KAREN L. HAYES, Magistrate Judge.
Before the undersigned magistrate judge on reference from the District Court is a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) [doc. # 9], filed by defendant, Voxx International Corporation ("Voxx"). The motion is opposed. For reasons assigned below, it is recommended that the motion to dismiss be GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.
On June 6, 2014, Bradford Keith Watts and Jill Watts (individually, and on behalf of the minor child, C.W.),
Plaintiffs originally alleged that G.E. was the party responsible for C.W.'s injuries because 1) it failed to warn that the monitor would come off the headrest despite being secured per G.E.'s directions; and 2) defective design. Id., ¶¶ 7-8. On June 13, 2014, plaintiffs amended their petition to substitute Voxx as defendant in lieu of G.E. (1
On December 11, 2014, plaintiffs amended their complaint to join an additional defendant, ALCO Electronics, Ltd. ("ALCO"). (2
Meanwhile, on September 15, 2014, Voxx filed the instant motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). In support of its motion, Voxx argued that plaintiffs' bare and conclusory allegations failed to state a claim for relief under the Louisiana Products Liability Act, La. R.S. 9:2800.51, et seq. ("LPLA") — the exclusive source for recovery against a manufacturer for damage caused by its product(s). Plaintiffs filed their opposition to the motion on December 1, 2014. Voxx filed its reply brief on December 11, 2014. Thus, the matter is ripe.
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure sanction dismissal where the plaintiff fails "to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). A pleading states a claim for relief when, inter alia, it contains a "short and plain statement . . . showing that the pleader is entitled to relief . . ." Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2).
To withstand a motion to dismiss, "a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to "state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 127 S.Ct. 1955 (2007)). A claim is facially plausible when it contains sufficient factual content for the court "to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Id. Plausibility does not equate to possibility or probability; it lies somewhere in between. See Iqbal, supra. Plausibility simply calls for enough factual allegations to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence to support the elements of the claim. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556, 127 S.Ct. at 1965. Assessing whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief is a "context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense." Iqbal, supra (citation omitted). A well-pleaded complaint may proceed even if it strikes the court that actual proof of the asserted facts is improbable, and that recovery is unlikely. Twombly,
Although the court must accept as true all factual allegations set forth in the complaint, the same presumption does not extend to legal conclusions. Iqbal, supra. A pleading comprised of "labels and conclusions" or "a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action" does not satisfy Rule 8. Id. Moreover, courts are compelled to dismiss claims grounded upon invalid legal theories even though they might otherwise be well-pleaded. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 109 S.Ct. 1827 (1989).
Nevertheless, "[t]he notice pleading requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 and case law do not require an inordinate amount of detail or precision." Gilbert v. Outback Steakhouse of Florida Inc., 295 Fed. Appx. 710, 713 (5
When considering a motion to dismiss, courts generally are limited to the complaint and its proper attachments. Dorsey v. Portfolio Equities, Inc., 540 F.3d 333, 338 (5
Under the Erie doctrine, federal courts sitting in diversity apply state substantive law and federal procedural law." Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 427, 116 S.Ct. 2211(1996); see also Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78, 58 S.Ct. 817 (1938). The parties in this matter implicitly agree that the disputed issues are governed by the substantive law of Louisiana.
Because Louisiana law applies, "courts must begin every legal analysis by examining primary sources of law: the State's Constitution, codes, and statutes. Jurisprudence, even when it rises to the level of jurisprudence constante, is a secondary law source in Louisiana." Ayala v. Enerco Grp., Inc., 569 F. App'x 241, 246 (5th Cir. 2014) (citation omitted). Thus, this court must look first to the LPLA, and only secondarily to judicial decisions (i.e., decisions of the Louisiana Supreme Court). Id., see also Moore v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 556 F.3d 264, 269 (5
Under Louisiana law, the LPLA provides "the exclusive theories of liability for manufacturers for damage caused by their products.
To hold a manufacturer liable under the LPLA, a plaintiff must establish: "damage proximately caused by a characteristic of the product that rendered its product unreasonably dangerous when such damage arose from a reasonably anticipated use of the product by the claimant or another person or entity." La. R. S. 9:2800.54 A. Liability may attach, if and only if (among other requirements) the product is unreasonably dangerous: 1) in construction or composition, 2) design, 3) because of an inadequate warning, or 4) because it fails to conform to an express warranty. La. R. S. 9:2800.54 B. Ultimately, a cause of action under the LPLA requires proof:
Jefferson, 106 F.3d at 1251.
In this case, plaintiffs contend that the monitor/DVD player was unreasonably dangerous only in two of the four categories of defects recognized by the LPLA: failure to warn and faulty design. (Petition, ¶ 7; 2
La. R. S. § 9:2800.57(A)-(B).
In addition, the LPLA defines an "adequate warning" as,
La. R. S. § 9:2800.53(9).
Thus, to "maintain a failure-to-warn claim under the LPLA, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the product in question has a potentially damage-causing characteristic and that the manufacturer failed to use reasonable care to provide an adequate warning about this characteristic." Stahl v. Novartis Pharm. Corp., 283 F.3d 254, 264 (5th Cir. 2002) (citation omitted). To satisfy the first prong of this test, the plaintiff must allege facts as to the "cause, frequency, or consequences" of the dangerous characteristic at issue. Id.
