JEFFREY P. NORMAN, UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY JUDGE.
This matter is before the Court concerning the confirmation of the debtor's amended Chapter 13 plan (ECF No. 15). A confirmation hearing was held on April 19, 2017. After considering the pleadings, evidence, testimony, arguments, and briefs, the Court makes the following findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52, as incorporated by Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure 7052 and 9014.2. To the extent any finding of fact is construed to be a conclusion of law, it is adopted as such. To the extent that any conclusion of law is construed to be a finding of fact, it is adopted as such. The Court reserves the
The debtor, Marlea Adley Briggs, filed this Chapter 13 bankruptcy case on December 31, 2016. The most recent plan (ECF No. 15) was filed on February 21, 2017. The plan is supported by an amended budget (ECF No. 17) filed on March 14, 2017. No parties in interest objected to the plan. On March 17, 2017, a proceeding memo was entered by the Chapter 13 Trustee stating the following: "[c]onfirmation hearing not held. Plan confirmed on consent docket."
Procedures for the confirmation of Chapter 13 plans are set forth in this Court's Standing Order Adopting Mandatory Form Chapter 13 Plan Effective August 1, 2015. That Standing Order provides the following:
Accordingly, unopposed Chapter 13 plans which the Chapter 13 Trustee recommends for confirmation are struck from the docket.
The Court had its own independent concerns regarding confirmation of the debtor's plan. So, after it's in camera review, the Court entered an order setting a hearing (ECF No. 18) which stated the following:
Thereafter, in anticipation of the hearing, the debtor filed an Amended Schedule J (ECF No. 20). This amendment included additional disclosures, but none of the debtor's previously disclosed expenses were impacted.
The debtor is married and has a non-filing spouse. Her original schedules reflect she maintains a household of two, which consists of the debtor and her husband. However, her latest amended Schedule J reflects that her twenty-seven year old daughter, who was recently diagnosed with Crohn's disease, is temporarily living with her. The daughter moved in with the debtor just two weeks prior to the bankruptcy filing, and the debtor does not disclose her as a dependent in the bankruptcy schedules. Debtor's counsel conceded at the hearing that the correct family size should be two. The Court assumes debtor's counsel does not believe the daughter's temporary living arrangements with the debtor impacts the means test calculation.
The debtor has proposed a Chapter 13 plan calling for plan payments of $310.00 per month for 52 months, and then $825.22 per month for the final eight months. While no evidence was introduced regarding the increase in the plan payment, the Court assumes the non-filing spouse's car payment for his 2012 Ford Truck ends in month 52 and those funds would become available for the higher plan payment. The debtor is above median income and her applicable commitment period
The debtor's Chapter 13 Statement of Current Monthly Income and Calculation of Commitment Period, together with the Chapter 13 Calculation of Your Disposable Income (commonly called the Chapter 13 Means Test") (ECF No. 1, pgs. 52 to 64), discloses the following: a family size of two, average monthly income for the debtor of $2,582.85, and average monthly income for the non-filing spouse of $3,445.20. The following chart compares the debtor's income and expenses in her means test and her budget:
Chapter 13 Means Budget Test (Form 122C-1 Schedule I and and Form 122C-2) Schedule Average Monthly Income Debtor $ 2:582.85 $ 2:582.85 Average Monthly Income Non-Filing Spouse $ 3,445.20 $ 3,445.20 Total Income $ 6:028.05 $ 6,028.05 Income Deductions Lines 16, 25, 41 (All references to Form 122C-2) $(1,304.75) Lines 5a-5h (All references to Schedule J) $ (1,368.14) Net Income $ 4,723.30 $ 4,659.91 Clothing Food and other items Line 6 $ 1,083.00 Line 7, 9, 10, 13, 21 $ 1,064.17 Health Care Line 7(g) $ 108.00 Line 11 $ 100.00 Housing-Insurance and operating expenses Line 8 $ 509.00 Line 4b, 4c, 6a, 6b, 6d mid unscheduled cell phone purchase not scheduled in budget Purchase (2 × $25) $ 811.35 Housing Line 9(c) Court notes that line 9(c) is incorrectly calculated $ 913.00 Line 4 $ 438.20 Vehicle Operation Expense Line 12 $ 440.00 Line 12 and 15(c) $ 787.97 vehicle Ownership Expense Line 13(a)/Line 33b $ 471.00 $ 515.22 Line 13(d)Line 33c $ 471.00 Paid in Plan Life Insurance Line 18 $ 15.84 Line 15(a) $ 83.00 Optional telephone arid telephone senices' $ 50.00 Not scheduled Charitable Contributions Line 31 $ 602.81 Line 14 $ 600.00 Trustee Fee (Line 36) $ 22.32 Paid in Chapter 13 Plan Total Schedule I Deductions $ 4,685.97 $ 4,399.91 < Total Payroll Deductions $ 1,304.75 Grand Total $ 5,990.72* <Equal to Line 22(c) of Schedule 1, plus 550.00 in unscheduled cell phone purchase ^Incorrectly deducted *Equal to Line 44 of Form 122C-2
