MARK L HORNSBY, Magistrate Judge.
John Burford filed this suit on December 21, 2004 against Cargill, Incorporated.
In early 2012, the parties sought to resolve the dispute, and they asked the Court to approve a class settlement. On June 4, 2012, the Court conditionally certified the class.
No one objected to the settlement.
The CADA, coordinating with and under the direction of the Special Master, reviewed each claim that it received. If the claim provided the appropriate information, the CADA evaluated it to determine whether it identified tonnage of feed that warranted recovery pursuant to the terms of the settlement (and, if so, how much). If the information provided by the claim was deficient (i.e., if the claim failed to provide some requested information), the CADA gave the claimant a chance to cure the deficiency. In such cases, the CADA mailed each claimant a letter stating both the deficiency and the time allotted to cure the deficiency as outlined in the Stipulation and Agreement of Settlement.
The deadline to file claims expired on September 14, 2012.
Late claims were processed according to the guidelines in the Stipulation and Agreement of Settlement. As was the case with timely claims, claimants were given an opportunity to object to the decision and provide documentation in support of their objection, in accordance with Section 111.9.1 of the Stipulation and Agreement of Settlement.
Although the Fifth Circuit has not directly addressed the issue, other circuits have held that late claimants should be allowed to share in a class settlement if they satisfy an "excusable neglect" standard.
The Special Master reviewed each of the submissions by late claimants. If the Special Master determined that a late claimant satisfied the excusable neglect standard, he directed the CADA to allocate a recovery to the claimant according to the Stipulation and Agreement of Settlement. If the Special Master determined that the late claimant did not satisfy the excusable neglect standard, he informed the CADA of this decision and asked the CADA to include the reason for the decision on the spreadsheet attached hereto as Exhibit 1
All claimants were issued allocation letters that provided their status in the case and estimated recovery awards (if applicable). All claimants were given an opportunity to submit a written objection to either (a) the overall allocation amount or (b) an "invalid" status that resulted in a zero dollar allocation. Late claimants were charged with the responsibility of providing a reason for "excusable neglect" in failing to submit a timely claim. In accordance with Section III.9.1 of the Stipulation and Agreement of Settlement, claimants were given an objection deadline of 30 days from the time that allocation letters were distributed. The Special Master personally evaluated all objections.
The Special Master subsequently determined that most outstanding objections could be determined (whether favorably or unfavorably) based upon the written submissions. The Special Master did, however, conclude that testimonial evidence might be helpful in determining certain claims (as was the case with some late claimants who alleged excusable neglect). To this end, he directed the CADA to contact these claimants to determine whether they desired a hearing.
Eventually, the Special Master conducted five telephone hearings on May 23, 2013: Brad Thomas, Country Ayre Farms, Allen Weller, Edsel Beck, and Fagundes Dairy. The Special Master is now prepared to make the following recommendations as to those five claimants.
Question 7 of the claim form asked for the time period of the claimant's "dissatisfaction or harm." Mr. Thomas's claim form stated that this time period was 2008 to 2009. Nevertheless, he testified at the hearing that he made a mistake, and that the time period should have been from 2001 through March 2009. He produced invoices to support his revised claim. Cargill's counsel confirmed that Mr. Thomas's revised claim appeared to be in the "accurate ballpark of what he purchased."
The Special Master recommends that Mr. Thomas's award be adjusted as is reflected in the spreadsheet which is attached as Exhibit 2.
Heather Woodis appeared on behalf of Country Ayre Farms. Country Ayre Farms filed claims for feed purchased in two states, New York and Massachusetts. Like Mr. Thomas, Ms. Woodis testified that she mistakenly filled in the time period in response to Question 7. In light of the testimony received at the evidentiary hearing, the Special Master is satisfied that Country Ayre Farms's award should be adjusted.
The Special Master recommends that Country Ayre Farms's award be adjusted as is reflected in the spreadsheet which is attached as Exhibit 2.
Mr. Weller did not argue that the CADA incorrectly implemented the terms of the Stipulation and Agreement of Settlement. Instead, he argued that the terms of the Stipulation and Agreement of Settlement were unfair. However, Mr. Weller did not timely object to the settlement or timely opt out.
The Special Master recommends that the Court adopt the CADA's award to Mr. Weller as reflected in Exhibit 2.
