JOSEPH H. L. PEREZ-MONTES, Magistrate Judge.
On October 15, 2013, pro se prisoner Andrae D. Aaron ("Aaron") filed a complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Aaron is an inmate in the custody of the Louisiana Department of Corrections ("LA DOC"). Aaron was incarcerated at Winn Correctional Center ("WCC") in Winnfield, Louisiana at the time he filed his complaint. Aaron contends that Defendants violated his constitutional rights by failing to protect him from harm inflicted by another inmate, and for failing to provide him with timely and adequate medical care following the attack. He additionally alleges that CCA has a policy of keeping "mental health" inmates separate from the general population, but they deliberately ignore the policy. He also alleges that WCC is understaffed.
In their Motion for Summary Judgment, Defendants contend that they were not aware of a potential attack on Aaron. They point out that although Aaron attached three inmate request forms to his Amended Complaint (Doc. 10, pp. 14-16), those forms were not date stamped. Date stamps would have been an indication that the forms were received. However, in addition to those forms not being date stamped, no copies of those forms exist in the inmate files, and in his ARP, Aaron never indicated that he had filed those requests. Defendants further state that Aaron received medical treatment when his injuries were discovered the morning of the alleged attack and that none of Defendants were deliberately indifferent to his medical needs. Defendants further contend that Aaron has not produced any evidence that WCC was understaffed, and cannot show a violation of his constitutional rights by Defendants in this regard.
Aaron filed an Opposition to Defendant's Joint Motion for Summary Judgment (styled as Objections to Defendants Motion for Summary Judgment) and simultaneously requested leave to file a supplemental due to an issue receiving mail. (Doc. 57). Aaron relies on an article by Shane Bauer in Mother Jones magazine, an article from the Baton Rouge Advocate reporting on the Bauer article, and a report from the Department of Justice, to argue that a substantial risk of inmate attacks was "longstanding, pervasive, well-documented, or expressly noted by prison officials in the past." (Doc. 57). However, any all references to the Mother Jones article and the Baton Rouge Advocate article were stricken from the record. (
Aaron alleges that he was attacked by inmate Marcus Dorsey ("Dorsey"), while in his cell at WCC, despite informing officials of the danger.
On August 1, 2013, Aaron states he had submitted a written notice and warning to Warden Keith, informing him that Dorsey had threatened Aaron. Aaron states he asked that either he or Dorsey be moved out of the tier to avoid Aaron being harmed. (Doc. 10, p. 14).
On August 10, 2013, Aaron states that he had submitted a request to Assistant Warden Walker after receiving no response from Warden Keith. (Doc. 10, p. 15).
On August 11, 2013, Aaron states that he submitted a request to Assistant Warden Pollack, advising him that he had written to Warden Keith and Assistant Warden Walker, and telling him that Dorsey was going to harm him. Aaron advised that Dorsey was assigned to the bed next to his. Aaron states that he received no response from Assistant Warden Pollack, either. (Doc. 10, p. 16).
On August 20, 2013, at around 6:53 a.m., Dorsey used a microwave to heat water, which Dorsey poured on Aaron as Aaron slept. (Doc. 15-2, p. 11/45). Dorsey then beat Aaron with a sock filled with combination locks. The incident was reported at approximately 8:28 a.m. (
Aaron filed an Administrative Remedy Procedure ("ARP") form. (Doc. 15-2, pp. 3-6/45). In that form, he stated that he was attacked and injured by Dorsey around 6:40 a.m. on August 20, 2013. He further stated that it was a direct result of a lack of security and staff not performing their duties. He asked that "[a]ll evidence including but not limited to, pictures, video surveillance, reports, logbooks, medical records, mental health notes and incident statement concerning this incident be preserved," but there was no statement asking for inmate request forms to be preserved. (Doc. 15-1, p. 6/45). Even assuming that those forms were inadvertently forgotten during the above request, there was no allegation anywhere in the ARP that he had advised Warden Keith, Tim Pollock, Nicole Walker, or any other offer that he felt unsafe being housed in the same tier with Dorsey.
Under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a court must grant summary judgment "if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Paragraph (e) of Rule 56 also provides the following:
"A genuine dispute of material fact exists `if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.'"
Prison officials have a duty, under the Eighth Amendment, to protect prisoners from violence at the hands of other prisoners.