Here, plaintiffs allege that Voxx failed to warn that, in an accident, the monitor/DVD player would detach from the headrest, despite having been installed in accordance with the manufacturer's instructions. (Petition, ¶ 7). In other words, plaintiffs allege facts which suggest that the cause of the dangerous characteristic was the means of securing the monitor to the headrest, with the reasonably foreseeable consequence that the monitor/player would become detached in an accident, thereby causing serious injury to an occupant.
Voxx argues, in response, that it was not required to warn about the dangerous propensities of the monitor/DVD player because plaintiffs either knew or reasonably should have known that the monitor/DVD would become detached in a violent accident. Indeed, "Louisiana law does not require manufacturers to provide warnings of dangers which are obvious to the ordinary user." Morgan v. Gaylord Container Corp., 30 F.3d 586, 591 n.7 (5th Cir. 1994) (citation omitted). The threshold burden (at least in the summary judgment context) is on the manufacturer to prove that the purchaser knew or reasonably should have been expected to know of the dangerous characteristic of the injury-causing product. Swope v. Columbian Chemicals Co., 281 F.3d 185, 206 (5th Cir. 2002).
In this case, however, plaintiffs do not allege that they were aware of the dangerous propensities of the monitor/DVD player. Moreover, drawing upon judicial experience and common sense, as instructed by Iqbal, the court finds it plausible that, after installing the device in accordance with the manufacturer's instructions, a purchaser/user should not reasonably anticipate that, in the event of a serious accident, the monitor/DVD player will detach from the headrest and become a dangerous projectile.
Voxx further contends that plaintiffs failed to allege that a characteristic of the monitor/DVD player was the proximate cause of their injuries. Under the LPLA, proximate cause is analyzed using the same duty/risk considerations employed in an ordinary negligence action, i.e., whether the "risk, and harm caused, [was] within the scope of protection afforded by the duty breached." See Traina v. Nationsbank of Texas, N.A., 2001 WL 1041773 (E.D. La. Sept. 7, 2001) (citations omitted); Mathieu v. Imperial Toy Corp., 646 So.2d 318, 321-322 (La. 1994). "Regardless if stated in terms of proximate cause, legal cause, or duty, the scope of the duty inquiry is ultimately a question of policy as to whether the particular risk falls within the scope of the duty." Roberts v. Benoit, 605 So.2d 1032, 1044 (La.1991).
Here, plaintiffs allege that C.W.'s injuries were caused by defendant's failure to warn that the monitor/DVD player would detach from the headrest, despite plaintiffs' having secured the device per defendants' instructions. (Petition, ¶ 7). The court readily concludes that the scope of the duty owed by Voxx is broad enough to encompass the risk of the harm suffered by plaintiffs.
In sum, at this early stage of the proceedings, plaintiffs' complaint, as amended, states a plausible inadequate warning claim under the LPLA, sufficient to afford defendant fair notice of the claim against it, together with the reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal relevant evidence to support each of the elements of the claim.
La. R.S. § 9:2800.56.
Thus, to state a claim for defective design under the LPLA, plaintiff must allege, at minimum, an alternative design that was capable of preventing the damage. See Flagg v. Elliot, Civ. Action No. 14-0852, 2014 WL 4450451, at *4 (E.D. La. Sept. 10, 2014); Becnel v. Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC, Civil Action No. 14-0003, 2014 WL 1918468, at *8 (E.D. La. May 13, 2014).
In the case at bar, plaintiffs allege that the design of the monitor/DVD player was defective because it should not have come loose in the accident. Plaintiffs, however, fail to set forth any alternative design that was capable of preventing the injury. As such, they also omit requisite facts to show that the cost of the unidentified, alternative design was less than the likelihood and gravity of the harm. Accordingly, the complaint, as amended, does not allege sufficient facts to show that the monitor/DVD player was unreasonably dangerous by design. See Kennedy v. Pfizer, Inc., Civ. Action No. 13-3132, 2014 WL 4092918 (W.D. La. Aug. 15, 2014); Watson v. Bayer Healthcare Pharm., Inc., Civ. Action No. 13-0212, 2013 WL 1558328 (E.D. La. Apr. 11, 2013).
Nonetheless, the court is not persuaded that plaintiffs are forever precluded from discerning and alleging facts to state a defective design claim.
For the foregoing reasons,
IT IS RECOMMENDED that the motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) [doc. # 9], filed by defendant, Voxx International Corporation be GRANTED IN PART, in favor of both remaining defendants, DISMISSING, without prejudice, plaintiffs' LPLA claim for defective design only.
IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that the motion [doc. # 9] otherwise be DENIED.
Under the provisions of 28 U.S.C. §636(b)(1)(C) and FRCP Rule 72(b), the parties have
The court cautions plaintiffs not to dither in retaining an expert. They should amend their complaint to properly allege a defective design claim as soon as possible, but no later than the deadline to amend pleadings.