Mr. Beck owned E&S dairy farm in Georgia beginning in the 1990s. He testified that he purchased feed from Southeast Dairy Co-op in Florida. Mr. Beck did not travel to Florida to purchase the feed; Southeast would send a dairy nutritionist to Georgia. Mr. Beck believes that the nutritionist told him that it was Cargill feed, but he cannot remember the nutritionist's name: "Sir, that has been so long. There is no way in the world I could remember that."
The CADA's representative testified that Mr. Beck had provided invoices, but the invoices had no coding from Cargill. The CADA took the further step of directly contacting Southeast in Florida and spoke to the feed manager who stated that, to his knowledge, Southeast had never sold Cargill feed in the state of Florida. Cargill's business manager for the region could not locate any records to support Mr. Beck's claim and could not find anyone with a recollection of selling Mr. Beck or E&S Cargill feed. Furthermore, Cargill's counsel pointed out that not all Cargill feed qualifies pursuant to the settlement. Even if one accepts Mr. Beck's memory of what he was told by the dairy nutritionist (i.e., that he was purchasing Cargill feed), that alone would not be enough to qualify Mr. Beck for recovery.
The Special Master recommends that the Court adopt the CADA's denial of an award to Mr. Beck as reflected in Exhibit 1.
Fagundes Dairy submitted its claim 34 days late. The Special Master concludes Fagundes did not satisfy the excusable neglect standard. Nevertheless, the Special Master will address the merits of the claim.
Glenn Guior of Financial Recovery Services appeared on behalf of Fagundes. Although Mr. Guior is a retired attorney, he stated that he was not appearing in the capacity of an attorney. He stated that Brad Samuelson of Fagundes was aware that Mr. Guior was participating in the telephone hearing.
Fagundes made three claims. One was for direct purchases from Cargill. The other two for indirect purchases (potentially from A.L. Gilbert & Sons and Associated Feed).
For the direct purchases, the CADA reviewed Cargill's sales history and database, but could not find any evidence of Fagundes's direct purchases. The CADA referred the matter to Cargill, which found purchases by Valley Calf Ranch (a Fagundes entity). However, as its name implies, Valley Calf Ranch apparently used calf feed (which is borne out by Cargill's records), which does not qualify for recovery under the settlement.
For indirect purchases, the CADA contacted the nutritionist at A.L. Gilbert & Sons and the vice-president at Associated Feed. The CADA confirmed that neither of those entities ever sold Cargill feed. Cargill made similar inquiries and was unable to find evidence of any indirect purchases.
When confronted with these statements from the CADA and Cargill, Mr. Guior conceded that their investigation was reasonable.
The Special Master recommends that the Court deny Fagundes's claims as is reflected in Exhibit 1.
As Exhibits 1 and 2 indicate, most claimants filed claims on their own behalf. If this Court approves the suggested awards, the CADA will name those claimants as the payees on their respective checks.
The CADA received many other claims (mostly late claims) through three intermediary entities: Financial Recovery Services (FRS) of South Hackensack, New Jersey; Johnson Recoveries, LLC of North Oaks, Minnesota; and David Meyers of East Lansing, Michigan.
FRS typically would submit a claim form accompanied by a cover letter and an "Antitrust Settlement Contract."
Furthermore, paragraph 4 of the Antitrust Settlement Contract states: "FRS is not Class Member's Attorney and is not practicing law."
For its part, Johnson Recoveries would submit a claim form accompanied by a cover letter and a "Limited Power of Attorney."
David Meyers would submit a claim form accompanied by a cover letter and a "Cargill Antitrust Settlement."
Citing the above provisions, these entities have asked the CADA to issue checks to them rather than to the claimants themselves. The CADA turned to the Special Master for guidance. The Special Master now turns to the Court.
As the Fifth Circuit has long recognized, a district court presiding over a class action has the inherent authority, and the duty, to protect the class. This authority extends to the district court's supervision over the amount and allocation of attorney's fees, as this Court recognized in its own Memorandum Order addressing the attorney's fees in this case.
A good example of a court exercising its authority over fees is Allapattah Servs. v. Exxon Corp.
The Allapattah court had to decide whether it was bound to enforce a fee allocation agreement among the lawyers. The court surveyed the jurisprudence throughout the nation, and decided to follow the majority view that "the distribution of fees in a fee allocation agreement must be in proportion to the services rendered."
Ignoring the parties' agreement, the Allapattah court proceeded to determine "the relative contributions of the five law firms seeking an award of attorneys' fees. . ."
