MAGISTRATE JUDGE'S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

RICHARD L. BOURGEOIS, Jr., Magistrate Judge.

Before the Court is Plaintiff's Motion to Remand. (R. Doc. 11). The Motion is opposed. (R. Doc. 12). Based on the undisputed facts and the applicable law as set forth below, Plaintiff's motion should be granted and the action should be remanded to state court.

I. BACKGROUND

William E. Bartel (Plaintiff),1 personal representative of the Estate of Paul E. Owen (Decedent), filed this action on March 12, 2014 in the 19th Judicial District Court for the Parish of East Baton Rouge, Louisiana. (Petition, R. Doc. 1-1). Plaintiff alleges that between 1944 and 1963, Decedent was employed by the following Defendants: Alcoa Steamship Company, Inc.; Crowley Marine Services, Inc., as successor by merger to Delta Steamship Lines, Inc. f/k/a Mississippi Shipping Co., Inc.; Mississippi Shipping Company; Pan Atlantic Steamship Co.; and Waterman Steamship Corporation (Defendants). (Petition ¶¶ 2, 7-11). Plaintiff alleges that Decedent contracted and died of lung cancer as a result of asbestos exposure while working on vessels owned or operated by Defendants. (Petition ¶¶ 12-25). Plaintiff brings causes of action for recovery against Defendants under both the Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. § 30104 (Petition ¶¶ 26-27), and general maritime law (Petition ¶¶ 28-31). Plaintiff did not demand a jury trial.

Crowley Maritime Services, Inc., as successor by merger to Delta Steamship Lines, Inc. f/k/a Mississippi Shipping Co., Inc. and Mississippi Shipping Company filed a Notice of Removal on May 9, 2014. (R. Doc. 1). The remaining Defendants consented to the removal. (R. Doc. 2). Defendants allege that the Court has subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiff's claims under the admiralty jurisdiction statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1333(1) (saving to suitors clause), and that removal is proper pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (removal of civil actions).

On June 6, 2014, the Plaintiff moved to remand this action to state court. (R. Doc. 11). Plaintiff asserts that removal is improper because (1) his Jones Act claims are non-removable pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1445(a), and (2) his general maritime law claims are non-removable pursuant to the "saving to suitors" clause of 28 U.S.C. § 1333(1).

II. ARGUMENTS OF THE PARTIES

Plaintiff's primary argument for remand is that his Jones Act claims are made non-removable pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1445(a). (R. Doc. 11-1 at 2). Plaintiff then explains that because his general maritime claims arise out of the same operative facts as his Jones Act claims, the entire action becomes non-removable. (R. Doc. 11-1 at 3-4). Plaintiff further argues that nothing in the 2011 amendments to 28 U.S.C. § 1441 permits the Court to exercise removal jurisdiction over his general maritime claims, while severing and remanding his Jones Act claims. (R. Doc. 11-1 at 4-5).

Plaintiff also argues that his general maritime claims are not removable to federal court. (R. Doc. 11-1 at 5-9). Plaintiff argues that the "saving to suitors" clause in the admiralty jurisdiction statute is the historical basis for non-removability of general maritime claims. (R. Doc. 11-1 at 5-6). Accordingly, despite decisions in this district holding otherwise, the 2011 amendments to 28 U.S.C. § 1441 did not make general maritime claims removable. (R. Doc. 11-1 at 5-9).

In opposition, Defendants argue that in light of the 2011 amendments to 28 U.S.C. § 1441, this Court has held that general maritime claims are removable and the assertion of a Jones Act claim does not prevent the removal of actions in which general maritime claims are alleged. (R. Doc. 12 at 3-6). Defendants do not argue, however, that Plaintiff has fraudulently pled claims under the Jones Act or has otherwise waived any challenge to the removal of the Jones Act claims.

