FRANK J. POLOZOLA, District Judge.
Defendant Jacobs Field Services North America ("Jacobs") has filed a Motion for Summary Judgment.
Hammond was first employed by Jacobs in 1996, and then again in 1998 at the Exxon Lube facility in Port Allen after a gap in employment. The Exxon Lube facility packages motor oil, and employees in this facility work in shifts and rotate among the various types of automated lines which package the oil. As an operator, plaintiff worked on the high-speed gallon line most often. His job duties involved climbing, balancing, stooping,
For security purposes, the Exxon facility where plaintiff worked required employees to use a gate pass assigned to each employee which is scanned to gain entry into the plant. This procedure is a safety measure which ensures that only authorized personnel have access to the facility and also allows Exxon to know how many people are in the facility in the event of an emergency. If an employee's badge is not used for an extended period of time, it is de-activated. It is against the rules of both Exxon and Jacobs for an employee to enter the facility on someone else's pass. This rule was discussed at a safety meeting which plaintiff attended during his employment.
In the year leading up to plaintiff's termination in March of 2008, plaintiff had suffered various health issues, including carpal tunnel, neck pain, back pain and weakness in the legs.
On March 3, 2008, plaintiff met with Brent Watts and Jacobs employees Wayne Tyson and Darryl Fuentes to discuss the incident. During this meeting, plaintiff admitted that he entered the plant on someone else's badge and acknowledged that he knew this was against both Exxon and Jacobs' rules. His only excuse for violating the rules was he wanted to discuss his returning to work with someone.
Based on this security breach, Jacobs Project Manager Wayne Tyson terminated plaintiff. This decision was later affirmed by McClelland, who told Tyson that even if Jacobs had not terminated the plaintiff, Exxon would have refused to allow the plaintiff entrance to the facility.
At the time of his termination, Jacobs also contends that plaintiff was unable to perform the essential functions of his job. In fact, Jacobs contends plaintiff could not perform ANY of his job duties. The record reflects that plaintiff has worked for other employees only for a few months since his termination because of his physical condition. Since his separation from Jacobs, plaintiff has received disability benefits and began receiving social security disability benefits in February of 2010.
Plaintiff filed an EEOC charge on May 22, 2008, alleging race and disability discrimination and retaliation. He filed this lawsuit in January of 2010 claiming that Jacobs has violated his rights under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA),
Summary judgment should be granted if the record, taken as a whole, "together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law."
If the moving party meets this burden, Rule 56(c) requires the nonmovant to go beyond the pleadings and show by affidavits, depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions on file, or other admissible evidence that specific facts exist over which there is a genuine issue for trial.
In order to determine whether or not summary judgment should be granted, an
Jacobs contends that while plaintiff's EEOC charge of May 2008 complains of race and disability discrimination and retaliation, plaintiff has included in his lawsuit harassment complaints of being drug tested when returning from leave; not being provided light duty or alternative duty assignments prior to termination; his paycheck not being in its normal location; being unduly monitored while performing his job; and his superintendent speeding up the production line and requiring him to manually cap bottles. Jacobs contends none of the above claims are contained in plaintiff's EEOC charge and thus are not properly before the Court since incidents that are not addressed in or reasonably related to Charges of Discrimination filed with the EEOC cannot form the basis for Title VII or ADA claims in a subsequent lawsuit.
Jacobs also contends the above claims are time barred. The record reveals that the plaintiff filed his EEOC charge in March of 2008. Under Title VII and the ADA, an EEOC charge of discrimination in a deferral state like Louisiana must be filed within 300 days of the last act of discrimination.
In his opposition, plaintiff essentially concedes he is not seeking to recover damages for any incidents occurring outside the 300 day time period at issue. Thus, the Court finds that the only claims properly before the Court are plaintiff's claims of race and disability discrimination and retaliation with respect to his termination and request for disability accommodation. The Court shall grant defendant's motion for summary judgment on all other federal claims which were not set forth in plaintiff's EEOC charge and are time barred. The Court now turns to a discussion of the claims that are properly before the Court.
The ADA provides that "[n]o covered entity shall discriminate against a qualified individual with a disability because of the disability of such individual in regard to [the] ... advancement, [or] discharge of employees, ... and other terms and conditions, and privileges of employment."
However, even assuming plaintiff has a disability, to be a qualified individual with a disability,
Plaintiff contends he was disabled, was denied a reasonable accommodation, and he suffered disability discrimination and retaliation when he was terminated. Jacobs concedes for the purposes of this motion that plaintiff's conditions (carpal tunnel syndrome, MS, and other health issues) constitute an impairment. However, Jacobs argues plaintiff failed to satisfy his burden of showing that plaintiff's impairments constitute disabilities under the law, reasonable accommodations were denied, or plaintiff experienced an adverse employment action because of his disability.