Of course, this Court already analyzed the reasonableness of the requested attorney's fees when it issued its Memorandum Order on November 8, 2012.
The Special Master suggests that the Court consider whether it should review the reasonableness of the additional assessments that FRS and Johnson Recovery seek to impose (up to 33% of the claimant's recovery). This issue is not novel. As the Manual for Complex Litigation states:
The Manual cites Jack Faucett Assocs., Inc. v. American Tel. & Tel. Co.
The Special Master notes that neither FRS, Johnson Recoveries, nor David Meyers has formally filed any papers in the record on behalf of any party. They have traded communications with the Special Master and the CADA, but have always made clear that they are not appearing as attorneys at this time.
The Special Master recommends the following:
1. That the Court adopt the allocations reflected in the spreadsheet attached as Exhibit 2.
2. That the Court deny all other claims (whether they were filed timely or late, and whether they are listed in the attached exhibits or not).
3. That the Court direct the CADA to issue checks in the amounts listed in Exhibit 2, naming as payees the claimants listed in Exhibit 2, and mailing said checks to the claimant addresses as shown in Exhibit 2 (or to the last known address for the claimant).
4. That the Court direct the CADA to commence the distribution of the settlement allocation checks within 20 business days of the date that the accompanying Order is signed and filed in the record.
5. That the Court direct the CADA to use its discretion to appropriately follow up on settlement allocations that go unclaimed more than 180 days from the date of distribution; that the Court direct the CADA to employ at least one of the following methods of due diligence: direct telephone calls to the contact number provided on the submitted claim form, sending of electronic mail to the email address provided on the submitted claim form, a follow up letter to the claimant informing them of the outstanding allocation amount, or additional address research using paid subscription services to locate the claimant; and that the Court direct the CADA to deliver any unclaimed settlement allocations to the appropriate entity for the state of last known address for the claimant after the passage of one year from the date of distribution.
6. That the Court grant the Special Master and the CADA the authority to determine the appropriate method for distribution of settlement funds to deceased claimants; and that the Court authorize the Special Master and the CADA to require notarized power of attorney, notarized affidavits of entitlement, court orders, or other court process as well as other appropriate identification as deemed appropriate or necessary.
7. That the Court direct the CADA to disburse the residual amount of $935,564.50 to Cargill, Incorporated.
8. That the Court adopt this Report and Recommendations in full.
JACKSON, D. J.
1. This Court, consistent with its obligations under Rule 23, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, directed, in Settlement Order No. 1, that notice of this class action and proposed settlement be sent to putative class members. The form of the notice approved by the Court was attached to that order. The Notice (entitled. Notice of Class Action and Proposed Settlement) carefully outlined the status of this litigation, the proposed settlement which had been preliminarily approved, and the procedure to be followed by putative class members if they wished to opt-out of the litigation, object to the settlement, and participate in the settlement fund. In addition, the Notice established the following procedures: In order to participate in the settlement, a Class member must submit a Sworn Statement of Claim by November 12. The Class member is required to complete the Claim Form, have his signature notarized and file the form with the Clerk of Court. This requirement was designed to minimize the potential submission of fraudulent claims. The Notice further provides that distributions of settlement amounts will be made directly to the Class member to minimize time spent by Class counsel in the administration of the settlement fund.
2. Independent Communications Services, Inc. and Independent Consulting Services (hereinafter referred to as "ICS'") are engaged in a plan to solicit Class members which would have the effect of depriving Class members of 50% of amounts they would receive under the proposed Settlement Agreement. (Plaintiff's Exhibits No. 1, 2, 3 and 4.) The Court has not authorized or approved these solicitations.
3. Pursuant to this plan, ICS is seeking assignments of Class members' claims. ICS, at its own expense, agrees to take all steps necessary to apply for and collect settlement payments which are due Class members, including preparing, completing and filing claim forms for Class members. ICS seeks to divert settlement payments from Class members, by having payments made to it, alone or jointly with the Class member. Under the assignment, ICS agrees to remit to the Class member one-half of monies recovered. ICS has not given Class members any consideration for these assignments. The exclusive purpose of the assignment is to enable ICS to assert the claim in this action (Plaintiff's Exhibits 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6.)
