ROBERT G. JAMES, Magistrate Judge.
Before the Court is a Motion for Summary Judgment [Doc. No. 20] filed by Defendant Bio-Medical Applications of Louisiana, LLC. Plaintiff Sheneka H. Hatfield opposes the motion. [Doc. No. 28]. For reasons assigned below, the Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED.
In October 2013, Defendant hired Plaintiff to work as a patient care technician ("PCT") at its dialysis clinic in Monroe, Louisiana. As a PCT, Plaintiff was responsible for weighing dialysis patients, helping patients to and from their wheelchairs, periodically recording patients' blood pressure and temperature, connecting patients to dialysis machines, removing patients from the machines, monitoring patients for side effects,
If a patient moves her arm or if a kink develops in the line, the dialysis machine stops and an alarm sounds. PCTs are responsible for restarting the machine; if the machine is not restarted, a clot can form. If a patient stands during treatment or her needle comes out, the patient can bleed to death.
Defendant staffs its clinic with one PCT for every four patients, one registered nurse for every eight patients, one secretary, one social worker, and one clinical manager. The clinical manager was Plaintiff's direct supervisor and worked at the clinic daily. For the majority of Plaintiff's employment with Defendant, Sierra Norwood ("Norwood") was her clinical manager. When Norwood went on maternity leave from approximately April of 2015 to July of 2015, Sherry Scalia ("Scalia") served as Plaintiff's clinical manager. The clinical manager reports to the Director of Operations, Dana Temple ("Temple"), who generally visited the clinic once each month.
In the instant Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that she was "regularly subjected to sexual harassment" from patients while working for Defendant, which created a "sexually charged and hostile work environment." [Doc. No. 1, p. 2]. She alleges that, sometime in 2014, one patient, Patient B, told her he wanted her to "get naked and take care of [him]." [Doc. No. 28-1, p. 2]. She continued working and did not report Patient B's comments. Id.
Plaintiff alleges that another patient, Patient C, asked to "touch [her] bottom" and claimed that he "would have had [her] sprung, back in [his] young days." [Doc. No. 28-3, pp. 6-7]. Plaintiff continued working and did not report the incident.
In March of 2015, according to Plaintiff, another patient, Patient A, attempted to grab Plaintiff's breast, forcing her to evade his reach. Plaintiff reported the alleged incident to Norwood, her clinical manager at the time. Plaintiff claims that she reported the incident again on June 11, 2015, to her then-clinical manager, Scalia, and the Director of Operations, Temple. Plaintiff alleges that, despite her complaints, "no meaningful action was taken. . . ." Id.
On June 4, 2015, Scalia witnessed Plaintiff using her cell phone on the treatment floor, which Defendant prohibits because it presents a safety risk. Scalia instructed Plaintiff to store her phone in her locker. In response, Plaintiff slammed her locker shut, prompting Scalia to call Plaintiff into her office. On June 11, 2015, Scalia and Temple issued Plaintiff a warning for violating the cell phone policy.
On June 16, 2015, Scalia received a complaint from a female patient that Plaintiff did not reset the patient's dialysis machine when necessary, had a hateful attitude when asked for assistance, and failed to assist another patient who needed help. Scalia chose not to discipline Plaintiff because, in part, she thought the incident was isolated.
On June 23, 2015, Scalia received a complaint from Patient A concerning Plaintiff. Patient A stated that he had a cramp in his leg, stood up to alleviate the cramp, and asked Plaintiff to take him off the machine. He complained that Plaintiff had a "snappy attitude," refused to take him off the machine, and told him to get out of her face and sit down. [Doc. Nos. 20-8, 20-9]. Plaintiff, however, disputes Patient A's version of events and alleges that Patient A wagged his tongue, licked his lips in a "sexually overt manner[,]" spoke to her using profane language, and threatened to "have her job." [Doc. No. 28-1, p. 3]. Plaintiff reported the alleged sexual harassment the same day to the social worker at the clinic, Charmaine Winters ("Winters"). Id. at 4.
On June 24, 2015, Scalia reported Patient A's complaint to the Director of Operations, Mia Haney ("Haney"),
On July 2, 2015, Scalia and Temple terminated Plaintiff's employment. Defendant contends it discharged Plaintiff because of Patient A's complaint, the June 16, 2015 complaint from the female patient, and Plaintiff's use of a cell phone on the treatment floor.