III. LAW AND ANALYSIS

It is well settled that when faced with a motion to remand the removing party bears the burden of establishing the facts necessary to show that federal jurisdiction exists. Allen v. R & H Oil & Gas Co., 63 F.3d 1326, 1335 (5th Cir. 1995). The federal removal statute "is subject to strict construction because a defendant's use of that statute deprives a state court of a case properly before it and thereby implicates important federalism concerns." Frank v. Bear Stearns & Co., 128 F.3d 919, 922 (5th Cir. 1997). Any doubts regarding whether removal jurisdiction is proper should be resolved against federal jurisdiction. Acuna v. Brown & Root, Inc., 200 F.3d 335, 339 (5th Cir. 2000).

The Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. § 30104, provides a cause of action in negligence for a seaman who is injured in the course of his employment.2 See Pate v. Standard Dredging Corp., 193 F.2d 498, 501 (5th Cir. 1952) (The Jones Act "modified the prior maritime law of the United States by giving to seamen injured through negligence a right of action in personam against the employer."). The Act incorporates the federal laws regulating recovery for personal injury to railway employees — the Federal Employers' Liability Act (FELA), 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60. See 46 U.S.C. § 30104. Therefore, Jones Act claims are non-removable pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1445(a).3 See Lewis v. Lewis & Clark Marine, Inc., 531 U.S. 438, 455 (2001) (28 U.S.C. § 1445(a) prevents removal of claims under the Jones Act even in the presence of diversity jurisdiction); Lackey v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 990 F.2d 202, 207 (5th Cir. 1993) ("It is axiomatic that Jones Act suits may not be removed from state court" because the Jones Act "incorporates the general provisions of [FELA], including 28 U.S.C. § 1445(a).").

Because Plaintiff alleges causes of action under both the Jones Act and general maritime law, the Court must determine whether his general maritime claim under § 1333(1) is removable under the current version of § 1441(c) when joined with his properly pled Jones Act claim. Section 1441(c) provides that actions involving both federal question claims and claims made non-removable by statute may be removed in their entirety, subject to severance and remand of the non-removable claim:

28 U.S.C. § 1441(c)(1)-(2).4

Section 1441(c) permits removal of a "claim" not within the original or supplemental jurisdiction of the district court, or a "claim" that has been made non-removable by statute, when joined with a claim arising under federal law. Both the pre-amendment and post-amendment versions of § 1441(c) require that the "civil action" include "a claim" within the meaning of § 1331.5 Accordingly, where the plaintiff files a "civil action" that includes both a "claim arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States" and a non-removable Jones Act claim, then the action is removable in its entirety, but the court must sever and remand the Jones Act claim. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(c); see Shultz v. Hercules Offshore, Inc., No. 14-188, 2014 WL 2041282, at *3 (E.D. Tex. May 15, 2014); Landerman v. Tarpon Operating & Dev., L.L.C., ___ F. Supp. 2d ___, 2014 WL 1763208, at *4-5 (E.D. La. May 1, 2014) (finding federal question jurisdiction over the plaintiff's OCSLA claim, but severing and remanding Jones Act claims, "in accordance with the mandatory language of § 1441(c)").

Here, Plaintiff filed a civil action in state court alleging Jones Act and general maritime claims, and Defendants removed the action to federal court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441.

Plaintiff's action does not assert a claim that arises under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1331. The Supreme Court has held that maritime claims, for which federal courts have original jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1333, do not "arise under" the Constitution, law, or treaties of the United States within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1331. See Romero v. International Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354, 378 (1959) (finding it "clear that the words of [the `arising under'] statute do not extend, and could not reasonably be interpreted to extend, to cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction"), superseded by statute on other grounds, 45 U.S.C. § 59, as recognized in Miles v. Apex Marine Corp., 498 U.S. 19, 33 (1990); In re Dutile, 935 F.2d 61, 63 (5th Cir. 1991) ("Emphatically, claims in admiralty, whether designated in rem or in personam, do not fall within" the category of claims arising under federal law.) (citing Romero, 358 U.S. at 378).

