KAREN L. HAYES, Magistrate Judge.
Before the court is plaintiff's petition for review of the Commissioner's denial of social security disability benefits. The district court referred the matter to the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge for proposed findings of fact and recommendation pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and (C). For the reasons assigned below, it is recommended that the decision of the Commissioner be
On October 25, 2011, Digamo Jones, f/k/a Carl David Logan, filed the instant applications for Title II Disability Insurance Benefits and Title XVI Supplemental Security Income payments. (Tr. 196-208). He alleged disability as of July 1, 2005, because of depression, anxiety, paranoia, and back and lung problems. (Tr. 217, 232). At the initial stage of the administrative process, the state agency granted his Title XVI claim, but denied his Title II claim because of insufficient evidence to determine disability prior to March 31, 2011 — the last day that he was insured for Title II benefits. (Tr. 94-120, 175-195). Thereafter, Jones requested and received hearings on May 31, 2012, and February 21, 2013, before an Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ"). (Tr. 25-93). However, in a May 29, 2013, written decision, the ALJ determined that Jones was not disabled under the Act. (Tr. 8-20).
On September 26, 2014, Jones filed the instant pro se complaint for judicial review of the Commissioner's final decision. In his three sentence brief, plaintiff contends that the ALJ should have given more effect to a 2007 report authored by Kay Studevant. The matter is now before the court.
This court's standard of review is (1) whether substantial evidence of record supports the ALJ's determination, and (2) whether the decision comports with relevant legal standards. Villa v. Sullivan, 895 F.2d 1019, 1021 (5th Cir. 1990). Where the Commissioner's decision is supported by substantial evidence, the findings therein are conclusive and must be affirmed. Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 390 (1971). The Commissioner's decision is not supported by substantial evidence when the decision is reached by applying improper legal standards. Singletary v. Bowen, 798 F.2d 818 (5th Cir. 1986). Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. at 401. Substantial evidence lies somewhere between a scintilla and a preponderance. Muse v. Sullivan, 925 F.2d 785, 789 (5th Cir. 1991). A finding of no substantial evidence is proper when no credible medical findings or evidence support the ALJ's determination. Johnson v. Bowen, 864 F.2d 340, 343-44 (5th Cir. 1988). The reviewing court may not reweigh the evidence, try the issues de novo, or substitute its judgment for that of the Commissioner. Greenspan v. Shalala, 38 F.3d 232, 236 (5th Cir. 1994).
Pursuant to the Social Security Act ("SSA"), individuals who contribute to the program throughout their lives are entitled to payment of insurance benefits if they suffer from a physical or mental disability. See 42 U.S.C. § 423(a)(1)(D). The SSA defines a disability as the "inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months. . . ." 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A). Based on a claimant's age, education, and work experience, the SSA utilizes a broad definition of substantial gainful employment that is not restricted by a claimant's previous form of work or the availability of other acceptable forms of work. See 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(A). Furthermore, a disability may be based on the combined effect of multiple impairments which, if considered individually, would not be of the requisite severity under the SSA. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(ii).
The Commissioner of the Social Security Administration has established a five-step sequential evaluation process that the agency uses to determine whether a claimant is disabled under the SSA. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920. The steps are as follows,
See Boyd v. Apfel, 239 F.3d 698, 704-705 (5th Cir. 2001); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520. The claimant bears the burden of proving a disability under the first four steps of the analysis; under the fifth step, however, the Commissioner must show that the claimant is capable of performing work in the national economy and is therefore not disabled. Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 146 n. 5 (1987). When a finding of "disabled" or "not disabled" may be made at any step, the process is terminated. Villa v. Sullivan, 895 F.2d 1019, 1022 (5th Cir. 1990). If at any point during the five-step review the claimant is found to be disabled or not disabled, that finding is conclusive and terminates the analysis. Lovelace v. Bowen, 813 F.2d 55, 58 (5th Cir. 1987).
