JANE TRICHE MILAZZO, District Judge.
Before the Court is Plaintiff's Motion to Remand. For the following reasons, this Motion is
This suit stems from a Request for Proposals ("RFP") for selection of a Workers' Compensation Claims Administrator issued by Defendant the City of New Orleans (the "City") in November 2016. Plaintiff Hammerman & Gainer, Inc. ("HGI") was the incumbent bidder on the contract; however, the City's selection committee selected a proposal submitted by Defendant CorVel Enterprise Comp, Inc. ("CorVel") as the winning bidder. HGI filed a protest with the City averring that it misapplied provisions relative to Disadvantaged Business Entities in the RFP. The City rejected this protest, and HGI filed suit in the Civil District Court for the Parish of Orleans on April 7, 2017. Therein, Plaintiff asserted claims that (1) the City violated its own laws and procedures in failing to properly follow selection criteria in handling the RFP and (2) that Defendant Adolph Delaparte violated 42 U.S.C. § 1983 by making false statements regarding HGI's application to deprive it of its Constitutional rights. Plaintiff subsequently amended its Petition to assert a state law tort claim against CorVel. Following substantial proceedings in state court, the City removed the action to this Court on May 8, 2017, citing the Court's federal question jurisdiction based on the § 1983 claim. Plaintiff immediately moved for a temporary restraining order, which this Court denied. Plaintiff then voluntarily dismissed his § 1983 claim against Delaparte. This Motion to Remand follows.
Generally, a defendant may remove a civil state court action to federal court if the federal court has original jurisdiction over the action.
Plaintiff has filed the instant Motion to Remand, arguing that the dismissal of the § 1983 claim against Defendant Delaparte deprives the Court of jurisdiction and necessitates remand. Defendants respond in opposition, arguing (1) removal was proper because the federal question claims existed at the time of removal; (2) that a federal claim remains pending despite dismissal of the § 1983 claim against Delaparte; (3) even if the federal claims are dismissed, the Court should exercise its discretion and retain supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims. The Court will address these arguments in turn.
Defendants contend that Plaintiff's subsequent dismissal of the claims within the Court's original jurisdiction does not by itself warrant remand. This contention is correct. "[J]urisdictional facts are determined at the time of removal, and consequently post-removal events do not affect that properly established jurisdiction."
Defendants next contend that remand is inappropriate because federal question claims remain despite Plaintiff's dismissal of the § 1983 claims against Delaparte. In support of this contention, they point to (1) Plaintiff's allegation that the City deprived them of a "federally-protected property right" and (2) Plaintiff's respondeat superior claims against the City based on Delaparte's conduct. The Court perceives no such federal claim. "Where removal jurisdiction is predicated on the existence of a federal question, the federal question generally must appear on the face of the plaintiff's complaint."
Defendants' argument relative to the City's respondeat superior liability also fails. Plaintiff's Petition alleged that "the City of New Orleans is responsible for the actions of its employee and agent, Adolph Delaparte under the legal theory of Respondeat Superior." Notwithstanding the fact that respondeat superior liability is inapplicable in § 1983 cases,
Though the dismissal of all federal claims within original jurisdiction does not automatically warrant remand of the remaining claims, the Court will now consider whether the exercise of supplemental jurisdiction is appropriate. When all federal claims are dismissed or otherwise eliminated before trial, the court should generally decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over any remaining state law claims.
The Court finds no reason to retain supplemental jurisdiction over this matter. Defendants argue that fairness and equity militate in favor of maintaining jurisdiction because Plaintiff did not move for remand until after this Court denied its request for a temporary restraining order. The Court does not find this to be grounds for retaining jurisdiction. Upon removal, Plaintiff filed its Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and Motion to Remand on the same day. The Court declined to issue a temporary restraining on procedural grounds and set the matter for a preliminary injunction hearing in the coming weeks. At no point has it issued a ruling on the merits of the case. Plaintiff has not lain in the gap only to move for remand following an adverse ruling after substantial litigation.
Defendants also argue that remand is favored because Plaintiff has attempted to manipulate the forum by eliminating its federal question claims. The Court finds that there is at least as much evidence, if not more, that Defendants have also engaged in forum manipulation. This matter was clearly removable at the time of filing. Instead of promptly removing the matter, Defendants elected to conduct substantial proceedings in state court prior to filing a notice of removal. Only after receiving unfavorable rulings from the state trial court did Defendants remove the action. Accordingly, this factor is at best neutral.
Judicial economy favors remand, as the state court has gained great familiarity with this matter through substantial proceedings prior to removal.
For the forgoing reasons, Plaintiff's Motion to Remand is