RULING ON MOTION TO INTERVENE

ERIN WILDER-DOOMES, Magistrate Judge.

Before the Court is a Motion to Intervene1 filed by Liberty Insurance Corporation ("Liberty"). No opposition to the Motion to Intervene has been filed and counsel for Liberty has certified that he received no objection from counsel of record to Liberty's intervention.2 For the reasons set forth herein, Liberty's Motion to Intervene is GRANTED.3

I. Background

On June 25, 2015, Plaintiffs, Wilbert Gaudet and Jennifer Gaudet ("Plaintiffs") filed suit against Edward G. Rumley, Wachob Transportation, LLC, and The Travelers Indemnity Co. (collectively "Defendants") in state court.4 On July 29, 2015, the suit was removed to this Court on the basis of diversity jurisdiction.5

Plaintiffs allege that Wilbert Gaudet was a guest passenger in a vehicle traveling westbound on Interstate 10 and that Edward Rumley, the defendant driver, was also traveling westbound on Interstate 10 behind Mr. Gaudet's vehicle.6 Plaintiffs allege that Mr. Rumley "failed to stop and struck the rear of [the] GAUDET vehicle" causing Plaintiffs' damages.7

Per Liberty's proposed Complaint of Intervention, Liberty issued a policy of insurance in favor of Evergreen Tank Solutions, Inc. ("Evergreen") which covered Wilbert Gaudet as an employee of Evergreen at the time of the accident.8 Liberty asserts that "as the workers' compensation carrier of Evergreen . . . [it] has paid benefits to and on behalf of" Plaintiff.9 Liberty therefore asks to intervene in this suit seeking reimbursement "for such workers' compensation benefits as may have been actually paid by Intervenor to and on behalf of plaintiff. . . ."10 Liberty additionally asserts that it is entitled to a judgment or settlement recognizing its right to offset any additional benefits that may otherwise be due to Wilbert Gaudet against the portion of such judgment or settlement that may be entered in favor of Mr. Gaudet.11

II. Law and Analysis

Liberty seeks to intervene in this suit pursuant to Rule 24 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.12 However, it does not specify whether it seeks to intervene as of right under Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(a) or permissively under Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(b). As set forth herein, because the Court finds Liberty is an intervenor of right, the Court does not conduct an analysis of permissive intervention pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(b).

A. Timeliness of the Motion to Intervene

"Whether leave to intervene is sought under section (a) or (b) of Rule 24, the application must be timely." Stallworth v. Monsanto Co., 558 F.2d 257, 263 (5th Cir. 1977). The timeliness of a motion to intervene is a matter committed to the sound discretion of the trial court. McDonald v. E.J. Lavino, 430 F.2d 1065, 1071 (5th Cir. 1970). Timeliness "is not limited to chronological considerations but `is to be determined from all the circumstances.'" Stallworth v. Monsanto Co., 558 F.2d 257, 263 (5th Cir. 1977). The Fifth Circuit has set forth four factors to consider when evaluating whether a motion to intervene is timely: (1) the length of time during which the proposed intervenor should have known of his interest in the case before he petitioned to intervene; (2) the extent of prejudice that those parties already in the litigation would suffer "as a result of the would-be intervenor's failure to apply for intervention as soon as he actually knew or reasonably should have known of his interest in the case;" (3) the extent of prejudice to the proposed intervenor if he is not allowed to intervene; and (4) the existence of "unusual circumstances militating either for or against a determination that the application is timely." Ross v. Marshall, 426 F.3d 745, 754 (5th Cir. 2005) (citing Stallworth v. Monsanto Co., 558 F.2d 257, 264-266 (5th Cir. 1977)).

Here, Plaintiff filed suit in October, 2015. The case was removed to this Court in November of last year. No party has asserted the Motion to Intervene is untimely. A jury trial is currently scheduled for June 19, 2017.13 Considering the lack of opposition to Liberty's Motion to Intervene, the early procedural posture of this suit, and the extent of prejudice to Liberty if it is not allowed to intervene (discussed below), the Court finds Liberty's Motion to Intervene to be timely.

B. Intervention of Right

Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(a)(2), a party is entitled to intervene in a pending lawsuit when: (1) the motion to intervene is timely; (2) the potential intervenor asserts an interest that is related to the property or transaction that is the subject of the action in which he seeks to intervene; (3) the potential intervenor is so situated that disposition of the case may as a practical matter impair or impede his ability to protect his interest; and (4) the parties already in the action do not adequately protect the potential intervenor's interest. Ford v. City of Huntsville, 242 F.3d 235, 239 (5th Cir. 2001). As discussed above, the Court finds Liberty's Motion to Intervene to be timely.

Pursuant to the Louisiana Workers' Compensation Act, "[i]f either the employee . . . or the employer or insurer bring suits against a third person . . . he shall forthwith notify the other in writing of such fact and of the name of the court in which the suit is filed, and such other may intervene as party plaintiff in the suit." La. R.S. § 23:1102(A). "Although the statute provides that the other may intervene as a party plaintiff if either the employee or the employer brings suit against a third person (tortfeasor), the jurisprudence holds that an employer's failure to intervene in a suit filed by the employee, after proper notice, bars the employer from bringing a separate suit against a third party tortfeasor." Houston General Ins. Co. v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 649 So.2d 776, 782 (La. App. 1 Cir. 1994) (citing Roche v. Big Moose Oil Field Truck Service, 381 So.2d 396, 401 (La. 1980) ("If an employee files suit for damages from a third party tortfeasor, an employer seeking reimbursement of compensation paid must intervene in the pending lawsuit. . . .")). In light of this jurisprudence, district courts in this circuit have found that workers' compensation insurers who have paid a plaintiff workers' compensation benefits are intervenors of right in a plaintiff's action against alleged tortfeasors. See, Johnson v. Qualawash Holdings, LLC, 990 F.Supp.2d 629, 640 (dismissing action after finding workers' compensation insurer to be an indispensable non-diverse party and explaining that insurer "has already made payments to the plaintiff in this matter pursuant to its policy of insurance. . . . Under Louisiana law, if [insurer] does not intervene in this suit, it loses its right to recover from any third party tortfeasors under Louisiana's workers' compensation scheme."); Youngblood v. Rain CII Carbon, LLC, 2014 WL 2547588, at *3 (W.D. La. June 4, 2014) (plaintiff's statutory employer and workers' compensation insurer were both intervenors of right because, unless they were allowed to intervene, they would lose their right to reimbursement.). Here, Liberty alleges that it has paid workers' compensation benefits to Plaintiff and seeks reimbursement for same. Unless Liberty is allowed to intervene, it will lose its right to reimbursement. Accordingly, the Court finds Liberty to be an intervenor of right under Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(a)(2).14

III. Conclusion

For the reasons set forth herein, Liberty Insurance Corporation's Motion to Intervene15 is GRANTED.