The debtor testified at the hearing and the Court finds her testimony credible. The debtor testified that the filed budget reflected her best estimate of her average monthly expenses. The only contradiction concerned her cell phone expense. The debtor's budget indicates she has a $170.00 per month cell phone expense. She testified this was her total cost for her cell phone service for two phones with AT & T; but, she also testified that she was paying and additional $50 per month for the purchase of cell phones for her and her husband ($25.00 per phone). She mentioned the AT & T Next purchase program, which allows customers to finance phones as part of their cell phone bills by paying $25.00 per month. This $50.00 monthly payment is not reflected in the debtor's budget. The Court can only conclude that this expense is improperly bundled with some other expense in the debtor's budget, or that it is simply not listed as an expense.
The debtor and her non-debtor spouse drive two cars. The debtor drives a 2013 Ford Fusion and the debtor's spouse drives the aforementioned Ford truck. The debtor testified she drives 35,000 miles per year, and that 18,000 of those miles are related to her work. She is not reimbursed for these miles, but she deducts them on her tax return. The debtor sells life insurance and also services the policies for her existing insurance customers. Her income is commissions based, and she does not receive a mileage reimbursement for visiting her clients on sales calls or policy servicing. Based on her testimony and current IRS mileage rates, the debtor's yearly tax deduction would be approximately $9,630.00, limited to the extent it exceeds 2% of her adjusted gross income.
As noted above, the debtor's expenses on the means test are both above and below the Local and National Standards in several categories. However, the Court must point out the debtor's errors in the debtor's means test and budget. The first error occurs at line 9b of the Form 122C-2 (the means test), where the debtor fails to list the mortgage payment of $438.20 on her home. The debtor's home is community property and, whether or not she is liable on the mortgage (the debtor's testimony was unclear), that payment should
Likewise, because the mortgage payment is not listed at line 9b, the error is compounded when the mortgage payment is not repeated at line 33a. That error is illustrated below:
The errors at line 9b and line 33a, and this Court's disallowance of the deduction of the debtor's non-existent rental expense, have a direct impact on the means test calculation. Correction of these errors would increase the debtor's monthly disposable income (line 45 of Form 122C-2) from $37.33 (the debtor's means test result) to $512.13.
The second error occurs at line 23 of Form 122C-2, where the debtor takes an inappropriate deduction of $50.00. The Court finds no evidence the debtor is entitled to any deduction at line 23. That error is illustrated as follows:
This error impacts the calculation in Form 122C-2 and would additionally increase monthly disposable income (line 45 of Form 122C-2) by $50.00, to a total of $562.13. In total, the Court's corrections are illustrated below:
The final error is in Schedule J, where the debtor discloses a cell phone expense of $170.00 (ECF No. 20, pg. 3 of 4, line 6d). The debtor's testimony supports a cell phone expense of $220.00, which includes the purchase of two cell phones at $25.00 per month and per phone. As it will discuss later, the Court finds this expense excessive and requires the debtor to reduce it. This telephone expense appears in Schedule J as follows:
Some of the important issues the Court must address in this matter include the interplay between the "mechanical" calculation in the means test and confirmation of the debtor's Chapter 13 plan, the balancing of the debtor's expenses under the means test, and this Court's authority to sua sponte raise an objection to the debtor's budget, particularly when it concerns a specific line item expense. Prior to the enactment of the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 ("BAPCPA"), disposable income was defined in 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b)(2) as "income which is received by the debtor and which is not reasonably necessary to be expended for the maintenance or support of the debtor or a dependent of the debtor." A debtor was then required to pay that disposable income for not less than 36 months (unless unsecured creditors were paid in full sooner), but not more than 60 months. BAPCPA changed the definition of "disposable income" and instituted a "means test" referenced in 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b)(2), which partly incorporates 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2). Specifically, 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2)(A)(ii)-(iv) describes certain monthly expenses which "shall be the debtor's applicable monthly expenses" for an above median income debtor.
