ORDER AND REASONS

LANCE M. AFRICK, District Judge.

Before the Court is a motion1 filed by plaintiff, Shell Offshore Inc. ("Shell") to exclude expert testimony concerning the alleged application of navigational statutes and regulations to the DEEPWATER NAUTILUS. Oppositions have been filed by defendant, Tesla Offshore LLC ("Tesla"),2 and defendants, International Offshore Services, L.L.C. and International Marine, LLC (collectively, "International").3 The motion is granted in part and denied in part as set forth herein.

BACKGROUND

For the purpose of deciding this motion, the material facts are straightforward and undisputed. Tesla time-chartered the M/V INTERNATIONAL THUNDER from International for the purpose of conducting an underwater archeological survey of the seafloor.4 Tesla installed surveying equipment on the THUNDER, including a sonar "towfish" ("fish"), which was an 89" metal tube towed by a winched cable.5 On November 2, 2012, while the "fish" was deployed from and being pulled by the THUNDER at the end of 14,000 feet of cable, the fish hit a mooring line holding in place the DEEPWATER NAUTILUS, a mobile offshore drilling unit ("MODU") owned and operated by Shell and Transocean.6 This case arises out of that alleged allision, as do many evidentiary disputes.

ANALYSIS

Shell moves to exclude specific opinions offered by experts retained by Tesla and International regarding the applicability of certain statutory, regulatory, industry, or prudential standards to the DEEPWATER NAUTILUS. Shell does not dispute that Fazioli (International's expert) and Daley (Tesla's expert) are qualified to opine on the marine operations of the INTERNATIONAL THUNDER, or marine operations in general.7 Rather, Shell contends that neither expert is qualified specifically with respect to marine operations of MODUs such as the DEEPWATER NAUTILUS8 and, therefore, Shell moves to exclude certain opinions purportedly requiring such expertise.9

Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence allows testimony by "[a] witness who is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education." But "Rule 702 does not mandate that an expert be highly qualified in order to testify about a given issue." Huss v. Gayden, 571 F.3d 442, 452 (5th Cir. 2009). "Differences in expertise bear chiefly on the weight to be assigned to the testimony by the trier of fact, not its admissibility." Id. Furthermore, "lack of specialization should generally go to the weight of the evidence rather than its admissibility and vigorous cross-examination, presentation of contrary evidence, and careful instruction on the burden of proof are the traditional and appropriate means of attacking shaky but admissible evidence." United States v. Wen Chyu Liu, 716 F.3d 159, 168-69 (5th Cir. 2013) (alterations and internal quotation marks omitted). With this guidance in mind, and without deciding the parameters of Fazioli's or Daley's expertise or qualifications, the Court considers the specific opinions Shell seeks to exclude.

1) Coast Guard Notice Requirements

First, Shell contends that Fazioli is not qualified to opine "as to what MODUs are required to report to the Coast Guard for purposes of Notices to Mariners, whether by regulation or industry custom."10 Having reviewed that portion of Fazioli's expert report and his articulated basis for that opinion, as well as International's opposition,11 the Court is not persuaded at this time that Fazioli exceeds his expertise in general marine operations by offering that opinion. Because purported lack of qualification is the only basis for excluding the opinion articulated by Shell in its motion, the in limine motion is denied. Cross-examination is the proper remedy to address Shell's concerns.

2) Automatic Identification System/Radar Requirements

Second, Shell contends that neither Fazioli nor Daley are qualified to opine regarding whether the DEEPWATER NAUTILUS was required to have an Automatic Identification System ("AIS") or radar.12 Fazioli opines that the DEEPWATER NAUTILUS "was not required by statute to be equipped with either AIS or Radar equipment," but that "there was certainly an industry standard that both systems would be installed on" MODUs.13 Daley opines that AIS and radar "were available to the NAUTILUS for collision avoidance,"14 although they were not mandated,15 and that having AIS and radar "would be a good practice," but not an industry standard.16

As neither Fazioli nor Daley opine that federal regulations required AIS or radar on the DEEPWATER NAUTILUS, Shell's motion as to that issue is moot.17 With regard to Fazioli's and Daley's opinions that the DEEPWATER NAUTILUS should have had AIS or radar, although these systems were not mandated, the Court is not persuaded that such opinions require specific expertise in "the navigational rules and regulations which apply to moored NSP MODUs." Shell concedes Fazioli's and Daley's qualifications with respect to marine operations in general. Any lack of specialization appears to go to the weight, rather than the admissibility, of their opinions. See Wen Chyu Liu, 716 F.3d at 168-69. Accordingly, Shell's in limine motion as to such opinions is denied.

3) Opinion Testimony That the COLREGS Applied to the DEEPWATER NAUTILUS

Third, Shell argues that Fazioli and Daley are not qualified to opine whether the International Rules for the Prevention of Collisions at Sea, commonly referred to as the "COLREGS,"18 applied to the DEEPWATER NAUTILUS while it was moored and drilling. Fazioli opines that he "know[s] of no U.S. regulation that directly exempts vessels such as MODU DEEPWATER NAUTILUS from complying with" the COLREGS.19 Daley opines that "the COLREGS . . . set the standards in international waters."20

The Court need not address either Fazioli's or Daley's qualifications to render such opinions because expert testimony purporting to establish which rules or regulations actually applied to the incident in this case is inappropriate. See Askanase v. Fatjo, 130 F.3d 657, 673 ("There being only one applicable legal rule for each dispute or issue, it requires only one spokesman of the law, who of course is the judge.") (quotation omitted); In re Actos, No. 11-2299, 2014 WL 120973, at *11 (W.D. La. Jan 10, 2014) ("There is no question this Court will not allow Dr. Kessler-or any expert or attorney—to instruct the jury as to what the applicable law in this case is.") (emphasis omitted). Accordingly, neither Fazioli nor Daley will be permitted at trial to offer the legal conclusion whether or not the COLREGS applied with the force of law to the DEEPWATER NAUTILUS; such legal instruction to the jury is the role of the Court.

