DONALD E. WALTER, District Judge.
Before the Court in this personal injury suit involving a workplace accident is a Motion for Summary Judgment [Doc. #61] filed by Defendant Halcón Resources Corporation ("Halcón Resources"). Pursuant to its motion, Defendant seeks dismissal with prejudice of all claims asserted by pro se Plaintiff Derrick Coleman, on the basis that Defendant had "no involvement in or connection to the well where the alleged incident occurred," and therefore Defendant owed no duty to Plaintiff. Id. Defendant alternatively argues summary judgment is warranted, "because Plaintiff has no evidence to support several of the essential elements of his claims. . . ." Id. For the following reasons, the motion is GRANTED.
Plaintiff filed this negligence suit against Halcón Resources Corporation and Halcón Operating Co., Inc. ("Halcón Operating") for injuries he alleges he incurred in a workplace accident. [Docs. #1, 27]. Plaintiff, a floor hand employed by Pioneer Well Services, LLC ("Pioneer"), was part of a Pioneer crew performing well-completion services on Black Stone Well 4H-2 ("Well"), located at or near Woodville, Mississippi. See Coleman v. Halcon Res. Corp., No. 6:15-CV-2086, 2017 WL 2509151, at *1 (W.D. La. June 7, 2017); see also Doc. 61-2 at ¶¶ 5, 8-9. Pioneer was performing the well-completion services pursuant to a Master Service Contract between Pioneer and Halcón Operating. Id. at 5; see also Doc. 61-2 at ¶ 8. The well was operated by Halcón Operating; it was owned by a third party, HK TMS, LLC.
Plaintiff alleges on July 30, 2014, he was replacing a nut on the wellhead when he slipped and landed on the pointed handle of a needle valve, resulting in bodily injuries. Coleman at *1; see also Doc. #1 at ¶ 8. Following the incident, Plaintiff sought and received medical and indemnity benefits from Pioneer under the Louisiana Workers' Compensation Act ("LWCA"), La. R.S. 23:1020.1, et seq. Id. On July 21, 2015, Plaintiff filed this suit against Halcón Resources and Halcón Operating, seeking general tort damages for negligence. [Doc. #1].
After suit was filed, Halcón Resources and Halcón Operating filed a Motion for Summary Judgment [Doc. #36] seeking dismissal with prejudice of all claims asserted by Plaintiff, arguing Plaintiff was the statutory employee of both defendants at the time of the incident sued upon, and therefore movants were immune from suit in tort under Louisiana law. Coleman at *1. On June 7, 2017, the Court granted summary judgment in favor of Halcón Operating, finding it was Plaintiff's statutory employer under the Louisiana Workers' Compensation Act ("LWCA") by virtue of the Master Service Contract between Pioneer and Halcón Operating, and therefore Halcón Operating was immune from tort liability as a matter of law. Id. at *5-7. The Court denied summary judgment with regard to Halcón Resources, finding that entity was "not entitled to statutory employer status under the LWCA," as the Master Service Contract between Pioneer and Halcón Operating contained "no language extending statutory employer status to Halcón Resources. . . ."
Defendant Halcón Resources now seeks dismissal with prejudice of all claims asserted by Plaintiff, arguing it had no involvement in or connection to the well where Plaintiff alleges he was injured, and therefore it owed no duty to Plaintiff. Alternatively, Defendant argues summary judgment is warranted, because "Plaintiff has no evidence to support several of the essential elements of his claims. . . ." [Doc. 61]. The following facts are not in dispute
[Doc. #61-2 at 1-4 (footnotes omitted)]
"A party may move for summary judgment, identifying each claim or defense — or the part of each claim or defense — on which summary judgment is sought." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). "The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Id. "A genuine issue of material fact exists when the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving party." Quality Infusion Care, Inc. v. Health Care Service Corp., 628 F.3d 725, 728 (5
As summarized by the Fifth Circuit:
Lindsey v. Sears Roebuck and Co., 16 F.3d 616, 618 (5
When reviewing evidence in connection with a motion for summary judgment, "the court must disregard all evidence favorable to the moving party that the jury is not required to believe, and should give credence to the evidence favoring the nonmoving party as well as that evidence supporting the moving party that is uncontradicted and unimpeached." Roberts v. Cardinal Servs., 266 F.3d 368, 373 (5
In a negligence cause of action decided under Louisiana substantive law, "[t]he duty-risk analysis is the standard negligence analysis employed in determining whether to impose liability."
Lemann at 633. The failure to prove any one of these elements results in a determination of no liability. Id.
"A duty, in negligence cases, may be defined as an obligation, to which the law will give recognition and effect, to conform to a particular standard of conduct toward another." Morris v. Orleans Parish School Bd., 553 So.2d 427, 429 (La.1989) (quoting Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts (5
Lemann at 633.
Defendant contends it owed no duty to Plaintiff, and therefore summary judgment in its favor is warranted. [Doc. #61-1 at 1]. According to Defendant, it owed no duty to Plaintiff "because it had absolutely no involvement in, or connection to, the facts giving rise to Plaintiff's claims in this lawsuit," based on the undisputed facts set forth above. [Doc. #61-1 at 13]. In opposition, while Plaintiff "concede[s] that technically Halcón Resources, Halcón Operating and HK TMS, LLC are separate entities," he nevertheless argues, "this should not release Halcón Resources from liability as it had substantial connections to and did, in fact, own, operate, supervise, and control everything at the well site." [Doc. #64 at 1]. In support, Plaintiff submits the following documents: (1) two corporate press releases issued in 2014 by Halcón Resources, Id. at 3-14; (2) Halcón Resources' Rule 26(a) Initial Disclosures, Id. at 15-22; (3) a document entitled "First Report of Injury," addressing Plaintiff's accident, Id. at 23; (4) the Declaration of Tim McDonald, Director of Risk Management for Halcón Resources, Id. at 24-25; (5) various documents from the Oil & Gas Board for the State of Mississippi, Id. at 26-28; and (6) a Certificate of Liability Insurance procured by Pioneer (i.e., the "Insured") in accordance with the Master Service Agreement between Halcón Operating and Pioneer, Id. at 29-30.