Post-BAPCPA, federal courts struggled with how the changes to the Code had modified the disposable income test in Chapter 13. Some courts adopted a "mechanical" approach, and strictly calculated current monthly income (CMI) consistent with 11 U.S.C. § 101(10A). These courts did this by subtracting the expenses and other amounts allowed under 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b)(2) or (b)(3) depending on whether the debtor's CMI was greater than or less than the applicable median family income. Then, these courts "projected" the resulting "disposable income" by multiplying the calculated disposable income by the number of months in the applicable commitment period. If this "mechanical" test was applied to the debtor in this case, the debtor would be required to pay $562.13 for 60 months, or a total of $33,727.80 to unsecured creditors.
Before the Supreme Court issued several opinions, the circuit courts were split on this issue. The majority held that the mechanical approach was a "presumption" or "starting point" for disposable income. Only one circuit used the "mechanical" test. All of these approaches were affected by the Supreme Court's opinion in Hamilton v. Lanning, 560 U.S. 505, 130 S.Ct. 2464, 177 L.Ed.2d 23 (2010). Importantly, prior to the Lanning decision, the Fifth Circuit used the forward-looking approach. See Nowlin v. Peak (In re Nowlin), 576 F.3d 258 (5th Cir. 2009). The Fifth Circuit held that "disposable income" calculated under 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b)(2), multiplied by the applicable commitment period, is "presumptively" the debtor's "projected disposable income." Id. However, any party "may rebut this presumption by presenting evidence of present or reasonably certain future events that substantially change the debtor's financial situation." Id. at 266. The Fifth Circuit stated the following concerning how bankruptcy judges should assess the certainty of future events for projected disposable income test purposes:
Accordingly, this Court cannot speculate about the income or expenses of any Chapter 13 debtor at plan confirmation. Instead, evidence must be submitted concerning a debtor's income and expenses, and the Court can then evaluate them based on the reasonable certainty of future events. However, nothing in Nowlin restricts this Court's ability to evaluate a debtor's income or expenses at confirmation based on the reasonable certainty of a future event.
This interpretation is consistent with the Supreme Court's holding in Lanning. In Lanning, the Supreme Court endorsed the "forward-looking" approach to determine projected disposable income. Although it was clear that the expense side of the projected disposable income calculation was not at issue before the lower court, the Supreme Court granted certiorari more broadly by stating the following:
By examining changes in income and expenses, the Supreme Court ultimately decided "how a bankruptcy court should calculate a debtor's `projected disposable income.'" The Court held the following:
There is not a lack of certainty concerning the debtor's expenses in this case. For example, the debtor's cell phone expense is certain. The debtor will continue to pay $170.00 per month for her cell phone service, plus $50.00 per month for the purchase of two cell phones until paid in full. The issue is whether the debtor can reduce this cell phone expense, and whether the Court should deny confirmation if it determines she can. This Court concludes it should deny confirmation unless the debtor reduces her cell phone expense and increases the distribution to unsecured creditors.
This judge was previously a Chapter 13 Trustee, and routinely evaluated cell phone expenses. Cell phone service is not a luxury; it is a reasonable necessity for any adult debtor and some teenage dependents. However, this Court has previously ruled that reasonably necessary means adequate, not "first-class." See, e.g., In re Easley, 72 B.R. 948 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1987); In re Kitson, 65 B.R. 615 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 1986); In re Tinneberg, 59 B.R. 634 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1986). Therefore, there are instances, such as in this case, where a debtor should be required to reduce her cell phone expenses. Debtors should not have "first class" cell phone service; it is not reasonably necessary for them to have the latest and most expensive cell phones with unlimited data packages and with capabilities to interact with social media accounts. Debtors' cell phone service should be practical and inexpensive, and may include unlimited calls and texts but should not include unlimited data. Cell phone service has become ubiquitous and pricing has recently become more competitive. The Chapter 13 Trustee is in the best position to evaluate costs and cell phone budgets, and should present such evidence to the Court. Debtors should not finance the most current iPhone or Android cell phone. There are many cell phone service providers, including Boost Mobile, Consumer Cellular, Cricket, MetroPCS, Net 10, Straight Talk, TracFone, Walmart, and Virgin Mobile that provide adequate and low cost cell phone service. There is also a large secondary market in used cell phones, and the latest cell phone is often eclipsed by a newer and better model within a year or two. A used iPhone 5, which is currently four years old but fully functional, can be purchased for as little as $70.00 on eBay. Adequate cell phone service can currently be purchased for as little as $20.00 per month and a cell phone can be purchased for less than $19.99.
