IVAN L.R. LEMELLE, District Judge.
Before the Court is a Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim (upon which relief can be granted), or in the alternative 12(c) Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, or in the alternative Fed. R. Civ. P. 46 Motion for Summary Judgment, by Defendant, Walter Reed,("Defendant"), former District Attorney for Washington Parish, State of Louisiana, sued in both his individual and official capacity.
Plaintiff alleges that, commencing on or about 2010 through April or May 2012, he provided information to the Federal Bureau of Investigation ("FBI"), concerning Jerry Wayne Cox ("Cox") regarding actions taken by Cox with respect to property damage insurance claims and with regard to his relationship with Defendant.
On or about October 25, 2012, an Order for Body Attachment concerning unpaid child support was filed in the matter entitled Crystal Magee v. Roger G. Magee.
On March 28, 2014, Plaintiff traveled from Arkansas to his aunt's home in Louisiana to visit with his family.
As a result of the above, Plaintiff alleges that he suffered severe traumatic brain injury, and while incarcerated experienced a number of symptoms, and injured his left foot, left knee, and left shoulder.
After Plaintiff was booked, he was incarcerated at the Washington Parish Jail where he alleges black mold covered the walls and ceilings and he was forced to sleep on the floor due to overcrowding, which he further alleges is a policy of the Washington Parish Jail.
During his ninety-seven (97) days of incarceration, Plaintiff alleges he requested bail through his family and criminal defense counsel, and those requests were refused allegedly due to a "DA hold."
Plaintiff has asserted causes of action against Defendant, in his individual and official capacity as former District Attorney for Washington Parish. The allegations against Defendant are as follows: under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Plaintiff brings an action for false arrest; excessive force; procedural due process; false imprisonment; and free speech retaliation.
Plaintiff filed the Amended Complaint in response to Defendant's Motion for More Definite Statement. The Motion for More Definite Statement was dismissed without prejudice by the Magistrate Judge.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) allows for dismissal of an action "for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." While a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion need not contain detailed factual allegations, to survive a motion to dismiss, the plaintiff's factual allegations must "state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009). A claim is plausible on its face when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows a court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. Id.
Simply reciting the elements of a cause of action, supported only by conclusory statements, does not suffice. Ashcroft, 129 S.Ct. at 1949, (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. V. Twombly, 127 S.Ct. 1955 (2007)). In order to determine whether a plaintiff has pled factual allegations that state a claim that is facially plausible, the Court may not evaluate the probability of plaintiff's success, but must construe the complaint "liberally" and accept all of the allegations in the complaint as true. See Twombly, 127 S.Ct. at 1965 (factual allegations, taken as true, must be sufficient to raise a right to relief beyond the speculative level, even if doubtful in fact); see also In re Katrina Canal Breaches Litigation, 495 F.3d 191, 205 (5th Cir. 2009).
Relying on Heck v. Humphrey, the Defendant contends that Plaintiff's guilty pleas to state charges (resisting an officer and failure to pay child support) preclude each of his § 1983 claims.
In Count I Plaintiff alleges there was no probable cause to arrest him, and Defendant erroneously gave instructions to the Washington Parish's Sherriff's Office to deploy a large number of officers and to use force against the Plaintiff.
To prevail on a false arrest claim, Plaintiff would have to show there was no probable cause to arrest him. Club Retro, L.L.C. v. Hilton, 568 F.3d 181, 204 (5th Cir. 2009); see also Haggerty v. Tex. S. Univ., 391 F.3d 653, 644 (5th Cir. 2004)("To ultimately prevail on his § 1983 false arrest/false imprisonment claim, [plaintiff] must show that [the officer] did not have probable cause to arrest him."). Generally, where a plaintiff was arrested for crimes of which he was ultimately convicted, Heck bars recovery for the false arrest claim, because the conviction necessarily implies that there was probable cause for the arrest. Walter v. Horseshoe Entm't, 483 F.Appx 884, 887-88 (5th Cir. 2012). Plaintiff's argument against his arrest is that at the time of his arrest, March 28, 2014, Louisiana lacked jurisdiction over his child support obligation.
However, pursuant to La. R.S. 13:3201(A)(6), Louisiana's Long-Arm Statute, "A court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresident, who acts directly or by an agent as to a cause of action arising from any one of the following activities performed by the nonresident . . . (6) Non-support of a child. . . domiciled in this state to whom an obligation of support is owed and with whom the nonresident formerly resided in this state." Therefore, as Defendant asserts, regardless of Plaintiff's residency at the time of the arrest, because his child to whom he owed support was domiciled in Louisiana, Louisiana courts had personal jurisdiction over a cause of action arising out of his failure to pay child support. Thus, Plaintiff's false arrest claim is barred under Heck due to his subsequent guilty plea for failure to pay child support, the very charge for which he was arrested.
In Count II Plaintiff alleges that during his arrest, an excessive use of force was deployed against him after he was handcuffed.
Comparing the complaint in this case to the complaints in Daigre and Bush, Plaintiff's excessive force claim is not subject to dismissal under Heck. First, as a result of Plaintiff's guilty plea, there were no factual findings made on the issue. Whether a plaintiff's § 1983 claim is barred under Heck is an "analytical and fact-intensive determination." Id. at 497. Moreover, Plaintiff's allegation that excessive force was used after he was handcuffed does not invalidate his guilty plea to resisting arrest prior to his being restrained, and therefore his excessive force claim is not Heck-barred.
