JANE TRICHE MILAZZO, District Judge.
Before the Court is Defendant Flight Services and Systems, Inc.'s Motion to Dismiss the Second Amended Complaint (Doc. 39). For the following reasons, the Motion is DENIED.
Plaintiffs, Stanley Cook, Kerionna Bradley, Kennedy Prader, Darion Winters, Terrance Bruster, Donald Johnson, Christian Flores, Damon Perriloux, II, Lanisha Bruster, Rashard Johnson, Pablo Holdine, Darioen Buchanan, Janay Williams, Kristoffer Wilbanks, Cardell Andry, Johnny Brasley, and Raven Barre are employees or former employees of Defendant Flight Services and Systems, Inc. They allege that Defendant has violated the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA") by failing to pay them mandated minimum and overtime wages.
Specifically, Plaintiffs make two primary complaints about their compensation and the compensation of other similarly situated employees. First, they allege that they were not compensated for job-related training. Second, they allege that Defendant "arbitrarily cut" their hours after the work was completed due to policies aimed at: (1) requiring managers to attain a 20% profit margin; (2) not allowing employees to work more than 30 hours per week to avoid the application of the Affordable Care Act; and (3) deducting for time spent on the job site waiting or when Defendant felt the work performed took longer than expected. Plaintiffs allege that because of this practice their paychecks did not reflect the correct number of hours actually worked. Plaintiffs bring this collective action on behalf of themselves and all other similarly situated employees.
This Court previously dismissed Plaintiffs' First Amended Complaint based on these same facts for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. It held that Plaintiffs had failed to allege an FLSA violation or collective action with sufficient particularity. This Court gave Plaintiffs leave to amend their complaint to correct these deficiencies, and they subsequently filed a Second Amended Complaint. Despite their amendments, Defendant has once again moved to dismiss Plaintiffs' FLSA and collective action claims for failure to state a claim. It also alleges that Plaintiffs' claims should be dismissed or time-barred because they do not relate back to the original complaint.
To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a plaintiff must plead enough facts "to state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face."
An employer violates the FLSA if it fails to pay covered employees at least one and one-half times their normal rate for hours worked in excess of 40 hours per week or fails to pay covered employees a minimum wage.
Defendant asks this Court to dismiss Plaintiffs' claims because the Second Amended Complaint still fails to adequately allege FLSA violations or a basis for a collective action. In dismissing Plaintiffs' First Amended Complaint, this Court pointed out that the pleading requirements are satisfied in the FLSA context when the complaint contains the "`approximate date ranges, as well as the approximate number of hours worked' for which the plaintiff claims he was under-compensated."
"By alleging the amount that Defendants paid Plaintiffs, the time period during which Plaintiffs worked, and that Plaintiffs worked in excess of forty (40) hours and were never paid one-and-half times their hourly rate, Plaintiffs have met [their] burden."
Defendant next argues that Plaintiffs' Complaint fails to adequately plead an FLSA collective action. The FLSA authorizes a single employee or group of employees to bring a collective action against their employer to recover unpaid overtime or minimum wages on their own behalf and on behalf of other "similarly situated" employees.
Here, Plaintiffs describe the putative class as "all persons who have worked as non-exempt employees for Defendant, including but not limited to, ramp agents, lead ramp agents, ramp supervisors, customer service agents/representatives, who were not paid for all hours actually worked under forty (40), and for any overtime compensation for all hours actually worked over forty (40) in a workweek." It goes on to explain that the putative class is similarly situated to Plaintiffs because they have similar job requirements and pay provisions. Defendant alleges that this description still fails to adequately describe the class or how they are similarly situated to Plaintiffs. This Court disagrees and finds that Plaintiffs' collective action allegations are sufficient to give Defendant fair notice of the putative class. Plaintiffs have alleged sufficient facts to show that there is a class of similarly situated employees that were subject to Defendant's allegedly unlawful payment policies.
Finally, Defendant argues that Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint does not relate back to the original complaint and therefore should be dismissed or time-barred. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(c) states that "[a]n amendment to a pleading relates back to the date of the original pleading when: . . . the amendment asserts a claim or defense that arose out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set out—or attempted to be set out—in the original pleading."
For the forgoing reasons, Defendant's Motion to Dismiss is