Therefore, to establish an Eighth Amendment "failure to protect" claim, the inmate must show that the prison official acted or failed to act despite his knowledge of a substantial risk of serious harm.
The failure of a prisoner to give any advance notice to prison officials of potential danger to the prisoner's safety is not dispositive of the official's awareness.
Aaron quotes
Therefore, there must be some evidence in the record in that Defendants had been exposed to the information from the articles and actually knew of the risk in order for this language to have effect.
In his Amended Complaint, Aaron attached three inmate request forms that he contends he submitted prior to the attack by Dorsey as proof that he advised Defendants of a possible pending attack. (Doc. 10). The specific procedures to handle an Inmate Request Form are noted in the affidavits submitted by Defendants. The forms are date stamped when received by staff at WCC. (Doc. 44, pp. 31-39/46, Exh. A, B, C). Following a written response from Defendants, the original form would be returned to the inmate while a copy would go in the inmate's Master Prison File. (
In lieu of responding to Defendants' evidence regarding the inmate request forms, Aaron instead chooses to respond by arguing that the newspaper articles are sufficient evidence to prove the officials were subjectively aware of a risk to inmate safety. Yet, those newspapers are not proper summary judgment evidence, nor do they offer any evidence that Defendants were actually aware of the risk to Aaron. Therefore, Aaron has not offered any proof that any of the Defendants were actually aware of the situation between Aaron and Dorsey. Since Aaron cannot show that there was a known risk, Defendants cannot be shown to have deliberately ignored that risk.
Additionally, in his opposition, Aaron argues that Defendants failed to protect him, citing to lack of overall security. Aaron specifically states that security cameras throughout the jail do not work. As an example, he states that he had requested video of the incident from Defendants, "which they never produced, obviously, much due to the faulty cameras not working." (Doc. 79, p. 2/286). The Court had received a letter from Aaron regarding the CD-ROM of the video being lost before he could view it. (Doc. 55). Following a telephone conference, Defendants were ordered to provide Aaron a replacement copy of the video and other materials by September 26, 2016. (Doc. 54). In response to Aaron's assertion in his opposition, Defendants show that a replacement copy was sent. (Doc. 75). Additionally, a Notice of Compliance was filed with this Court on September 26, 2016 (Doc. 56), and a letter from an official at Elayn Hunt Correctional Center stated that Aaron had viewed the video. (Doc. 75, Exh. B).
Aaron has not shown that any of the named Defendants were aware prior to the incident that he was at risk from attack by Dorsey. Therefore, Aaron has not shown that Defendants knew of a substantial risk of serious harm to Aaron and disregarded that risk by failing to take reasonable measures to abate it.
Aaron claims Defendants were deliberately indifferent to his medical needs following the attack by Dorsey. Aaron is a convicted inmate. Therefore, his claim for inadequate medical care is analyzed under the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment.
The Court must balance the needs of prisoners against the needs of the penal institution in light of medical necessity, not desirability.
Aaron was attacked by Dorsey at approximately 6:53 a.m. on August 20, 2013. (Doc. 15-2, p. 11/45). At 8:28 a.m., a correctional officer informed Counselor Marcus Hayes ("Hayes") of a man down in C1 tier. (
Aaron remained in the ward at WCC from August 20 through September 17, 2013. (Doc. 15-1, p. 279-309). Medical records indicate that he was monitored and treated daily. (
Aaron does not dispute that he was sent to the hospital, but instead argues that he was not cared for upon return to WCC from the hospital. (Doc. 79). Aaron states that he was not given the Lortabs when he requested it, and that he was forced to dress his own wounds. (Doc. 79). Aaron does not mention in his Complaint or Amended Complaint that he was not provided pain medication, nor did he file an ARP regarding a denial of pain medication. Additionally, Aaron does not point to evidence in the record regarding his not receiving pain medication, instead relying on the newspaper articles and letters to Secretary LeBlanc, none of which address Aaron's situation or Defendants. Aaron's medical records instead indicate that Aaron received pain medication and dressing changes following the attack. (
In his Complaint, Aaron claims that WCC is under-staffed and that the under-staffing contributed to his injuries. (Doc. 10, p. 9).
"Mere understaffing, without more, is not proof of an official policy."
