RULING

SHELLY D. DICK, Chief District Judge.

This matter is before the Court on the Motion for Summary Judgment on Plaintiff's Retaliation Claim filed by Defendant E.I. duPont de Nemours and Co. ("DuPont").1 Plaintiff Jeffrey M. Simoneaux ("Plaintiff") has filed an Opposition,2 to which DuPont filed a Reply.3 For the reasons which follow, DuPont's Motion shall be DENIED as moot, and the Court shall reinstate the Jury's Verdict and the Court's Judgment as to Plaintiff's FCA retaliation claim.

I. BRIEF FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Two claims were advanced by Plaintiff in this case: a reverse False Claims Act ("FCA") claim7 and a FCA employment retaliation claim.8 The Court denied summary judgment9 as to both claims and denied DuPont's Motion to certify for appeal the denial of its Motion for Summary Judgment on the FCA claim.10 The matter proceeded to trial and, after hearing evidence for two weeks, the jury returned a verdict for DuPont on both claims, and the Court entered Judgment11 in accordance with the jury's verdict. However, subsequently, the Court set aside the verdict and Judgment under Rule 60(b)(3) upon finding by clear and convincing evidence that DuPont obtained the verdict through "fraud . . ., misrepresentation, or other misconduct" such that the Relator was prevented from fully and fairly presenting his case.12

Facing a lengthy and costly re-trial, DuPont moved the Court to reconsider its pre-trial denial of DuPont's Motion to certify for appeal the denial of its Motion for Summary Judgment.13 The Court granted the Motion for Reconsideration and certified its denial of the Motion for Summary Judgment for Appeal.14 The Court specifically stated: "the Court hereby certifies its April 4, 2014 Ruling denying DuPont's summary judgment motion for appeal."15 The Court's April 4, 2014 Ruling addressed only the Plaintiff's reverse FCA claim, not the FCA retaliation claim.16

On the interlocutory appeal in this matter, the Fifth Circuit ruled: "It is ordered and adjudged that the denial of summary judgment for duPont on the reverse-FCA claim is reversed and remanded. With respect to the retaliation claim, the appeal is dismissed for lack of appellate jurisdiction."17 On June 15, 2017, this Court entered its Ruling on Remand which ordered: "For the reasons articulated by the Court of Appeal, the Court hereby GRANTS Dupont's Motion for Summary Judgment and the Plaintiff's reverse FCA claim is hereby DISMISSED with prejudice."18

The procedural history makes it clear that only the issue of the Plaintiff's reverse FCA claim was certified for interlocutory appeal. The Court of Appeal reversed and remanded this Court's denial of DuPont's Motion for Summary Judgment on the reverse-FCA claim, and for the reasons articulated by Fifth Circuit, the Court dismissed the Plaintiff's reverse FCA claim with prejudice. The Court then held that, the jury's verdict having been vacated, the Plaintiff's FCA retaliation claim remains before this Court.19

II. RECONSIDERATION OF COURT'S PRIOR RULINGS

Upon review of the lengthy and complex record of this matter, the Court hereby reconsiders its previous Rulings and its ultimate conclusion that Plaintiff's FCA retaliation claim remains viable. Both the United States Supreme Court and the Fifth Circuit have held that a district court has the discretion to reconsider its prior decisions sua sponte in any circumstance:

A review of the Jury's Verdict, rendered on January 23, 2015, reveals that the jury answered in the affirmative that Plaintiff "engaged in activity motivated by a concern that DuPont knowingly concealed or knowingly and improperly avoided or decreased its obligation to pay fines or penalties to the EPA," and that Plaintiff "made DuPont aware that he was concerned that DuPont was knowingly concealing or knowingly and improperly avoiding or decreasing possible fines or penalties." Nevertheless, the jury also answered in the negative when asked if "DuPont retaliated against Mr. Simoneaux by creating working conditions that were so intolerable that a reasonable employee would feel compelled to resign." Thus, the jury declined to award Plaintiff any money damages in relation to his retaliation claim. The Court entered Judgment31 in accordance with the jury's verdict.

As set forth above, the Court set aside the verdict and Judgment pursuant to Rule 60(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure after finding that DuPont failed to produce newly discovered evidence pertaining to leak calculations and OSHA citations that was found to be material to Plaintiff's reverse FCA claim and which the Court found constituted misconduct on the part of DuPont.32 Specifically, the Court held that the new evidence prevented Plaintiff from fully and fairly presenting his case.33 However, a closer reading of the Court's ruling demonstrates that the newly discovered evidence pertained only to Plaintiff's reverse FCA claim and had nothing to do with Plaintiff's evidence, elements, or burden of proof with respect to his FCA retaliation claim. Indeed, Plaintiff's retaliation claim is never mentioned in this Ruling. When DuPont moved for reconsideration of this Ruling, the Court denied that Motion and again addressed the reasons for setting aside the jury's verdict and Judgment, explaining how the absence of the leak calculations and OSHA citations prevented Plaintiff from "fully and fairly presenting his case."34 But again, Plaintiff's FCA retaliation claim was never mentioned.

Any fair reading of the Court's Rulings granting a new trial demonstrates that Plaintiff's retaliation claim was not at issue in the Court's consideration of the newly discovered evidence. Further, all discussion of the value of the leak calculations and the OSHA citations went directly to Plaintiff's ability to fully and fairly present his evidence on his reverse FCA claim. No party argued, and no argument can be made from any of the Court's analysis, that the newly discovered evidence pertained to, or would have in some way affected, the jury's answer to the question "Do you find, by a preponderance of the evidence, that DuPont retaliated against Mr. Simoneaux by creating working conditions that were so intolerable that a reasonable employee would feel compelled to resign?"

Because Plaintiff's FCA retaliation claim was fully and fairly adjudicated by the jury and was unaffected by the newly discovered evidence relating to Plaintiff's reverse FCA claim, the Court sua sponte vacates its previous Ruling in part and reinstates the Jury Verdict and Judgment as to Plaintiff's FCA retaliation claim.

Accordingly, DuPont's Motion for Summary Judgment on Plaintiff's Retaliation Claim52 is DENIED as MOOT.53

Judgment shall be entered accordingly.

IT IS SO ORDERED.