4) Applicability of the COLREGS to the DEEPWATER NAUTILUS

On top of arguing that neither Fazioli nor Daley are qualified to opine on the subject, Shell argues that the COLREGS in fact did not apply to the DEEPWATER NAUTILUS at the time of the incident.21 Although the applicable law is sparse, the Court is persuaded by Shell's argument.

No party disputes that the DEEPWATER NAUTILUS was a vessel. See 33 C.F.R. § 140.10 ("Mobile offshore drilling unit or MODU means a vessel, other than public vessel of the United States, capable of engaging in drilling operations for exploration or exploitation of subsea resources."). As a matter of federal law, the COLREGS "shall be applicable to, and shall be complied with by—"

33 U.S.C. § 1603.

In Martha's Vineyard Scuba Headquarters, Inc. v. Unidentified, Wrecked and Abandoned Steam Vessel, the First Circuit interpreted § 1603 and concluded that the statute did not apply the COLREGS to a Panamanian-registered vessel attempting to salvage a sunken vessel sixty miles off the shore of Nantucket Island. See 833 F.2d 1059, 1061-62, 1065-66 (1st Cir. 1987). First, because the salvaging vessel was sixty miles off the coast of the United States, it was "on the high seas, in waters not subject to the jurisdiction of the United States," making § 1603(2) inapplicable.22 See id. at 1066. Second, the court read "vessels, public and private, subject to the jurisdiction of the United States" to mean "ships of American registry." See id. Therefore, the fact that the salvaging vessel was of Panamanian registry "excluded her, while in international waters, from the sweep of 33 U.S.C. § 1603(1)." Id. The First Circuit also concluded that the legislative history "makes it abundantly plain that, in international waters, the COLREGS affect only vessels of U.S. Registry." Id. at n.6; see also id. at n.7 ("[T]he language of the Act neither requires nor allows us to extend the regulations to foreign flag vessels in international waters.").

Shell contends that the DEEPWATER NAUTILUS is situated identically to the vessel in Martha's Vineyard and, therefore, the COLREGS are not applicable pursuant to § 1603(1) or (2). No party disputes that at the time of the incident, the DEEPWATER NAUTILUS was a Vanuatuflagged vessel operating 72 miles off the coast of the United States in international, not territorial, waters.23 Consequently, Shell argues, §1603(1) does not apply because the DEEPWATER NAUTILUS was not a vessel "subject to the jurisdiction of the United States" because it was not a "ship[] of American registry." See id. Shell next argues that §1603(2) does not apply because the DEEPWATER NAUTILUS was 72 miles off the coast of the United States in international waters, not territorial waters, and therefore not in "waters subject to the jurisdiction of the United States," as that phrase was interpreted in Martha's Vineyard. See id.

The Court agrees that 33 U.S.C. § 1603 does not apply the COLREGS to the DEEPWATER NAUTILUS. No party has articulated any defect in the reasoning in Martha's Vineyard or distinguished its applicability to the facts in this case.24 Like the vessel in Martha's Vineyard, the DEEPWATER NAUTILUS (1) is not a ship of American registry and (2) was operating in international waters, not territorial waters. Accordingly, as a matter of federal law, neither § 1603(1) or (2) makes the COLREGS applicable to the DEEPWATER NAUTILUS.

Explaining which navigational requirements actually applied, Shell asserts that the DEEPWATER NAUTILUS was subject to the navigational requirements of Vanuatu, which is a signatory to the International Maritime Organization Code for the Construction and Equipment of Mobile Offshore Drilling Units, ("the MODU Code").25 Shell provides an excerpt of the MODU Code which reads as follows:

There is no dispute that the DEEPWATER NAUTILUS was stationary and engaged in drilling operations at the time of the incident; accordingly, pursuant to section 14.7.1, the COLREGS were not applicable to it. Rather, pursuant to 14.7.2, "when stationary and engaged in drilling operations" the DEEPWATER NAUTILUS should have complied "with the requirements for the safety of navigation of the coastal State in whose territorial sea or on whose continental shelf the unit is operation"—that is, the "requirements for the safety of navigation of" the United States.

As Shell points out, for the reasons explained above, United States law did not apply the COLREGS to the Vanuatu-flagged DEEPWATER NAUTILUS while in international waters.27 See 33 U.S.C. § 1603; Martha's Vineyard, 833 F.2d at 1066. Accordingly, whatever other "requirements for the safety of navigation" applied to the DEEPWATER NAUTILUS as a matter of United States law, either directly or as incorporated by the MODU Code, the COLREGS were not included. This conclusion comports with the First Circuit's interpretation of § 1603 in Martha's Vineyard and avoids a potentially problematic interpretation of the MODU Code that would apply the COLREGS to the DEEPWATER NAUTILUS while stationary and drilling pursuant to section 14.7.2, despite the clear statement in section 14.7.1 that the COLREGS should not apply while stationary and drilling.28

Accordingly, the Court concludes that the COLREGS were not applicable to the DEEPWATER NAUTILUS at the time of the incident giving rise to this case.

CONCLUSION

In light of the foregoing,

IT IS ORDERED that Shell's motion is GRANTED IN PART with respect to the applicability of the COLREGS to the DEEPWATER NAUTILUS and expert opinion testimony that the COLREGS applied to the DEEPWATER NAUTILUS, and DENIED and/or DEFERRED as set forth herein.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Tesla's motion for leave to file a reply brief is GRANTED.