The ALJ determined at step one of the sequential evaluation process that the claimant did not engage in substantial gainful activity during the relevant period. (Tr. 13-14). At step two, she found that, through the date last insured, the claimant suffered severe impairments of chronic obstructive pulmonary disease ("COPD"); substance abuse disorder; generalized anxiety disorder; and agitated depression with psychotic features. Id. Through the date last insured, the ALJ determined that the claimant's impairments, including substance use disorder, met listings 12.04 and 12.09 of 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appx 1 (20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(d)), at step three of the process. Id. However, if the claimant had stopped the substance abuse, then his impairments would not have been severe enough to meet or medically equal any of the impairments listed in Appendix 1, Subpart P, Regulations No. 4. (Tr. 15).
The ALJ next determined that, if the claimant had stopped the substance abuse, he would have had (through the date last insured) the residual functional capacity ("RFC") to perform the full range of work at all exertional levels, subject to the following nonexertional limitations: the need to avoid concentrated exposure to gases, fumes, and other pulmonary irritants; the need for simple, routine tasks, with no fast-paced production quotas; the ability to only occasionally adapt to workplace changes and decision-making; plus no more than occasional contact with the public, and frequent contact with co-workers and supervisors. (Tr. 16).
The ALJ concluded at step four of the sequential evaluation process that Jones was unable to perform his past relevant work. (Tr. 19). Accordingly, she proceeded to step five. At this step, the ALJ determined that Jones was a younger individual, with at least a high school education, and the ability to communicate in English. (Tr. 19-20). Transferability of skills was immaterial. Id. The ALJ then observed that, given Jones' vocational factors, and if he had: 1) stopped the substance abuse, and 2) retained an RFC that did not include any non-exertional limitations, then the Medical-Vocational Guidelines would direct a finding of not disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1569; Rule 204.00, Appendix 2, Subpart P, Regulations No. 4. Id.
However, because Jones' RFC did include nonexertional limitations, the ALJ consulted a vocational expert ("VE") to determine whether, and to what extent his limitations eroded the occupational base for unskilled work at all exertional levels. Id. In response, the VE identified the representative jobs of kitchen helper — medium, Dictionary of Occupational Titles ("DOT") Code # 318.687-010; and price marker — light, DOT Code # 209.587-034
Pursuant to the court's scheduling order, plaintiff was required to submit a brief that inter alia, set forth "
The sole, arguably specific contention proffered by Jones in his six line brief is that the ALJ should have given more effect to a 2007 report authored by Kay Studevant.
The administrative record includes plaintiff's appeal brief that he submitted to the Appeals Council. (Tr. 285-287). In that brief, Jones stated that he did not begin using drugs until 2008, and thus, Kay Studevant's treatment notes from 2007 pre-date his substance abuse, and actually document the disabling effects of his impairments absent substance abuse. (Tr. 286). Farther down on the same page of his brief, however, plaintiff stated that he left Shreveport in August 2005, withdrew from society, and ended up living in a tent in the woods, using drugs. Id. Similarly, at a January 27, 2012, clinical evaluation, Jones admitted to the counselor that he began using cocaine in about 2005 through approximately September 2011. (Tr. 579). In short, there is substantial record evidence to support the ALJ's implicit finding that plaintiff's substance abuse extended throughout the relevant period.
The court also independently reviewed the record for legal error and substantial evidence, but has uncovered no grounds for reversal and/or remand. Because plaintiff continued to engage in substance abuse, through and beyond the date that he was last eligible for disability insurance benefits (March 31, 2011), the ALJ was compelled to consider some evidence that post-dates the period at issue. For example, progress notes from June 2012 and March 2013, during periods of at least partial medication compliance, document GAF scores of 55, i.e., moderate symptoms of impairment.
For the foregoing reasons, the undersigned finds that the Commissioner's decision that plaintiff was not disabled under the Social Security Act, is supported by substantial evidence and remains free of legal error. Under these circumstances, the Commissioner's determination cannot be disturbed on appeal. Pate v. Heckler, 777 F.2d 1023, 1027 (5th Cir. 1985).
IT IS RECOMMENDED that the Commissioner's decision to deny disability benefits be AFFIRMED, and that this civil action be DISMISSED with prejudice.
Under the provisions of 28 U.S.C. §636(b)(1)(C) and FRCP Rule 72(b), the parties have
20 C.F.R. § 404.1535; see also Brown v. Apfel, 192 F.3d 492, 499 (5th Cir. 1999).