This reduction is necessary given the Court's evaluation of the debtor's expenses, especially as it relates to the debtor's home insurance and maintenance expenses which exceed the Local Standards by $302.35. In above median income cases, a debtor's expenses are limited in certain categories to amounts set forth in the National and Local Standards unless the Court accounts for changes in the debtor's income or expenses that are known or virtually certain at confirmation. No evidence was introduced that the home insurance and maintenance expenses should exceed the Local Standard based on the debtor's unreasonably high cell phone bill. While the home insurance and maintenance expense will still exceed the standards if the cell phone bill is reduced, that expense category would be much closer to being in compliance.
This Court adopts the view that the mechanical approach to the means test is merely a "presumption" or "starting point" in the calculation of disposable income. This Court will continue to be forward-looking with regard to income and expenses. It will not be bound by the mechanical test; instead, it will require expense be known or virtually certain at confirmation if those expenses exceed the Local or National Standards.
Additionally, this Court will not allow the debtor to balance expenses exceeding the National or Local Standards against her claimed rent expense. At line 9c of the means test, the debtor incorrectly takes a Local Standard deduction of $913.00 for rent. In reality, the debtor has no rental expense; instead, she has a monthly mortgage payment of $438.20. In Ransom v. FIA Card Servs., N.A., 562 U.S. 61, 131 S.Ct. 716, 178 L.Ed.2d 603 (2011), the Supreme Court held that a debtor who owns his car outright may not claim an allowance for car ownership costs in his means test. The debtor in that case claimed the means test expense even though he did not actually incur the expense. In effect, the Supreme Court held that a debtor may not deduct "phantom" expenses in the means test. The Court stated the following:
In Ransom, the Court concluded that a person cannot claim an allowance for vehicle ownership costs unless he has some expense falling within that category. The Ransom court stated the following:
Based on the reasoning in Ransom, this Court holds that a home rental expense is not "applicable" to a debtor who will not incur any such rental costs during the case. Because the home rental expense category covers rental of a home, and because
At first glance, the holding in Ransom may appear to support the balancing of Local and National Standard expenses that are above the amounts allowed by the Chapter 13 means test against amounts that are below these standards. The Supreme Court stated that "a debtor should be required to qualify for a deduction by actually incurring an expense in the relevant category. If a debtor will not have a particular kind of expense during his plan, an allowance to cover that cost is not `reasonably necessary' within the meaning of the statute." Id. at 70-71, 131 S.Ct. 716. It is unclear whether this qualification is for the total amount allowed by the means test in the relevant category or just the actual expense incurred by the debtor in that category. However, the opinion in Ransom goes further and states the following:
This Court, after consulting the Collection Financial Standards notes that the IRS Collection Standards for an automobile's Operating Costs
Still further, the IRS Collection Financial Standards states the following:
These standards create a dichotomy for National and Local Standard expenses, allowing the netting of expenses in one category (the National Standard expenses) but not against another (the Local Standard expenses). Because a debtor is allowed the National Standard expenses without regard to the actual amount the debtor spends, the offsetting of the debtor's other expenses against the National Standards in the means test is allowed. However, for expenses that are defined by the Local Standards, the debtor is only allowed the amount actually spent or the Local Standard, whichever is less. Therefore, netting of expenses against a Local Standard when claiming a lesser amount is not allowed. Therefore, this Court holds that a debtor may not net her higher expenses in any other expense categories against any claimed Local Standard expense that is below the standard, but may offset excess expenses against any National Standards expenses that are below the standard.
