PATRICK J. HANNA, Magistrate Judge.
Before this Court is an appeal of the Commissioner's finding of non-disability. Considering the administrative record, the briefs of the parties, and the applicable law, it is recommended that the Commissioner's decision be AFFIRMED.
The claimant, Joann Marie Broussard, was born on April 6, 1958.
Ms. Broussard argues that the Commissioner failed to properly consider and weigh the medical opinion of Dr. Shahed Jameel; failed to properly consider and weigh relevant medical evidence regarding her orthopedic and rheumatologic impairments; failed to comply with SSR 96-8p when assessing her residual functional capacity; failed to comply with SSR 96-7p when assessing her credibility; and erred in finding that she has the residual functional capacity to perform the full range of light work.
This Court's review of the Commissioner's decision is limited to determining whether the decision was supported by substantial evidence and whether the proper legal standards were applied in reaching the decision.
A claimant seeking Social Security benefits bears the burden of proving that he or she is disabled.
The Commissioner utilizes a sequential five-step inquiry to determine whether a claimant is disabled. At step one, an individual who is working and engaging in substantial gainful activity will not be found disabled regardless of medical findings. At step two, an individual who does not have a severe impairment will not be found disabled. At step three, an individual who meets or equals an impairment listed in the regulations at 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1 will be considered disabled without consideration of vocational factors. If an individual is capable of performing the work he has done in the past, a finding of not disabled must be made at step four. If an individual's impairment precludes him from performing his past work, other factors including age, education, past work experience, and residual functional capacity must be considered to determine if the claimant can perform any other work at step five.
Before going from step three to step four, the Commissioner assesses the claimant's residual functional capacity
The claimant bears the burden of proof on the first four steps.
In this case, the Commissioner found, at step one, that Ms. Broussard has not engaged in substantial gainful activity since her alleged disability onset date of December 27, 2008.
At step two, the ALJ found that Ms. Broussard has the following severe impairments: coronary artery disease and pain in the right shoulder and left knee.
At step three, the ALJ found that Ms. Broussard does not have an impairment or a combination of impairments that meets or medically equals a listed impairment.
The ALJ then found that Ms. Broussard retains the residual functional capacity to perform the full range of light work as defined in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1567(b) and 416.967(b).
Ms. Broussard argues that there are several reasons why the ALJ's decision is erroneous, each of which will be considered in turn.
Ms. Broussard argues that the Commissioner failed to properly consider and weigh the medical opinion of Dr. Shahed Jameel. At the request of the claimant, Dr. Jameel issued a medical source statement of ability to do work-related physical activities on October 1, 2009.
The ALJ found Dr. Jameel's assessment of Ms. Broussard's functional capacity "to be inconsistent with the objective medical evidence and, therefore, [it] is given little weight."
Ms. Broussard contends that Dr. Jameel's opinions should have been given more weight. Ms. Broussard does not assert that Dr. Jameel is her treating physician, but she does contend that he examined her and reviewed medical records from UMC as the basis for his opinions.
This logic is faulty because Dr. Jameel's report, which is dated October 1, 2009, was also issued before Ms. Broussard was diagnosed with degenerative joint disease, polyarthralgia, or Sjogren's syndrome. At the time that Dr. Jameel evaluated Ms. Broussard's functional capacity, she had been diagnosed with costochondritis but, just a couple of days earlier, she was also found to have essentially normal joints. Although she reported left knee and right shoulder pain on September 28, 2009, she had a full range of motion in both of those joints and x-rays taken that day showed no bony or soft tissue abnormalities.
After Dr. Denison examined Ms. Broussard, he prepared a detailed report
An ALJ is free to reject the opinion of any physician when the evidence supports a contrary conclusion.
Accordingly, the undersigned finds that the ALJ did not err in assigning weight to the physician's statements and that the Commissioner's residual functional capacity finding was based on substantial evidence.
Ms. Broussard argues that the Commissioner failed to properly consider and weigh relevant medical evidence regarding her orthopedic and rheumatologic impairments. Originally, Ms. Broussard claimed that she was disabled because of a heart attack. Later, she argued that her disabling conditions are joint pain caused by osteoarthritis and/or certain rheumatologic conditions.
In March 2009,
On May 22, 2009,
On September 28, 2009,
Ms. Broussard was evaluated at UMC's orthopedic clinic on November 11, 2009.
Ms. Broussard was seen in UMC's internal medicine clinic for her costochondritis on January 4, 2010.
A few days later, on January 13, 2010, she went to UMC's orthopedic clinic for a follow-up visit. She reported improvement in her shoulder but continued knee pain that radiated to her feet. She was given another steroid injection.
The hearing was held on February 12, 2010, and the ALJ's unfavorable decision was rendered on April 29, 2010. Thereafter, Ms. Broussard was evaluated for rheumatologic disorders (June 12, 2010), diagnosed with polyarthralgia (August 15, 2010), and diagnosed with Sjogrens Syndrome (August 30, 2010), an autoimmune disease.
Ms. Broussard argues that the ALJ failed to properly consider and weigh the evidence in the record concerning her orthopedic and rheumatologic conditions. But that evidence does not shed light on Ms. Broussard's medical condition on her alleged disability onset date, on the date of the hearing, or on any date between the two. This evidence might have been material had the date of the hearing been later. But the Fifth Circuit has instructed that evidence is not material "insofar as it details the alleged worsening of a claimant's condition after the date of the hearing. This is not to say that we cannot consider any evidence post-dating a hearing, but that medical evidence must shed light on the severity of a claimant's medical condition before the hearing."