4. The procedure being followed by ICS is inconsistent with that established by this Court in its Notice and will unduly complicate these proceedings. The Court and Class Counsel have no way of knowing the circumstances within which ICS obtained each assignment or whether Class members in fact authorized the assignment. In order to ensure that a fraud is not committed upon Class members, Class Counsel would have to verify each and every assignment. If settlement payments were made to ICS, alone or jointly with the Class member, Class Counsel would have the further problem of monitoring whether Class members in fact received their share.
5a. ICS, in its solicitation letters, also falsely gives the impression that the procedures (contingent fee agreements and assignments) suggested by it are acceptable to the Court. (Plaintiff's Exhibits 1, 2 and 3.) However, the Court has not and does not approve of ICS' procedures. Moreover, these solicitation letters significantly fail to disclose to Class members that the Court would be sending them a Notice and Claim form and that the Class member is to complete and file the form, with monies going to Class members. The letters also significantly fail to disclose that the Court has appointed Class Counsel to represent Class members and that Class members may direct any questions they have about any aspect of their claim or the settlement to the Claims Committee.
6. In connection with this plan, ICS intends to prepare, complete and file claim forms for members of the Class (Plaintiff's Exhibits No. 1, 2, 3, 4 and 6), advise people and entities as to whether they are eligible to participate in the settlement and as to whether or not they should participate in the settlement (Plaintiff's Exhibit 8), make objections to the proposed settlement (Plaintiff's Exhibit 8), and appear before the Court, on behalf of the class members, at the December 4, 1985 hearing to determine whether the proposed settlement should be approved by the Court (Plaintiff's Exhibit 7).
7. Neither ICS nor its President, Thomas Sievers, is licensed to practice law.
8. Communications Sales Dynamics, Inc. (hereinafter referred to as "CSD'") is engaged in a plan to solicit Class members, which would have the effect of depriving Class members of 50% of the amounts they would receive under the proposed Settlement Agreement. (Plaintiff's Exhibits No. 10, 11 and 12.) The Court has not authorized or approved these solicitations.
9. Pursuant to this plan, CSD is seeking "Letters of Agency'" from Class members, which are tantamount to assignments of Class members' claims. (Plaintiff's Exhibits No. 10, 11 and 12.) Under these agency agreements, CSD, at its own expense, agrees to act as an agent "in preparing, filing ... and administering Claims for monetary award.'" (See CSD Agency And Award Agreement at page 17 of Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 10.) CSD seeks to "direct the Claims Committee to make any award check payable to Claimant and CSD jointly, and to direct that it be deposited in a trust account with Security Pacific National Bank as trustee, and that the trustee is hereby authorized to withhold and pay CSD's fee ... and dispense the balance of any award monies to Claimant in full satisfaction of its claim.'" (Id.) CSD has not given Class members any consideration for these agency agreements, which are really assignments. The exclusive purpose of these agency agreements is to enable CSD to assert the claim in this action. Any claim filed by CSD supercedes prior or subsequent claims filed by a Class member. (See Claimant Representation Authorization And Notice To Claims Committee And Others at page 20 of Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 10 and included in Plaintiff's Exhibits No. 11 and 12.) Class members, thus, effectively give up all control over their claims to CSD.
11, In connection with this plan, CSD sent numerous solicitation letters and material to Class members that contain material misrepresentations concerning the nature of the procedure for obtaining and completing a Sworn Statement of Claim form, the manner by which settlement payments will be disbursed, and its role in this litigation. In its solicitation letter of September 23, 1985, CSD refers to the possibility of receiving a "Claim form from AT&T.'" (Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 10, page 3.) Question one of CSD's questionnaire also asks if the Class member received a Claim form from AT&T. (See Initial Information Request Form at page 19 of Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 10.) However, the Court, not AT&T, is responsible for sending the Claim form to Class members. In its solicitation letter of September 23, 1985, CSD also refers to the Claim form approved by the Court as "eleven pages of legalese and thirty-three requests for detailed information.'" (Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 10, page 3.) It appears to be part of CSD's "sales pitch'" to characterize the Court's Claim form as being unduly complicated. Yet, CSD's questionnaire asks virtually the same questions as asked on the Court's form. (See initial Information Request Form at page 19 of Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 10.) In its solicitation letter, CSD also states that it will file the claim form and establish a trust fund for receipt and distribution of claim proceeds. (Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 10, page 3.) However, these procedures were not authorized by the Court and are contrary to the procedure stated in the Court's Notice. CSD's Authorization Letter also states that the Claims Committee is directed to follow CSD's instructions. (See Claimant Representation Authorization And Notice To Claims Committee And Others at page 20 of Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 10.) However, the Claims Committee is accountable to the Court and must follow the Court's instructions.
