Filed: Feb. 26, 2016
Latest Update: Feb. 26, 2016
Summary: ORDER AND REASONS LANCE M. AFRICK , District Judge . Plaintiff has filed a motion 1 for relief from judgment pursuant to Rule 60(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. He argues that relief is warranted for a number of reasons, 2 all of which have been raised in prior pleadings except for his argument that this section should have recused itself from this matter because it is also overseeing implementation of the Consent Decree in Jones v. Gusman, No. 2:12-cv-00859. Defendants hav
Summary: ORDER AND REASONS LANCE M. AFRICK , District Judge . Plaintiff has filed a motion 1 for relief from judgment pursuant to Rule 60(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. He argues that relief is warranted for a number of reasons, 2 all of which have been raised in prior pleadings except for his argument that this section should have recused itself from this matter because it is also overseeing implementation of the Consent Decree in Jones v. Gusman, No. 2:12-cv-00859. Defendants have..
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ORDER AND REASONS
LANCE M. AFRICK, District Judge.
Plaintiff has filed a motion1 for relief from judgment pursuant to Rule 60(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. He argues that relief is warranted for a number of reasons,2 all of which have been raised in prior pleadings except for his argument that this section should have recused itself from this matter because it is also overseeing implementation of the Consent Decree in Jones v. Gusman, No. 2:12-cv-00859. Defendants have filed oppositions3 to plaintiff's motion. For the following reasons, the Court agrees with defendants that plaintiff's Rule 60(b) motion is meritless and should be denied.4
Rule 60(b) allows a court to relieve a party from a final judgment based on:
(1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence that, with reasonable diligence, could not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud . . ., misrepresentation, or misconduct by an opposing party; (4) the judgment is void; (5) the judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged . . .; or (6) any other reason that justifies relief.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b). Plaintiff contends that the Court should reopen the case on the basis of Rule 60(b)(1), (b)(4), and the catch-all provision, (b)(6).5 Granting relief under Rule 60 is "an extraordinary remedy which should be used sparingly." Templet v. HydroChem Inc., 367 F.3d 473, 479 (5th Cir. 2004); see also Pease v. Pakhoed, 980 F.2d 995, 998 (5th Cir. 1993) ("Courts are disinclined to disturb judgments under the aegis of Rule 60(b).").
The Court agrees with all defendants that the only novel argument plaintiff raises in his motion is his assertion that this section should have recused itself from his case. 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) provides that a judge "shall disqualify himself in any proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned." Furthermore, Section 455(B)(1) requires that a judge disqualify himself "[w]here he has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party, or personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the proceeding." 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(1).
"The goal of section 455(a) is to avoid even the appearance of partiality." Liljeberg v. Health Serv. Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847, 860 (1988). The Court must therefore determine "whether a reasonable and objective person, knowing all of the facts, would harbor doubts concerning the judge's impartiality." United States v. Jordan, 49 F.3d 152, 155 (5th Cir. 1995) (citing Liljeberg, 486 U.S. at 860-61). Although section 455 contains mandatory language, in application, "the decision to recuse is committed to the sound discretion of the trial court . . . ." In re Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 121 F.3d 163, 165 (5th Cir. 1997).
Plaintiff's contention that this Court was somehow biased against him as a result of its overseeing implementation of the Consent Decree in Jones v. Gusman, No. 2:12-cv-00859 is completely without merit. No reasonable person familiar with the all of the circumstances of Jones would "harbor doubts about the judge's impartiality." Jordan, 49 F.3d at 155. As defendants argue, this Court "is more than capable of dealing in a fair and even-handed manner with all parties — particularly in a case where the prescription issue is so clear cut."67 Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED that plaintiff's motion for relief from judgment is DENIED.