The Defendant also argues that Heck bars the Plaintiff's procedural due process/false imprisonment claim because he has not satisfied Heck's "favorable termination requirement." Like the above false arrest claim, to recover damages for alleged unconstitutional imprisonment, a § 1983 plaintiff must prove that the officer lacked probable cause to arrest and detain him. Haggerty, 391 F.3d at 644. A guilty plea establishes guilt as a matter of law, and a plaintiff cannot change the validity of his guilty plea, sentence, or judgment in a tort proceeding. Heck, 512 U.S. 486-87; see also Thomas v. Louisiana, Dep't of Soc. Servs., 406 F. App'x 890, 898 (5th Cir. 2010). Due to the fact that success on his false imprisonment claim would involve a determination that would invalidate his plea of guilty to the charges for which he was confined, Plaintiff's claim for false imprisonment is also barred by Heck. See e.g. Daigre, 549 F. App'x 283; DeLeon v. City of Corpus Christy, 488 F.3d 649 (5th Cir. 2007).
Finally, Defendant contends that Heck also bars the Plaintiff's § 1983 free speech retaliation claim because like Plaintiff's excessive force and false imprisonment claims, it is in fundamental conflict with his guilty plea.
While Plaintiff's excessive force claim is not Heck-barred, it does not survive § 1983's causality requirement. To state a claim under § 1983 a plaintiff must (1) allege a violation of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States and (2) demonstrate that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law. Victoria W. v. Larpenter, 369 F.3d 475, 482 (5th Cir. 2004). A plaintiff "must identify defendants who were either personally involved in the constitutional violation or whose acts are causally connected to the constitutional violation alleged." Woods v. Edwards, 51 F.3d 577, 583 (5th Cir. 1995). Because Plaintiff's excessive force claim deals with actions of the officers who effectuated the Plaintiff's arrest and Defendant was not present at the time of the arrest, Defendant is not "causally connected" to Plaintiff's excessive force claim.
Additionally, as to Plaintiff's assertion that his procedural due process rights were violated because he was not allowed to post bail, Defendant submits that there was a state court hearing for the purposes of setting bond on March 31, 2015.
Additionally, Defendant alleges that the Plaintiff failed to state a cause of action upon which relief may be granted under Monell.
District attorney's offices have been held to resemble local government entities for purposes of "official capacity" suits, and therefore these suits are recognized as suits against the municipality. See Burge v. Parish of St. Tammany, 187 F.3d 452 (5th Cir. 1999); see also Connick v. Thompson, 131 S.Ct. 1350 (2011).
In a Monell claim, there is no respondeat superior liability. Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 693-94 (1978). Instead, in order to succeed on such a claim, a plaintiff must establish (1) an official policy or custom of which (2) a policymaker can be charged with actual or constructive knowledge, and (3) a constitutional violation whose "moving force" is that policy or custom. See McGreggory v. City of Jackson, 335 Fed. Appx. 446, 448 (5th Cir. 2009); see also Rivera v. Houston Indep. Sch. Dist, 349 F.3d 244, 247-49 (5th Cir. 2003).
Moreover, to establish liability against a government official in his "official capacity" under § 1983, a plaintiff must show that a policy or custom of which the official is an agent must have played a part in the violation of federal law. Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 25 (1991). Plaintiff must prove that "action pursuant to official municipal policy" caused his injury. Connick, 131 S. Ct. at 1359. Official municipal policies include the decisions of a government's lawmakers, the acts of its policymaking officials, and "practices so persistent and widespread as to practically have the force of law." Id.; see also Monell, 436 U.S. at 690-91. A plaintiff may not infer a policy because harm resulted from an interaction with a governmental entity; however, if a policy exists and causes a constitutional violation, a single application of that policy can result in liability. Colle v. Brazos Cnty., Tex., 981 F.2d 237, 245 (5th Cir. 1993); see also Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. at 820-24 (1985) (holding that jury instructions that permitted jurors to infer the existence of official policies from a single unconstitutional act were improper).
Here, Plaintiff's cause of action is based upon the allegation that there was no probable cause to arrest him, and he was only arrested in retaliation for his protected speech, but the official policies and procedures identified by the Plaintiff do not relate to any of his claims. That is, Plaintiff alleges that the assistant district attorneys were improperly trained, but does not submit that any assistant district attorneys or staff participated in any of the claims brought herein.
The Defendant has raised the qualified immunity defense to all of Plaintiff's § 1983 claims brought against him in his individual capacity. The United States Supreme Court has established that "government officials performing discretionary functions generally are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate a clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known." Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).
Once a defendant invokes qualified immunity, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to demonstrate the inapplicability of the defense. McClendon v. City of Columbia, 305 F.3d 314, 323 (5th Cir. 2002) (citation omitted). Because qualified immunity constitutes immunity from a lawsuit, rather than a mere defense to liability, the defense is intended to give public officials immunity from disruptive and burdensome pretrial matters such as discovery. Id. Thus, adjudication of qualified immunity claims should occur "at the earliest possible stage in litigation." Id. (quoting Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 227 (1991)).
The qualified immunity defense presents a two-part inquiry:
(1) whether the facts alleged or shown by the plaintiff made out a violation of a constitutional right, and (2) whether that right was `clearly established' at the time of the defendant's alleged misconduct. The Court must determine whether a public official's conduct deprived a § 1983 plaintiff of a "clearly established constitutional or statutory right." Ontiveros v. City of Rosenberg, Tex., 564 F.3d 379, 382 (5th Cir. 2009). A constitutional right "is clearly established" if, `in the light of pre-existing law the unlawfulness [is] apparent.'" Doe v. Taylor Indep. Sch. Dist., 15 F.3d 443, 455 (5th Cir. 1994) (en banc).
Plaintiff's only remaining claim is that of excessive force. Here, Plaintiff alleges that the Defendant ordered his arrest and instructed that excessive force be used against him.
Accordingly, and for the reasons enumerated above, Defendant's Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State A Claim is granted as to all claims asserted against him by Plaintiff.