5a. CSD, in its solicitation letter, also falsely gives the impression that the procedures (contingent fee agreements and agency agreements) suggested by it are acceptable to the Court. (Plaintiff's Exhibit 10.) However, the Court has not and does not approve of CSD's procedures. Moreover, the solicitation letter significantly fails to disclose to Class members that the Court would be sending them a Notice and Claim form and that the Class member is to complete and file the form, with monies going to Class members. The letter also significantly fails to disclose that the Court has appointed Class Counsel to represent Class members and that Class members may direct any questions they have about any aspect of their claim or the settlement to the Claims Committee.
13. Neither CSD nor its President, Anthony Knowles, is licensed to practice law,
1. This Court, pursuant to Rules 23(d)(5) and 83, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, has the duty and authority to restrict communications that nterfere with the proper administration of a class action and to restrict conduct that abuses the rights of members of the class. Furthermore, under Rule 23(e), the Court is a fiduciary who must protect the rights of absent class members. Reutlion v. U. S. Shelter, 98 F. R. D. 313 (D. S. C. 1983). Section 30.47 at p. 248 of the recently revised Manual For Complex Litigation Second, which deals with the administration of settlements in Class actions, states that "[ti he court and counsel should be alert to the possibility of persons soliciting class members after the settlement, offering to provide collection services' for a percentage of the claims; such activities may fraudulently deprive class members of benefits provided by the settlement and impinge on the court's responsibility to control fees in class actions.'" The authors of the Manual specifically recognize that the court has the equitable powers to deal with this problem.
2. Rule 23(e), Federal Rules Civil Procedure, specifically provides that the Court shall direct the manner in which notice of a proposed settlement shall be given to members of the Class. ICS' and CSD's misleading solicitation letters, which seek to inform class members of the proposed settlement in this case and which were not authorized or approved by the Court, violate this rule. ICS and CSD are interfering with the orderly administration of the class notice procedure by sending unauthorized communications about the settlement to members of the class.
3. Gulf Oil Company v. Bernard, 452 U.S. 89 (1981), supports an order restricting communications with class members when the evidence establishes that the restricted communications have the potential of interferring with the rights of the class members. 452 U. S. at 101. Any reliance ICS and CSD place on Gulf Oil is misplaced. Gulf Oil dealt with political speech, not commercial speech employed to advance economic interests. ICS and CSD are commercial enterprises and their communications with class members are to advance the economic interests of these enterprises. Commercial speech is entitled to less First Amendment protection than noncommercial, political speech. Sec Kleiner v. First National Bank of Atlanta, 751 F.2d 1193, 1203 (11th Cir. 1985). In Kleiner, the court held that a noncommunication order barring the defendant and defense counsel's solicitation of opt-outs from class members was not an unconstitutional prior restraint. Commercial speech that is false or misleading or that is employed to carry-out illegal transactions may be prohibited. See Zauderer Oflice of Disciplinary Counsel, 105 S.Ct. 2265, 2275 (1985). In this case, ICS' and CSD's solicitation letters to class members are misleading, contain false information and propose illegal transactions (illegal 50% contingent fees, illegal assignments and the unauthorized practice of law).
5. ICS and CSD arc improperly soliciting for their own accounts half of the settlement proceeds to be paid to members of the Class, all to the prejudice of the members of the Class. The fifty percent contingent fee agreements that ICS and CSD are seeking to enter into with Class members are not based on any contingency, because a settlement has already been negotiated in this case. Accordingly, these contingent fee agreements are unenforceable. In re Chicken Antitrust Litigation, No. C-74-2454-A (N. D. Ga. Sept. 11, 1985). See also Pete v. United Mine Workers of America Welfare and Retirement Lund of 1950, 171 App. D. C. 1. 517 F.2d 1275, 1291 (1975).
6. ICS is improperly soliciting assignments of Class members' claims. CSD is improperly soliciting agency agreements, which are, in effect, an assignment of Class members' claims. These assignments and agency agreements are invalid because they are being purchased by ICS and CSD for the sole purpose of asserting a claim and effectively eliminate class members' control over their own claims. ICS and CSD themselves have suffered no injury by reason of the antitrust laws and have no connection with the transaction giving rise to the claims in this litigation. Koro Co. v. Bristol-Myers Co., 568 F.Supp. 280, 287 (D. D. C. 1983); District Distributors, Inc. Heublein, Inc., 1971 TRADE CASES (CCH) P 73,695 (D. D. C. 1971) at 90,903.