Plaintiff initiated the instant proceeding on September 15, 2016, alleging that Defendant violated Title VII and state law by subjecting her to a hostile work environment and by suspending and discharging her in retaliation for reporting Patient A's sexual harassment. [Doc. No. 1].
Defendant moved for summary judgment on September 14, 2017, seeking dismissal of all Plaintiff's claims. [Doc. No. 20]. Plaintiff responded to Defendant's motion on October 5, 2017 [Doc. No. 28], and Defendant replied on October 19, 2017 [Doc. No. 30].
Summary judgment is appropriate when the evidence before a court shows "that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a). A fact is "material" if proof of its existence or nonexistence would affect the outcome of the lawsuit under applicable law in the case. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A dispute about a material fact is "genuine" if the evidence is such that a reasonable fact finder could render a verdict for the nonmoving party. Id.
"[A] party seeking summary judgment always bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of `the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any,' which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986) (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 247). "The moving party may meet its burden to demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact by pointing out that the record contains no support for the non-moving party's claim." Stahl v. Novartis Pharm. Corp., 283 F.3d 254, 263 (5th Cir. 2002). Thereafter, if the non-movant is unable to identify anything in the record to support its claim, summary judgment is appropriate. Id. "The court need consider only the cited materials, but it may consider other materials in the record." FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c)(3).
In evaluating a motion for summary judgment, courts "may not make credibility determinations or weigh the evidence" and "must resolve all ambiguities and draw all permissible inferences in favor of the non-moving party." Total E & P USA Inc. v. Kerr-McGee Oil and Gas Corp., 719 F.3d 424, 434 (5th Cir. 2013) (citations omitted). While courts will "resolve factual controversies in favor of the nonmoving party," an actual controversy exists only "when both parties have submitted evidence of contradictory facts." Little v. Liquid Air. Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1994). To rebut a properly supported motion for summary judgment, the opposing party must show, with "significant probative evidence," that a genuine issue of material fact exists. Hamilton v. Segue Software, Inc., 232 F.3d 473, 477 (5th Cir. 2000) (emphasis added). "`If the evidence is merely colorable, or is not significantly probative,' summary judgment is appropriate." Cutting Underwater Tech. USA, Inc. v. Eni U.S. Operating Co., 671 F.3d 512, 517 (5th Cir. 2012) (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248).
Relatedly, there can be no genuine dispute as to a material fact when a party fails "to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial." Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 322-23. This is true "since a complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party's case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial." Id. at 323.
Title VII forbids employers to take actions on the basis of sex that "discriminate against any individual with respect to [her] compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). "The Supreme Court has held that Title VII proscribes the creation of `a discriminatorily hostile or abusive environment.'" Matherne v. Ruba Mgmt., 624 F. App'x 835, 839 (5th Cir. 2015) (quoting Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993)).
To prevail on a sexual-harassment-based hostile work environment claim, a plaintiff must prove that: (1) she belongs to a protected class; (2) she was subjected to unwelcome harassment; (3) the harassment complained of was based on sex; (4) the harassment complained of was so severe or pervasive that it affected a term, condition, or privilege of employment; and (5) the employer knew or should have known of the harassment in question and failed to take prompt remedial action. Woods v. Delta Beverage Grp., Inc., 274 F.3d 295, 298 (5th Cir. 2001); Wiggins v. St. Luke's Episcopal Health Sys., 517 F. App'x 249, 251 (5th Cir. 2013). "To be actionable, the challenged conduct must be both objectively offensive, meaning that a reasonable person would find it hostile and abusive, and subjectively offensive, meaning that the victim perceived it to be so." Wiggins, 517 F. App'x at 251.
Here, Defendant grounds its motion primarily on the fourth factor, arguing that the alleged harassment did not affect a term, condition, or privilege of Plaintiff's employment. Courts examining this factor look at all the circumstances, including the frequency of the discriminatory conduct, the severity of the conduct, whether it is physically threatening or humiliating or a mere offensive utterance, and whether it unreasonably interferes with the employee's work performance. Id. Title VII does not prohibit "genuine but innocuous differences in the ways men and women routinely interact with members of the same sex and of the opposite sex." Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Svcs. Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 81 (1998).