This Court recognizes that post-Ransom, bankruptcy courts have come to different conclusions when considering the issue of whether an above median income debtor may claim the full amount of the deductions under the IRS's National and Local Standards when the debtor has expenses which are lower than the amounts listed in the Standards. See, e.g., In re Daniel, 2012 WL 3322438 at *2 (Bankr. M.D. Ala. 2012) (finding that debtors shall deduct the lesser of the IRS Local Standard allowance or their actual costs); In re O'Neill Miranda, 449 B.R. 182, 196 (Bankr. D.P.R. 2011) (finding that debtors "pursuant to Section 707(b)(2)(A)(ii)(I) may deduct the full amount of applicable expenses under the IRS's National and Local Standards if they provide evidence to the [t]rustee that they have some expense for that particular category, irrespective of the fact that their actual expenses for certain categories are lower"); In re Harris, 522 B.R. 804 (Bankr. E.D. N.C. 2014) ([t]he Court agrees with the Daniel decision of the Bankruptcy Court for the Middle District of Alabama . . . [t]he Supreme Court
Therefore, this Court expressly rejects those opinions that allow a debtor to deduct the full amount of applicable expenses under the IRS's Local Standards if they provide evidence to the Trustee that they have some expense for that particular category, irrespective of the fact that their actual expenses for certain categories are lower. Likewise, the Court endorses those opinions that find that a debtor shall deduct the lesser of the IRS Local Standard allowance or their actual costs.
Irrespective of this holding, if the Court assumes that the debtor can net her expenses that are higher than the Local and National Standards against her lower expenses without exception, this would still not favor the debtor or support plan confirmation given the errors in the debtor's means test. The debtor's income deductions exceed the deductions allowed in the means test by $63.39; her housing insurance and operating expenses exceed the Local Standard for such expense by $302.35; her transportation operating expenses exceed the Local Standard by $347.97; and her life insurance expense exceeds the allowed deduction in the means test by $67.16.
To clarify, an above median income debtor should only deduct expenses in the means test that are applicable as of the date of plan confirmation. The maximum allowed deduction is either (a) the National Standard or (b) the Local Standard limited by the amount actually spent by the debtor, whichever is
Also at issue in this case is the Court's ability to raise concerns regarding confirmation sua sponte. The Court notes there has been no objection from any party to the plan and budget filed by the debtor in this case. This Court has a history of raising concerns and objections sua sponte, especially regarding debtors' budgets. Some issues involve errors made by the Chapter 13 Trustee in recommending confirmation and others are directly related to a debtor's disposable income.
It is Judge Lundin's opinion that a bankruptcy judge should not raise objections to a Chapter 13 plan when no parties have filed an objection. He suggests that the bankruptcy court should not interject itself into a bankruptcy case and raise issues which others have not, and that courts are overreaching under the Supreme Court's opinion in Espinosa v. United Student Aid Funds, Inc., 553 F.3d 1193 (9th Cir. 2008). He also states that judges rule on cases and controversies. Therefore, bankruptcy judges should be reactive; that is, they should respond only to objections of parties. According to this
A Chapter 13 plan may not be confirmed unless it passes the disposable income test. 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b)(1). Basically, a Chapter 13 debtor must either pay a claim in full (11 U.S.C. § 1325(b)(1)(A)) or commit his disposable income for the applicable commitment period (11 U.S.C. § 1325(b)(1)(B). Judge Lundin's opinion concerning sua sponte objections based on disposable income has support in in 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b)(1), which provides "[i]f the trustee or the holder of an allowed unsecured claim objects to the confirmation of the plan, then the court may not approve the plan." Some consider this a restriction on the court's ability to raise a disposable income objection. The Court is obviously not the trustee or an unsecured claim holder. Some courts sidestep this provision under the theory that the good faith requirement in 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(3) also allows it to raise a disposable income objection sua sponte. A Chapter 13 treatise, which Judge Lundin co-authors, says the following about this theory:
This Court disagrees with Judge Lundin's assertions and takes the position that it can raise disposable income objections sua sponte based on good faith. This Court's reasoning is noted below in order of importance:
(a.) This Court cannot read the Supreme Court's ruling in Espinosa and reach any other conclusion other than that it has an independent duty to review all budgets and Chapter 13 plans. The Court has a duty to raise objections to confirmation based on its independent review even in the absence of objection from any party in interest. Many would argue that Espinosa is dicta and not binding. While the Court understands this argument, it will not ignore the plain language in the Supreme Court's opinion. The Court is bound by the holding in Espinosa.
(b.) BAPCPA was enacted to correct perceived abuses in the bankruptcy system. The Supreme Court stated the following in Ransom:
The sua sponte objections this Court raises generally can be classified into two distinct categories noted below. Some have no effect on a debtor's plan payment. However, all objections concerning disposable income are raised so that a debtor will increase his payments and pay the maximum he can afford as required by BAPCPA and Ransom.