Accordingly, Plaintiff's action, which alleges a non-removable Jones Act claim but no claim falling under this Court's federal question jurisdiction, is not removable pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441(c).6 One judge in this district has recently remanded actions where the plaintiff asserted both general maritime and Jones Act claims. See Marvin v. Farrell Lines, Inc., No. 14-316-BAJ-SCR, ECF No. 23 at *7-10 (M.D. La. Sept. 12, 2014), report and recommendation adopted sub nom. Marvin v. Am. Export Lines Inc., ECF No. 24 (M.D. La. Sept. 30, 2014); Alfready Day, Sr. v. Alcoa Steamship Co., Inc., No. 14-317-BAJ-SCR, ECF No. 16 at *7-9 (M.D. La. Sept. 12, 2014), report and recommendation adopted, ECF No. 17 (M.D. La. Sept. 30, 2014). Other district courts have reached the same conclusion. See Unterberg v. Exxon Mobil Corp., No. 14-181, 2014 WL 3420779, at *4-5 (D. Haw. July 10, 2014); Rawls v. Phillips 66 Co., No. 14-602, 2014 WL 2003104, at *1-2 (E.D. La. May 15, 2014); Freeman v. Phillips 66 Co., No. 14-311, 2014 WL 1379786, at *5 (E.D. La. Apr. 8, 2014).

Defendants do not raise any specific statutory argument for why the Court should find removal jurisdiction in this action. Instead, Defendants rely on decisions by two judges in this district, including the district judge on this case, holding that after the 2011 amendments, general maritime claims are removable in the absence of a separate basis for subject matter jurisdiction. See Provost v. Offshore Serv. Vessels, LLC, No. 14-89-SDD-SCR, 2014 WL 2515412, at *3-4 (M.D. La. June 4, 2014); Garza v. Phillips 66 Co., No. 13-742-SDD-SCR, 2014 WL 1330547, at *4-5 (M.D. La. Apr. 1, 2014); Harrold v. Liberty Ins. Underwriters, Inc., No. 13-762-JJB-SCR, 2014 WL 688984, at *3-4 (M.D. La. Feb. 20, 2014); Bridges v. Phillips 66 Co., No. 13-477-JJB-SCR, 2013 WL 6092803, at *4-5 (M.D. La. Nov. 19, 2013).7

The four decisions in this district allowing removal of general maritime claims under the admiralty jurisdiction statute are distinguishable from the instant action. In one of those cases, the plaintiff did not allege a Jones Act claim at all. See Provost, 2014 WL 2515412. Two of the cases were removed on the basis of federal question jurisdiction under the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, and the defendants specifically alleged that the plaintiffs had fraudulently pled their Jones Act claims.8 See Bridges, 2013 WL 6092803; Garza, 2014 WL 1330547. In the final case, the removing defendant asserted that the plaintiff's Jones Act claim was alleged against other defendants. See Harrold, 2014 WL 688984, at *1. The court found the plaintiff's arguments that there was no "separate and independent" claim providing for subject matter jurisdiction unavailing because the plaintiff relied on decisions interpreting the "separate and independent" language that no longer appears in §1441(c). Id. at *4.

Here, Plaintiff has alleged a non-removable Jones Act claim. There is no allegation that the Court has original federal question jurisdiction. The Jones Act claims are brought against all Defendants, and none of those Defendants argues that the Jones Act claims are improperly pled. Although Plaintiff does invoke some jurisprudence engaging in pre-2011 "separate and independent" claim analysis, his primary arguments focus on the non-removability of his Jones Act claims under the current version of § 1441(c). Accordingly, the four decisions in this district allowing for the removal of general maritime claims are distinguishable.

IV. CONCLUSION

Because the Court finds that Plaintiff's Jones Act claims are not removable under § 1445(a), and Plaintiff's general maritime claims are not removable under § 1441(c), the Court need not determine whether Plaintiff's general maritime claims would be removable in the absence of Plaintiff's Jones Act claims.

RECOMMENDATION

IT IS THE RECOMMENDATION of the Magistrate Judge that Plaintiff's Motion to Remand be GRANTED, and the action be remanded to the 19th Judicial District Court for the Parish of East Baton Rouge, Louisiana.

Signed in Baton Rouge, Louisiana, on October 1, 2014.