The United States Supreme Court has instructed that courts are to make an individualized determination of whether an employee's impairment constitutes a disability, taking into consideration measures taken by the employee to mitigate the effects of the impairment.
The Fifth Circuit has stated:
In Dupre v. Charter Behavioral Health Systems of Lafayette, Inc., a former employee (Dupre) sued her former employer for terminating her based on her disability in violation of the ADA.
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit noted that, "[w]hether an impairment is substantially limiting depends on `(1) the nature and severity of the impairment, (2) its duration or expected duration, and (3) its permanent or expected permanent or long-term impact."
Dupre also claimed a substantial limitation in the major life activity of working. To prove this limitation, Dupre was "required to demonstrate that her back injury precluded her from a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs."
Dupre argued that her impairment had disqualified her from all manual labor, thus precluding her from a broad range of jobs. However, the court found that "Dupre has presented no evidence that she would be disqualified from all jobs requiring manual labor."
In this case, Hammond contends his carpal tunnel syndrome, back pain from a compressed disc, leg and arm numbness, and various related conditions, have substantially limited his major life activities of working, standing, running, and walking. Plaintiff contends he can no longer run, has trouble walking at times, and often cannot stand without holding something for support. Plaintiff claims he is limited in the major life activity of working in that he can no longer lift, stack, climb stairs, or load the machines.
The Court finds the reasoning and analysis by the Fifth Circuit of the claims in Dupre are directly on point and applicable in the case at bar. First, Hammond simply stating his belief that his impairments substantially limit his major life activities is insufficient summary judgment evidence to prove a disability under the ADA. Furthermore, the simple fact that plaintiff could no longer perform the job duties of the specific job he previously held does not constitute being precluded from a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs. In fact, plaintiff has failed to present any evidence to establish or support his contention. Plaintiff simply has insufficient evidence that any of his major life activities were substantially limited as defined by the law. Just because plaintiff contends his impairments have affected his ability to work does not trigger coverage under the law.
Thus, the Court finds that plaintiff has failed to satisfy his burden of proving that he suffers from a "disability" as defined by the ADA or even creates an issue of fact in dispute. However, the analysis set forth below shows that even if plaintiff were disabled under the ADA, he would still fail to carry his ultimate burden to recover under the law and facts of this case.
The Court also finds that the plaintiff has failed to set forth a prima facie case of disability discrimination because he has failed to prove that he was qualified for his position, with or without reasonable accommodation. The record is clear that since plaintiff could not perform any of the duties of his position, he was not qualified for his position under the law and facts of this case.
Plaintiff offers what he believes to be several reasonable accommodations
Jacobs points out that the only time plaintiff requested to be assigned to the depalletizer was in 2006, which falls outside the scope of this lawsuit. Further, Jacobs contends plaintiff provided no evidence that this request was reasonable under the circumstances. Jacobs also notes that plaintiff failed to produce summary judgment type evidence that he could perform
In opposition to plaintiff's request that he be allowed to train other employees, Jacobs has set forth a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for not assigning this task to the plaintiff: there was no trainer position and no money to support someone who only performed the task of training.
Finally, Jacobs rebuts plaintiff's contention that he was "sabotaged" by his supervisor changing the speed of the lines on which plaintiff and his co-workers worked. Jacobs' legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for this activity was that the speed at which the line operated was at the discretion of the supervisor and could be changed to meet production goals. It is important to note that plaintiff admitted in his deposition that his supervisor sped up the lines of other Jacobs' employees, not just Hammond's. Plaintiff has failed to controvert this legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the action taken, and has failed to show that he was singled out on any discriminatory basis in this regard.
The Court finds that plaintiff has failed to carry his burden of proving he was denied a reasonable accommodation. Jacobs' obligation under the law was to provide reasonable accommodation to an employee who can perform the essential functions of the job with such accommodation. Jacobs was not obligated under the law to create a new position for plaintiff in order to do this. Plaintiff has also failed to controvert the fact that he could not perform the essential functions of his job at the time of his termination. Under these circumstances, no reasonable accommodation was even required.
Plaintiff contends he was terminated because of his disability. However, Jacobs contends plaintiff was terminated solely because he violated the security rules of both Jacobs and Exxon. The record is clear that the prohibition of "piggybacking" or coming into the plant on someone else's security badge, was discussed at safety meetings where plaintiff was in attendance.
Because plaintiff does not allege any direct evidence of discrimination, the Court must apply the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting analysis.
