ORDER

LANCE M. AFRICK, District Judge.

Before the Court is pro se petitioner Cliff Durio's ("Durio") motion to vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. For the following reasons, Durio's motion is denied.

I.

On October 30, 2015, Durio was charged in a single-count indictment with knowingly possessing fifteen or more counterfeit and unauthorized access devices, including credit cards and gift cards, with the intent to defraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1029(a)(3).1 Durio pleaded guilty to the offense on July 14, 2016.2

According to the factual basis3 to which Durio agreed at his rearraignment, Durio attempted to fly from New Orleans to Houston on August 2, 2013, checking luggage for his flight. When the bag Durio checked went through the Transportation Security Administration ("TSA") screening machine, TSA agents noticed an item that required further inspection. When TSA agents opened Durio's bag, they found a bundle of approximately 500 credit cards and contacted the Jefferson Parish Sheriff's Office ("JPSO") for assistance.

TSA agents provided JPSO officers with Durio's name. JPSO officers then went to the gate area for Durio's flight and began asking passengers for their names in an attempt to identify Durio. When asked for his name, Durio refused to answer and began walking toward baggage claim. A JPSO officer instructed Durio to stop, but Durio ignored the instruction. The JPSO officer called for backup, and as officers closed in on Durio, he fled.

Soon after, Durio was subdued, and a search incident to arrest yielded 46 gift cards, $2,050 in cash, a laptop computer, an iPad mini, an iPhone, and two other smart phones. A separate investigation revealed that Durio's checked luggage contained 738 access device cards embossed with names and account numbers.

The financial institutions that held the accounts corresponding to the numbers on the cards confirmed that the true account holders were not the individuals whose names appeared on the cards and that several of the accounts had recently had fraud reported. Investigators determined that, with respect to 549 of the cards from 12 different financial institutions, the total fraud loss was at least $35,096.92 and the total credit limit—i.e., the total potential loss—was at least $4,331,511.00.

On December 15, 2016, the Court sentenced Durio to a term of 78 months imprisonment. Durio timely appealed, and his appeal was dismissed on July 21, 2017. Durio filed the instant motion on April 30, 2018. The government does not contest the timeliness of Durio's § 2255 petition.

II.

Durio asserts two grounds for relief. First, he asserts various claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. Second, he contends that his sentence was imposed in violation of the sentencing guidelines and violates his constitutional rights. The Court considers each of Durio's meritless arguments in turn.

A.

Ineffective assistance of counsel claims are governed by the standard established in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). Strickland's two-part test requires a petitioner to prove both deficient performance and resulting prejudice. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687.

Deficient performance is established by "show[ing] that counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness." Id. at 688. In applying this standard, a "court must indulge a `strong presumption' that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance because it is all too easy to conclude that a particular act or omission of counsel was unreasonable in the harsh light of hindsight." Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 702 (2002) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689). In other words, "judicial scrutiny of counsel's performance must be highly deferential." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689.

A showing of prejudice requires "a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different." Id. at 694. With respect to guilty pleas, the prejudice requirement "focuses on whether counsel's constitutionally ineffective performance affected the outcome of the plea process." Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985). Thus, in challenging a guilty plea on grounds of ineffective assistance, a petitioner must show "that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial." Id.

The petitioner must satisfy both prongs of the Strickland test in order to be successful on an ineffective assistance claim. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. A court is not required to address these prongs in any particular order. Id. at 697. If it is possible to dispose of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim without addressing both prongs, "that course should be followed." Id.

i.

Durio first contends that his counsel was ineffective because she pressured him into pleading guilty to a crime that he did not commit.4 This argument is belied by Durio's own statements.

A defendant's representations at a plea hearing "constitute a formidable barrier in any subsequent collateral proceedings." Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 74 (1977). This is because, "[s]olemn declarations in open court carry a strong presumption of verity." Id. Accordingly, "the subsequent presentation of conclusory allegations unsupported by specifics is subject to summary dismissal, as are contentions that in the face of the record are wholly incredible." Id. Furthermore, "[w]hen a defendant pleads guilty relying upon his counsel's best professional judgment, he cannot later argue that his plea was due to coercion by counsel." United States v. Lagrone, 727 F.2d 1037, 1038 (11th Cir. 1984) (citing Williams v. United States, 443 F.2d 1151, 1153 (5th Cir. 1971)).

The Court entered into the following exchange with Durio and his counsel at Durio's rearraignment hearing:

As previously stated, Durio's statements, made under oath in open court, are entitled to a strong presumption of verity. As illustrated by those statements, it was ultimately Durio's choice and Durio's choice alone to forego trial and plead guilty. Durio's counsel may have provided Durio with frank professional advice as to the merits of his case. Such advice, however, certainly does not equate with objective unreasonableness. Furthermore, Durio has not demonstrated that, but for counsel's alleged conduct, he would not have pleaded guilty, and that he would have insisted on proceeding to trial.

Next, Durio complains that his counsel failed to file unspecified motions and raise unspecified objections. This argument is simply frivolous. Durio does not state with any particularity which motions or objections his counsel should have brought nor does he describe the facts on which any such motion or objection could have been based. Durio, therefore, has not shown that his counsel's performance was deficient or that he was prejudiced by her assistance. See Green v. Johnson, 160 F.3d 1029, 142 (5th Cir. 1998) ("Mere conclusory allegations in support of a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel are insufficient to raise a constitutional issue.").

Finally, Durio argues that his counsel was ineffective in failing to file an appeal on his behalf.6 This argument is directly contradicted by the record. At the conclusion of Durio's sentencing hearing, the Court asked Durio whether he wanted his counsel to file a notice of appeal.7 Durio answered in the affirmative,8 and Durio's counsel filed the requested notice of appeal the following day.9 Thus, Durio's contention that his counsel did not file an appeal is patently false. Furthermore, the Court notes that Durio was appointed substitute counsel for purpose of appeal, and his appeal was dismissed pursuant to his own motion.10

Ultimately, Durio has not demonstrated that his Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel was violated. His § 2255 petition will, therefore, be dismissed in that regard.

B.

Durio also argues that his sentence was imposed in violation of the United States Sentencing Guidelines.11 Durio points to the fact that, at his sentencing hearing, the Court sought clarification as to which version of the guidelines should have been applied to his sentence—the guidelines in effect at the time the offense was committed or the guidelines in effect at the time of sentencing.12

Pursuant to guideline § 1B.11(a), sentencing courts typically "use the Guidelines Manual in effect on the date that the defendant in sentenced." However, § 1B1.11(b) provides:

In Durio's case, the Court and counsel determined that the guidelines in effect at the time of sentencing were actually more favorable to Durio than those in effect at the time he committed the offense.13 Therefore, no ex post facto issue was presented, and the Court, adhering to § 1B.11(a), applied the guidelines in effect at the time Durio was sentenced. Hence, Durio's argument regarding his sentence is meritless.14

Accordingly,

IT IS ORDERED that the defendant's motion to vacate his sentence is DENIED and DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.