A recurring point in the Supreme Court's hostile environment cases is that simple teasing, offhand comments, and isolated incidents (unless extremely serious) will not amount to discriminatory changes in the terms and conditions of employment. Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 788 (1998). The standards set forth by the Supreme Court seek to ensure that Title VII does not become a "general civility code." Oncale, 523 U.S. at 80. Properly applied, the standards will filter out complaints attacking "the ordinary tribulations of the workplace, such as the sporadic use of abusive language, gender-related jokes, and occasional teasing." Faragher, 524 U.S. at 788. The conduct, in the end analysis, must be "extreme." Id. at 788.
Here, Plaintiff alleges the following acts of harassment: (1) sometime in 2014, Patient B told her he wanted her to "get naked and take care of [him]"; (2) on an undisclosed date, Patient C asked to "touch [her] bottom" and claimed that he "would have had [her] sprung, back in [his] young days[]"; (3) In March of 2015, Patient A attempted to grab her breast and forced her to evade his grasp; and (4) Patient A wagged his tongue, licked his lips in a "sexually overt manner[,]" spoke to her using profane language, and threatened to "have her job."
Comparing these instances of harassment to instances set forth in cases decided by courts in the Fifth Circuit, and considering all the circumstances, the harassment Plaintiff suffered, even if proved, is not so severe or pervasive that it affected a term, condition, or privilege of Plaintiff's employment.
Plaintiff alleges that Defendant suspended and discharged her because she reported Patient A's sexual harassment. [Doc. No. 1, p. 2]. Under Title VII, "[i]t shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to discriminate against any of his employees . . . because [the employee] has opposed any practice made an unlawful employment practice by [Title VII], or because [the employee] has made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under [Title VII]." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a). To prove retaliation, a Plaintiff must: "set out a prima facie case of retaliation; if the plaintiff sets out a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the defendant to state a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for its action; if the defendant provides such a reason, the plaintiff must prove that it is pretextual." Wiggins, 517 F. App'x at 251-52.
Here, even assuming, without deciding, that Plaintiff establishes a prima facie case of retaliation,
Defendant's first legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for discharging Plaintiff is that, on June 4, 2015, Plaintiff used her cell phone on the treatment floor. [Doc. Nos. 20-4, p. 20; 20-3, p. 28]. Defendant prohibits employees from using cell phones on the treatment floor because it presents a safety risk. [Doc. Nos. 20-3, p. 32; 20-4, p. 21]. Scalia instructed Plaintiff to store her phone in her locker and, in response, Plaintiff slammed her locker shut, prompting Scalia to call Plaintiff into her office. [Doc. No. 20-4, p. 20].
Second, on June 16, 2015, Scalia received a complaint from a female patient that Plaintiff did not reset the patient's dialysis machine when necessary, had a hateful attitude when asked for assistance, and failed to assist another patient who needed help. [Doc. Nos. 20-8, pp. 1, 3; 20-4, pp. 9-11].
Third, on June 23, 2015, Scalia received a complaint from Patient A concerning Plaintiff. Patient A stated that he had a cramp in his leg, stood up to alleviate the cramp, and asked Plaintiff to take him off the machine. [Doc. Nos. 20-4, pp. 12-13; 20-8, pp. 1, 4]. He complained that Plaintiff had a "snappy attitude," refused to take him off the machine, and told him to get out of her face and sit down. [Doc. Nos. 20-8, 20-9]. Chelsea Talley, another PCT, witnessed the incident and confirmed Plaintiff A's complaints. [Doc. No. 20-8, p. 5-6]. According to Temple, refusing to remove a patient from the dialysis machine is tantamount to holding a patient against his will. [Doc. No. 20-6, p. 9].
Plaintiff, however, maintains that Defendant's stated reasons for termination are pretextual. [Doc. No. 28, p. 18]. "To demonstrate pretext and avoid summary judgment, [a plaintiff] must show a conflict in substantial evidence on the question of whether the employer would not have taken the action but for the protected activity." Porter v. Houma Terrebonne Hous. Auth. Bd. of Comm'rs, 810 F.3d 940, 948 (5th Cir. 2015) (internal quotations marks and quoted source omitted) (emphasis added).