7. The Court is vested with the power to regulate and define what activities constitute the practice of law. In re Arthur, 15 Bank". 541, 545 (Bankr. E, D. Pa. 1981). A court also has the authority to maintain its freedom from the unauthorized practice of law. In re Brown, 454 F.2d 999, 1009 (D. D. C. 1971); J. Marshall & Associates, Inc. v. Burleson, 313 A.2d 587 (D. C. Cir. 1973). The proper protection of members of the public requires that the court enjoin lay persons from the unauthorized practice of law. Arthur, supra.
9. ICS is engaged in the preparation, completion and filing of claim forms with the court on behalf of Class members and advising Class members as to whether or not they are eligible to participate in the settlement and as to whether they should participate. ICS is engaged in writing and filing objections to a proposed settlement in a Class action on behalf of Class members. ICS has announced its intention to participate on behalf of Class members at a hearing before this Court to determine whether the proposed settlement should be approved by the court. Lay persons who perform any and all of these activities are engaged in the unauthorized practice of law. Accordingly, ICS and its president, Thomas Sievers, are engaged in the unauthorized practice of law.
10. CSD is engaged in the preparation, completion and filing of claim forms with the Court on behalf of Class members and advising Class members as to whether or not they are eligible to participate in the settlement. CSD is also engaged in advising Class members of the status of this litigation and the nature of the settlement. CSD has stated that it intends to assist Class members in maximizing their recoveries from the settlement fund, to monitor Class members' claims, to participate in and monitor the Court's post-filing proceedings, and to field Class members' questions while the disposition of the settlement is pending. Lay persons who perform any and all of these activities are engaged in the unauthorized practice of law. Accordingly, CSD and its president, Anthony Knowles, are engaged in the unauthorized practice of law.
Based on the Court's findings of fact and Conclusions of Law, It Is Ordered that:
1. Independent Communications Services, Inc. and Independent Consulting Services, including their directors, officers, employees and agents, and Communications Sales Dynamics, Inc., including its directors, officers, employees and agents, shall not contact, through the United States mail or any other mode of communication, any Class member in the Interface Device Litigation concerning this litigation without prior approval of the Court.
2. Independent Communications Services, Inc. and Independent Consulting Services, including their directors, officers, employees and agents, and Communications Sales Dynamics, Inc., its directors, officers, employees and agents, shall not solicit for their own accounts half of the settlement proceeds to be paid to members of the class.
3. Independent Communications Services, Inc. and Independent Consulting Services, including their directors, officers, employees and agents, and Communications Sales Dynamics, Inc., its directors, officers, employees and agents, shall not seek assignment of claims from Class members, or enter into any other type of contractual agreement with class members that, in effect, grants them a proprietary interest in the claims of Class members and/or requires that settlement payments be made to them, alone or jointly with Class members.
5. Independent Communications Services, Inc. and Independent Consulting Services, including their directors, officers, employees and agents, and Communications Sales Dynamics, Inc., its directors, officers, employees and agents, are enjoined from performing those activities which constitute the unauthorized practice of law as described in the Court's Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law.
6. Independent Communications Services, Inc. and Independent Consulting Services, including their directors, officers, employees and agents, and Communications Sales Dynamics, Inc., its directors, officers, employees and agents, shall provide, on or before October 23, 1985, the Claims Committee with copies of the following documents: (a) any assignments, agency agreements or other types of agreements they have entered into with Class members relating in any manner to Class members' claims in this litigation; (b) all solicitation letters and similar types of letters that they have sent to Class members; and (c) any lists or files in their possession or under their control providing the names, addresses and/or telephone numbers of people and entities they have sent solicitation letters and similar types of letters; and (d) any lists of files, in addition to those described in subpart (c), in their possession or under their control providing the names, addresses and/or telephone numbers of Class members.
7. Class counsel shall, by letter authorized and approved by this Court, notify any and all people or entities of this Order who (a) entered into assignments or other agency agreements with ICS or CSD as described in 6(a); (b) were sent solicitation letters or similar types of letters by ICS or CSD as described in 6(b); or appear on the list or in the files described in 6(c) and 6(d); and shall send these people and entities the Court's "Notice of Class Actions and Proposed Settlement'" and claim form if they have not already received the Notice and Claim form.