At the time that Dr. Denison examined Ms. Broussard and submitted his report, and at the time that Dr. Walker evaluated Ms. Broussard's residual functional capacity, Ms. Broussard was alleging that she was disabled because of her heart condition. She later withdrew that contention and now argues that she is disabled because of orthopedic and rheumatologic conditions most of which developed and were diagnosed after the hearing. Thus, the evidence that Ms. Broussard would like the Commissioner to focus on likely reflects a later-acquired disability or the subsequent deterioration of the previously non-disabling condition. The undersigned accordingly finds that the Commissioner did not err in weighing this evidence.
Ms. Broussard's next three arguments are related. She contends that the Commissioner failed to comply with SSR 96-8p when assessing her residual functional capacity, failed to comply with SSR 96-7p when assessing her credibility considering her functionality, and erred in finding that she has the residual functional capacity to perform the full range of light work. The undersigned finds that the Commissioner's finding that Ms. Broussard has the residual functional capacity to perform the full range of light work was reached by use of the proper legal analysis and is supported by substantial evidence.
Ms. Broussard's primary complaint is pain. Pain can limit the range of jobs a claimant can perform, but there should be clinical or laboratory diagnostic studies showing the existence of a medical impairment which could reasonably be expected to produce the amount of pain alleged.
Instead, she argues that the ALJ failed to comply with SSR 96-8p in evaluating her residual functional capacity and failed to comply with SSR 96-7p when evaluating her credibility concerning her alleged functional limitations. Overall, Ms. Broussard contends that the Commissioner erred in finding that she retains the capacity to perform light work.
SSR 96-8p states that a residual functional capacity "is an assessment of an individual's ability to do sustained work-related physical and mental activities in a work setting on a regular and continuing basis." Although the Social Security Administration's rulings are not binding on this court, the Fifth Circuit has frequently relied upon those rulings in evaluating an ALJ's decision.
A review of the ALJ's decision reveals, however, that he reviewed in detail the functional analysis performed by Dr. Shahed Jameel at the claimant's request and the state agency consultant's functional analysis as well as Ms. Broussard's function report and hearing testimony. The undersigned finds that this was sufficient. When an ALJ's residual functional capacity assessment is based at least in part on the function-by-function analysis of claimant's exertional limitations contained in a state examiner's medical report, the legal standard set forth in the jurisprudence and in SSR 96-8p is satisfied.
Ms. Broussard next argues that the Commissioner failed to properly evaluate her credibility. "Once a medical impairment is established, the subjective complaints of pain must be considered along with the medical evidence in determining the individual's work capacity."
The Fifth Circuit has held that although an ALJ "is bound . . . to explain his reasons for rejecting a claimant's complaints of pain," he is not required to "follow formalistic rules in his articulation."
Furthermore, a careful review of the record reveals no physician-imposed restrictions on Ms. Broussard's activities other than those of Dr. Jameel, which as explained above were properly discounted by the ALJ. The lack of physician-imposed restrictions inconsistent with light work rebuts Ms. Broussard's alleged inability to work.
The record indicates that Ms. Broussard worked as a caregiver and security guard at a halfway house in 2007 and 2008. The record contains no evidence that Ms. Broussard was unable to perform all of her work duties during the time period that she performed that work. She stopped working before she had a heart attack on December 28, 2008 for reasons unrelated to her health. She originally claimed that she became disabled on that day because of her heart condition, but she now contends that it is not her heart condition that makes her disabled. She contends, instead, that osteoarthritis in her chest, knee, and shoulder — which is unrelated to her heart condition — is disabling. The record contains no evidence that Ms. Broussard had arthritis or arthritis-related pain in her chest, knee, or shoulder at any time prior to the alleged disability onset date.
In this case, the ALJ was presented with medical evidence that Ms. Broussard has a painful knee and a painful shoulder but the nature and extent of the functional impairment resulting from those conditions, as revealed by the medical testing and as explained by the physicians, was inconsistent with Ms. Broussard's own subjective evaluation of her functional capacity. Accordingly, the ALJ's finding regarding Ms. Broussard's credibility is supported by the evidence in the record.
While the ALJ did not strictly follow the letter of SSR 96-7p in explaining the credibility finding, strict adherence is not mandatory. Procedural perfection in administrative proceedings is not required, and a judgment will not be vacated unless a party's substantial rights have been affected.
In this case, the ALJ's decision that Ms. Broussard is capable of performing light work is supported by substantial evidence, and the ALJ's failure to evaluate the credibility of her statements regarding her functional capacity in strict adherence to the letter of the cited regulation was not reversible error.
For these reasons, the undersigned finds that the Commissioner did not err in evaluating Ms. Broussard's residual functional capacity.
For the reasons explained above, the undersigned finds that the Commissioner's ruling that Mrs. Melancon is not disabled is supported by substantial evidence. Accordingly,
Under the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(c) and Rule Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b), parties aggrieved by this recommendation have fourteen days from receipt of this report and recommendation to file specific, written objections with the Clerk of Court. A party may respond to another party's objections within fourteen days after receipt of a copy of any objections or responses to the district judge at the time of filing.
Failure to file written objections to the proposed factual findings and/or the proposed legal conclusions reflected in the report and recommendation within fourteen days following the date of receipt, or within the time frame authorized by Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(b) shall bar an aggrieved party from attacking either the factual findings or the legal conclusions accepted by the district court, except upon grounds of plan error. See Douglass v. United Services Automobile Association, 79 F.3d 1415 (5