Plaintiff does not address the first of Defendant's proffered reasons for termination. See Laxton v. Gap Inc., 333 F.3d 572, 578 (5th Cir. 2003) ("The plaintiff must rebut each nondiscriminatory reason articulated by the employer.") (emphasis added). As to the second reason—the complaint from the female patient—Plaintiff argues that Defendant never informed her that there was a complaint, who the complaining female patient was, or what the patient complained of. That Plaintiff was unaware of the patient's complaint, however, does not necessarily indicate that Defendant did not rely on the complaint as one reason for discharge. Even drawing all inferences in Plaintiff's favor, her ignorance of the complaint is far from substantial evidence of pretext. Moreover, Defendant presents evidence that it did not have an opportunity to advise Plaintiff of the complaint because Plaintiff was not at work for "several days" after the patient lodged the complaint. [Doc. No. 20-4, p. 12].
Next, Plaintiff claims that Defendant's third proffered reason—the encounter with Patient A—is pretextual because Defendant did not properly investigate and confirm Patient A's complaint before terminating Plaintiff. [Doc. No. 28, p. 20]. Specifically, Plaintiff argues that Defendant discharged her without first interviewing a nurse, Kala Parks ("Parks"), who witnessed the incident. Id.
Defendant, however, provides evidence that Scalia did investigate the incident before terminating Plaintiff. Scalia testified that she spoke with Chelsea Talley who, as mentioned, confirmed Patient A's version of events. [Doc. No. 20-4, p. 17]. Temple also testified that Defendant's human resources department investigated the incident. [Doc. No. 30-2, p. 2]. The human resources department spoke with Plaintiff and documented her allegations. [Doc. No. 20-3, p. 90]. All of this suggests that Defendant performed at least a good faith investigation.
Even if Defendant did not interview Parks, the adequacy of Defendant's investigation into only one of the three reasons Defendant provides for discharging Plaintiff does not establish a genuine dispute surrounding pretext. In Medlock v. Ace Cash Exp., Inc., 589 F. App'x 707, 710 (5th Cir. 2014), the Fifth Circuit explicitly held that "evidence of an improper investigation does not establish a discriminatory motive[,]" and "a deficient investigation does not prove pretext for retaliation."
Relatedly, Plaintiff intimates that Defendant's third reason for discharge is pretext because her version of the incident with Patient A is true, and Patient A's version is false. In support, Plaintiff presents Parks' testimony, which tends to corroborate Plaintiff's version of events. [Doc. No. 28-7, p. 3-6]. To recall, though, Chelsea Talley corroborated Patient A's version.
Whether Patient A's complaints concerning Plaintiff are true is, however, irrelevant. De Anda v. St. Joseph's Hosp., 671 F.2d 850, 854, n.6 (5th Cir. 1982) ("Whether [an employer] was wrong in its determination . . . is irrelevant, as long as its belief, though erroneous, was the basis for the termination."). An employer need not be correct in its basis for discharging an employee "to show that its actions were motivated for non-retaliatory reasons." Jones, 793 F.2d at 729. "[T]he validity of the initial complaint is not the central issue, because the ultimate falseness of the complaint proves nothing as to the employer, only as to the complaining employee." Waggoner v. City of Garland, Tex., 987 F.2d 1160, 1165 (5th Cir. 1993).
Rather, "The issue is whether [a defendant's] perception of [an employee's] performance, accurate or not, was the real reason for her termination." Shackelford v. Deloitte & Touche, LLP, 190 F.3d 398, 408 (5th Cir. 1999). "[T]he inquiry is limited to whether the employer believed [the allegations against the employee] in good faith and whether the decision to discharge the employee was based on that belief." Waggoner, 987 F.2d at 1165.
Here, even assuming Defendant mistakenly believed the version of the incident given by Patient A and Chelsea Talley,
Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate a conflict in substantial evidence on the question of whether Defendant would not have suspended or discharged her but for her reports of harassment. Otherwise stated, there is no genuine dispute that Defendant's reasons for termination were pretextual. As demonstrating prextext is an essential element of Plaintiff's claim, Defendant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, and Plaintiff's retaliation claim is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
Plaintiff, as mentioned, alleges a hostile work environment claim and a retaliation claim under state law.
McCoy v. City of Shreveport, 492 F.3d 551, 556 (5th Cir. 2007). Here, because Defendant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on Plaintiff's hostile work environment and retaliation claims under Title VII, Defendant is also entitled to judgment as a matter of law under state law.
For the foregoing reasons, Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED, and Plaintiff's claims are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