With regard to the press releases, Plaintiff notes:
[Doc. 64 at 1-2 (footnotes omitted)].
In response, Defendant argues the press releases "constitute inadmissible hearsay under Rule 801 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, et seq.," and that the press releases have not been properly identified or authenticated, as required by Fed. R. Evid. 901.
Plaintiff submits the Rule 26(a) Initial Disclosures provided by Halcón Resources and Halcón Operating, alleging through these disclosures, "Halcón Resources admits that at least 8 employees identified were employees of either Halcón Resources or Halcón Operating, and that those employees would have knowledge of relevant facts concerning the accident." [Doc. #64 at 2]. Defendant contends Rule 26(a) disclosures are not proper summary judgment evidence. The Court finds the Rule 26(a) disclosures submitted by Plaintiff in this matter have no bearing on whether Halcón Resources owed a duty to Plaintiff. These disclosures contain only the names and contact information "of each individual likely to have discoverable information — along with the subjects of that information — that [Halcón Resources and/or Halcón Operating] may use to support [their] claims or defenses." Id. at 15; see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1)(i). This information is neither evidence nor facts, but rather is merely a disclosure designed to put the opposing party on notice of potential witnesses.
As to the document entitled "First Report of Injury," Defendant contends it is inadmissible hearsay because it does "not satisfy the requirements of a business record within the scope of Rule 803(6) of the Federal Rules of Evidence," and because it has not been properly authenticated pursuant to Fed. R. Evid. 901(a). [Doc. #71 at 3-4] Assuming for present purposes that this document would be admissible at trial, the report contains no substantive information linking Halcón Resources to the Well or the incident sued upon. Indeed, the only connection between the report and Halcón Resources appears to be that Halcón Resources' logo appears at the top of the form. However, nothing in that document provides evidence of a duty on behalf of Halcón Resources to Plaintiff, a breach of duty, or causation. Accordingly, the Court finds this document is insufficient to support Plaintiff's claims against Halcón Resources.
Plaintiff submits the Declaration of Tim McDonald, Director of Risk Management for Halcón Resources, and notes McDonald "identifie[s] himself as an employee of Halcon Resources, not Halcon Operating." [Doc. #64 at 2]. This Declaration was previously submitted by Halcón Resources and Halcón Operating in connection with their prior motion for summary judgment, for the purpose of authenticating certain documents submitted in connection with that motion. [See Doc. #36-5 at 1-2]. Other than confirming Halcón Operating is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Halcón Resources, and that Pioneer performed work on the Well pursuant to the Master Service Contract between Halcón Operating and Pioneer, there is nothing in the Declaration showing Halcón Resources had any connection to the Well or Plaintiff's accident. As such, the Court finds this document has no bearing on whether Halcón Resources owed a duty to Plaintiff, whether Halcón Resources breached any alleged duty, or causation.
Plaintiff submits various documents from the Oil & Gas Board for the State of Mississippi, noting, "Interestingly, Halcon Resources is identified in various filings associated with acquiring a permit from the State of Mississippi." [Doc. #64 at 2]. Defendant argues these documents constitute inadmissible hearsay, "because Plaintiff has failed to satisfy the requirements for a public record under Rule 803(8) of the Federal Rules of Evidence," and because Plaintiff has failed to properly authenticate these documents pursuant to Fed. R. Evid. 901(a).
Finally, Plaintiff submits a Certificate of Liability Insurance procured by Pioneer (i.e., the "Insured") in accordance with the Master Service Agreement between Halcón Operating and Pioneer. The Master Service Agreement required Pioneer to obtain various types of insurance naming the "Company Group (as defined in the Contract) as additional insureds." [Doc. #36-5 at 15 (emphasis omitted)]. The Master Service Agreement defines "Company Group" in pertinent part as Halcón Operating, "its parent, subsidiaries, [and] affiliated companies. . . ." Id. at 3, 5; see also Coleman at 8. Defendant argues this document constitutes inadmissible hearsay, as it does "not satisfy the requirements of a business record within the scope of Rule 803(6) of the Federal Rules of Evidence," and it is not properly identified or authenticated in conformity with Fed. R. Evid. 901(a). [Doc. #71 at 3-4]. Assuming this document would be properly admissible at trial, it has no bearing on the accident sued upon other than to show Halcón Resources is named as an additional insured on certain insurance policies issued to Pioneer.
In sum, even assuming the exhibits tendered by Plaintiff are capable of being presented in a form that would be admissible in evidence at trial, Plaintiff has failed to articulate the precise manner in which these exhibits support his claims. Specifically, Plaintiff has failed to point to evidence in the record showing Halcón Resources had sufficient involvement in the activities at the Well such that Halcón Resources owed a duty to Plaintiff. Further, even assuming Halcón Resources did owe a duty to Plaintiff, Plaintiff has failed to point to any evidence in the record showing Halcón Resources breached its duty, or that its breach was the cause in fact of Plaintiff's injuries. To the extent Plaintiff contends Halcón Resources' status as the parent corporation of Halcón Operating gives rise to such a duty, the Court finds that argument fails. "A bedrock principle of corporate law is that `a parent corporation . . . is not liable' for actions taken by its subsidiaries."
For the reasons set forth above, the Motion for Summary Judgment [Doc. 61] submitted by Halcón Resources is
