DONALD E. WALTER, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
Before the Court is a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment [Doc. # 149], filed by Plaintiffs Crum & Forster Specialty Insurance Company ("CFS") and Seneca Specialty Insurance Company ("Seneca"), in this insurance dispute. Plaintiffs seek summary judgment declaring that: (a) they have no duty to defend or indemnify Defendant Explo Systems, Inc. ("Explo") for any claims involving or arising out of either the October 15, 2012 explosion at Camp Minden or the resultant evacuation of Camp Minden and the surrounding area; and (b) they have no obligation to pay any claims asserted by the intervenors in this action. Plaintiffs have filed briefs in support of the motion for summary judgment [Docs. ## 150, 186, and 187]. Intervenor Robert W. Hayden ("Intervenor") opposes the motion [Doc. # 167].
On October 15, 2012, a large explosion occurred at Explo's munitions storage facility at Camp Minden, Louisiana. On November
CFS filed the instant suit on December 14, 2012; Seneca joined as a party plaintiff on December 27, 2012. Plaintiffs seek declaratory judgment against their insured, Explo, as well as rescission of the liability policy in effect at the time of the explosion. The Court previously denied Plaintiffs' motions for partial summary judgment, based on Plaintiffs' failure to adequately set forth the relevant facts and arguments upon which the motions were ostensibly based.
First, Plaintiffs allege that there is no coverage for claims arising out of Explo's storage of M6 propellant or other explosive materials, as Explo's storage thereof knowingly violated multiple state and federal laws and regulations, rendering such acts subject to the criminal, fraudulent, and dishonest act exclusion. Second, Plaintiffs allege that there is no coverage for any claims arising out of the October 15, 2012 explosion, because said explosion involved smokeless black powder that was purchased by Explo for resale and not covered by the two designated operations, which are thermal treatment and disassembly of ammunition and recycling and separation of remaining scrap. Third, Plaintiffs deny coverage for claims arising out of the evacuation of the area surrounding Camp Minden, because the third-party evacuation claims do not involve claims for bodily injury or property damage as those terms are defined in the CFS policy. Plaintiffs further allege that the commercial property policy issued by Seneca to Explo provides coverage only for direct physical loss of, or damage to, specified property at Camp Minden, which is caused by a covered loss; therefore, Plaintiffs deny coverage for any third-party evacuation claims. And, fourth and finally, Plaintiffs assert that the Seneca Policy does not provide coverage for any third-party claims, as it only provides first-party property coverage to Explo, for direct physical loss of or damage to covered property at the premises, as defined and described therein.
Intervenor responds by arguing that the claims arising out of the explosion and evacuation are covered, for the following four reasons: (1) M6 is a propellant and not an "explosive" as defined in La.Rev. Stat. § 40:1472.2(7); (2) the ammunition shells were at Explo for the purpose of disassembling the ammunition to recover and recycle the metal therein and to thermally
Explo leased certain real property, located at Camp Minden, from the Louisiana Military Department ("LMD") pursuant to a commercial lease. CFS issued Policy Number EPK-100814 ("CFS Policy") to Explo for the period from September 12, 2012 through September 12, 2013. The CFS Policy contains three coverage parts: Commercial General Liability Occurrence Coverage, Third Party Pollution Liability Coverage, and Onsite Cleanup Pollution Liability Coverage. A Designated Operations Coverage Endorsement attached to the policy provides that coverage under all three parts of the CFS Policy applies only to "bodily injury" or "property damage" arising out of "the designated operations indicated in the Schedule[:]" (1) thermal treatment and disassembly of ammunition and (2) recycling and separation of remaining scrap.
The Covered Locations Endorsement to the CFS Policy describes the two, above-stated designated operations at the Camp Minden site, as being covered under the Third Party Pollution Liability and Onsite Cleanup Coverage Parts.
Seneca issued Commercial Property Policy Number SSP 22 011 76 ("Seneca Policy") to Explo for the period from January 22, 2012 through January 22, 2013. The Building and Personal Property Coverage Form in the Seneca Policy provides that the insurer "will pay for direct physical loss of or damage to Covered Property at the premises described in the Declarations caused by or resulting from any Covered Cause of Loss."
In the ordinary course of business, Explo stored materials it disassembled and/or
Thereafter, LSP discovered that Explo was storing more than 15 million pounds of unsecured M6 propellant, outside of bunkers, in the portion of Camp Minden where Explo performed its operations.
The Louisiana National Guard ("LNG"), as owner of Camp Minden, requested that the Army assess the potential short-and long-term hazards associated with the presence of M6 propellant at the site.
In August of 2013, the Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") asked that the DOD reconsider its level of participation in the responsive actions necessary to address the millions of pounds of "improperly stored explosive materials[,]" which created "an imminent and substantial endangerment to public health, welfare, and the environment."
In January of 2014, the EPA, acting pursuant to its authority under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 ("CERCLA") entered into an Administrative Settlement Agreement and Order on Consent for Removal Action ("AOC") with General Dynamics Ordnance and Tactical Systems, Inc. and Alliant.
Explo admitted that the M6 propellant is an "explosive" as defined under La.Rev. Stat. § 40:1472.2(7).