Defendants show in an affidavit attached to their Motion for Summary Judgment that the staffing pattern at WCC was done in conjunction with the LA DOC. (Doc. 44, p. 33/46). The Management Services Contract includes a staffing pattern that is specifically approved by the LA DOC. (
Aaron attached a report from the Office of the Inspector General with the U.S. Department of Justice ("DOJ") entitled "Review of the Federal Bureau of Prisons' Monitoring of Contract Prisons" ("DOJ report"). (Doc. 79, p. 203-286). The DOJ report addressed facilities within the Federal Bureau of Prisons ("BOP"), in order to examine how the BOP monitors the facilities. As the study examined federal prisons, not state prisons, none of the prisons studied included WCC.
In addition, Aaron also attached letters between the LA DOC and CCA to his Opposition to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment. (Doc. 79). The WCC letter from January 20, 2015, did discuss turnover rates, and noted that staff members had been temporarily assigned from other CCA locations to supplement the facility staffing. The letter noted that 31 temporary duty employees had been assigned to the facility. (Doc. 79, pp. 17, 20/286). In addition, the letter stated that pay had been increased to assist with retention rates, and a referral bonus had been implemented. (
Aaron has not provided evidence that there was an official policy of understaffing. Aaron has failed to draw a link from the DOJ report on federal prison monitoring to understaffing at WCC. Additionally, although Aaron argues that the letters between the LA DOC and CCA are evidence of understaffing, he needed to have shown that the officials were aware of the staffing problem and failed to take corrective action. The letters show just the opposite: that CCA had brought in temporary duty employees and were attempting to improve work conditions in order to attract and retain staff. Therefore, Aaron has only made conclusory allegations that there was a policy of understaffing WCC, and has failed to show a genuine issue as to this claim. As there are no genuine issues of material fact which preclude a summary judgment, Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment should be granted on the issue of prison staffing.
The doctrine of respondeat superior, which makes an employer or supervisor vicariously liable for an employee's alleged tort, is unavailable in suits under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Aaron has failed to establish that there was any official policy or custom that was the force behind the alleged constitutional violation. Aaron refers to letters between the LA DOC and CCA regarding the need for improvements, or areas in which contract requirements could be an issue. (Doc. 79, p. 13/286). In response, CCA detailed a plan of action addressing those concerns, including making security improvements, such as increasing the number of shakedowns throughout the week, and implementing a plan to address staff turnover rates. (Doc. 79, p. 16-17/286). The DOJ report reflected on BOP monitoring of private contract prisons within the federal system. (Doc. 79, p. 202/286). Aaron states that the evidence proves that Defendants were not personally involved in the events, but that they failed to properly train and supervise employees involved in the constitutional deprivation. (Doc. 79, p. 10/286).
Aaron has not offered any evidence that acts or omissions of Warden Keith or CCA, or any unconstitutional policies implemented by Warden Keith or CCA, have deprived him of his constitutional rights, as he cannot establish an underlying constitutional violation. Aaron may disagree with the medical treatment he received and may believe that Defendants' failed to protect him from attack, but the record is clear that they were not deliberately indifferent to his needs. Furthermore, the letters presented by Aaron indicate that officials were taking corrective action to improve conditions at WCC, as opposed to being deliberately indifferent to its prisoners needs. Since there are no genuine issues of material fact that would preclude a summary judgment in favor of CCA, Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment should be granted in favor of Warden Keith and CCA.
Based on the foregoing, IT IS RECOMMENDED that Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 44) be GRANTED, and that Plaintiff's claims against all Defendants be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
Under the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(c) and Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b), parties aggrieved by this Report and Recommendation have fourteen (14) calendar days from service of this Report and Recommendation to file specific, written objections with the Clerk of Court. A party may respond to another party's objections within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy thereof. No other briefs (such as supplemental objections, reply briefs, etc.) may be filed. Providing a courtesy copy of the objection to the undersigned is neither required nor encouraged. Timely objections will be considered by the District Judge before a final ruling.
Failure to file written objections to the proposed findings, conclusions, and recommendations contained in this Report and Recommendation within fourteen (14) days from the date of its service, or within the time frame authorized by Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(b), shall bar an aggrieved party from attacking either the factual findings or the legal conclusions accepted by the District Judge, except upon grounds of plain error.