The first kind of objections involve errors by the Chapter 13 Trustee in recommending confirmation, and generally do not affect a debtor's plan payment or disposable income. These are generally simple oversights in the debtor's budget or plan for which the Court finds little fault. These can include miscalculations, incorrect interest rates, transposing errors, improperly allowed payroll deductions, incorrect confirmation orders, improper attorney fee payments and duplicative or omitted secured creditor repayments. The correction of these errors generally leads to an amended budget or Chapter 13 plan and perhaps an increased distribution to unsecured creditors. These Court raised objections are primarily due to the Court's concerns regarding the binding effect of plan confirmation. The provisions of a confirmed plan bind the debtor and each creditor, whether or not the claim of such creditor is provided for by the plan and whether or not such creditor has objected to, has accepted, or has rejected the plan but only if notice is adequate. Bad plans, bad notices and bad confirmation orders that fall short of the due process required in the Code and Rules are the principal limitations on the effects of confirmation in Chapter 13 cases.
The Chapter 13 Trustee in this division administers over 6,500 cases, and he cannot be perfect in every aspect. He employs a large staff and, while the Court has expectations that he will engage in quality control, no single person on the Trustee's staff is perfect. Errors will occur as the Trustee and his staff review cases and make confirmation recommendations. Even if the Trustee makes confirmation recommendation errors in only 3% of all cases, the Court will see as many as eight cases per month with either budget or plan errors. When caught by the Court, these errors are properly brought to the attention of the debtor, debtor's counsel and the Chapter 13 Trustee. The Court finds nothing in the Code or Bankruptcy Rules that does not allow it to bring these errors to the attention of all involved. Correction of these errors may increase the distribution to unsecured creditors as well as eliminate future errors of the same type. Additionally, they insure that the confirmed Chapter 13 plan has a binding effect on debtors and creditors.
The second category of objections does not involve an oversight or omission in the debtor's budget, Chapter 13 plan or confirmation order. These objections are directly related to this case and to a debtor's disposable income. These objections, such as the Court's objection in this case, involve a subjective disagreement between this Court and the Chapter 13 Trustee regarding a debtor's expenses. As already noted, the Trustee did not originally object to the debtor's plan or budget. In fact, the Trustee again recommended confirmation following the hearing. The Court can only conclude that the Trustee had no objections to the debtor's budget. If 11 U.S.C.
The Court also notes that the Chapter 13 Trustee in Shreveport, Todd Johns, was appointed on October 1, 2016 (about nine months ago). The position of a Chapter 13 Trustee is somewhat unique as it requires the legal and administrative experience to shepherd Chapter 13 cases from start to end. While almost all Chapter 13 Trustees have a level of Chapter 13 experience prior to appointment, they often have no experience as an actual Chapter 13 Trustee. Once appointed, trustees typically do not move; therefore, they almost exclusively come to a job for which they may be well qualified but have little actual experience. Like Mr. Johns, they often inherit an office they did not create, with staff they did not hire, and computer software they are unfamiliar with. Therefore, there will always be a transition period as a new trustee trains and adapts to his new surroundings, personnel, and technology. Accordingly, the Court must note its limited history with the current Chapter 13 Trustee and its limited ability to provide feedback regarding issues of disposable income in in an adversarial context. Without an ability to raise sua sponte disposable income objections, the Trustee would have no way of knowing the Court's position.
(c.) Finally, this Court does not see itself as simply a confirmation order signing machine. In the Shreveport Division, where typically over 70% of all cases filed are Chapter 13 and a clear majority of the hearings scheduled weekly involve uncontested Chapter 13 matters, this Court does not believe it should avoid the Supreme Court's ruling in Espinosa and simply sign every confirmation order on every case that is recommended for confirmation by the Chapter 13 Trustee. While not reviewing cases and raising sua sponte objections would make the Court's job much easier by removing the often tedious and repetitive task of reviewing Chapter 13 Plans and budgets, it would be contrary to this Court's duty to review Chapter 13 plans under Espinosa. This Court simply will not agree to blindly sign every confirmation order.
In conclusion, the Court must again highlight and stress what it believes to be Supreme Court precedent from Espinosa and Ransom. A Court should independently review all budgets and Chapter 13 plans and ensure that debtors will repay creditors the maximum they can afford. For these reasons, the Court will deny confirmation of the debtor's Chapter 13 plan and require the debtor to increase her distribution to unsecured creditors in conformity with this opinion.
