MEMORANDUM ORDER

ELIZABETH ERNY FOOTE, District Judge.

Before the Court is Defendant Elton Ray Jones' Motion for New Trial [Record Document 140]. The Government opposes the motion [Record Document 141], and Defendant Jones has likewise filed a reply [Record Document 148]. Upon due consideration and for the reasons that follow, the motion is DENIED.

Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 33 provides that, "[u]pon the defendant's motion, the court may vacate any judgment and grant a new trial if the interest of justice so requires." The Fifth Circuit has held that "a district court does not have the authority to grant a motion for a new trial under Rule 33 on a basis not raised by the defendant." United States v. Nguyen, 507 F.3d 836, 839 (5th Cir. 2007). Jones has alleged two bases upon which he argues that a new trial should be granted. First, Jones claims that the Government's case agent, Trooper Hal Hutchinson, gave false testimony and that counsel for the Government knew or should have known such testimony was false. Second, Jones argues that he was denied due process when this Court disallowed cross-examination of Trooper Hutchinson on the basis of prior rulings made during a pretrial evidentiary hearing.1

The decision to grant or deny a motion for new trial is entrusted to the discretion of the trial judge; however, motions for new trial are not favored and are only granted with great caution. United States v. O'Keefe, 128 F.3d 885, 898 (5th Cir. 1997) (citing United States v. Hamilton, 559 F.2d 1370, 1373 (5th Cir. 1977)). "The remedy of a new trial is rarely used; it is warranted `only where there would be a miscarriage of justice' or `where the evidence preponderates heavily against the verdict.'" Id. (quoting United States v. Andrade, 94 F.3d 9, 14 (1st Cir. 1996)).

As to Jones' first alleged basis for new trial, the Court agrees with the Government that there is no evidence to contradict Trooper Hutchinson's testimony, which was given under oath and based on his experience, since 2007, with the Louisiana State Police Crimes Against Children Unit.2 Jones specifically points to Trooper Hutchinson's responses to questions during the Government's redirect examination as to why his investigation focused on the adult chat room at issue rather than a teen chat room.3 Trooper Hutchinson explained that his investigations focus on "the state regional" chat rooms, in order to narrow the focus to potential child victims in Louisiana, and on adult chat rooms because the "kids that we rescue the most of [sic] go into adult rooms like a child sneaks into a barroom."4 Although Jones emphasizes that this line of questioning arose in response to the Government's redirect, the Court notes that defense counsel questioned Trooper Hutchinson on this topic extensively during cross-examination, such that the Government was entitled on redirect to inquire of Trooper Hutchinson's rationale for making such decisions in conducting investigations.5 As a motion for new trial based on false testimony requires a finding that the testimony in question was "actually false," Jones' first argument is without merit.6 See United States v. Wall, 389 F.3d 457, 473 (5th Cir. 2004) (internal citations omitted).

Jones' second argument in support of his motion for new trial is based on an allegation that this Court interfered with his fundamental right to present a defense when this Court excluded evidence related to the Louisiana State Police (LSP) policies. The specific policy excerpts in dispute are those related to the recordation of statements of persons arrested by the LSP and those pertaining to the execution of the statement and/or waiver of rights.7 Prior to trial, an evidentiary hearing was held on Jones' first motion to suppress, in which Jones sought to exclude an inculpatory statement made at the time of his arrest on the basis that said statement was made without a voluntary and knowing waiver of Jones' Miranda rights.8 At the conclusion of that hearing, the Court found that Miranda rights were given and that they were knowingly and intelligently waived before Jones made any statements to law enforcement officers.9 Thereafter, the Government moved in limine to exclude exculpatory statements by the Defendant and conceded that it would not introduce later inculpatory statements made by the Defendant in its case-in-chief.10 The Court granted the motion and accepted the Government's concession.

In light of these rulings, the Court then excluded any mention of Miranda warnings or statements made by the Defendant, on the basis that none of the Defendant's statements would be offered and therefore Miranda warnings and the LSP policies relating thereto were simply not relevant at trial.11 As to the recording of statements, the Court likewise issued a pretrial ruling that it was "undisputed that Trooper Hutchinson failed to record his interview of Defendant Jones[;] [t]herefore, the fact that this particular policy language exists is not relevant, as it does not tend to make any fact more or less probable than it would otherwise be."12 Thus, in both instances, the Court had given these issues due consideration prior to trial. The Court found that the jury would be tasked with weighing the evidence, including the testimony and credibility of Trooper Hutchinson, but that the specific LSP policies were not relevant to any issue before the jury. The Court's legal rulings are in the record and do not bear repeating herein. In accordance with the "law of the case" doctrine, it is generally the practice of courts "to refuse to reopen what has been decided." See Messinger v. Anderson, 225 U.S. 436, 444 (1912). "The doctrine `posits that when a court decides upon a rule of law, that decision should continue to govern the same issues in subsequent stages of the same case.'" United States v. Mendez, 102 F.3d 126, 131 (5th Cir. 1996) (quoting Arizona v. California, 460 U.S. 605, 618 (1983)). Therefore, the Court finds that the second basis for Jones' motion for new trial also lacks merit.

Accordingly, for the reasons stated herein, the Court finds that there has been no miscarriage of justice which might warrant a new trial; therefore, Defendant Jones' Motion for New Trial [Record Document 140] is hereby DENIED.