulate the principal from liability if what actually occurred on the platform was inconsistent with an independent contractor relationship. See Allstate Ins., supra. The Court is persuaded that the facts surrounding Roberts' accident, and concomitantly the role, if any, that each party played in contributing to the accident, are too unclear at this point to conclude that any party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
Accordingly, and for the foregoing reasons;