Prior to the 2012 explosion, Explo improperly stored one million pounds of explosives at its Camp Minden operations; failed to maintain its Camp Minden facilities in accordance with the law; failed to maintain proper regard and concern for the safety and well-being of persons and property in the vicinity of Camp Minden; failed to take reasonable steps to prevent the 2012 explosion and other explosions; and failed to take reasonable and necessary steps to insure that the explosives stored at Camp Minden would be stored in a safe manner, as required by law.
Explo recklessly failed to exhibit responsible care for explosives safety and failed to create and enforce an explosives safety culture.
By routinely storing millions of pounds of M6 propellant and other explosive material outside in the open air and in other non-approved explosive storage buildings and facilities, Explo failed to comply with 27 C.F.R. § 555.205, which requires that all explosive material be kept in locked magazines meeting certain requirements, unless the explosive material is being manufactured, physically handled in the operating process, being used, or being transported. Explo failed to store M6 propellant and other explosive materials at Camp Minden in compliance with 18 U.S.C. § 842(j) which provides that it is unlawful to store explosive materials in a manner not in conformance with the regulations promulgated by the Attorney General of the United States, 27 C.F.R. § 555 et seq.
Explo and several of its officers and employees were holders of Louisiana state licenses for the handling, processing, transportation, and storage of explosive materials. In June of 2013, Explo and several of its officers and managers were criminally indicted in Webster Parish, on charges relating to the handling and storage of explosives and explosive materials at Camp Minden.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a) directs that a court "shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact
To award summary judgment, "[a] court must be satisfied that no reasonable trier of fact could find for the nonmoving party or, in other words, that the evidence favoring the nonmoving party is insufficient to enable a reasonable jury to return a verdict in [his] favor." Norwegian Bulk Transport A/S v. Int'l Marine Terminals P'ship, 520 F.3d 409, 411 (5th Cir.2008) (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986)). To this end, "[t]he moving party bears the burden of establishing that there are no genuine issues of material fact." Id. at 412. Incorporated herein are facts which, on prior motion of the Plaintiffs, were deemed admitted, pursuant to a memorandum order issued by the magistrate judge.
Where federal jurisdiction is based on diversity of citizenship, a federal court applies the substantive law of the forum state. Foradori v. Harris, 523 F.3d 477, 486 (5th Cir.2008) (citing Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78-79, 58 S.Ct. 817, 82 L.Ed. 1188 (1938)). The parties agree that Louisiana law applies in this case. "Interpretation of an insurance policy usually involves a legal question which can be resolved properly in the framework of a motion for summary judgment." Huggins v. Gerry Lane Enterprises, Inc., 2006-2816 (La. 5/22/07), 957 So.2d 127, 129.
Under Louisiana law, "[a]n insurance policy is a contract between the parties and should be construed by using the general rules of interpretation of contracts set forth in the Louisiana Civil Code." Cadwallader v. Allstate Ins. Co., 2002-1637 (La. 6/27/03), 848 So.2d 577, 580. Louisiana's Civil Code provides that "[i]nterpretation of a contract is the determination of the common intent of the parties." La. Civ.Code art.2045; see also Cadwallader, 848 So.2d at 580. "If the policy wording at issue is clear and unambiguously expresses the parties' intent, the insurance contract must be enforced as written." Cadwallader, 848 So.2d at 580. If, however, there is any ambiguity, "[t]he court should construe the policy `to fulfill the reasonable expectations of the parties
An insurance contract must be "construed according to the entirety of its terms and conditions as set forth in the policy, and as amplified, extended, or modified by any rider, endorsement, or application attached to or made a part of the policy." La.Rev.Stat. § 22:881. An insurance contract "should not be interpreted in an unreasonable or strained manner under the guise of contractual interpretation to enlarge or restrict its provisions beyond what is reasonably contemplated by unambiguous terms or achieve an absurd conclusion." In re Katrina Canal Breaches Litig., 495 F.3d 191, 208 (5th Cir.2007) (quoting Cadwallader, 848 So.2d at 580). "The fact that a term is not defined in the policy itself does not alone make that term ambiguous." Id. (citing Am. Deposit Ins. Co. v. Myles, 2000-2457 (La. 4/25/01), 783 So.2d 1282, 1287). "Courts lack the authority to alter the terms of insurance contracts under the guise of contractual interpretation when the policy's provisions are couched in unambiguous terms." Id. (quoting Cadwallader, 848 So.2d at 580).
"Unless a policy conflicts with statutory provisions or public policy, it may limit an insurer's liability and impose and enforce reasonable conditions upon the policy obligations the insurer contractually assumes." Huggins, 957 So.2d at 129 (citing Carbon v. Allstate Ins. Co., 97-3085 (La. 10/20/98), 719 So.2d 437, 439) (citation omitted). Under Louisiana law, the insured bears the burden of establishing that the claim falls within the policy coverage; the burden shifts to the insurer to prove the applicability of an exclusion within the policy. See Doerr v. Mobil Oil Corp., 2000-0947 (La. 12/19/00),774 So.2d 119, 124. As stated, the CFS Policy provided coverage for "bodily injury" or "property damage" arising out of "the designated operations indicated in the Schedule[,]" which included: thermal treatment and disassembly of ammunition; and recycling and separation of remaining scrap. According to the declaration of Plaintiffs' explosives expert Robert C. Morhard,
The parties agree that the October 15, 2012 explosion did not involve M6 propellant.