To establish a prima facie case of discrimination, plaintiff must show that: (1) he is a member of a protected class; (2) he is qualified for the position; (3) he suffered an adverse employment action; and (4) he was replaced by someone outside the protected class or was treated less favorably than other similarly situated employees outside the protected group.
Plaintiff, who is African-American, is clearly a member of a protected class, and he suffered the adverse employment action of being terminated. However, the Court finds that plaintiff has failed to satisfy the second and fourth prongs of his prima facie case. First, the discussion set forth earlier in this opinion establishes that after plaintiff returned to work from an extended medical leave, he was no longer "qualified" for his position. Second, plaintiff has failed to present any summary judgment evidence that white individuals were treated differently for violating the "piggybacking" rule or other similar security breaches. Plaintiff's only "evidence" consists of his own self-serving testimony regarding differential treatment.
Plaintiff has also made several claims which the Court has previously held to be time-barred and outside the scope of the EEOC charge. However, out of an abundance of caution, the Court will briefly address these claims.
Plaintiff contends his work performance was unduly monitored by Superintendent James Watts. However, plaintiff admitted that part of Watts' duties was to oversee employee work. Plaintiff has presented no evidence that he was monitored more than any other similarly situated white employees.
Plaintiff complains there was a time his paycheck was not in its normal pickup location. However, plaintiff again fails to rebut Jacobs' legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for this: the check was kept in Watts' office for safekeeping because there was no safe place to store the check in the shipping area to which plaintiff had been temporarily assigned. Plaintiff ultimately received his check and suffered no damage from this incident.
Plaintiff's complaints about the adjustment of the speed line have been addressed in Section B of this opinion and need not be discussed at length again. For the same reasons set forth above, the Court finds Jacobs' evidence was not a pretext for discrimination. Jacobs' contention that the lines were paced at the discretion of the supervisor and the purpose was increased production was supported by the evidence in this case.
Plaintiff complains that he was required to cap containers by hand when the line malfunctioned. However, the record reflects that white employees also had to perform this task.
Finally, plaintiff argues he was subjected to drug testing because of his race. Jacobs has shown that employees who have been away from work on leave for more than 30 days are subject to this screening. There is simply no evidence to show that plaintiff was somehow singled out for drug testing because of his race. Plaintiff relies on the deposition testimony of other African-American co-workers who claim that black employees who tested positive for drugs were fired, while white employees who tested positive were not. The Court notes the record reveals that plaintiff was tested and the results were negative. The plaintiff returned to work thereafter and was not terminated because of the drug test. James Moffatt, Administrator of the Occupational Health Services Department, testified that those drug tested employees identified by deposition testimony either actually failed drug tests or never had a positive test. In all instances, the record reflects that Jacobs applied this drug policy without regard to race.
Plaintiff has simply failed to establish a prima facie case of race discrimination, or to carry his ultimate burden of proving the legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons given by Jacobs are a pretext for race discrimination.
Plaintiff also claims he was subjected to retaliation because of his disability and his race. To establish a prima facie case of retaliation, an employee must show: (1) the he engaged in protected activity; (2) that he was subjected to an adverse employment action; and (3) there was a causal connection between the protected activity and the adverse action.
Assuming arguendo, that plaintiff has made out a prima facie case and Jacobs has offered a legitimate, non-retaliatory reason for the adverse employment action, plaintiff has failed to establish the "but for" causation required by the McDonnell Douglas framework because he failed to offer sufficient proof that any alleged retaliatory motive was a necessary cause of the decision to terminate him. A
There is nothing in the record, and indeed plaintiff has submitted no summary judgment evidence which would show that seeking a reasonable accommodation or his race was the "but for" cause of his termination. The Court is also convinced that Jacobs would have fired plaintiff for his security breach regardless of any other motivating factors. Thus, Jacobs is entitled to summary judgment on the plaintiff's claim of retaliation.
For the reasons set forth above, the Court finds that the plaintiff has failed to carry his burden of proof in establishing his claims for disability discrimination under the ADA, race discrimination under Title VII, or retaliation. Thus, summary judgment shall be granted in favor of Jacobs dismissing these claims with prejudice. The Court also grants summary judgment on all of the other federal claims which plaintiff failed to include in his EEOC complaint and which are also time barred. The Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction
Therefore:
IT IS ORDERED that defendant's motion for summary judgment shall be granted on all of plaintiff's federal claims based on disability discrimination, race discrimination, and retaliation. These claims shall be dismissed with prejudice.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that plaintiff's state law claims shall be dismissed without prejudice.
Judgment shall be entered accordingly.