Similarly, the Court is unpersuaded by Intervenor's argument in favor of coverage for Explo's storage of the M6 propellant. Intervenor contends that it could be reasonably anticipated, under the CFS Policy, that the M6 propellant and other materials would be stored at the facility until thermally destroyed, during the designated operations. The Court finds that the improper nature of Explo's extensive storage of such an enormous amount of M6 propellant, as well as the investigative reports and correspondence in the record, arguably renders Explo's actions outside of the designated operations as it seems unreasonable that such storage would be considered part of the disassembling and recycling operations. However, in light of the evidence before the Court, it is prudent to discuss the criminal, fraudulent, and dishonest acts exclusion in the context of the M6 propellant, which was the cause of the post-explosion evacuation. The record is replete with overwhelming evidence of the illegal and improper nature of Explo's actions, involving conscious and knowing decisions to improperly store millions of pounds of M6 propellant and other explosive materials at Camp Minden. Intervenor's primary arguments against the application of this exclusion are, first, that M6 is not an "explosive" under Louisiana law, and second, that no crimes or intentional acts were committed.
As to Intervenor's first argument, regarding whether or not M6 is an "explosive," the Court finds Intervenor's contentions meritless. As stated, Explo admitted that the M6 propellant is an "explosive," as defined under La.Rev.Stat. § 40:1472.2(7). This fact finds ample support in the record evidence, including investigative reports of the Army and LSP, EPA orders and documents, and consent orders entered into by the EPA and various entities involved in emergency removal actions. Even assuming, arguendo, that Explo's admission that M6 propellant is an explosive as defined by La.Rev.Stat. § 40:1472.2(7) does not suffice to establish that fact, it is undisputed that Explo's storage of M6 was a violation
Intervenor's second argument is that the word "criminal" must be read in the context of both "fraudulent" and "dishonest," such that the exclusion cannot apply because Explo fairly, accurately and honestly disclosed the nature of its operations to CFS and Seneca. On Explo's application for insurance coverage, submitted to CFS in September of 2011, Explo described its current operations as: "disassemble and recycle military bombs for [the government]."
Louisiana requires a policy to be construed so as to give effect, if possible, to every provision therein. Huey T. Littleton Claims, Inc. v. Employers Reinsurance Corp., 933 F.2d 337, 340 (5th Cir. 1991); Hemel v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 211 La. 95, 29 So.2d 483 (1947). The exclusion applies to both: any criminal, fraudulent, or dishonest act, omission, or offense; or any act, omission, or offense committed by the insured with knowledge of its wrongful nature or with the intent to cause damage. The record before the Court, including determinations by the LSP, LNG and EPA that Explo improperly and illegally stored explosives and the admissions that Explo knew that such storage was wrongful, gives the Court no pause in deciding that this policy exclusion disallows coverage for damages arising from the evacuation, which was ordered upon discovery of the improper and illegal storage of millions of pounds of explosives at Camp Minden. It is undisputed that Explo's storage thereof constituted violations of the following: La.Rev.Stat. § 40:1472.3; La.Rev.Stat. § 40:1472.5(A) and (B); La.Rev.Stat. § 40:1472.12; La. Rev.Stat. § 40:1472.19; 18 U.S.C. § 842(j); and 27 C.F.R. § 555.205. It is further undisputed that at least some of those violations were knowing violations, as evidenced by both Explo's admissions thereof and the training that Explo's officers and employees received as holders of licenses issued by Louisiana for the handling, processing, transportation and storage of explosive materials. Explo knew that it stored M6 propellant and other explosive materials in a manner that endangered or could endanger human, life, health or property. Therefore, because the evacuation was the result of Explo's storage of millions of pounds of unsecured M6 propellant and other explosive materials and that storage was in knowing violation of state and federal laws, the Court finds that evacuation-related claims arising out of
Regarding the Seneca Policy, Plaintiffs correctly point out that there is no substantive opposition to the motion for summary judgment. Intervenor's opposition, in large part, conflates the two policies and references merely "the policy" throughout. To the extent Seneca is discussed in isolation, the discussion does not extend to substantive opposition. Therefore, the Court finds that Seneca is entitled to summary judgment and has no duty to indemnify Explo or intervenors for any claims arising out of the October 15, 2012 explosion at, or subsequent evacuation of, Camp Minden.
Plaintiffs have shown, through the admissions of Explo and the evidence of record, that they are entitled to summary judgment on all bases discussed herein. All claims arising out of the October 15, 2012 explosion are outside the scope of coverage of the CFS Policy, and all claims arising out of the subsequent evacuation are excluded from coverage under the CFS Policy. Seneca likewise has no duty to indemnify Explo or intervenors for any claims arising out of the explosion or evacuation. Accordingly, the motion for partial summary judgment [Doc. # 149] is hereby